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“All great insights and discoveries are not only usually thought by several people
at the same time, they must also be re-thought in that unique effort to truly say the
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Almost one hundred years after the birth of Quantum Mechanics, the relation in
which it stands to Classical Mechanics is still not completely well understood. The
problem can take several forms: for instance, one may start with the classical descrip-
tion of some given system and then attempt to generate the corresponding quantum
description; on the other hand, one may as well decide to start with the quantum
description of a system and then try to recover, through some controlled limiting pro-
cedure, a classical description. The former is called the problem of quantization; the
latter is the problem of the classical limit. But, on top of these questions, which inves-
tigate the possible transitions between both theories, it is also possible to be interested
in detecting the core ideas which distinguish the Quantum from the Classical. This last
question—which is the question of this dissertation—seems simpler to address; yet, it
is a subtle matter.
One cannot expect to have an acute understanding of the differences between
Classical and Quantum Mechanics without a thorough analysis of the mathematics
underlying both theories. Klaas Landsman, whose many writings are an invaluable
reading for anyone interested in such questions, emphasizes the importance of mathe-
matical rigor to achieve conceptual clarity:
[...] the problem [of the relation between classical and quantum physics] is so
delicate that in this area sloppy mathematics is almost guaranteed to lead to
unreliable physics and conceptual confusion.1
1N. P. Landsman. “Between Classical and Quantum”. In: Philosophy of Physics (Handbook of
the Philosophy of Science) 2 volume set. Ed. by J. Butterfield and J. Earman. Vol. 1. Amsterdam:
1
2 Introduction
This thesis belongs to the field of Foundations of Physics, and, more specifically,
of Foundations of Mechanics. This is not to say that its goal is to find the logical
structure and the first principles upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests. Rather,
the characteristic task of the foundations I wish to practice is the clarification of the
conceptual content of a physical theory, and its means is the discussion of precise
technical results. In style, it is closer to the idea described by the mathematician
William Lawvere:
A foundation makes explicit the essential general features, ingredients, and op-
erations of a science, as well as its origins and general laws of development. The
purpose of making these explicit is to provide a guide to the learning, use, and
further development of the science. A ‘pure’ foundation that forgets this purpose
and pursues a speculative ‘foundation’ for its own sake is clearly a nonfounda-
tion.2
The object of true wonder that launches our investigation is the role symplectic ge-
ometry has come to play in the formulation of Mechanics. Although one may argue that
symplectic geometry has been present in Classical Mechanics since the seminal work of
Joseph-Louis Lagrange at the beginning of the 19th century3, it is undeniable that the
subject has had to wait another hundred and fifty years before acquiring the importance
it has today. For in the last fifty years, through the works of, first, Vladimir Arnold,
Bertram Kostant and Jean-Marie Souriau, and, afterwards, Victor Guillemin, Jerrold
Marsden, Shlomo Sternberg and Alan Weinstein—to name just a few—, symplectic
geometry has become an indispensable ingredient in the contemporary understanding
of Mechanics. The situation is such that it allows Patrick Iglesias-Zemmour, one of the
leading specialists in the subject, to declare:
Symplectic geometry has become the framework per se of mechanics, up to the
North-Holland Publishing Co., 2007, pp. 417–554. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0506082,
p. 418.
2F. W. Lawvere and R. Rosebrugh. Sets for Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003, p. 235.
3For a short study (in French) on the origins of symplectic geometry, see P. Iglesias-Zemmour.
Aperçu des origines de la géométrie symplectique. Actes du colloque “Histoire des géométries”, vol. 1.
2004.
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point one may claim today that these two theories are the same. Symplectic
geometry is not just the language of mechanics, it is its essence and its matter.4
Now, whenever a new tool acquires such an importance in a large field, it should
be expected that not only does this tool constitute a leap forward in the solution
of technical problems, but, moreover, that it highlights ideas which were previously
unnoticed and that it brings about new ways of structuring the field. This motto, which
is at the core of the “philosophical history” that Timmermans tries to develop in his
beautiful book Histoire philosophique de l’algèbre moderne – Les origines romantiques
de la pensée abstraite5, is also the main methodological premise of this work.
It is my opinion that the collective efforts undertaken to investigate the conceptual
lessons to be drawn from the ‘symplectic-geometrization’ of Mechanics have still to
match the tremendous impact this has had on the development of Mechanics itself. In
the course of the last century, there have been numerous attempts to capture ever more
precisely some of the fundamental features distinguishing the quantum world. Perhaps
the two most widely discussed traits are entanglement and the state reduction: the first
deals with the description of composite systems and expresses the fact that a state of
a composite system may not always be decomposed into states of the various parts6;
the second regards the dynamics of physical systems and is meant to encapsulate the
fundamental influence of the measurement process on the time evolution of a system.
But in most cases these analyses rely upon a careful examination of the mathematical
formulations of Quantum Mechanics. Seldom has it been the case that the novelties
4“La géométrie symplectique est devenue le cadre par excellence de la mécanique à tel point que
l’on peut dire aujourd’hui que ces théories se confondent. La géométrie n’est pas seulement le langage
de la mécanique, elle en est l’essence et la matière.” (Ibid., p. 2.)
5Timmermans’ exact formulation is: “Lorsqu’un nouvel outil prend ainsi autant d’importance dans
un large domaine [...], on s’attend à ce qu’il n’apporte pas seulement des recettes permettant de régler
des questions, mais qu’il détermine aussi des façons nouvelles de poser les problèmes, d’envisager le
monde.” (Whenever a new tool thus acquires such an importance in a large field, it should be expected
that not only does this tool bring about new recipes enabling to solve questions, but, moreover, that
it also determines new ways of formulating problems, of looking at the world.) B. Timmermans.
Histoire philosophique de l’algèbre moderne – Les origines romantiques de la pensée abstraite. Paris:
Classiques Garnier, 2012, p. 10.
6More precisely, given physical systems R and S with space of states R and S, it is not the case,
in quantum mechanics, that the space of states R
S of the composite system R t S is the cartesian
product RS. This means that, unlike in classical mechanics, a state of R t S cannot in general be
thought as a pair (r; s) with r 2 R and s 2 S.
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introduced by this theory into our conception of Mechanics have been examined under
the light of the aforementioned developments in the foundations of Classical Mechanics.
The present thesis is an attempt to push into that direction of research.
The broad goal is therefore to compare Classical and Quantum Mechanics by fo-
cusing as much as possible on the concepts highlighted by symplectic geometry. In
the midst of the dominant narrative that smugly exclaims over the ‘extraordinary’
differences between Classical and Quantum Mechanics, symplectic geometry acts as
a powerful countercurrent. For indeed, if there is one lesson to take from this ge-
ometrization of Mechanics, it is the impressive merger of the two Mechanics. In the
setting offered by symplectic manifolds, Poisson algebras, Hamiltonian vector fields
and all the surrounding machinery, one clearly realizes how much these two theories
actually share. By the same token, precisely because it offers a common ground in
which to discuss both theories, symplectic geometry allows to pinpoint some of the
most fundamental differences between the Classical and the Quantum.
One example of this coming closer together is the treatment of the equations






where H is the hermitian operator representing the Hamiltonian and 	, the wavefunc-
tion, denotes a (normed) element of the Hilbert space. (1) is almost systematically
perceived as a breakaway from Classical Mechanics. However, through the work of
Werner Heisenberg, whose emphasis was on the time-evolution of observables rather
than states, and Paul Dirac, who emphasized the role of the Hamiltonian formulation
of Classical Mechanics, the equations of motion of Classical and Quantum Mechanics
were very early shown to be similar in their form. Indeed, Schrödinger’s equation could




=  [H;F (t)]; (2)
where F is any hermitian operator and [; ] denotes the commutator, not without
reminding Hamilton’s classical equations for the time-evolution of an observable
df(t)
dt
= fh; fg; (3)
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where f is now any smooth real-valued function over the space of states of the classical
system and f; g denotes the Poisson bracket. Despite this, it was only with the
increasing interest for the geometry underlying Classical Mechanics, and the remark
that both the space of states of a classical system and the (projective) Hilbert spaces
used in QuantumMechanics were examples of symplectic manifolds, that it was realized





; ) = dh; (4)
where ! is the symplectic 2-form7.
With the discovery that the time-evolution of any physical system, be it classical
or quantum, is governed by the same very simple geometrical equation, one barely
begins to scratch the surface of the situation. At the heart of the symplectic geo-
metric formulation of Mechanics lies the idea that physical properties are tied in an
essential way to state transformations. For some particular physical properties, this
idea has been for long included in the folklore of theoretical physics—for instance by
regarding angular momentum as the generator of spatial rotations. Nonetheless, that
a completely general property–transformation link may constitute a key feature in the
conceptual interpretation of both Classical and Quantum Mechanics has remain some-
how dormant. This is to be contrasted with the endless efforts to accommodate the
quantum theory, despite such no-go theorems as the famous Kochen-Specker, to the
prevalent conception of properties as quantities, which stresses their numerical char-
acter and so smoothly appears to fit the classical formalism. Through the geometric
formulation, one clearly perceives the importance of these two aspects of physical prop-
erties, and understanding the articulation between properties-as-transformations and
properties-as-quantities in the Classical and the Quantum becomes a central issue of
our analysis.
This last point is of purely kinematical nature. In the contemporary usage, the
‘kinematical description’ of a physical system has come to signify a characterization of
7For the precise derivation of this, see N. P. Landsman. Mathematical Topics Between Classical
and Quantum Mechanics. New York: Springer, 1998, pp. 71–76, and in particular the comment
preceding equation (2.39). See also Chapter II of the present work.
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the algebra of observables and of the space of all possible states in which a system may
be found. In the light of equation (4), the complete mechanical picture involves, in
addition to the kinematical description, choosing a preferred observable (which is then
regarded as the Hamiltonian of the system) and writing explicitly the flows generated
by it on the space of states. In Quantum Mechanics, one also needs to postulate a
second dynamical process that covers the state reduction or wavefunction collapse8. In
this work, the choice is made to circumscribe our comparison of Classical and Quan-
tum Mechanics to the most basic kinematical level, thus ignoring all interpretational
problems related to Dynamics and, in particular, the measurement problem. From
Schrödinger’s cat9 to Bell’s “and/or” objection10, the measurement problem has been
the focus of much attention in the philosophy of physics—and rightly so: no satis-
factory understanding of Quantum Mechanics can avoid addressing this issue—but,
as a consequence, it has overshadowed the important conceptual differences between
Classical and Quantum Kinematics. After all, one should not forget the major role of
purely kinematical considerations in Heisenberg’s breakthrough11.
Moreover, the concept of a ‘kinematical description of a physical system’ furnishes
us with a perspective from which to question the mathematical formalisms of Classi-
cal and Quantum Kinematics. Abstract symplectic manifolds and abstract projective
Hilbert spaces are, in a sense to be rendered precise later, homogeneous—it is impossi-
ble to differentiate their points. This evidently clashes with the idea that one should be
8Roger Penrose calls these two different evolutions of Quantum Mechanics the U-quantum pro-
cedure (which is governed by the Schrödinger equation and is hence unitary) and the R-quantum
procedure (which is governed by the state reduction postulate and is hence non-unitary). See R.
Penrose. The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2005, Chapter 22.
9E. Schrödinger. “Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik”. In: Naturwissenschaften
23.48 (1935), pp. 807–812 (English translation: E. Schrödinger. “The Present Situation in Quantum
Mechanics”. Trans. by J. D. Trimmer. In: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 124.5
(1980), pp. 323–338).
10J. S. Bell. “Against ‘measurement’”. In: 62 Years of Uncertainty: Erice, 5-14 August 1989.
Plenum Publishers, 1990. (Reprinted in: J. S. Bell. Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics.
2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 213–231).
11W. Heisenberg. “Über quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer
Beziehungen”. In: Zeitschrift für Physik 33 (1925), pp. 879–893 (English translation: W. Heisen-
berg. “Quantum-theoretical Re-interpretation of Kinematic and Mechanical Relations”. In: Sources
of Quantum Mechanics. Ed. by B. Van der Waerden. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967,
pp. 261–276).
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able to distinguish states of a physical system by means of physical properties. Thus,
when such homogeneous mathematical structures are taken as the starting points in
the kinematical descriptions, there must inevitably be a constitution of a labelling
scheme which allows to identify each particular state and each specific property of the
physical system being described. The progressive constitution of this labelling scheme
within the mathematical frameworks of Classical and Quantum Kinematics is what I
have wished to call the Chase for Individuation which gives the title to this work.
Hence, two main themes pervade throughout the dissertation and determine its
structure:
1) Thinking the difference between Classical and Quantum Kinematics through the
looking glass of symplectic geometry and, in particular, through the double role
of physical properties;
2) Looking for the techniques, explicitly or implicitly at work in the mathematics of
Kinematics, which break the homogeneity of the initially given abstract structures
and help constituting a labelling scheme for states and properties.
Chapter I is a detailed discussion of the conceptual background in which the ‘Chase
for Individuation’ is to be understood. We will argue that, in practice, the mathemat-
ical objects involved in the kinematical description of a physical system are abstract
structures. For this, we will look at the example of how a unified framework for Quan-
tum Mechanics was brought out from Göttingen’s Matrix Mechanics and Schrödinger’s
Wave Mechanics. Then, we will try to elucidate the notion of an ‘abstract mathematical
structure’, first by addressing the question of what it means for a mathematical object
to be conceived ‘abstractly’—making heavy use, in particular, of Jean-Pierre Marquis’
account of the abstract method—, and then by discussing mathematical structuralism
as developed by Stewart Shapiro and James Ladyman among others. Only in this
setting will it become clear in which sense one can say that the elements of a sym-
plectic manifold or a projective Hilbert space are indiscernible. The second and third
sections of this first chapter are therefore close in style and matter to the philosophy
of mathematics.
In Chapter II, the proper conceptual analysis of the mathematical structures used
in Classical and Quantum Kinematics begins. From then on, the style becomes closer
8 Introduction
to that of mathematical physics: although there is no question of proving theorems,
an effort is made to give the exact technical definition of all the new elements that
are introduced. Again, the combination of mathematical analysis and conceptual syn-
thesis is crucial. In this chapter, we deal only with the kinematical arenas—that is,
with the homogeneous structures which are taken as a starting point in the kinematical
description of classical and quantum systems, and where no labelling scheme is still
present—and we investigate the articulation between the transformational and the
quantitative role of properties. This investigation is performed within three different
frameworks: first, the standard kinematical formulation which uses symplectic mani-
folds for Classical Mechanics and Hilbert spaces for Quantum Mechanics; second, the
geometric formulation which emphasizes the notion of ‘state’ and develops Quantum
Mechanics in terms of Hermitian symmetric spaces; and third, the algebraic formu-
lation which emphasizes the notion of ‘property’ and develops the theory in terms of
Jordan-Lie-Banach algebras.
The first two chapters are almost completely independent from each other. From
the perspective of the narrative offered by the ‘Chase for Individuation’ (question 2
above), Chapter II is perhaps an unnecessarily lengthy preparation. However, with
regard to the conceptual comparison of Classical and Quantum Kinematics (question
1 above), it surely is the central part of the dissertation. On the other hand, the third
and final chapter cannot be understood without the preceding two. Therein, we finally
investigate how Lie groups, and their infinitesimal versions Lie algebras, are used to
introduce a notion of difference within both kinematical arenas, breaking in this way
the homogeneity of the initial mathematical structures and providing a sketch of a
labelling scheme. This approach—which is in sharp contrast with the traditional view
on groups as implementing symmetries, and hence a notion of ‘sameness’—illuminates
in a new way the role of groups in the mathematics of Mechanics.
By the mathematical notions it deals with—symplectic manifolds, of course, but
also (strongly) Hamiltonian actions and the momentum map, C-algebras and Jordan-
Lie algebras, Hermitian symmetric spaces, Poisson spaces with a transition probability,
etc.—, the detailed mathematical level to which these notions are discussed and the
questions it asks, this work is an unconventional one for the philosophy of physics. But
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all these recent developments and all these new mathematical formulations show ‘basic’
Kinematics to be, in fact, a vast and complex territory which ought to be explored once
and again, thought and “re-thought in that unique effort to truly say the same thing
about the same thing”12. The promenade taken here is resolutely against the idea
of there being ‘technicalities’—supposedly small and harmless mathematical details,
important for the correct statement of a theorem or the smooth rolling out of a proof,
but insignificant from a conceptual standpoint. In general, ‘technicalities’ are perceived
as such only because of the failure to find the approach from which their true role and
meaning is exposed. Finally, it tries to carry as few preconceptions as possible, striving
to listen to what these formalisms are expressing instead of attempting to include them
in some prefabricated interpretational framework. In this, I am strongly influenced by
the words Alexander Grothendieck once wrote:
One cannot ‘invent’ the structure of an object. The most we can do is to patiently
bring it to the light of day, with humility—in making it known, it is ‘discovered’.
If there is some sort of inventiveness in this work, and if it happens that we
find ourselves the maker or indefatigable builder, we are in no sense ‘making’
or ’building’ these ‘structures’. They have not waited for us to find them in
order to exist, exactly as they are! But it is in order to express, as faithfully
as possible, the things that we have been detecting or discovering, the reticent
structure which we are trying to grasp at, perhaps with a language no better
than babbling. Thereby are we constantly driven to ‘invent’ the language most
appropriate to express, with increasing refinement, the intimate structure of the
mathematical object, and to ‘construct’ with the help of this language, bit by bit,
those ‘theories’ which claim to give a fair account of what has been apprehended
and seen. There is a continual coming and going, uninterrupted, between the
apprehension of things, and the means of expressing them by a language in
constant state improvement [...].
12M. Heidegger. What is a Thing? Trans. by W. B. Barton and V. Deutsch. Indiana: Gateway
Editions, Ltd., 1967, p. 80.
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The sole thing that constitutes the true inventiveness and imagination of
the researcher is the quality of his attention as he listens to the voices of things.13
13“La structure d’une chose n’est nullement une chose que nous puissions “inventer”. Nous pouvons
seulement la mettre à jour patiemment, humblement en faire connaissance, la “découvrir”. S’il y a
inventivité dans ce travail, et s’il nous arrive de faire œuvre de forgeron ou d’infatigable bâtisseur, ce
n’est nullement pour “façonner”, ou pour “bâtir”, des “structures”. Celles-ci ne nous ont nullement
attendues pour être, et pour être exactement ce qu’elles sont ! Mais c’est pour exprimer, le plus
fidèlement que nous le pouvons, ces choses que nous sommes en train de découvrir et de sonder, et cette
structure réticente à se livrer, que nous essayons à tâtons, et par un langage encore balbutiant peut-
être, à cerner. Ainsi sommes-nous amenés à constamment “inventer” le langage apte à exprimer
de plus en plus finement la structure intime de la chose mathématique, et à “construire” à l’aide de
ce langage, au fur et à mesure et de toutes pièces, les “théories” qui sont censées rendre compte de
ce qui a été appréhendé et vu. Il y a là un mouvement de va-et-vient continuel, ininterrompu, entre
l’appréhension des choses, et l’expression de ce qui est appréhendé, par un langage qui s’affine et
se re-crée au fil du travail, [...].
Ce qui fait la qualité de l’inventivité et de l’imagination du chercheur, c’est la qualité de son
attention, à l’écoute de la voix des choses.”
(A. Grothendieck. Récoltes et semailles – Réflexions et témoignage sur un passé de mathématicien.
1985, 2.9. Forme et structure - ou la voie des choses. Bold typeface is Grothendieck’s. Partial





In the practice of theoretical and mathematical physics, it has become customary
to consider general assignments which, to any given physical system S of a certain type
Tphys (e.g., non-relativistic systems with finitely-many degrees of freedom), associate
a particular mathematical object D(S) of type Tmath. In general, the object D(S) is
intended to describe the physical system in some way and the map D : Tphys  ! Tmath
is accordingly called the mathematical description of a generic physical system (of the
type Tphys).
This is particularly salient in the foundations of quantization where the main
problem could roughly be stated as follows: given the classical description DC(S) of
a physical system S, can we construct its corresponding quantum description DQ(S)?
In the early stages of the quantum theory, this problem was addressed separately for
each particular system which was of interest at the time, and advances towards the
solution were the result of great heuristic physical insights. A paradigmatic example
of this situation is Bohr’s quantum model of the hydrogen atom of 19131. However,
1N. Bohr. “On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules”. In: Philosophical Magazine 26.151
(1913), pp. 1–25. (Reprinted in: N. Bohr. Collected Works. Ed. by U. Hoyer. Vol. 2. Amsterdam:
Elsevier, 2008, pp. 161–185); N. Bohr. “On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules (Part II)”. in:
Philosophical Magazine 26.153 (1913), pp. 476–502. (Reprinted in: N. Bohr. Collected Works. Ed. by
U. Hoyer. Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 188–214).
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with the progressive development of the mathematical foundations of Classical and
QuantumMechanics, the situation changed and it became possible to attempt to regard
quantization as a systematic procedure which could be applied to any physical system
whose classical description was known. The important point here is that this all-
encompassing conception of quantization as a systematic procedure is not possible if
there is not, moreover, a definition of general assignments DC and DQ which associate
to any physical system S of the type Tphys its classical and quantum descriptions
DC(S) and DQ(S). Schematically, the perspective on quantization evolved from the
conception of a single assignment
DC(S) DQ(S)QS
where the method of quantization QS strongly depended on the particular system S









which covers at once the quantization of all the different physical systems S of the type
Tphys.
In this setting, the general mathematical problem of quantization is thus: given
the maps DC and DQ, to construct a map Q such that the diagram (I.1) commutes.
The choice of the mathematical objects constituting TCMmath and TQMmath may vary slightly
between different approaches to quantization. For example, in his great textbook on
geometric quantization, Nick Woodhouse writes:
The first problem of quantization concerns the kinematic relationship between the
classical and quantum domains. At the quantum level, the states of a physical
system are represented by the rays in a Hilbert space H and the observables
by a collection O of symmetric operators on H, while in the limiting classical
description, the state space is a symplectic manifold (M;!) and the observables
are the smooth functions on M . The kinematic problem is: given M and !, is it
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possible to reconstruct H and O?2
According to this account, in geometric quantization TCMmath would then be the type
of symplectic manifolds, whereas TQMmath would be the type of pairs (H;O) of Hilbert
spaces with collections of symmetric operators. Another example is the so-called “strict
deformation quantization”: therein, the mathematical problem of quantization is casted
in the language of real Poisson algebras (which form TCMmath) and C-algebras (which
form TQMmath)3. Of course, deformation quantization and geometric quantization are
closely related to each other since the smooth real-valued functions over a symplectic
manifold form a Poisson algebra, and bounded operators over a Hilbert space form a
C-algebra4.
Now, the idea of considering assignments D : Tphys  ! Tmath does not appear
solely in the discussion of quantization: it is explicitly or implicitly present in many
works on the foundations of Mechanics. In the present chapter, our primary interest will
lie on this notion of ‘mathematical description of a generic physical system’. Because
of this, let me list a few other places where this idea shows up:
a) In Eduard Prugovec̆ki’s textbook Quantum Mechanics in Hilbert Space:
[:::] we associate a Hilbert space with any given system which we intend to
describe quantum mechanically. For instance [...], if the systems consists
of n particles, which are of different kinds, without spin and moving in
three dimensions, then [...] we associate with that system the Hilbert space
L2(R3n).
Let us assume now that we are dealing with a particular quantum mechanical
problem in which a certain system has been specified (e.g., a hydrogren
atom) and with which a certain Hilbert space H is associated (e.g., L2(R6)).
It is then postulated that to each observable corresponds in the formalism
2N. Woodhouse. Geometric Quantization. 2nd. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 155.
3See for example M. A. Rieffel. “Deformation Quantization and Operator Algebras”. In: Proceed-
ings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics 51 (1990), pp. 411–423.
4See Chapter II for the precise definition of all these structures (symplectic manifolds, Poisson
algebras, C-algebras).
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a unique self-adjoint operator acting on H [...].5
b) In Abraham and Marsden’s Foundations of Mechanics:
A (simple) mechanical system with symmetry is a quadruple (M;K;V;G)
where:
i. M is a Riemannian manifold [...] called the configuration space [...].
ii. K 2 F(T M) is the kinetic energy of the system [...].
iii. V 2 F(M) is the potential energy.
iv. G is a connected Lie group acting on M [...].6
c) In Carlo Rovelli’s monograph Quantum Gravity:
A [classical] dynamical system is determined by a triple ( 0; !0;H0), where
 0 is a manifold, !0 is a symplectic two-form and H0 is a function on  0.
[...]
A [classical] dynamical system is thus completely defined by a presymplectic
space (; !). [...]
A given quantum system is defined by a family (generally an algebra) of
operators Ai, including H0 [the Hamiltonian operator corresponding to the
energy], defined over an Hilbert space H0.7
And the examples could be multiplied ad infinitum...
The first important question regarding this notion is to understand its purpose:
What information about the physical system S do we expect to capture through its
mathematical description D(S)? Put differently, given the knowledge of D(S), how
much ambiguity do we expect to have about the system S being thus handled? This
question may be easily translated into a more precise one in the following fashion:
given a certain choice of a map D : Tphys  ! Tmath, define the equivalence relation
“two systems S and S 0 of type Tphys are D–equivalent, denoted by S D S
0, if and only
if D(S) and D(S 0) are equal”, and call Tphys
.
D the collection of all such equivalence
5E. Prugovec̆ki. Quantum Mechanics in Hilbert Space. 2nd ed. New York: Academic Press, 1981,
p. 258.
6R. Abraham and J. E. Marsden. Foundations of Mechanics. 2nd ed. Redwood City: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, 1978, p. 341.
7C. Rovelli. Quantum Gravity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 100, 101, 165.
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classes. The above question wishes to understand the difference between D–equivalence




If taken literally, the language of some authors suggest quite an ambitious view
on the power of these mathematical descriptions. Thus, when Rovelli writes that a
dynamical system is “determined” or “completely defined” by the mathematical object
D(S), he seems to claim that the data of D(S) fully and unambiguously characterizes
the system S. According to this reading, if a physicist is given the mathematical
description of a given physical system and nothing else, he will nonetheless be able to
recognize which physical system is being described. Let me call this view the descriptive
perspective towards the mathematical description of a physical system. It is defined by
the wish of constructing a map D : Tphys  ! Tmath such that any difference between
two physical systems is reflected in their respective mathematical descriptions. In other
words, it demands the following faithfulness requirement:
Faithfulness requirement (descriptive perspective): consider two
physical systems S and S 0 of type Tphys described by the mathematical
objects D(S) and D(S 0) of type Tmath. We must have:
D(S) =M D(S 0) if and only if S =P S 0:
Of course, this is tantamount to requiring the map D to be injective. But it seems
preferable to write the condition explicitly: the two different signs of equality, =M and
=P , are there to stress that we are in fact dealing with two different criteria of identity,
one for physical systems of the type Tphys and one for mathematical objects of the type
Tmath.
To be sure, the descriptive perspective may appear as a very naive answer to
the question of the relation between Tphys and Tphys
.
D . Rather, it is certainly more
natural to adopt some variant of a formalist perspective towards these mathematical
descriptions. The mathematical object D(S) is then perceived as a formal framework
in which it is possible to develop certain techniques, useful for the theoretical analysis
of physical systems. But the full description of the specificities of a particular system is
never reached by the sole study of D(S): to unambiguously refer to one specific system
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it is necessary to consider additional information, extraneous to the mathematical
formalism, that conveys to D(S) its complete physical meaning. There are then two
separate levels of meaning: a first one, encoded in the Mathematics of Mechanics,
that captures the general features common to certain physical systems; and a second
one added on top, the so-called physical interpretation, invariably situated beyond the
grasp of mathematical formalization. This idea appears quite clearly in the writings
of many authors, and an explicit example is found in Franco Strocchi’s textbook on
Algebraic Quantum Mechanics. He writes:
In the mathematical literature, given a C-algebra A, any normalized positive
linear functional on it is by definition a state; here we allow the possibility that
the set S of states with physical interpretation (briefly called physical states) is
full but smaller than the set of all the normalized positive linear functionals on
A.8
There is in this quote a sharp contrast between what is declared by definition in Mathe-
matics and what is to be interpreted in Physics. According to this formalist perspective,
the physical interpretation is not determined by the mathematical formalism. There-
fore, the same object D(S) may describe a wide range of different physical systems and
the quotient Tphys
.
D only provides a rough picture of Tphys.
Although one may suspect that it is simply not possible for the mathematical ob-
ject D(S) to capture everything about the physical system S, it certainly encapsulates
something about it. In other words, although one probably has Tphys
.
D 6' Tphys, it
is certainly the case that Tphys
.
D 6' . Despite the soundness of the formalist per-
spective, it then becomes interesting to adopt the descriptive perspective as a working
hypothesis—as an ideal asymptotic situation one should try to approach. In this way,
by attempting to fully and unambiguously characterize a physical system through its
mathematical description, one is forced to study in detail the mechanisms through
which some physical information is encoded in the mathematics of Mechanics.
Given a certain type of physical systems Tphys, it cannot be the task of our work
8F. Strocchi. An Introduction to the Mathematical Structure of Quantum Mechanics. 2nd ed.
Singapore: World Scientific, 2008, p. 24, my emphasis.
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to determine ‘the correct’ map D : Tphys  ! Tmath which succeeds in performing this
characterization—otherwise, it would be a research program in mathematical physics.
Rather, our main task in this chapter will be to clarify some general characteristics the
mathematical objects of type Tmath should have in order to be considered as a priori
‘acceptable’ candidates for describing physical systems.
In general, the object D(S) is intended to describe either the space of states of
the system S—sometimes also called the “phase space”—or its algebra of observables.
Now, an experimental physicist must be able to clearly identify the state in which a
physical system S is prepared. But if the mathematical object D(S) is to capture
all the physical information of the system, then one should expect this ability of the
experimentalist to be reflected within D(S). In other words, one is confronted with
the following requirement:
Requirement of individuation: it must be possible, in practice, to in-
dividuate any specific element of the mathematical object D(S) used to
described the physical system S.
As innocent-looking as the requirement of individuation may appear, it nonetheless
imposes some stringent conditions on the mathematical formalisms to be used for the
development of Classical and Quantum Mechanics. To see this, we need however to
clarify further the content of the two main requirements of the descriptive perspective.
The goal of the present chapter is to do so by addressing the following three questions:
| How does one conceive the mathematical entities involved in the kinematical
description of physical systems?
♡ Which is the criterion of identity =M used in practice for the mathematical
objects D(S)?
 What exactly does it mean to individuate an element within the mathematical
entity D(S)?
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I.1 A case study: the birth of Quantum Mechanics
(1925–1932)
The turning years, from 1925 to 1932, during which a unified conceptual and
mathematical framework was built for the theory of Quantum Mechanics, appear as
a particularly well suited example to launch our investigations. With the advent of
both Göttingen’s matrix mechanics and Schrödinger’s wave mechanics, the quantum
theory passed, in only one year (June 1925 to June 1926), from lacking any systematic
scheme to having two seemingly different foundations. The sudden rise of two empiri-
cally equivalent theories which however seemed conceptually at odds from each other
baffled the Physics community. The perplexity felt at the time is clearly expressed by
Schrödinger himself:
Considering the extraordinary differences between the starting-points and the
concepts of Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics and of the theory which has been
designated “undulatory” or “physical” mechanics, it is very strange that these
two new theories agree with one another with regard to the known facts, where
they differ from the old quantum theory. [...] That is really very remarkable,
because starting-points, presentations, methods, and in fact the whole mathe-
matical apparatus seem fundamentally different.9
This exceptional situation10 inevitably brought to the forefront the question of the
relation between the mathematical characteristics of the theories being developed and
their physical content. It offers a particularly well-suited context to perceive how
different physicists dealt with the questions we have posed.
In the following subsections, I wish to investigate what can be learned with re-
spect to these questions from the attempts of the founders of Quantum Mechanics in
9E. Schrödinger. “On The Relation Between The Quantum Mechanics of Heisenberg, Born, and
Jordan, and That of Schrödinger”. In: Collected Papers on Wave Mechanics. Trans. by J. Shearer
and W. Deans. London: Blackie & Son, 1928, pp. 45–61, p. 45.
10As Jammer puts it: “It is hard to find in the history of physics two theories designed to cover the
same range of experience, which differ more radically than these two.” (M. Jammer. The Conceptual
Development of Quantum Mechanics. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: Tomash Publishers, 1989, p. 270)
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clarifying the relation between wave and matrix mechanics. I will therefore summar-
ily present the key points in these developments, from Heisenberg’s Umdeutung paper
until von Neumann’s introduction of abstract Hilbert spaces. The historical account
does not pretend to any originality, even if, I hope, its synthetic and reflexive ap-
proach might be useful. It is based on some much more detailed works, which are now
standard. I think in particular of Jammer’s The Conceptual Development of Quantum
Mechanics, Darrigol’s From c-Numbers to q-Numbers: The Classical Analogy in the
History of Quantum Theory and Mehra and Rechenberg’s The Historical Development
of Quantum Theory. Volumes 1 – 6. Along the way, I will pay particular attention
to the places where emerges a reflection on the physical content of the mathematical
apparatus used in Quantum Mechanics.
I.1.1 Matrix and Wave Mechanics
Prior to 1925, the quantum theory, although empirically very successful, lacked any
clarity from the conceptual and methodological point of view. In the introduction of the
book which represented the culmination in the establishing of quantum mechanics—von
Neumann’s Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik—, the author recalled
the situation as follows:
In spite of the claim of quantum theory to universality, which had evidently been
vindicated, there was lacking the necessary formal and conceptual instrument;
there was a conglomeration of essentially different, independent, heterogeneous
and partially contradictory fragments.11
Along the same lines, Jammer describes the state of the art as “a lamentable hodge-
podge of hypotheses, principles, theorems, and computational recipes rather than a
logical consistent theory”12. However, during the second semester of that year, the sit-
uation widely changed with the development of what later came to be known as ‘matrix
11J. von Neumann. Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Trans. by R. T. Beyer.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, p. 4.
12Jammer, op. cit., p. 208.
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mechanics’13. This new quantum theory of Mechanics was essentially established by
four physicists: the three-man Göttingen group formed by Werner Heisenberg, Max
Born and Pascual Jordan, and the Cambridge student Paul Adrien Maurice Dirac.
I.1.1.a Matrix Mechanics
The seminal work that cleared the fog and set up the path was Heisenberg’s article
“Über quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer Beziehungen”,
received on July 29 1925, written while he was part of Max Born’s group at Göttingen14.
His main motivation is clearly stated in the introduction of his paper:
Instead it seems more reasonable to try to establish a theoretical quantum me-
chanics, analogous to classical mechanics, but in which only relations between
observable quantities occur.15
There are two important ideas here. On the one hand, there is the emphasis on
“observable quantities”. In particular, this meant refusing any attempt to describe the
trajectory in space-time of the electrons of an atom. Instead, the central phenomenom
upon which the theory had to be built was the emission of radiation16. Through
this move, frequencies and energy were conferred a preferred role amongst physical
13The term of ‘matrix mechanics’ does not appear in any of the first papers on the theory. Mehra
and Rechenberg track back this expression to a review written in late 1926 by Edwin C. Kemble.
(See J. Mehra and H. Rechenberg. The Historical Development of Quantum Theory. Volume 3: The
Formulation of Matrix Mechanics and Its Modifications. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982, footnote
74, pp. 61–62.)
14W. Heisenberg. “Über quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer
Beziehungen”. In: Zeitschrift für Physik 33 (1925), pp. 879–893 (English translation: W. Heisen-
berg. “Quantum-theoretical Re-interpretation of Kinematic and Mechanical Relations”. In: Sources
of Quantum Mechanics. Ed. by B. Van der Waerden. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967,
pp. 261–276).
15Ibid., p. 262.
16“[I]t is necessary to bear in mind that in quantum theory it has not been possible to associate the
electron with a point in space, considered as a function of time, by means of observable quantities.
However, even in quantum theory it is possible to ascribe to an electron the emission of radiation.”
(Ibid., p. 263.)
Jean Petitot—following Alain Connes—considers this change of “regional object”, from motion
to spectra, as the fundamental move which characterizes the transition from Classical to Quantum
Mechanics (see, for example, A. Connes. Noncommutative Geometry. Trans. by S. Berberian. London:
Academic Press, 1994, pp. 33–39 and J. Petitot. “Noncommutative Geometry and Transcendental
Physics”. In: Constituting Objectivity. Trascendental Perspectives on Modern Physics. Ed. by M.
Bitbol, P. Kerszberg, and J. Petitot. Springer, 2009, pp. 415–455).
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quantities, and this had two important consequences on the form matrix mechanics
was going to take. First, as we will shortly see, in the first papers on the theory one
almost invariantly considered states with a definite value of energy—i.e., stationary
states. Second, the theory of quantum mechanics was to be built by close analogy
with classical Fourier analysis, which allowed to represent any physical quantity—in
particular, position—in terms of frequencies and amplitudes.
On the other hand, Heisenberg insisted on the fact that quantum mechanics had
to be “analogous to classical mechanics”. The young german physicist was in fact
deeply influenced by Bohr’s correspondence principle and wished to give a rigorous
formulation of it17. Therefore, he was aiming, as the title of the article underlines, at
a systematic method of re-interpreting or translating the classical laws which related
classical properties into similar laws relating quantum quantities18. In the road to this
systematic translation scheme, the first fundamental problem became to translate into
quantum mechanics the square of a given physical quantity:
17On the paper he co-authored with Born and Jordan, Heisenberg would be more explicit about
the relation between his work and Bohr’s. In the introduction of this famous “three-man paper”, he
wrote:
If one reviews the fundamental differences between classical and quantum theory, dif-
ferences which stem from the basic quantum theoretical postulates, then the formalism
proposed [...], if proved to be correct, would appear to represent a system of quantum
mechanics as close to that of classical theory as could reasonably be hoped. [...] This
similarity of the new theory with classical theory also precludes any question of a sep-
arate correspondence principle outside the new theory; rather, the latter can itself be
regarded as an exact formulation of Bohr’s correspondence considerations.
(M. Born, W. Heisenberg, and P. Jordan. “On Quantum Mechanics II”. in: Sources of
Quantum Mechanics. Ed. by B. Van der Waerden. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1967, pp. 321–384, p. 322)
(Although the paper was conjointly written by the three man, the introduction was written by Heisen-
berg, as it is explained in Mehra and Rechenberg, op. cit., pp. 92–102.)
18This point was clearly understood by Dirac, who, only a few months after the publication of the
Heisenberg’s work, concisely captured its essence:
In a recent paper Heisenberg puts forward a new theory which suggests that it is not the
equations of classical mechanics that are in any way at fault, but that the mathematical
operations by which physical results are deduced from them require modification. All
the information supplied by the classical theory can thus be made use of in the new
theory.
(P. A. M. Dirac. “The Fundamental Equations of Quantum Mechanics”. In: Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London A109 (1925), pp. 642–653. (Reprinted in: P. A. M.
Dirac. The Collected Works of P.A.M. Dirac: 1924–1948. Ed. by R. Dalitz. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 65–78), p. 642)
22 Chapter I. Mathematical Description of Physical Systems
This point has nothing to do with electrodynamics but rather — and this seems
to be particularly important — is of purely kinematical nature. We may pose the
question in its simplest form thus: If instead of a classical quantity x(t) we have
a quantum-theoretical quantity, what quantum-theoretical quantity will appear
in place of x2(t)?19
In other words, he asked about the product governing the algebra of quantum proper-
ties. As it is well-known, basing his considerations on the frequency conditions for the
emission of radiation and using the analogy with the decomposition of a product in
Fourier analysis, he concluded the quantum product needed to be non-commutative:
“Whereas in the classical theory x(t)y(t) is always equal to y(t)x(t), this is not nec-
essarily the case in the quantum theory”20. Having determined this new product, he
was able to solve the quantum anharmonic oscillator, by re-interpreting the classical
equations of motion x + !20x + x2 = 0. This was the first success of Göttingen’s
quantum mechanics.
Immediately after Heisenberg had finished writing his article, Max Born recog-
nized that the “law of multiplication of quantum-theoretical quantities [introduced by
Heisenberg] was none other than the well-known mathematical rule of matrix multipli-
cation”21. This realization launched a collaboration with Pascual Jordan, and in a few
months they properly rewrote the mathematical aspects of Heisenberg’s work in terms
of infinite matrices, in a paper received on September 27 192522. The major contribu-
tion of this work was, of course, the understanding that in this newly developed theory
of quantum mechanics physical quantities were to be represented by matrices:
19Heisenberg, loc. cit.
20Ibid., p. 266. Although the introduction of this noncommutative product constitutes probably
the most important breakthrough of the paper, Heisenberg was not satisfied with it, as he later
acknowledged in a interview with Kuhn: ‘In my paper, the fact that XY was not equal to Y X was
very disagreeable to me. I felt this was the only point of difficulty in the whole scheme, otherwise I
would be perfectly happy.” (Cited in Mehra and Rechenberg, op. cit., p. 94)
21M. Born and P. Jordan. “On Quantum Mechanics”. In: Sources of Quantum Mechanics. Ed.
by B. Van der Waerden. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967, pp. 277–306, p. 278, author’s
emphasis.
22M. Born and P. Jordan. “Zur Quantenmechanik”. In: Zeitschrift für Physik 34 (1925), pp. 858–
888 (English translation: M. Born and P. Jordan. “On Quantum Mechanics”. In: Sources of Quantum
Mechanics. Ed. by B. Van der Waerden. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967, pp. 277–306).
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The infinite square array (with discrete or continuous indices) which ap-
pears at the start of the next section, termed matrix, is a representation of
a physical quantity which is given in classical theory as a function of time.
The mathematical method of treatment inherent in the new quantum me-
chanics is thereby characterized through the employment of matrix analysis
in place of the usual number analysis.23





which represented the dynamical quantity q(t) (e.g., the position) was considered to be







Although in principle the indices of the matrix coefficients could also be continuous,
in practice they confined themselves from the outset to systems whose motion was
periodic, a fact which restricted them to only considering discrete indices24.
On top of this major insight, they introduced for the first time the canonical
commutation relations for a system with one degree of freedom
pq   qp = h
2i
1
(which they called at the time “stronger quantum conditions” since they were related to
the quantization of angular momentum required by Bohr), proposed the probabilistic
interpretation of the amplitude jq(nm)j2 and wrote Hamilton’s equations of motion in
23Ibid., p. 278.
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Independently of the work of Born and Jordan at Göttingen, Paul Dirac, who was
at the time a student at Cambridge, also managed to put Heisenberg’s Umdeutung
paper on a firmer mathematical ground in his article “The Fundamental Equations of
Quantum Mechanics”, received on November 7 192525. The whole paper is devoted
to the study of the mathematical operations which can be performed on the phys-
ical quantities in the new quantum theory: section 2, “Quantum algebra”, restates
Heisenberg’s law of multiplication for quantum variables; section 3, “Quantum dif-
ferentiation”, deals with “the most general quantum operation”26 satisfying Leibniz’s
rule (multiplication and differentiation were the two main operations needed to find
the quantum ‘re-interpretation’ of the classical laws); section 4, “The quantum condi-
tions”, introduces the quantum Poisson bracket which allows him to write the canonical
commutation relations for an arbitrary number of degrees of freedom8>>>><>>>>:
qrps   psqr = rs ih
2
qrqs   qsqr = 0
prps   pspr = 0;
and section 5, “Properties of the quantum Poisson bracket expression”, introduces
Hamilton’s equations of motion. Hence, he essentially recovered (and slightly ex-
tended), in a beautifully concise style, all the basic results of Born and Jordan27.
And he did so without mention of the just-found matrix representation (which he was
unaware of). Instead, Dirac preferred to work at a purely symbolic level, disregarding
25P. A. M. Dirac. “The Fundamental Equations of Quantum Mechanics”. In: Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London A109 (1925), pp. 642–653. (Reprinted in: P. A. M. Dirac. The Collected
Works of P.A.M. Dirac: 1924–1948. Ed. by R. Dalitz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995, pp. 65–78).
26Ibid., p. 311.
27Dirac’s paper is only ten pages long. Compare this with the thirty pages of Born and Jordan’s
first paper!
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any particular representation of what he later decided to call the “q-numbers” and fo-
cusing on the algebraic relations they satisfied. This methodology was clearly described
in his second paper on the subject:
This [matrix] representation was taken as defining a q-number in the previous
papers [of Heisenberg, Born and Jordan] on the new theory. It seems preferable
though to take the above algebraic laws and the general conditions (1) [the
canonical commutation relations] as defining the properties of q-numbers, and
to deduce from them that a q-number can be represented by c-numbers in this
manner when it has the necessary periodic properties.28
Finally, simultaneously with Dirac’s first paper, Born, Jordan and Heisenberg
wrote yet another article that further developed the new quantum theory of mechan-
ics: “On Quantum Mechanics II”, received on November 16 192529. For a system with
an arbitrary number of (periodic) degrees of freedom, they proposed the same gener-
alized commutation relations found by Dirac. But the main novelty of this sixty pages
long ‘three man paper’ was their introduction of the concept of “canonical transfor-
mations” (leaving invariant the quantum commutation relations) in order to translate
the dynamical problem of integrating the equations of motions into the problem of
diagonalizing the energy matrix H(p; q)30. In this way, the theory of eigenvalues of
hermitian forms became of central importance to quantum mechanics.
At this point, essentially all the fundamental ingredients of what became to be
known as ‘matrix mechanics’ had been properly laid down. All the relevant information
of a quantum-theoretical dynamical system was to be completely described by the
form of the Hamiltonian and the set of observable quantities, which were represented
28P. A. M. Dirac. “Quantum Mechanics and a Preliminary Investigation of The Hydrogen Atom”.
In: Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A110 (1926), pp. 561–579. (Reprinted in: P. A. M.
Dirac. The Collected Works of P.A.M. Dirac: 1924–1948. Ed. by R. Dalitz. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995, pp. 85–105), p. 563.
29M. Born, W. Heisenberg, and P. Jordan. “Zur Quantenmechanik II”. in: Zeitschrift für Physik
35 (1926), pp. 557–615 (English translation, M. Born, W. Heisenberg, and P. Jordan. “On Quantum
Mechanics II”. in: Sources of Quantum Mechanics. Ed. by B. Van der Waerden. New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1967, pp. 321–384)
30“Then, the dynamic problem, e.g., the determination of the pk; qk can be formulated as: A
transformation p0k; q0k ! pk; qk is to be found which leaves [the basic commutation relations] invariant
and at the same time reduces the energy to a diagonal matrix.” (Ibid., p. 349)
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by infinite dimensional matrices satisfying a certain number of algebraic relations.
Pauli’s application of this matrix scheme to solve the hydrogen atom was the first
truly impressive success of the theory31.
Therefore, only six months after the publication of Heisenberg’s seminal paper, the
new theory of ‘matrix mechanics’ seemed to be expanding full steam ahead, especially
carried by the Göttingen group. But this swift development was to be echoed, during
the first semester of 1926, by the equally sudden and expeditious construction of ‘wave
mechanics’.
I.1.1.b Wave Mechanics
Contrary to the situation of the quantum theory of ‘matrix mechanics’, which
progressively took its form thanks to the contribution of various physicists, ‘wave me-
chanics’ was single-handedly developed by Erwin Schrödinger, who at the time worked
in Zurich. He did so in a series of four papers written and published in only six months,
from end of December 1925 to end of June 1926:
– “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (I)”, received on January 27 192632,
– “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (II)”, received on February 23 192633,
– “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (III)”, received on May 10 192634,
31W. Pauli. “Über das Wasserstoffspektrum vom Standpunkt der neuen Quantenmechanik”. In:
Zeitschrift für Physik 36 (1926), pp. 336–363, received on January 17 1926 (English translation: W.
Pauli. “On The Hydrogen Spectrum From The Standpoint of The New Quantum Mechanics”. In:
Sources of Quantum Mechanics. Ed. by B. Van der Waerden. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1967, pp. 387–415).
32E. Schrödinger. “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (I)”. in: Annalen der Physik 79 (1926),
pp. 361–376 (English translation: E. Schrödinger. “Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part
I”. in: Collected Papers on Wave Mechanics. Trans. by J. Shearer and W. Deans. 2nd ed. London
and Glasgow: Blackie & Son, Ltd, 1928, pp. 1–12).
33E. Schrödinger. “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (II)”. in: Annalen der Physik 79 (1926),
pp. 489–527 (English translation: E. Schrödinger. “Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part
II”. in: Collected Papers on Wave Mechanics. Trans. by J. Shearer and W. Deans. 2nd ed. London
and Glasgow: Blackie & Son, Ltd, 1928, pp. 13–40).
34E. Schrödinger. “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (III)”. in: Annalen der Physik 80 (1926),
pp. 437–490 (English translation: E. Schrödinger. “Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part
III”. in: Collected Papers on Wave Mechanics. 2nd ed. London and Glasgow: Blackie & Son, Ltd,
1928, pp. 62–101).
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– “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (IV)”, received on June 21 192635.
This four-parts paper has been qualified by Jammer as “one of the most influential
contributions ever made in the history of science”36. As Schrödinger explains, they
were not first conceived as a whole and then written; rather, the writing process ac-
companied the author’s progressive understanding of the theory he was building37. As
a consequence, they do not constitute the best exposition for a reader who would be
approaching the subject for the first time. Far more enlightening are the presentations
of the same material he wrote in English and French a few months later38.
As it had been the case with Heisenberg, Schrödinger wanted to ban the notion
of “trajectory” from the theory of Mechanics. But his reasons for this widely differed
from those of the German physicist. As we saw in the previous section, Heisenberg’s
dismissal of trajectories originated in the impossibility found at the time to observe the
position of the electrons in an orbit. Because of this, Heisenberg rejected any spatial
picture of atomic phenomena. Instead, Schrödinger’s main motivation was to get rid
of the picture of material points and build a theory of Mechanics entirely based upon
the notion of “wave”:
The theory which is reported in the following pages is based on the very interest-
ing and fundamental researches of L. de Broglie on what he called “phase-waves”
(“ondes de phase”) and thought to be associated with the motion of material
points, especially with the motion of an electron or proton. The point of view
35E. Schrödinger. “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (IV)”. in: Annalen der Physik 81 (1926),
pp. 109–139 (English translation: E. Schrödinger. “Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part
IV”. in: Collected Papers on Wave Mechanics. Trans. by J. Shearer and W. Deans. 2nd ed. London
and Glasgow: Blackie & Son, Ltd, 1928, pp. 102–123).
36Jammer, op. cit., p. 266.
37“[T]he papers now combined in one volume were originally written one by one at different times.
The results of the later sections were largely unknown to the writer of the earlier ones.” (E. Schrödinger.
Collected Papers on Wave Mechanics. Trans. by J. Shearer and W. Deans. 2nd ed. London and
Glasgow: Blackie & Son, Ltd, 1928, p. v.)
38E. Schrödinger. “An Undulatory Theory of the Mechanics of Atoms and Molecules”. In: The
Physical Review 28 (1926), pp. 1049–1070. (Reprinted in: E. Schrödinger. Gesammelte Abhandlungen
/ Collected Papers. Volume 3. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Science, 1984, pp. 280–301), and
E. Schrödinger. “La mécanique des ondes”. In: Electrons et Photons: Rapports et Discussions du
Cinquième Conseil de Physique, tenu à Bruxelles du 24 au 29 Octobre 1927. Paris: Gauthiers-Villars,
1928, pp. 185–213. (Reprinted in: E. Schrödinger. Gesammelte Abhandlungen / Collected Papers.
Volume 3. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Science, 1984, pp. 302–323).
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taken here [...] is rather that material points consist of, or are nothing but,
wave-systems.39
The urge Schrödinger felt to build this “undulatory” or “wave” Mechanics was indeed
strongly influenced by the recent work of the French Louis de Broglie, which allowed
to associate a wavelength to material particles. But there was also the work of William
Hamilton, who had constructed his analytical Mechanics by analogy with geometrical
optics. This exerted a decisive influence on Schrödinger’s ideas. In fact, during the
process of firmly establishing his quantum theory, Schrödinger was driven by the funda-
mental idea that quantum mechanics should be to classical mechanics what undulatory
optics had been to geometrical optics:
[...] we know to-day, in fact, that our classical mechanics fails for very small
dimensions of the path and for very great curvatures. Perhaps this failure is in
strict analogy with the failure of geometrical optics, i.e., “the optics of infinitely
small wave lengths”, that becomes evident as soon as the obstacles or apertures
are no longer great compared with the real, finite, wave length. Perhaps our
classical mechanics is the complete analogy of geometrical optics and as such is
wrong and not in agreement with reality [...]. Then it becomes a question of
searching for an undulatory mechanics, and the most obvious way is the working
out of the Hamiltonian analogy on the lines of undulatory optics.40
39Idem, “An Undulatory Theory of the Mechanics of Atoms and Molecules”, p. 1049.
40Idem, “Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part II”, p. 18, author’s emphasis. Another
paradigmatic paragraph of Schrödinger’s thought is the following:
The true mechanical process is realised or represented in a fitting way by the wave
process in q-space, and not by the motion of image points in this space. The study of the
image points, which is the object of classical mechanics, is only an approximate treatment,
and has, as such, just as much justification as geometrical or “ray” optics has, compared
with the true optical process. A macroscopic mechanical process will be portrayed as
a wave signal [...], which can approximately enough be regarded as confined to a point
compared with the geometrical structure of the path. [...] This manner of treatment,
however, loses all meaning where the structure of the path is no longer very large compared
with the wave length or indeed is comparable with it. Then we must treat the matter
strictly on the wave theory, i.e. we must proceed from the wave equation [yet to be found]
and not from the fundamental equations of mechanics [...]. These latter equations are
just as useless for the elucidation of the micro-structure of the mechanical processes as
geometrical optics is for explaining the phenomena of diffraction. (Ibid., p. 25.)
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From a mathematical point of view, Schrödinger’s program of going from material-
point Mechanics to undulatory Mechanics meant the passage from total differential







q(t) = 0—to partial differential equations where both time








u(x; t) = 0.
The first article is solely dedicated to treating the simplified non-relativistic hydro-
gen atom, described by the Keplerian central potential V =   e2
r
. For this, he proposed
the partial differential equation
r2 (x) +K(E   V ) (x) = 0 (I.2)
and re-obtained Bohr’s energy levels for the stationary states En /   e4n2 (n = 1; 2; 3; : : :)
as the only possible negative values of the parameter E for which the equation admitted
a finite, continuous solution. In this way, Schrödinger claimed, the postulation of whole
numbers, which was the core of the old quantum theory, acquired a more natural
justification:
The essential thing seems to me to be, that the postulation of “whole numbers”
no longer enters into the quantum rules mysteriously, but that we have traced
the matter a step further back, and found the “integralness” to have its origin in
the finiteness and single-valuedness of a certain space function.41
Despite this success, the justification for Equation I.2, which Schrödinger had es-
sentially guessed42 and later came to be known as the ‘time-independent Schrödinger
equation’, was not very convincing (to say the least)43. By extensively discussing the
already mentioned analogy between Mechanics and Optics, the second paper tried to
41Idem, “Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part I”, p. 9.
42For a detailed reconstruction of Schrödinger’s complex route of “educated guesses” towards his
wave equation, see J. Mehra and H. Rechenberg. The Historical Development of Quantum Theory.
Volume 5: Erwin Schrödinger and the Rise of Wave Mechanics. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987,
Chapter III.
43In the first paragraph of his second paper, Schrödinger himself described his previous derivation
of the time-independent equation as “unintelligible” and “incomprehensible”!
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establish it on firmer grounds, but the result was not much more transparent. Notwith-
standing this, he continued developing his theory and considered further applications
of his wave equation: in the second article, he managed to solve other simple mechan-
ical systems such as the harmonic oscillator and the rigid rotator, while in the third
he developed the time-independent perturbation theory which allowed him to compute
the Stark effect in the hydrogen atom. Finally, in the fourth article, Schrödinger dealt
with non-conservative systems, i.e. systems for which the external potential V varied









which yielded the previous time-independent equation (I.2) whenever the wave-function
was stationary: 	(x; t) =  (x)e2iEt/h.
Therefore, by the end of the fourth paper, Schrödinger had written down mostly
all of quantum mechanics as it is known today. Table I.1 (page 31) summarizes the sit-
uation at that point, with the fundamental traits of the two different quantum theories
of Mechanics44.
I.1.2 Extracting the physics (1): Schrödinger’s mathematical
equivalence
The state of perplexity of the Physics community, after having witnessed in such
a short lapse of time the development of both Matrix and Wave Mechanics, could very
well be described by the following words, which Einstein supposedly addressed to a
crowded room of physicists in the University of Berlin:
Now listen! Up to now we had no exact quantum theory, and today we suddenly
have two of them. You will agree with me that these two theories exclude one
44This synthetic description of both theories is strongly influenced by the one Van der Waerden
proposed in B. Van der Waerden. “From Matrix Mechanics and Wave Mechanics to Unified Quantum
Mechanics”. In: The Physicist’s Conception of Nature. Ed. by J. Mehra. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Publishing Company, 1987, pp. 276–293.
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Matrix Mechanics Wave Mechanics
Description of the mechanical system: by
its observable quantities, which are
represented by infinite square matrices.
Description of the mechanical system: by
its stationary states, which are de-
scribed by complex-valued functions
over q-space.
Dynamical problem: to find matrices q
and p satisfying the algebraic relation
pq   qp = ~
i
1
and for which the Hamiltonian matrix
H(p; q) is diagonal.
Dynamical problem: to find the wave
functions  and the values E satisfying
the partial differential equation
r2 (q) + 2m
~2
(E   V ) (q) = 0
Energy levels: eigenvalues of the matrix
H(p; q).
Energy levels: eigenvalues of the time-
independent Schrödinger equation.
Table I.1 – Fundamental ingredients of Matrix and Wave Mechanics.
another. Which theory is the correct one? Perhaps neither of them is correct!45
This surprise was the combination of two facts. On the one hand, Matrix and
Wave Mechanics were ‘extraordinarily different in their starting-points and concepts’
(Schrödinger), up to the point that they seemed to ‘exclude one another’ (Einstein).
On the other hand, however, the two theories had lead to the same predictions for
the energy levels of the systems they had considered—coincidence which was specially
spectacular for the harmonic oscillator since the predictions differed from those of
the old quantum theory. To be sure, the observation of their empirical equivalence
raised the question of whether or not the ‘extraordinary differences’ were nothing but
a misleading impression. In other words, it raised the question of the identity of the
two theories. The importance of reflecting on the notion of identity was immediately
recognized by Schrödinger, who was the first to unveil the profound relation between
the two new quantum theories in the article “On The Relation Between The Quantum
45H. Kallmann. “Von der Anfängen der Quantentheorie—Eine persönliche Rückschau”. In:
Physikalische Blätter 22 (1966), pp. 489–500. Cited in: Mehra and Rechenberg, op. cit., p. 636.
Mehra and Rechenberg raise doubts on the faithfulness of Kallmann’s recollection of Einstein’s words,
but this need not worry us here.
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Mechanics of Heisenberg, Born, and Jordan, and That of Schrödinger”46.
But before reviewing this work, let us look more closely at the reasons Schrödinger
could have had for considering these two theories to be so radically different. In the
introduction of his paper, the Austrian physicist explains:
Above all, however, the departure from classical mechanics in the two theo-
ries seems to occur in diametrically opposed directions. In Heisenberg’s work
the classical continuous variables are replaced by systems of discrete numerical
quantities (matrices), which depend on a pair of integral indices, and are de-
fined by algebraic equations. The authors themselves describe the theory as a
“true theory of the discontinuum”. On the other hand, wave mechanics shows
just the reverse tendency; it is a step from classical point-mechanics towards a
continuum-theory. In place of a process described in terms of a finite number of
dependent variables occurring in a finite number of total differential equations,
we have a continuous field-like process in configuration space, which is governed
by a single partial differential equation [...].47
Hence, for him, the couple of opposite notions Continuum/Discrete characterized the
essential trait distinguishing Wave and Matrix Mechanics.
Undoubtedly, Schrödinger could not be wrong when claiming that, in the devel-
opment of undulatory mechanics, the pursue of continuity played a major role—after
all, he was the author! However, the idea that ‘discreteness’ went hand in hand with
Matrix Mechanics—idea which has been repeated ever so often (for example in Jam-
mer’s book, p. 270)—is less obvious. From the above-quoted passage, it would seem
that this association stemmed from the use of “integral indices” in Göttingen’s theory.
However, although in all practical examples considered by the end of 1925, the indices
labelling the matrix coefficients were discrete—and this surely conveyed an impression
of an essential discreteness in the theory—, this trait arose only because the systems
46E. Schrödinger. “Über das Verhältnis der Heisenberg-Born-Jordanschen Quantumemchanik zu
der meinen”. In: Annalen der Physik 79 (1926), pp. 734–756 (English translation: E. Schrödinger.
“On The Relation Between The Quantum Mechanics of Heisenberg, Born, and Jordan, and That of
Schrödinger”. In: Collected Papers on Wave Mechanics. Trans. by J. Shearer and W. Deans. London:
Blackie & Son, 1928, pp. 45–61).
47Ibid., pp. 45-46, author’s emphasis.
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considered were periodic and hence the coordinates’ domain of variation was bounded.
In principle, Born, Jordan and Heisenberg insisted, these coefficients could be also
continuous48. Even more, this cohabitation of the continuum and the discrete was
emphasized as a major feature of their theory:
[...] a particularly important trait in the new theory would seem to us to consist of
the way in which both continuous and line spectra arise in it on an equal footing,
i.e. as solutions of one and the same equation of motion and closely connected
with one another mathematically; obviously, in this theory, any distinction be-
tween ‘quantized’ and ‘unquantized’ motion ceases to be at all meaningful [...].49
Thus, this circumstantial use of integral indices could certainly not be what rendered
Matrix Mechanics a “true theory of the discontinuum”.
Now, among all the seminal papers on matrix mechanics, there was indeed one
sentence in which discreteness was designated as fundamental to the theory: the sen-
tence from Born and Jordan that Schrödinger paraphrases in the above passage—and
which is also used by Jammer. In their paper “On Quantum Mechanics”, they wrote:
The new mechanics presents itself as an essentially discontinuous theory [...].
But, as far as I can tell, the reasons which led the two authors to this conclusion have
never been discussed. These had in fact little to do with the use of discrete indices
to label the matrix coefficients. Indeed, by analyzing the properties of the equations
they had just established, Born and Jordan realized that their matrix representation of





to the equations of motion, the permutation of some chosen rows and columns—that
is, the permutation of the the order of two indices n0 and n1—allowed to generate a




which would also solve the equations:
[...] one can see right away that the exact form of the matrix can never be deduced
48Thus, in the first section of Heisenberg’s Umdeutung article, all formulas are given in two versions:
one in terms of discrete sums and one in terms of integrals. This only ceases to be the case when he
turns to the consideration of the anharmonic oscillator.
49Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan, op. cit., pp. 322–323. The three authors insisted in this point with
a similar quote found thirty pages later in the same article: “The simultaneous appearance of both
continuous and line spectra as solutions to the same equations of motion and the same commutation
relations seemed to us to represent a particularly significant feature of the new theory.” (Ibid., p. 358)
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from the fundamental equations, since if rows and columns be subjected to the
same permutation, the canonical equations and the quantum condition remain
invariant and thereby one obtains a new and apparently different solution. But all










, although different in their exact nu-
merical form, described the same physical situation. The remark of this indeterminacy
in the form of the matrices had an important conceptual consequence for them: it
showed that the order in which were arranged the labels n0; n1; : : :, used to distinguish
the different frequencies (n0; n1) was completely arbitrary, and therefore physically
irrelevant. And it was this last fact which, in turn, was read as a manifestation of an
essential discontinuity of the quantum theory:
The classically calculated orbits merge into one another continuously; conse-
quently the quantum orbits selected at a later stage have a particular sequence
right from the outset. The new mechanics presents itself as an essentially discon-
tinuous theory in that herein there is no sequence of quantum states defined by
the physical process, but rather of quantum numbers which are indeed no more
than distinguishing indices which can be ordered and normalized according to
any practical standpoint whatsoever.51
Therefore, for Born and Jordan, the ‘essential discontinuity’ of matrix mechanics did
not lie in the fact that the quantum numbers were discrete, but rather in the fact there
was no preferred order in which to arrange these numbers52.
This may appear as strange a conclusion from the modern point of view. For the
50Born and Jordan, op. cit., p. 298.
51Ibid., pp. 300–301.
52The intuition behind their idea of relating continuity and order seems to be somewhat along
the following lines: given a discrete set of objects , , , : : :, their labelling by natural numbers is
arbitrary: one may choose = 1, = 2, = 3, : : :, but one can also perform the permutation   !
 which yields the labelling = 1, = 2, = 3, : : : If, however, these objects are part of a larger
continuous set (e.g., a straight line), then the picture changes. Now, we have and their
labelling by given real numbers  <  <  < : : : is no longer arbitrary: the number  must be used
to label  since there is no continuous transformation which, starting from , would yield
the picture . In other words, by introducing continuity into the picture, the notion of
‘being the object in the middle’ becomes meaningful.
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ambiguity in the matrix representation of a physical quantity observed by Born and
Jordan is now understood as the indication that physical quantities are better described
by operators rather than by matrices (the latter being a representation of the former in
a particular system of coordinates). But this was impossible for them to foresee, since
at the time they were not acquainted with this more abstract notion53. Hence, the
invariance of the fundamental equations of Göttingen’s Mechanics under permutation
of indices was completely unrelated with any sort of fundamental discontinuity.
Besides the couple Continuum/Discrete, another notion which can help us un-
derstand the seemingly irreducible differences between Wave and Matrix Mechanics
is that of visualizability in space-time. In the introduction to one of their papers, the
Göttingen group had written that the new quantum theory was “not directly amenable
to a geometrically visualizable interpretation, since the motion of electrons cannot be
described in terms of the familiar concepts of space and time”54, and had called their
theory a “symbolic quantum geometry” in contrast with the “visualizable classical ge-
ometry”55. On the contrary, Schrödinger was clearly striving for an intuitive spatial
picture of atomic processes:
[...] it has even been doubted whether what goes on in the atom could ever be de-
scribed within the scheme of space and time. From the philosophical standpoint,
I would consider a conclusive decision in this sense as equivalent to a complete
surrender. For we cannot really alter our manner of thinking in space and time,
and what we cannot comprehend within it we cannot understand at all. There
are such things—but I do not believe that atomic structure is one of them.56
53The idea that physical quantities were described by operators rather than matrices emerged from
the collaboration of Born with the mathematician Norbert Wiener at the beginning of 1926. However,
they considered operators acting on functions depending solely on time. As we will later explain, it
was Schrödinger who first considered operators acting on functions of configuration space. See M.
Born and N. Wiener. “A New Formulation of The Laws of Quantization of Periodic and Aperiodic
Phenomena”. In: Journal of Mathematics and Physics (MIT) (1925–1926), pp. 84–98. (Reprinted in:
N. Wiener. Norbert Wiener: Collected Works. Volume III. ed. by P. Masani. Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1981, pp. 427–441).
54Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan, op. cit., p. 322.
55Ibid., p. 322.
56Schrödinger, “Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part II”, pp. 26-27.
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And this difference seemed to be at the origin of the mutual dislike Heisenberg and
Schrödinger felt towards each other’s theories57.
Now, Schrödinger’s claims on the visualizability of his theory strongly depended
on his tentative to attach a physical meaning to the wave-function 	 he had intro-
duced, and which he expected to “represent the true mechanical process in a fitting
way”58. However, this intended interpretation was made difficult by two mathematical
characteristics of the theory: first, the wave-function was not a function of space but
rather a function of the configuration space (“the q-space”)59. Hence, only when deal-
ing with one electron could one readily interpret the atomic process as a “vibration in
real three-dimensional space”60. Second, after the introduction of the time-dependent
Schrödinger equation (Equation I.3, page 30), complex numbers had become a seem-
ingly unavoidable and essential ingredient, somewhat against Schrödinger’s will61. To
some extent, these two problems—of the interpretation of the wave-function and of the
57Thus, Heisenberg, in a letter to Pauli, wrote: “The more I ponder about the physical part of
Schrödinger’s theory, the more horrible I find it. [...] What Schrödinger writes on the visualizability
of his theory [...] I find rubbish. The great achievement of Schrödinger’s theory is the calculation of
matrix elements”. (Cited in: Mehra and Rechenberg, op. cit., p. 821.)
On the other side, Schrödinger confessed in a letter to Wien: “I firmly hope, of course, that the
matrix method, after its valuable results have been absorbed by the eigenvalue theory, will disappear
again. [...] Because the mere thought makes me shudder, if I later had to present the matrix calculus
to a young student as describing the true nature of the atom.” (Cited in: ibid., p. 639.)
58Schrödinger, “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (II)”, p. 25.
59“	 itself is in the general case a function of the generalized coordinates q1    qn and the time,—
not a function of ordinary space and time as in ordinary wave-problems. This raises some difficulty in
attaching a physical meaning to the wave-function.” (Idem, “An Undulatory Theory of the Mechanics
of Atoms and Molecules”, p. 1066.)
60Idem, “Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part II”, p. 28.
61In the French translation of his collected papers on wave mechanics, Schrödinger added the fol-
lowing comment:
In his desire to consider at any cost the propagation phenomenon of the waves  as
something real in the classical sense of the word, the author had refused to acknowledge
that the whole development of the theory increasingly tended to highlight the essential
complex nature of the wave function.
(Dans son désir d’envisager à tout prix le phénomène de la propagation des ondes  
comme quelque chose de réel dans le sens classique du terme, l’auteur s’était refusé
de reconnaître franchement que tout le développement de la théorie mettait de plus en
plus clairement en évidence le caractère essentiellement complexe de la fonction d’onde.
E. Schrödinger. Mémoires sur la mécanique ondulatoire. Trans. by A. Proca. Paris:
Librairie Alcan, 1933, p. 166.)
His apprehension towards complex numbers is also apparent in the concluding paragraph of his fourth
and last part of the article ”Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values”:
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role of complex numbers in Quantum Mechanics—are still discussed nowadays62.
Thus—we see—the impression of radical conceptual and physical differences owed
much to the tendency of attaching a meaning to certain particularities of the mathe-
matical form of one theory or the other: the use of discrete indices, the invariance of
the equations under permutation of indices, the appearance of a function depending
on the space-time coordinates, etc. Yet, despite having observed this and having ex-
plained how “the whole mathematical apparatus [of Matrix and Wave Mechanics] seem
fundamentally different”, Schrödinger made the following claim:
From the formal mathematical standpoint, one might well speak of the identity
of the two theories.63
From what has been explained so far, this statement is surely surprising. One
would have perhaps expected an argument along these lines: i) the mathematical ap-
paratus of the two theories are different; ii) however, the noticed empirical equivalence
stifles a naive and direct reading of these mathematical apparatus; iii) therefore, al-
though mathematically different, the two theories must be physically identical. In fact,
in the article he did also introduce the notion of “physical identity” and discussed its
relation with the notion of “mathematical identity”:
To-day there are not a few physicists who, like Kirchhoff and Mach, regard the
task of a physical theory as being merely a mathematical description (as eco-
nomical as possible) of the empirical connections between observable quantities
[...]. On this view, mathematical equivalence has almost the same meaning as
Meantime, there is no doubt a certain crudeness in the use of a complex wave function.
If it were unavoidable in principle, and not merely a facilitation of the calculation, this
would mean that there are in principle two wave functions, which must be used together
in order to obtain information on the state of the system. [...] Our inability to give
more accurate information about this is intimately connected with the fact that, in the
pair of equations (I.3), we have before us only the substitute—extraordinarily convenient
for the calculation, to be sure—for a real wave equation of probably the fourth order,
which, however, I have not succeeded in forming for the non-conservative case.” (Idem,
“Quantisation as a Problem of Proper Values. Part IV”, p. 123, author’s emphasis.)
62Cf. for example the modern debate between 	-epistemic models and 	-ontologists. For a review
of this, see M. S. Leifer. “Is the Quantum State Real? An Extended Review of  -ontology Theorems”.
In: Quanta 3 (2014), pp. 67–155.
63Schrödinger, “On The Relation Between The Quantum Mechanics of Heisenberg, Born, and Jor-
dan, and That of Schrödinger”, p. 46, author’s emphasis.
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physical equivalence. [...]
[However] the validity of the thesis that mathematical and physical equiv-
alence mean the same thing, must itself be qualified. Let us think, for example,
of the two expressions for the electrostatic energy of a system of charged conduc-
tors, the space integral 12
R
E2d and the sum 12eiVi taken over the conductors.
The two expressions are completely equivalent [...]. Nevertheless we intentionally
prefer the first [...].
We cannot yet say with certainty to which of the two new quantum theories
preference should be given, from this point of view. As natural advocate of one
of them, I will not be blamed if I frankly [...] bring forward the arguments in its
favour.64
Thus, it is clear from this passage that Schrödinger was considering the possibility
that, despite the empirical equivalence and mathematical identity of the two theories,
his Wave Mechanics was perhaps physically superior to Göttingen’s Quantum Mechan-
ics. Hence, the above outlined argument was surely not what Schrödinger was claiming.
What, then, did he mean by the “mathematical identity” of these two theories?
Here, the best is to look at the way in which he attempted to prove his claim. He
first proceeded to show how his wave functions could be used to construct matrices
obeying the algebraic relations written by Heisenberg, Jordan and Born. This he
achieved by a two-step procedure that is now well-known:
1. From functions to operators: to the 2n quantities fq1; : : : ; qn; p1; : : : ; png (position
and canonically conjugate momentum co-ordinates), associate linear operators
acting on functions of the first n variables as follows:
qk 7 ! qk 





   (differentiation by qk):
This allows to associate a linear operator [F; ] to any given (well-ordered) function
F (p; q) of ‘pq-space’.
64Ibid., pp. 58–59, author’s emphasis.
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2. From operators to matrices: given the choice of a complete orthogonal system of
functions of ‘q-space’ fu1(q); u2(q); : : :g, associate to the operator [F; ] a matrix




In this way, Heisenberg’s ‘mysterious’ commutation relations for the quantum rep-
resentatives fq1; : : : ; qn;p1; : : : ;png revealed themselves to be nothing else but the
trivial identity in ordinary analysis for linear differential operators: @
@qk
qk   qk @@qk = 1.
Moreover, the complete orthogonal system of functions which associated to the energy
function H(p; q) a diagonal matrix, as required by Göttingen’s quantum mechanics,
were precisely Schrödinger’s wave-functions  E(q), solutions to his time-independent
equation (which was the only one he had introduced at the time of the writing of the
article).
In other terms, one could say that, by the above construction, Schrödinger showed
how any statement of Matrix Mechanics could be interpreted in the language of Wave
Mechanics. But he did not stop here, for he knew this relation between both theories
was insufficient to prove the identity:
[...] the equivalence actually exists, and it also exists conversely. Not only the
matrices can be constructed from the proper functions as shown above, but
also, conversely, the functions can be constructed from the numerically given
matrices. Thus the functions do not form, as it were, an arbitrary and special
“fleshly clothing” for the bare matrix skeleton, provided to pander to the need for
intuitiveness. This really would establish the superiority of the matrices, from
the epistemological point of view.65
The last two sentences are enlightening. In his worry of being “as economical as
possible” and excluding any “arbitrary and special “fleshly clothing””, Schrödinger
was precisely trying to avoid the mistake of conceding a key role to a feature of the
theory that could turn out to be completely irrelevant. And to protect himself from
this, he needed to show how any statement expressed in terms of waves functions could
65Ibid., p. 58, author’s emphasis
40 Chapter I. Mathematical Description of Physical Systems
be found to be expressible as well in terms of matrices (and, of course, vice versa).
It thus appears that, for Schrödinger, the task of proving the ‘mathematical identity’
consisted in finding a perfect translation, in building an dictionary between the two
theories. In other words, Matrix and Wave Mechanics were to be identical, “from
the formal mathematical standpoint”, because one could make explicit a bi-directional
correspondence between what could be expressed within one language and what could
be expressed within the other.
Contrary to his claims however, Schrödinger did not really manage to rigorously
prove this ‘backwards translation’66. It was only with the work of Dirac and Jordan
first, and von Neumann afterwards, that the situation became completely understood67.
I.1.3 Extracting the physics (2): Dirac’s transformation theory
In December 1926, as he was visiting Niels Borh’s group at Copenhagen, Dirac fin-
ished the writing of a much celebrated article that brought a completely new perspective
on the relation between Wave and Matrix Mechanics: “The Physical Interpretation of
66For a much more detailed analysis Schrödinger’s notion of ‘mathematical equivalence’ and the
reasons why Schrödinger’s work should not be considered as a rigorous proof of the equivalence, see
the excellent two-part article F. A. Muller. “The Equivalence Myth of Quantum Mechanics—Part I”.
in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics 28 (1997), pp. 35–61; F. A. Muller. “The Equivalence Myth of Quantum Mechanics—Part
II”. in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics 28 (1997), pp. 219–247.
67In the road towards the proof of the equivalence between the two quantum mechanics, I should
also mention the names of other physicists whose works represented an advance in the completion of
the proof, but which I will not comment here. These are:
– Wolfgang Pauli, in particular a letter from April 12th 1926 he wrote to Jordan in which he
sketched the proof of the equivalence. An English translation of the full letter can be found in
Van der Waerden, op. cit., pp. 278–282.
– Carl Eckart, in particular his article C. Eckart. “The Solution of the Problem of the Single
Oscillator by a Combination of Schrödinger’s Wave Mechanics and Lanczos’ Field Theory”. In:
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 12 (1926), pp. 473–476.
– Fritz London, in particular his article F. London. “Über die Jacobischen Transformationen der
Quantenmechanik”. In: Zeitschrift für Physik 37 (1926), pp. 383–386.
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the Quantum Dynamics”68. As it was the case in Schrödinger’s approach to the equiv-
alence between his theory and Göttingen’s, the idea that indeed both theories were but
two different descriptions of the same situation was central to Dirac’s article. However,
in his own approach, the English physicist introduced a crucial conceptual shift that it
is important to highlight from the outset. As we have just seen, Schrödinger’s original
conception may be fairly well understood with the following claim: ‘Wave and Matrix
Mechanics are different descriptions of the same situation because these descriptions
are written in different languages’. On the contrary, as we are about to see, Dirac’s
conception is more accurately captured by saying: ‘Wave and Matrix Mechanics are
different descriptions of the same situation because these descriptions are performed
from different points of view’. Therefore, from Schrödinger’s article to Dirac’s article,
we pass from a ‘linguistic’ analogy to a ‘relativistic’ analogy.
Let me unpack, in more detail, what I mean by this last statement. The problem
of the relation between the two quantum theories, as tackled by Schrödinger, appears
to be quite similar to the problem of the relation between Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
Classical Mechanics. We are confronted with two, and only two, formulations of ap-
parently the same theory. Surely, in order to secure that they really correspond to the
same theory, it is important to find a correspondence/dictionary connecting them. But
the main interest of the theoretical physicist lies in the languages, not in the dictionary:
most efforts will be spent in working within one fixed formulation and exploring all its
implications. Now, the problem of the relation between Wave and Matrix Mechanics, as
tackled by Dirac in 1927, should instead be compared with the problem of relating two
descriptions of the same motion by different frames of reference. The two descriptions
appear then to be just two possible choices among a multitude of other possible ones.
And it is precisely the realization of the existence of this multitude which produces the
conceptual shift introduced by Dirac: the two particular formulations of Schrödinger
and Göttingen become less worthy of study in themselves; rather—this was perhaps
the great methodological lesson of Einstein’s relativity theory—the primary object of
68P. A. M. Dirac. “The Physical Interpretation of the Quantum Dynamics”. In: Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London 113 (1927), pp. 621–641. (Reprinted in: P. A. M. Dirac. The Collected
Works of P.A.M. Dirac: 1924–1948. Ed. by R. Dalitz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995,
pp. 207–229) (reprinted in: idem, The Collected Works of P.A.M. Dirac: 1924–1948, pp. 207–229).
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investigation becomes the transformations between the whole variety of points of view.
Presumably, it was in this spirit that Dirac famously wrote in the preface of his book
The Principles of Quantum Mechanics:
The growth of the use of transformation theory, as applied first to relativity and
later to the quantum theory, is the essence of the new method in theoretical
physics. Further progress lies in the direction of making our equations invariant
under wider and still wider transformations.69
In this way, not only did Dirac manage to render more precise Schrödinger’s equivalence
between Wave and Matrix Mechanics, but he wildly extended it.
With this in mind, let us now turn to the precise content of Dirac’s article, in
which the transformation theory was presented for the first time70. As we have recalled,
Dirac played a major role in the development of Göttingen’s Matrix Mechanics from its
very beginning. It is then not surprising that the starting point of his considerations
was the general dynamical problem as it had been formulated by Heisenberg and his
collaborators. In this setting, the key concept was that of a “scheme of matrices”—that
is, a particular set G of infinite square matrices, each of which represented a dynamical
variable. Dirac concisely summarized the problem as follows:
The solving of a problem in Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics consists in finding a
scheme of matrices to represent the dynamical variables, satisfying the following
conditions:
(i) The quantum conditions, qrpr   prqr = i~, etc.
(ii) The equations of motion, gH Hg = i~ _g, or if g involves the time explicitly
gH  Hg + i~@g@t = i~ _g.
69P. A. M. Dirac. The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. 1st ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930,
p. v.
70In fact, the transformation theory was independently and simultaneously developed by Dirac in
Copenhagen and by Jordan in Göttingen. The latter presented his work in two articles: P. Jordan.
“Über eine neue Begründung der Quantenmechanik”. In: Zeitschrift für Physik 40 (1927), pp. 809–
838, and P. Jordan. “Über eine neue Begründung der Quantenmechanik II”. in: Zeitschrift für Physik
44 (1927), pp. 1–25. The only reason why I discuss solely Dirac’s article is because, to my knowledge,
there exists no English translation of Jordan’s. For a discussion of the transformation theory which
focuses on Jordan’s papers, see A. Duncan and M. Janssen. “From Canonical Transformations to
Transformation Theory, 1926–1927: The Road to Jordan’s Neue Bergündung”. In: Studies In History
and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40.4 (2009),
pp. 352–362.
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(iii) The matrix representing the Hamiltonian H must be a diagonal matrix.
(iv) The matrices representing real variables must be Hermitian.71
However, the solution was not thereby uniquely determined: given a scheme of
matrices G and any invertible matrix b, one could define a new matrix scheme through
the transformation
G  ! G 0 := bGb 1 = bgb 1g 2 G	: (I.4)
The result would also solve the Heisenberg problem if
(2) the coefficients of b did not depend explicitly on time,
(3) b commuted with H,
(4) b 1 was equal to the conjugate transposed of b72,
where the conditions (2)–(4) insured that G 0 met the requirements (ii)–(iv) respectively
(requirement (i) being met for any choice of matrix b).
As we have seen, the remark of this fundamental indeterminacy in the solution
of the general dynamical problem of the quantum theory had first lead Born and
Jordan to claim that the theory was “essentially discontinuous” (cf. subsection I.1.2,
page 34), but it had also allowed them to introduce the general theory of canonical
transformations in the three-man paper. This work was of course known to Dirac from
the beginning—he had already discussed it in his paper on the hydrogen atom. At
the time, he had considered these transformations of “no great practical value”73. But
this was before the emergence of Schrödinger’s undulatory quantum theory and Bohr’s
statistical interpretation.
Now, Dirac returned with renewed energy to understanding the physical signif-
icance of these transformations of the scheme of matrices used to represent the dy-
namical variables. In his approach, the focus was set on the meaning of the indices
71Dirac, “The Physical Interpretation of the Quantum Dynamics”, p. 627. I have here changed
Dirac’s notation slightly: in the original paper, Dirac uses the letter h to refer to the reduced Planck
constant (which is hence sometimes also called the Dirac constant). I have here instead followed the
modern conventions, where h denotes the Planck constant and the reduced Planck constant is referred
to with the symbol ~ := h2 .
72In modern terms, this last condition means that b was required to be a unitary matrix.
73Idem, “Quantum Mechanics and a Preliminary Investigation of The Hydrogen Atom”, p. 565.
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which labelled the matrix coefficients. Associated to a given a matrix scheme, he said,
one should find a set of n real dynamical variables (n being the number of degrees of
freedom of the system under consideration) which were represented by diagonal matri-
ces: the values of the diagonal elements could then be used as labels for the rows and
columns. In this way, a particular scheme of matrices appeared to be closely related to
a preferred choice of dynamical quantities, the indeterminacy in the scheme of matrices
being just a manifestation of a certain freedom in the choice of the preferred dynamical
quantities.
Let us explain this important idea more explicitly74. In the scheme of matrices G,
the physical quantity g is represented by the matrix g with coefficients gab. Here, the
labels a and b are n-tuples of real values: a = (a1; : : : ; an) where ar 2 Ir and each Ir is
the set of possible values of a certain quantity fr. As Dirac remarks, each Ir may be
a discrete and/or continuous set of real values. Therefore, in the scheme of matrices
G, the quantity fr is represented, by definition of the matrix scheme G, through the
diagonal matrix fr whose coefficients are
(fr)ab = ar (a  b): (I.5)
In order for this latter and similar expressions to make sense even in the case of
continuously-varying indices, Dirac famously introduced the “Delta function” (x) de-
fined by the two properties75




Similarly, in the matrix scheme G 0, the same physical quantity g is represented by the
matrix g0 with coefficients g0, where now ;  2 I 01  : : :  I 0n and each I 0r refers to
74Despite the importance that Dirac attached to notation and his undisputed mastery in the in-
vention of new useful ones, I will in the following somehow depart from the original notation of his
paper, which I sometimes find rather confusing for the modern reader. I am thinking in particular of
his choice of using unprimed symbols for the variables (g; ; : : :) and primed symbols for the values of
these variables (g0; 0; : : :).
75Although this is sometimes called “Dirac’s delta function” and its use certainly became widespread
through the work of Dirac, he was not the inventor of it. The function had already been thus defined
by Kirchhoff in 1882 and was also used at least by Heaviside (see O. Darrigol. From c-Numbers
to q-Numbers: The Classical Analogy in the History of Quantum Theory. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992, footnote 84, p. 339 and also Jammer, op. cit., p. 316).
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the set of possible values of a different physical quantity kr which is represented in the
scheme G 0 through a diagonal matrix k0r: (k0r) = r (  ).
In this way, the transformation (I.4) is understood as a transformation from a
point of view which confers a preferred role to the quantities f1; : : : ; fn to a point of
view which confers a preferred role to the quantities k1; : : : ; kn. With all the labels
written down explicitly, (I.4) becomes, for a given quantity g:
g0 = ba gab b
 1
b (I.6)
where I have used Einstein’s summation convention for repeated indices. In partic-
ular, we see that “the new parameters [;  of the new matrix scheme G 0] are quite
unconnected” with the parameters a; b of the matrix scheme G, as Dirac insisted76.
There may even happen that there is “no one-one correspondence between the rows
and columns of the new matrices and those of the original matrices”77 (the spectra
of the quantities f1; : : : ; fn may happen to be all discrete whereas the spectra of the
quantities k1; : : : ; kn may happen to be all continuous).
Finally, Dirac noticed, since by definition the coefficients ba and b 1a of the trans-




a = (  )
b 1b ba = (b  a);
one could consider them as a complete family of mutually orthogonal complex-valued
functions of the parameters  (with a fixed), or of the parameters a (with  fixed). As
we will see in a moment, this apparently trivial remark was quite important for Dirac’s
understanding of Wave Mechanics.
Which was then the relation between this theory of transformations, Heisenberg’s
Matrix Mechanics and Schrödinger’s Wave Mechanics? The answer was in fact quite
simple: the two quantum theories were simply two matrix schemes which differed only
76Dirac, “The Physical Interpretation of the Quantum Dynamics”, p. 628.
77Ibid., p. 628.
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in their choice of the preferred quantities f1; : : : ; fn. Indeed, Göttingen’s quantum
theory had always been set in a matrix scheme G 0 in which the Hamiltonian or energy
function H was a preferred quantity—it was required to be represented by a diagonal
matrix (cf. condition (iii), page 43). The coefficients ;  labelled stationary states
and contained among the numbers r the value of energy E. On the other hand,
Schrödinger’s Wave Mechanics was set in a matrix scheme G in which the configura-
tion variables q1; : : : ; qn were chosen as preferred quantities. The labels a; b were simply
the possible values q0 = (q01; : : : ; q0n) of these quantities, which were represented by the
matrices (qr)q0q1 = q0r (q0   q1) (compare this with Equation I.5, page 44)78. More-
over, Schrödinger’s wave-functions  E(q) were nothing but the complex coefficients ba
of the transformation b which enabled to switch between these two particular matrix
schemes.
Hence, from the heights of Dirac’s general theory of “scheme of matrices” and
transformations between them, one recovered both Heisenberg’s and Schrödinger’s
quantum mechanics as two particular examples or points of view. This theory re-
lied on two crucial concepts. The first was that of a set of preferred quantities, which
was somehow the analogue of a reference frame, thereby furnishing a certain point of
view from which to describe the quantum system. It allowed to define a matrix scheme
by providing labels for the rows and columns. In modern terminology, this “set of pre-
ferred quantities” is called a “complete set of commuting observables” and corresponds
also to the better formalized notion of a “maximal abelian von Neumann subalgebra”79.
78For this last formula, Dirac’s original notation is more transparent, so let me rewrite it with
his notation. Consider the variables q1; : : : ; qn, represented by the matrices q1; : : : ; qn. Let q0 =
(q01; : : : ; q
0
n) be a certain n-tuple of possible values of the quantities q1; : : : ; qn. Then (qr)q0q00 denotes
the numerical coefficient of the matrix qr which is on the row labelled by the n-tuple of values q0 and





This is exactly the statement that, in Schrödinger’s Wave Mechanics representation, the position
operator acts by multiplication. In more familiar notation involving operators, this would be written
as bq0 = q0 (q   q0).
79A “complete set of commuting observables” or CSCO is a set of commuting self-adjoint operators
which admit a unique (up to phase factors) orthonormal basis of common eigenvectors. This is a
standard definition which is found in any textbook on Quantum Mechanics (see for example C. Cohen-
Tannoudji, B. Diu, and F. Laloë. Mécanique quantique. Paris: Hermann, Collection Enseignement des
Sciences, 1973, p. 144). However, this definition does not quite work for infinite-dimensional Hilbert
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The second notion was that of a transformation between matrix schemes, which was the
central object of the theory and contained all the physical information: Schrödinger’s
fundamental wave equation appeared to be an equation on the coefficients ba of these
transformations80. The coefficients, in turn were interpreted as “transition amplitudes”.
Thus, the knowledge of ba allowed to answer what Dirac considered to be “the only
question to which the physicist requires an answer”81: If a system is assumed to have
values 1; : : : ; n of the compatible quantities k1; : : : ; kn, what is the probability that
a measurement of the compatible quantities f1; : : : ; fn will yield the values a1; : : : ; an?
Although it is very tempting, from the vantage modern perspective, to interpret
all Dirac’s machinery in terms of states (a transformation being a change in the basis of
states), it is important to insist on the fact that this notion—of “state”—was completely
absent in his 1927 article. Darrigol lucidly highlights this when discussing Dirac’s
Quantum Mechanics:
There is one feature of Dirac’s original transformation theory that is likely to
surprise the modern quantum physicist: the notion of state vector is completely
absent. [...] Perhaps modern-day interpreters of quantum mechanics should
nevertheless remember that there exists a formulation of quantum mechanics
spaces, where self-adjoint operators may not admit any eigenvector. The best strategy is then to recast
it in an algebraic form. For finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, the existence of a CSCO is equivalent
to the existence of a maximal abelian von Neumann subalgebra of operators, and this latter notion is
still well-defined in the infinite-dimensional case (a ‘maximal abelian subalgebra’ U is an algebra such
that U = U 0, where U 0 denotes the commutant; a ‘von Neumann subalgebra’ U is an algebra such that
U = U 00). For the precise definitions and relations between these notions, see J.-M. Jauch. “Systems
of Observables in Quantum Mechanics”. In: Helvetica Physica Acta 33 (1960), pp. 711–726.
80 Indeed, Schrödinger’s equation arises from Equation I.6 (page 45) by taking g to be the Hamil-
tonian H. To see this, suppose you want to find a matrix scheme G0 such that g is represented by a
diagonal matrix. In other words, you want g0 = r (   ) for some r 2 f1; : : : ; ng. In this case,
Equation I.6 becomes r (  ) = ba gab b 1b , which is equivalently written as
gab b
 1
b = r b
 1
a :
Now, with a simple change of notation: g ! H, r ! E, a! q, b 1 !  , one gets
H  E(q) = E  E(q)
which is Schrödinger’s time-independent equation. There is however one caveat to this “proof” which
will be commented on the next section (cf. page 49).
81Dirac, op. cit., p. 623.
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without state vectors, and with transition amplitudes (transformations) only.82
In the rapidly developing field of quantum mechanics, it was the arrival of the
young Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann which brought again to the fore-
front the notion of state and completed the understanding of the relation between
Heisenberg’s and Schrödinger’s approaches.
I.1.4 Extracting the physics (3): von Neumann’s process of
abstraction
In 1926, around the same time during which Dirac, in Copenhagen, and Jordan,
in Göttingen, were finishing the development of the transformation theory, John von
Neumann came to Göttingen to be David Hilbert’s assistant at only twenty-two years
of age. By then, he had already shown outstanding mathematical skills and Hilbert
called him in order to contribute to his (Hilbert’s) new foundations of Mathematics
programme. However, as was often the case, Hilbert had decided to give a series of
lectures on the mathematical methods of Physics, and the topic of the 1926/1927 winter
semester was—as it could not have been otherwise—the quantum theory. In this way,
by helping in the preparation of these lectures, von Neumann found himself involved
with the most recent developments in the foundations of Quantum Mechanics83. In
May 1927, he presented his first important work on the subject, a sixty-pages long
82Darrigol, op. cit., p. 344.
83For at least twenty five years, Hilbert lectured every so often at Göttingen on the mathematics
of Physics and covered an impressively broad spectrum of topics: Mechanics, Special Relativity,
Kirchhoff’s laws of radiation, Boltzmann’s kinetic theory of gases, General Relativity, etc. This is
all the more impressive if one thinks of it as being just a peripheral activity compared to Hilbert’s
involvement with the whole of Mathematics. For an interesting analysis of the influence of Hilbert’s
lectures in the foundations of Physics, see U. Majer. “The Axiomatic Method and the Foundations of
Science: Historical Roots of Mathematical Physics in Göttingen (1900-1930)”. In: John von Neumann
and the Foundations of Quantum Physics. Ed. by M. Rédei and M. Stöltzner. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2001, pp. 11–31.
For a more detailed historical account of von Neumann’s arrival in Göttingen and the importance of
the 1926/1927 winter lectures on the quantum theory, see J. Mehra and H. Rechenberg. The Historical
Development of Quantum Theory. Volume 6: The Completion of Quantum Mechanics. 1926–1941.
New York: Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 392–411.
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article entitled Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics84, which culminated
five years later in his book with the same title, a masterpiece and invaluable reading
still today for anyone interested in the foundations of Quantum Mechanics85.
As he explains in the opening words of his book, von Neumann had mixed feelings
towards the work accomplished by Dirac. On the one hand, he considered the transfor-
mation theory to be “presumably the definitive form” of the new quantum mechanics
and Dirac’s own book on the subject to be “a representation of quantum mechanics
which is scarcely to be surpassed in brevity and elegance”86. On the other hand, he
was dissatisfied with the mathematical treatment of the theory, which, he said, “in no
way satisfies the requirements of mathematical rigor—not even if these are reduced in
a natural and proper fashion to the extent common elsewhere in theoretical physics”87.
Therefore, when von Neumann approached the subject of quantum mechanics, his main
goal was to find a clean mathematical reformulation of Dirac’s work. He wrote:
It should rather be pointed out that the quantum mechanical “transformation
theory” can be established in a manner which is just as clear and unified, but
which is also without mathematical objections. It should be emphasized that the
correct structure need not consist in a mathematical refinement and explanation
of the Dirac method, but rather that it requires a procedure differing from the
very beginning, namely, the reliance on the Hilbert theory of operators.88 89
84J. von Neumann. “Mathematische Begründung der Quantenmechanik”. In: Nachr. Ges. Wiss.
Göttingen (1927), pp. 1–57.
85J. von Neumann. Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag,
1932 (English translation: J. von Neumann. Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics.
Trans. by R. T. Beyer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955).
86Ibid., p. i and viii.
87Ibid., p. ix.
88Ibid., p. ix.
89 Although the mathematical reformulation of the transformation theory is certainly von Neu-
mann’s original motivation, this fails to do justice to everything he accomplished with his book. For
it is certainly much more than a simple rigorous “reformulation” of Dirac’s work! In this regard, I
prefer another characterization by von Neumann of the achievements of his book, found in a letter to
the president of Dover publications (which would later publish the English translation):
The subject-matter is partly physical-mathematical, partly, however, a very involved con-
ceptual critique of the logical foundations of various disciplines (theory of probability,
thermodynamics, classical mechanics, classical statistical mechanics, quantum mechan-
ics). This philosophical-epistemological discussion has to be continuously tied in and
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In the eyes of von Neumann, Dirac’s method was unacceptable for at least two
reasons. First, it clearly relied on the ability of finding, for any given quantity g, a
matrix scheme in which the chosen quantity would be represented by a diagonal matrix
g. But this was equivalent to supposing any self-adjoint operator to be diagonalizable,
which was a “mathematical fiction”. Second, as we saw in the previous section, Dirac
insisted in regarding Schrödinger’s wave equation
H E(q) = E  E(q) (q 2 
);
which is a differential equation, as the analogue of the linear transformation equation
Hab( E)b = E ( E)a (a; b = 1; 2; : : :)
(cf. page 47 and specially footnote 80). In this way, because he wished to regard dif-
ferential operators acting on Schrödinger’s wave functions as infinite matrices labelled
with a continuously varying index, Dirac’s unification of Matrix and Wave Mechanics
was somewhat grounded in an analogy between the continuous configuration space of
the physical system 
 and the discrete space Z = N. And this intended analogy was
the deep source of all the “violence to the formalism and to mathematics”90 inflicted
by the transformation theory.
Dirac had arrived at this analogy as a consequence of his focus on the labels and
their meaning. The crucial move of von Neumann, which allowed him to get round
all the mathematical difficulties of Dirac’s theory, was a shift of attention. Indeed,
he noticed that all the relevant information of both Wave and Matrix Mechanics was
not contained in the spaces 
 and Z but rather in the functions over these spaces.
At this level, the Fischer-Riesz theorem claimed F
 := L2(
) and FZ := l2(Z) were
quite critically synchronised with the parallel mathematical-physical discussion. It is, by
the way, one of the essential justifications of the book, which gives it a content not covered
in other treatises, written by physicists or by mathematicians, on quantum mechanics.
(Letter to H. Cirker, October 3, 1949. In: J. von Neumann. John von Neumann: Selected
Letters. Ed. by M. Rédei. History of Mathematics. American Mathematical Society, 2005,
p. 92)
90Idem, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, p. 28.
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isomorphic91:
Z and 
 are very different, and to set up a direct relation between them must
lead to great mathematical difficulties. On the other hand, FZ and F
 are
isomorphic [...]—and since they (and not Z and 
 themselves!) are the real
analytical substrata of the matrix and wave theories, this isomorphism means
that the two theories must always yield the same numerical results.92
Had von Neumann only wished to prove the equivalence of Matrix and Wave Me-
chanics, as Schrödinger wanted, this could have very well been his final remark on the
subject. Once it had become clear that only the elements of FZ or F
 were involved
in any calculation of Matrix or Wave Mechanics, the explicit construction of the iso-
morphism given by Fischer and Riesz was exactly the bi-directional correspondence
or dictionary that Schrödinger had been after. With this result, the equivalence be-
tween the two approaches to the quantum theory was firmly established. However, for
von Neumann, the Fischer-Riesz theorem was not the end point but rather the starting
point of his investigations. For indeed the Hungarian mathematician shared with Dirac
the idea of unifying Heisenberg’s and Schrödinger’s mechanics—that is, he wished to
find an overhanging perspective from which both theories would appear as particular
cases of a more general framework. But, as he had already warned, von Neumann’s
method required “a procedure differing from the very beginning” from Dirac’s.
Let us see how he described it:
The following may be said regarding the method employed in this mode of treat-
ment: as a rule, calculations should be performed with the operators themselves
(which represent physical quantities) and not with the matrices, which after the
introduction of a (special and arbitrary) coordinate system in Hilbert space, re-
sult from them. This “coordinate free”, i.e. invariant method, with its geometric
language, possesses noticeable formal advantages.93
91Here, L2(
) is the space of complex-valued square integrable functions over 
, and l2(Z) is the
space of square summable sequences (i.e., sequences (x1; x2; : : :) such that jxij2 is convergent). The
theorem was proven independently by Frigyes Riesz and Ernst Sigismund Fischer in 1907.
92Ibid., p. 31.
93Ibid., p. viii.
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In some regards, this may sound conceptually very similar to Dirac’s 1927 transfor-
mation theory. Recall the relativistic analogy used to grasp Dirac’s approach: the
difference between Matrix and Wave Mechanics could be conceived as similar to the
difference between two descriptions of the same motion from two different frames of
reference. Thus, for both Dirac and von Neumann, Göttingen’s and Schrödinger’s the-
ories arose from particular and arbitrary choices among many other possible ones. And
the choice being made was that of a frame of reference or coordinate system.
Yet, Dirac’s 1927 article and von Neumann’s 1932 book differ radically in how to
deal with this multiplicity of particular and arbitrary choices. Indeed, von Neumann’s
whole methodology consists in avoiding such choices: to elevate oneself and work in
a “coordinate free” fashion with the “operators themselves”—idea which is absent in
Dirac’s original conception94. This move towards a “coordinate free”, “invariant” or
“intrinsic” formulation of Mechanics I call the process of abstraction. It characterizes
the core of von Neumann’s approach and led him to introduce the fundamental notion
of an “abstract Hilbert space” in the following all-important passage which ended the
introductory chapter of his book:
Since the systems FZ and F
 are isomorphic, and since the theories of quan-
tum mechanics constructed on them are mathematically equivalent, it is to be
expected that a unified theory, independent of the accidents of the formal frame-
work selected at the time, and exhibiting only the really essential elements of
94In fact, if the relativistic analogy is taken seriously, one could even argue that, for the Dirac of
1927, it was impossible not to make a choice: it is indeed far from clear what it would mean to free
oneself from all frames of reference and describe the ‘motion itself’...
This reading seems further supported by a passage Dirac wrote in the preface of the first edition of
his 1930 book:
The growth of the use of transformation theory, as applied first to relativity and later
to the quantum theory, is the essence of the new method in theoretical physics. [...]
This state of affairs is very satisfactory from a philosophical point of view, as implying
an increasing recognition of the part played by the observer in himself introducing the
regularities that appear in his observations [...].
(Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, p. v)
Under this light, von Neumann’s “coordinate free” method could appear as a step backwards in the
“recognition of the part played by the observer” since it avoids describing the physical system from
the point of view any particular frame of reference whatsoever.
Of course, Dirac’s attitude towards the multiplicity of choices is much more complex, and this claim
only applies to what stems from his article “The Physical Interpretation of the Quantum Dynamics”.
As a matter of fact, Di
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quantum mechanics, will then be achieved if we do this: Investigate the intrinsic
properties (common to FZ and F
) of these systems of functions, and choose
these properties as a starting point.
The system FZ is generally known as “Hilbert space”. Therefore, our first
problem is to investigate the fundamental properties of Hilbert space, indepen-
dent of the special form of FZ or F
. The mathematical structure which is
described by these properties (which in any special case are equivalently repre-
sented by calculations within FZ or F
, but for general purposes are easier to
handle directly than by such calculations), is called “abstract Hilbert space”.
We wish then to describe the abstract Hilbert space, and then to prove
rigorously the following points:
1. That the abstract Hilbert space is characterized uniquely by the properties
specified, i.e., that it admits of no essentially different realizations.
2. That its properties belong to FZ as well as F
. [...] When this is ac-
complished, we shall employ the mathematical equipment thus obtained to
shape the structure of quantum mechanics.95
As announced, in Chapter II: “Abstract Hilbert Space”, von Neumann went on to
extract the intrinsic properties to be used as a starting point in the definition of this
new mathematical structure R. He proposed the five well-known axioms:
A. R is a complex linear space.
B. An Hermitian inner product is defined in R.
C.(1) There are arbitrarily many linear independent vectors.
D. R is complete.
E. R is separable.96
95Von Neumann, op. cit., pp. 32–33.
96These are the axioms for an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. For a n-dimensional Hilbert space,
axiom C.(1) is replaced by:
C.(n) There are exactly n linear independent vectors.
Axioms D. and E. then follow from the first three. See, respectively, ibid., pp. 36, 38, 45, 46.
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    
In our survey of the earlier developments in the foundations of Quantum Me-
chanics, we have finally arrived at an important methodological precept, which can be
summarized as follows:
Abstract methodological precept. In order to find the physical infor-
mation contained in the mathematics of Mechanics and avoid the “accidents
of the formalism chosen at the time”, work directly with the relevant ab-
stract mathematical structures “themselves” and not with the systems that
represent it.
I have voluntarily phrased this advice in more general terms, so that it is not thought
to be confined solely to Quantum Mechanics and abstract Hilbert spaces, nor is it
associated only to von Neumann. Indeed, although I have motivated it in this partic-
ular context, the abstract methodological precept should be considered as much more
general, and owes as much to Dirac and Weyl as it does to von Neumann97.
With regard to our initial inquiry—namely, to clarify which mathematical objects
can be considered as acceptable candidates for characterizing physical systems—the
main lesson to take from these years of development of Quantum Mechanics is the
following: the mathematical objects involved in the descriptions of physical systems
need to be conceived abstractly. If a quantum-mechanical system is to be described by
a Hilbert space at all, then it ought to be described by an abstract Hilbert space. In
the same way, one needs abstract symplectic manifolds in Classical Mechanics.
97Taking aside his 1927 “The Physical Interpretation of the Quantum Dynamics”, Dirac indeed
emphasised in many other places the advantages of working at a purely symbolic level. Here is for
example a quote from his book in 1930:
One does not anywhere specify the exact nature of the symbols employed, nor is such a
specification at all necessary. They are used all the time in an abstract way, the algebraic
axioms that they satisfy and the connections between equations involving them and
physical conditions being all that is required.
(Dirac, op. cit., p. 18)
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The awareness of this feature is perhaps not as clear in the Classical setting as
it is in the Quantum. As we have just seen, the particular way in which Quantum
Mechanics was developed forced it, from the outset, into higher levels of abstraction.
But in Classical Mechanics, one still tended to adopt, in the practice, a naive real-
istic reading of the mathematical formalism and to get attached to the ‘materiality’
of certain mathematical constructions—just recall Schrödinger’s appeal to the “visu-
alizability” of Classical Mechanics. For instance, when dealing with the Hamiltonian
description of a given classical system, one generally had the impression of working
with a particular, ‘concrete’ symplectic manifold and sticking to it. Therein, there
seemed to be no analogue of a ‘change of representation’ from a certain ‘Heisenberg
representation’ to a ‘Schrödinger representation’. Nonetheless, when one considers the
developments in the mathematical foundations of Classical Mechanics of the last sixty
years, it becomes clear this is an impression we must abandon: to describe the space of
states of a free massive non-relativistic particle, one can use the cotangent bundle T R3
with its natural symplectic structure or decide to work in the space R3R3 and impose
! = dqi ^ dpi as an ad hoc definition. Of course, the two descriptions are ‘the same’,
but only insofar as the two symplectic spaces are isomorphic98. The sense of working
“up to isomorphism” is hence present in both Classical and Quantum Mechanics.
However, von Neumann’s call to work at the level of the abstract structures them-
selves, and not at the level of their particular representations or coordinatizations,
surely requires some important elucidations. What exactly does the adjective ‘ab-
stract’ stand for when we apply it to a mathematical object? What exactly is an
abstract Hilbert space R, and in which way does it differ from the Hilbert spaces F

and FZ? In this regard, the above quoted passages from his book mention many dif-
ferent ideas which need to be clarified and which will be discussed at length in the
98A less trivial—but mathematically more sophisticated—example can be found in the classical
analogue of the theory of systems of imprimitivity developed by George Mackey. In this theory, the
classical phase space associated to a free massive (spin-zero) non-relativistic particle is the dual of
the action Lie algebroid R3 n R3, and one knows this theory to be equivalent to the usual point of
view because this space can be proven to be isomorphic to the cotangent bundle T R3. For a more
detailed exposition of this description, see N. P. Landsman. “Between Classical and Quantum”. In:
Philosophy of Physics (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science) 2 volume set. Ed. by J. Butterfield
and J. Earman. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 2007, pp. 417–554. url: http:
//arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0506082, pp. 461–462.
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following sections. Let us list them:
1. Hierarchy of levels. There seems to be (at least) two different levels: the one of
abstract mathematical structures and the one of particular “systems”, which are
“realizations” of the abstract ones.
2. One-to-many relation. Given an abstract structure, there are many isomorphic
systems which realize it. Conversely, given many isomorphic systems, there is a
unique abstract structure of which they are realizations.
3. Uniqueness of kind. Both the abstract and the systems are of the same kind
(e.g., both the abstract R and the system F
 are Hilbert spaces).
4. Commonality. The “intrinsic” properties of the “abstract” are “common” to the
different systems.
5. Schematic nature. The properties of the abstract Hilbert space are “independent
of the accidents” of the systems that realize it.
Moreover, the concept of “isomorphism” plays a fundamental role: it is the starting
point of von Neumann’s process of abstraction.
Undoubtedly, these features are not particular to the discussion of abstract Hilbert
spaces. The same ideas may be found in, e.g., Hermann Weyl’s writings on abstract
groups—to choose another example highly relevant for the mathematics of Mechanics.
He says:
A group   is a set of correspondences containing the identity E, the inverse S 1
of any S in   and the composite TS of any two correspondences S and T in  .
Considered as an abstract group scheme , our set   consists of elements s (of
irrelevant nature) for which a composition st is defined satisfying [the usual
group axioms]. The given transformation group   is a faithful realization of the
abstract group scheme .99
And also:
In the study of groups of transformations one does well to stress the mere struc-
ture of such a group. This is accomplished by attaching arbitrary labels to its
99H. Weyl. The Classical Groups - Their Invariants and Representations. 2nd ed. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1946. (First edition: 1939), p. 14. Italics are Weyl’s, bold typeface is
mine.
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elements and then expressing in terms of these labels for any two group elements
s, t what the result u = st of their composition is. If the group is finite one could
tabulate the composition of elements. The group scheme or abstract group
thus obtained is itself a structural entity, its structure represented by the
law or table of composition for its elements, st = u.100
Or, to choose a couple of more modern mathematicians, we can read Makkai claiming
that
[...] two groups that are isomorphic share all structural properties; they are
structurally indistinguishable.101
Mac Lane explaining that
All infinite cyclic groups are isomorphic, but this infinite group appears over and
over again — in number theory, in ornaments, in crystallography, and in physics.
Thus, the ‘existence’ of this group is really a many-splendored matter.102
and Lawvere emphasizing that
In the mathematical development of recent decades one sees clearly the rise of the
conviction that the relevant properties of mathematical objects are those which
can be stated in terms of their abstract structure rather than in terms of the
elements which the objects were thought to be made of.103
To sum up, it has emerged that physical systems are described by using some
sort of ‘abstract mathematical structures”. Yet, we are missing a precise account of
what abstract mathematical structures are. The task of such an account is to provide
an explanation of the above features 1 through 5. Of course, it is a priori possible
100H. Weyl. Symmetry. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952 (reprinted in 1989), p. 145.
Bold is mine.
101M. Makkai. “Towards a Categorical Foundation of Mathematics”. In: Logic Colloquium ’95
(Haifa). Vol. 11. Lecture Notes Logic. Berlin: Springer, 1998, pp. 153–190, p. 161.
102S. Mac Lane. “Structure in Mathematics”. In: Philosophia Mathematica 4.2 (1996), pp. 174–183,
p. 182 (Cited in: A. Rodin. “Categories Without Structures”. In: Philosophia Mathematica 19 (2011),
pp. 20–46, p. 22).
103F. W. Lawvere. “The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics”. In: Proceedings
of the Conference on Categorical Algebra. Springer. Berlin, 1966, pp. 1–20, p. 1 (cited in R. Krömer.
Tool and Object: A History and Philosophy of Category Theory. Vol. 32. Historical Studies. Berlin:
Springer Science & Business Media, 2007, p. 211).
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to have more than one account. Our goal is simply to find one proposal that does
the job and that might fruitfully be used in the remaining parts of our analysis of
Mechanics. Methodologically, it is important to distinguish the work done by the
notions of “abstraction” and “structure”: which of the features can be explained by the
fact that an abstract mathematical structure is an abstract entity? Which necessitate
the fact that this entity is, in particular, a structure? Therefore, the strategy to follow
to address the conceptual clarification of von Neumann’s methodological precept is the
following:
i) Confer a meaning to “abstraction” and “mathematical structuralism”.
ii) Understand the key role played by isomorphisms in relation with these two con-
cepts.
iii) Explain, in this conceptual scheme, the remaining features (1 through 5).
This is certainly a large problem which goes well beyond the physical interpre-
tation of the mathematics of Mechanics. As so, we will not restrain ourselves from
treating it in as general terms as possible. But in doing so, we should not forget that,
ultimately, we are interested in the mathematical objects involved in the foundations
of Mechanics, and in the conceptual problems that arise in the practice of this field.
Hence, although we will try to deal with abstraction and structuralism in full gener-
ality, we will nonetheless systematically ignore problems that are seemingly irrelevant
for the foundations of Mechanics (cf. Lawvere’s quote, section ). We will start by
first considering abstraction, to understand which of the features 1. through 5. can or
cannot be accounted for (section I.2). We will then move to the study of mathematical
structuralism (section I.3).
I.2 Abstract mathematical entities
There is in the analytical tradition of philosophy a vivid debate on the status of
abstract objects. It usually discusses three clearly distinguished questions: one onto-
logical—what kind of objects are abstract objects?—, one epistemological—how do we
gain knowledge on these objects?—and one terminological—how should be precisely
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drawn the distinction between abstract and concrete objects? The debate, in its con-
temporary analytical setting, is often seen as originating from the 1947 article “Steps
Toward a Constructive Nominalism” by Nelson Goodman and Willard V.O. Quine104,
and the main reference on the subject is perhaps the work of Michael Dummett105.
Most famous are also Lewis’ four ways of attempting to explain the abstract/concrete
distinction: the Way of Example, which simply lists paradigmatic examples of concrete
objects, such as donkeys, and of abstract objects, such as numbers; the Way of Confla-
tion, which relates the abstract/concrete distinction to other metaphysical distinctions,
such as the particular/universal distinction; the Negative Way, which attempts to char-
acterize abstract objects by their lacking of some property, such as their lack of causal
interaction or of spatiotemporal location; and finally the Way of Abstraction, which
rests on having already an account of the process of abstraction106.
However, as it should be clear, our quest for an explanation of the adjective ‘ab-
stract’, as it appears in expressions such as ‘abstract Hilbert spaces’, ‘abstract groups’
or ‘abstract C-algebras’, has little to do with the general debate on abstract objects
that occupies many analytical philosophers. For indeed the adjective ‘abstract’ applied
to such mathematical structures is used here to introduce a distinction between entities
which are all abstract on any account of the abstract/concrete distinction. The Hilbert
space FZ := l2(N), although it is not an abstract Hilbert space in the sense of von
Neumann, would certainly not belong to the category of concrete objects in the sense
of Lewis or Dummett. Therefore, if we are to address the problem of the nature of
abstract mathematical entities, it is better to understand ‘abstract’ not as opposed to
‘concrete’, but rather to ‘particular’.
104N. Goodman and W. V. O. Quine. “Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism”. In: Journal of
Symbolic Logic 12 (1947), pp. 105–122.
105In particular, M. Dummett. Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Duckworth, 1991. For
a nice introduction to Dummett’s ideas, see also G. Duke. Dummett on Abstract Objects. History of
Analytical Philosophy. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012
106See D. Lewis. On the Plurality of Worlds. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 81–86.
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I.2.1 Ontology: the abstract/particular as hierarchy of objects
In order to give an account of the abstract/particular distinction, one first possible
strategy is to try to interpret the hierarchy of levels—abstract mathematical structures
on one side, particular systems on the other—as a hierarchy between two clearly dis-
tinguished kinds of mathematical objects. Von Neumann’s wish of “describing the
abstract Hilbert space” and its “intrinsic properties” certainly seems to point in the
direction of reifying the abstract entities. The goal is then to find a precise definition
of these abstract mathematical objects, such as H107.
To this end, a natural move is to attempt to use the so-called abstraction principles
of the neo-Fregean logicism programme108. In their general form, these principles are
written as
8S; S 0 2 V1
 4(S) = 4(S 0) ! S  S 0 (I.7)
where S; S 0 are elements of a certain universe V1,  is an equivalence relation defined
on V1 and 4 is an operator applicable to elements of V1. It is precisely this operator
that introduces the hierarchy of levels: S; S 0 are the particular objects and 4(S) is
intended to be a new abstract object found as a result of the abstraction principle
(I.7). Some paradigmatic examples of this abstraction principle which are often cited
are:
– the direction of a line, where V1 is the set of all lines contained in, say, the Eu-
clidean two-dimensional plane, 4( ) is ‘the direction of’ and  is the equivalence
107Now that we have widened the discussion and the focus is no longer only on von Neumann’s work,
I will change the notation referring to abstract Hilbert spaces: instead of von Neumann’s R, I will use
the nowadays more standard H.
108This programme—sometimes dubbed Neo-Fregeanism, Neo-Logicism or Abstractionism—is usu-
ally taken to initiate with Crispin Wright’s Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects in 1983, which
revived some of Frege’s central ideas in his attempt to provide a foundation for arithmetic. Since then,
the philosophical literature on the subject has abysmally grown. Attempting a survey of this would
certainly take us too far afield. For an introduction, I refer the reader to F. MacBride. “Speaking
with Shadows: A Study of Neo-logicism”. In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003),
pp. 103–163 or to B. Hale and C. Wright. “Logicism in The Twenty-First Century”. In: The Oxford
Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Ed. by S. Shapiro. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005, pp. 166–202. A more in-depth approach is provided by the collection of articles R. T.
Cook, ed. The Arché Papers on the Mathematics of Abstraction. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.
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relation of being parallel (this is Frege’s original example);
– the shape of a figure, where V1 is the set of all possible figures contained in, say,
the Euclidean two-dimensional plane, 4( ) is ‘the shape of’ and  is similarity
between figures (this is Weyl’s example)109;
– the cardinal number of a finite set, where V1 is a fixed universe of finite sets,
4( ) is ‘the cardinal number of’ and  is the existence of a bijection between
two sets.
Already at this early stage of the discussion, some basic features of the process of
abstraction, as understood by the neo-Fregean logicists, are apparent. First, the partic-
ular systems S; S 0 are at least epistemologically prior to the abstract object 4(S): one
starts by having a fixed domain of particulars on which there is defined an equivalence
relation, and only then one has access to the abstract. This appears to be in agreement
with—or at least does not blatantly contradict—von Neumann’s road towards abstract
Hilbert spaces which starts by studying the properties of two particular systems (F

and FZ). Second, according to this account of abstraction, the fundamental ingredient
which underlies the process of abstraction is that of an equivalence relation. Without
the notion of ‘parallelism of lines’, one cannot even conceive the concept of ‘direction’.
Hence, under this view, the definition of the equivalence relation is also prior to the
definition of the abstract object. Third, in the process of abstraction, as conceived by
the neo-Fregeans, the essential trait of isomorphisms is that they induce the equiva-
lence relation “being isomorphic”. Following Andrei Rodin, we will call this conception
“isomorphism–qua–equivalence”110.
109H. Weyl. Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science. Trans. by O. Helmer. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 9. Recall that two figures F and F 0 in the Euclidean plane E2
are similar if there exists an automorphism of E2 which transforms F into F 0.
110 In his article “Categories Without Structures”, Rodin distinguishes three different ways of thinking
about isomorphisms: isomorphism–qua–equivalence, in which one only retains that ‘being isomorphic’
is en equivalence relation; isomorphism–qua–correspondence, where an isomorphism between E1 and
E2 is thought as a one-to-one (and onto) correspondence between the elements of the two objects;
and isomorphism–qua–transformation, where one stresses the direction of the isomorphism (say, from
E1 to E2) and where the idea that E1 and E2 are composed of elements is not essential. Thus, “the
same isomorphism–qua–correspondence gives rise to two isomorphisms–qua–transformations” (Rodin,
op. cit., p. 25). In the next section, we will add to these three conceptions a fourth one: isomorphism–
qua–possible-identification.
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But, as Angelelli rightly remarks in his discussion of Frege’s account of abstraction,
the sole principle (I.7) does not suffice, for it does not give an explicit and unambiguous
definition of what 4(S) is111. One simple possibility is to read it as saying that, in
fact, 4(S) is defined as the equivalence class of the system S. Symbolically:
4(S) := [S]eq: (I.8)
For the above paradigmatic examples, this reading works perfectly fine. There is indeed
no fundamental problem in defining the finite cardinal numbers to be equivalence classes
of finite sets112. Furthermore, this view is explicitly endorsed by some important
mathematicians. Let us see, for example, how Irving Segal explains the difference
between concrete and abstract C-algebras:
[...] we define as a concrete C-algebra A, an algebra of bounded linear operators
on a real or complex Hilbert space [...]. Now two concrete C-algebras may be
algebraically isomorphic (in one-to-one correspondence in a fashion making sums,
products, and adjoints correspond) without there being any simple connection
whatsoever between the Hilbert spaces on which the respective operators act.
The relevant object here is an abstract C-algebra, which may be defined as
an equivalence class of C-algebras under algebraic isomorphism. The
set of all self-adjoint elements of an abstract C-algebra forms then a physical
111I. Angelelli. “Frege and Abstraction”. In: Philosophia Naturalis 21 (1984), pp. 453–471, pp. 463–
464.
112See for example S. Mac Lane. Mathematics, Form and Function. New York: Springer, 1986,
p. 59. Nevertheless, with that definition, a finite cardinal number would not be a set but rather a
proper class. This implies that one cannot talk about the set of all finite cardinal numbers, since
in axiomatic set theory it is not allowed to form a set whose elements are proper classes. Bertrand
Russell did not consider this point to be a serious objection:
Thus a cardinal number is the class of all those classes that are similar to a given class.
This definition leaves unchanged the truth-values of all propositions in which cardinal
numbers occur, and avoids the inference to a set of entities called ‘cardinal numbers’,
which were never needed except for the purpose of making arithmetic intelligible, and
are no longer needed for that purpose.
(B. Russell. “Logical Atomism”. In: Contemporary British Philosophers. Ed. by J.
Muirhead. London: Allen and Unwin, 1924, pp. 356–383. (Reprinted in: B. Russell.
Logic and Knowledge. Ed. by R. Marsh. London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, pp. 323–343),
p. 327.)
However, precisely in order to avoid this ‘objection’ and be able to consider the set of all finite cardinal
numbers, von Neumann proposed another definition of them (as initial ordinals).
Chapter I. Mathematical Description of Physical Systems 63
system.113
This simple view has a certain evident appeal. It certainly establishes a two-level
hierarchy of well-defined objects and it illuminates the one-to-many relation: there
is one unique abstract object of which S is a realization because there is one unique
equivalence class to which S belongs, and different “realizations” of the abstract object
are just different ‘representatives’—that is, different members—of the equivalence class.
It therefore explains features 1 and 2 (page 56) and also seems to deal with feature
5—the particular nature of the members of the class is completely irrelevant to the
properties of the equivalence class.
But, despite all this, and despite Segal’s explicit definition, there is an obvious
problem with definition (I.8). This is best seen by taking an example: according to
(I.8), we should have
H := [L2(R)]eq:
Now, since, by definition, L2(R) and l2(N) are among the elements of the equivalence
class, and since the combination L2(R)  l2(N) is meaningless, we see there is no sense
in writing arbitrary linear combinations of elements of H. Thus, this newly defined
abstract ‘Hilbert space’ clearly fails to be a complex Hilbert space and any talk about
linear operators defined on H reveals to be complete nonsense!114
In fact, in the attempt to explain notions such as ‘abstract groups’, ‘abstract
Hilbert spaces’ or ‘abstract C-algebras’, definition (I.8) is such a blunder that one
cannot seriously consider that such fine a mathematician as Segal literally endorsed it.
On the contrary, one is pressed to find a more sophisticated account that avoids the
113I. E. Segal. “Mathematical Problems of Relativistic Physics”. In: Proceedings of the Summer
Conference, Boulder, Colorado. Ed. by M. Kac. American Mathematical Society, 1960, pp. 8–9, the
italics are Segal’s, the bold type emphasis is mine.
114This critique is pointed out by John Burgess in his review of Stewart Shapiro’s book. He writes:
Sometimes they [abstract structures] are confused with isomorphism types, but this is a
mistake: An isomorphism type is no more a special kind of system than a direction is a
special kind of line.
(J. P. Burgess. “Review of Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology by
Stewart Shapiro”. In: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40.2 (1999), pp. 283–291,
p. 287)
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definition of the abstract object as the isomorphism class of its realizations and yet re-
mains somewhat faithful to this idea. Here, it is important to remark a main difference
between the three examples given above—direction, shape and cardinal number—and
the type of abstract objects we are after—groups, Hilbert spaces, C-algebras. It is
the following: whereas we think of an abstract group as composed of various abstract
elements, we do not think in the same way of one given cardinal number. To put it
succinctly, the difference is exactly that between the notion of an ‘abstract set with
three elements’ and the notion of the ‘cardinal number 3’. The abstraction principle
(I.7) and the definition (I.8) allow to grasp the latter but not the former.
This last remark immediately suggests a new attempt to define the abstract objects
by means of an abstraction principle. The main idea is simply to somewhat reverse the
procedure of definition (I.8): instead of using an abstraction principle to directly define
the abstract object as a whole—strategy which fails, as we just saw, since it does not
give a proper account of the abstract elements: the elements of H := [L2(R)]eq were not
the abstract vectors we were expecting—, use an abstraction principle to first define
each abstract element separately and then define the abstract object as the set of all
the abstract elements. A flavor of this is clearly found in the work of the 19th century
German mathematician Heinrich Weber, one of the first mathematicians to work on
abstract groups. He says:
We can ... combine all isomorphic groups into a single class of groups that is itself
a group whose elements are the generic concepts obtained by making one general
concept out of the corresponding elements of the individual isomorphic groups.
The individual isomorphic groups are then to be regarded as different represen-
tatives of the generic concept, and it makes no difference which representative is
used to study the properties of the group.115
115H. Weber. “Die allgemeinen Grundlagen der Galois’schen Gleichungstheorie”. In: Mathematische
Annalen 43 (1893), pp. 521–549, p. 524 (English translation cited in H. Wussing. The Genesis of
the Abstract Group Concept. Trans. by A. Shenitze. Cambridge, MA: Dover Publications, Inc., 1984,
p. 248, my emphasis).
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Now, a precise elaboration of this idea is found in the paper “Two Types of Ab-
straction for Structuralism” written by Linnebo and Pettigrew116. The proposal runs
as follows: for any two systems S; S 0 and any elements x 2 S and x0 2 S 0, define the
abstraction principle
4(x) = 4(x0) ! 9f f : S  ! S 0 and f(x) = x0: (I.9)
Here, 4(x) denotes the abstract element of which x is a representative. In other words,
the abstract element is the equivalence class of elements of particular systems which
are connected by an isomorphism:
4(x) := [x]eq: (I.10)
With this definition in hand, the abstract object 4(S) is defined by
4(S) := f4(x) jx 2 Sg: (I.11)
As a side remark, one should notice that now the fact that an isomorphism is a bi-
jective function is essential. We have thus moved from the conception of isomorphism–
qua–equivalence of the previous definition to the conception of isomorphism–qua–
correspondence (cf. footnote 110, page 61).
Under this second view, when Segal writes that ‘an abstract C-algebra is an
equivalence class of C-algebras under algebraic isomorphism’, he rather meant: ‘an
element of an abstract C-algebras is an equivalence class of elements of C-algebras
under algebraic isomorphism’. The particular example the two authors have in mind is
the abstract field of real numbers R—in contradistinction with the various particular
realizations of this field. The system S would be Dedekind’s model of the real numbers
in terms of cuts, and S 0 would be Cantor’s model in terms of equivalence classes of
Cauchy sequences. In this case, definitions (I.10) and (I.11) lead to defining the abstract
116Ø. Linnebo and R. Pettigrew. “Two Types of Abstraction for Structuralism”. In: The Philosoph-
ical Quaterly 64.255 (2014), pp. 267–283, see in particular pp. 274–278 for the development of this
point.
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real number field by
R := f[x]eq jx 2 Sg: (I.12)
This a perfectly satisfactory definition which succeeds in explaining all the features of
the abstract/particular relation (page 56). In particular, it is indeed the case that the
abstract object R so defined is a field isomorphic to the system S which realizes it.
However, as Linnebo and Pettigrew do not miss to notice, the success of this
second approach to the definition of abstract mathematical objects is concomitant of
the example chosen. It works for the real number field but fails in general. It even fails
spectacularly for other well-chosen examples. Consider for instance the notion of an
‘abstract n-dimensional vector space V ’—which one easily finds in the mathematical
literature—and attempt to define it explicitly according to definitions (I.10) and (I.11)
so that
V := f[x]eq jx 2 Rng: (I.13)
The problem here is that for any two non-zero vectors of Rn—call them x1 and x2—
there exists an isomorphism of vector spaces of Rn with itself—call it f—such that
f(x1) = x2. Hence, we see that the abstract n-dimensional ‘vector space’ V defined
by (I.13) consists of only two elements: the class [0]eq of the zero vectors and the class
[6= 0]eq of non-vanishing vectors. Thus, V is certainly not an n-dimensional vector
space!
It therefore appears that, after all, this second, somewhat more sophisticated
approach to understanding abstract entities by means of abstraction principles faces
exactly the same problems as the naive approach of (I.8) (page 62), exception made of
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some very particular examples117. If the abstract/particular hierarchy is to be under-
stood as a hierarchy of mathematical objects, then the logicists abstraction principles
do not seem enough to grasp the situation. As Linnebo and Pettigrew conclude,
[...] this cannot be the sort of abstraction championed by Frege and developed
by the neo-Fregeans: for this sort of abstraction yields an unacceptable result for
many non-rigid structures.118
But then, in the face of such difficulties, it is natural to wonder whether one has
not taken the wrong road from the very beginning. To be successful, any ontological
account of the abstract/particular hierarchy needs to define two types of mathematical
objects such that:
i) both the abstract and the particular are of the same kind,
ii) the abstract is defined in such a way to be clearly distinguished from the partic-
ular.
By adopting first definition (I.8) (page 62) and then definition (I.11) (page 65), the
latter requirement was directly addressed, but the former was seen not to be met. In
fact, one clearly perceives the difficulty of satisfying both requirements, since they tend
to pull in opposite directions: the one wishes a unifying framework for the abstract
object and its realizations, while the other demands a distinguishing framework. The
striving for an ontological distinction may thus seem artificial and unnecessarily restric-
tive. Perhaps, one should better abandon altogether this ontological interpretation of
the abstract/particular hierarchy, and rather explore a more natural epistemological
explanation. To this other possible strategy we now turn.
117It is easy to characterize precisely when this approach is going to be successful, as it was the
case with the real numbers. The key feature that distinguished the example of the real number
field from the example of abstract vector spaces was the presence, in the latter case, of non-trivial
automorphisms. Mathematical objects which admit no non-trivial automorphisms, such as the real
number field R or the rational number field Q, are called rigid. For such objects, it will never be
the case that two elements of a certain particular realization belong to the same equivalence class (as
defined by equation (I.9)), and the abstract object (as defined by (I.11)) will then be isomorphic to
each of its realizations (see ibid., Proposition 5.1., p. 276).
118Ibid., p. 283.
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I.2.2 Epistemology: the abstract/particular as hierarchy of
information
As we have just explained, the ‘hierarchy of levels’ and the ‘uniqueness of kind’
(features 1 and 3, page 56) seem to pull in opposite directions if they are both in-
terpreted ontologically. This was recognized as the core difficulty of the ontological
approach to abstract entities. A natural move is then to circumvent the problem by
simply interpreting the abstract/particular distinction as a purely epistemological issue
and understanding the hierarchy of levels as a hierarchy of information.
An account along these lines is readily found in the writings of the mathematician
Saunders Mac Lane. In his book Mathematics, Form and Function, the author gives
a short account of his views on abstraction. After giving a very general idea of what
abstraction amounts to119, he proceeds to distinguish between three forms of abstrac-
tion, which he calls abstraction by deletion, abstraction by analogy and abstraction by
shift of attention. The three are certainly worth discussing by themselves. However, in
relation to our present investigation, the process of abstraction by deletion appears to
be the most relevant one: Mac Lane indeed regards ‘abstract groups’ as a paradigmatic
example of a mathematical concept attained through abstraction by deletion. Thus
we concentrate solely on this specific form of abstraction, which is probably also the
simplest of them all. The author describes it as follows:
Abstraction by deletion is a straightforward process: One carefully omits part
of the data describing the mathematical concept in question to obtain the more
“abstract” concept. [...] For example, if one starts with the notion of a transfor-
mation, one may delete the elements being transformed but retain the associative,
identity and inverse laws for the composition of transformations. The result is
the notion of an “abstract” group.120
119He writes: “An “abstraction” is intended to pick out certain central aspects of the prior instances
and to free them from aspects extraneous to the purpose at hand. Thus abstraction is likely to lead
to the description and analysis of new and more austere or more “abstract” mathematical concepts.”
(Mac Lane, op. cit., p. 436)
120Ibid., p. 436. Here is a rough idea of the other two forms of abstraction. First, abstraction by
shift of attention occurs when, in the development of a certain mathematical theory, some concepts
which were first ignored are realized to be the key ingredients. The example used by Mac Lane to
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As simple and “straightforward” as this process may be, it surely requires some
further clarifications. But the main point should not be missed: from this point of
view, the process of abstraction (by deletion) is not conceived as a process allowing
to attain entities of a dubious ontological nature, but just as a methodological decision
to disregard a certain amount of data. All mathematical objects are on equal footing,
and an abstract object is nothing more than a particular object for which some data
is forgotten, left unspecified121. In other words, any Hilbert space is some specific
Hilbert space, and one talks about an “abstract” Hilbert space when there is not
enough available information to ascertain which specific Hilbert space one is referring
to. Now, as Mac Lane explains, trying to recover the missing information—thus trying
to decide to which particular entity the abstract is referring to—is usually an important
mathematical problem:
This [abstraction by deletion] often leads to a reverse process, in which it is shown
that all (or some) of the abstract objects can have the deleted data restored,
perhaps in more than one way. Such a restoration is then called a “representation
theorem”.122
But one should not necessarily strive for this restoration: the lack of information
characteristic of the abstract entity should by no means be thought as a drawback.
Instead, it may appear as a welcomed methodological simplification allowing to focus
on some chosen features of the theory—remain at a certain level of ‘unspecification’
and study which knowledge can be gained without further assumptions. Consider for
example the following two theorems:
illustrate his point is the development of topology, where the notion of ‘open subsets’ slowly evolved
to become the central concept of the theory: one passed from sets embedded in Euclidean space to
abstract metric spaces and finally to abstract topological spaces. Second, abstraction by analogy arises
when a strong similarity is recognized between two different theories. Mac Lane here cites as example
the introduction of the notion of a modular lattice, which is the key ingredient to prove both the
Jordan-Hölder theorem for finite groups (two composition series of a finite group are of same length)
and the fact that two bases of a vector space have same cardinality.
121The idea that abstracting is not possible without forgetting—for one would constantly be immersed
in an infinite sea of details—is beautifully put in Jorge Luis Borges’ short story “Funes the Memorious”.
122Ibid., p. 436.
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Theorem I.1. Let H be an abstract Hilbert space and A any linear operator on H.
Then A is everywhere continuous if it is continuous at the point f = 0.123
Theorem I.2. Let x be a real number, then x2 + 1 admits a square root.124
According to the present view of abstraction by deletion, there is no conceptual
difference between these two theorems. In the same way that Theorem I.2 is clearly not
perceived as referring to some strange mathematical object ‘the abstract real number’
of which all particular real numbers would be realizations, Theorem I.1 should not be
interpreted as a claim about a strange mathematical structure called “the” abstract
Hilbert space, but simply as an assertion valid for any particular Hilbert space. And
precisely because of this—because abstraction is here seen as a linguistic shortcut
allowing to express claims which are valid for a variety of particulars—the specificities
of the particular become irrelevant. If abstraction is the methodological decision of
‘omitting part of the data’ and remaining at the chosen level of unspecification, then, by
definition, abstract entities such as ‘abstract Hilbert spaces’ are schematic. Therefore,
features 1, 3, 4 and 5 are easily understood in this setting.
Now, by dissolving the abstract/particular as an ontological distinction, eliminat-
ing the idea of abstract Hilbert spaces as objects in their own right, and declaring that
‘any Hilbert space is a particular Hilbert space’, this point of view has come to rest
on the notion of ‘particular entities’. And a clarification of this notion is needed. This
point seems especially pressing since we are here dealing with the realm of Mathematics
and it is by no means clear what a particular (as opposed to abstract) mathematical
object might be. If we were here concerned by general abstraction, the notion of ‘par-
ticular objects’ would perhaps not be so suspicious. To take a common example in the
literature, the claim ‘The white queen is allowed to move in any direction of the chess
board’ can be thought as a claim about an abstract entity (the white queen)125. Here,
123I take this theorem from von Neumann, op. cit., p. 99.
124This example is taken from S. Awodey. “An Answer to Hellman’s Question: ‘Does Category
Theory Provide a Framework for Mathematical Structuralism?’” In: Philosophia Mathematica 12.1
(2004), pp. 54–64, p. 59.
125Analogies with the game of chess are widespread in the work of Stewart Shapiro, one of the main
defenders of mathematical structuralism.
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one can adopt exactly the same epistemological account of abstraction and understand
this as a claim valid for any white queen. ‘The white queen’ is not a platonic abstract
object and any white queen is some particular white queen, having a specific shape,
made of some specific material, etc. Whether it is a plastic queen or a wooden queen
is irrelevant to the claim, and the information is judiciously omitted. Presumably, the
concept of ‘particular objects’ does not seem to pose any trouble in this case because
there is an underlying ontology presupposed126. Similarly, it appears that the above
epistemological view on mathematical abstraction needs to presuppose an analogous
underlying ontology—one allowing to define what it means to be a ‘particular mathe-
matical object’. One possible solution is to adopt the extensional view that dominated
Mathematics during the first half of the 20th century and that still overwhelmingly
dominates the Philosophy of Mathematics. According to it, all mathematical objects
are sets, explicitly constructed from the null set, and to know all the information about
a particular object is to know exactly which are the elements that compose it127.
This being said, let us turn to the understanding, in this account, of the role of
isomorphisms and the one-to-many relation. What does it mean to say that “L2(R3)
and l2(N) are different realizations of H”? Remember, H and L2(R3) are of the same
nature—they are both particular Hilbert spaces and what distinguishes them is the
amount of information we have about them: we know more about L2(R3) than about
H. So, in the ongoing understanding of abstraction, it would make no sense to inter-
pret ‘realization’ as ‘embodiment’. Given H, L2(R3) and l2(N), consider the following
important question: is H equal to L2(R3)? As it should be clear, there is no way to
126In fact, even here one could argue that the notion of a ‘particular white queen’ is not so easily
dealt with. Consider for instance a game of chess on the internet between two players in different parts
of the world. To explain what kind of particular object is ‘the white queen’ to which both players
refer is certainly not an easy task...
127This extensional view has been recently criticized, both for mathematical and philosophical rea-
sons. For a nice description—geared to a philosophically-oriented audience—of some developments in
main stream contemporary mathematics pushing away from this view, see J.-P. Marquis. “Mathemat-
ical Forms and Forms of Mathematics: Leaving the Shores of Extensional Mathematics”. In: Synthese
190.12 (2013), pp. 2141–2164.
However, the criticisms against the set-theoretic ontology of Mathematics need not worry much the
defenders of the ‘abstraction by deletion’ account. Indeed, as long as one in not wary of the idea of
an underlying ontology in Mathematics, this epistemological account of abstraction is independent of
what this ontology might be.
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answer this in a definite fashion. We simply are lacking enough information about H
to do so! Since all we know about H is that it is a Hilbert space, the best answer
which can be provided at this point is to say that, given the available information, it is
possible for H to be equal to L2(R3). But of course, it is also possible for H to be equal
to l2(N). And—it seems to me—it is precisely in this modal sense that the one-to-many
relation between the abstract and the particular entities should be interpreted in this
epistemological account of what is meant by ‘abstract groups’, ‘abstract Hilbert spaces’
or ‘abstract C-algebras’. Following Mac Lane, we could say that a realization of any
of those abstract mathematical entities is one of the many possible restorations of the
missing information.
Under this light, isomorphism appears as the technical tool that captures this
possibility of equality. But to understand this, it seems preferable at this point to
distinguish three different types of isomorphisms:
– Isomorphism between an abstract and a particular: in the ongoing conceptual
setting, this inter-level type of isomorphism is the most natural type to consider.
As we have just explained, the assertion H ' L2(R3) is interpreted as ‘it is
possible for H to be equal to L2(R3)’.
– Isomorphism between two particulars: obviously, this intra-level type of isomor-
phism cannot be interpreted in the same manner. We certainly have L2(R3) 6=
l2(N) (the elements of the former are continuous functions whereas the elements
of the latter are infinite series), so there is no possibility of them being equal.
Nevertheless, the claim L2(R3) ' l2(N) remains of interest, since it is equivalent
to the claim: if H ' L2(R3) then H ' l2(N). Thus, an isomorphism between two
particulars may be regarded as the statement that they are two different possible
restorations of the unspecified information of an abstract entity.
– Isomorphism between two abstract entities: in the neo-Fregean process of abstrac-
tion through equivalence, the loss of isomorphisms between abstract entities was
a major caveat. It is easy to see that this is no longer the case: the claimH1 ' H2
is readily interpreted in the same way as H1 ' l2(N). Again, isomorphic abstract
entities are entities which are possibly equal.
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This last point seems to be so important, that it is worthwhile to restate it some-
what differently. In the conception of isomorphism–qua–correspondence, there is no
fundamental difference between the three types of isomorphisms just discussed. They
are all thought of as bijective functions allowing to translate statements about one en-
tity into analogous statements about another entity. Thus conceived, isomorphisms–
qua–correspondences give rise to an equivalence relation. However, one can adopt a dif-
ferent conception of isomorphisms—namely, isomorphism–qua–possible-identification.
Now, two objects are isomorphic if they might be equal. As I see it, there are two
main differences between the two conceptions. First, strictu sensu, isomorphisms–
qua–possible-identifications give rise to a relation that is not an equivalence relation,
for it fails to be transitive: H might be equal to L2(R3) and H might be equal to
l2(N), but L2(R3) cannot be equal to l2(N). This is explained by the fact that the
conception of isomorphism–qua–possible–identification can only be adopted when ab-
stract, partly unspecified entities are involved. Second, given two abstract entities H1
and H2, in the isomorphism–qua–correspondence point of view, it is perfectly alright
to claim ‘H1 ' H2 but H1 6= H2’. But this claim is contradictory if one adopts
the isomorphism–qua–possible-identification point of view. Literally, this claim would
mean: ‘it is possible for H1 and H2 to be equal, but they are different’. This poses
the question of why one would adopt a point of view that restricts the sort of claims
allowed? Is it not as artificial and unnecessarily restrictive as the attempt of conferring
a distinct ontological status to the abstract?
The answer is simple: the motivation stems from the practice of mathematics
and mathematical physics. Even though a question about the equality of H1 and H2
may have in principle a definite answer (it may indeed be a matter of fact whether
H1 is equal to H2), this is not so in practice: as long as one remains at the level of
unspecification characteristic of the abstract objects one is dealing with, there is simply
not enough information to ascertain the validity of such an equality claim! Therein,
isomorphism appears as the strongest possible claim about the equality of two abstract
entities. Since, when considering abstract entities of a certain type, equality claims
cannot be ascertained, one might forget equality altogether and use only isomorphisms.
The talk ‘up to isomorphism’, ubiquitous in the practice of contemporary mathematics,
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reveals itself a natural and fundamental feature of this epistemological account of the
process of abstraction.
The identity conditions of these abstract entities is a quite subtle matter. It
would be a mistake to understand the above replacement as a move pushing to conflate
the notions of isomorphism and identity. There are two main reasons why it would
be so. On the one hand, this would be missing the point of the modal conception
of isomorphism: it is isomorphism–qua–possible-identification, not isomorphism–qua–
identification. In the same way that two n-dimensional Hilbert spacesH1 andH2 might
be identical, they might also be different, so one should better keep them distinct.
And this is indeed akin to what mathematicians do128. On the other hand, there
may be a whole myriad of different isomorphisms between two isomorphic objects,
and it is important to retain this multiplicity, for it contains relevant information
about the mathematical situation being handled. If one does not properly distinguish
‘identification’ from ‘identity’, one obfuscates the existence of this multiplicity. Given
two objects H1 and H2, it seems indeed rather difficult to understand how they can be
identical to each other in different ways (they are either identical or not), but it is much
easier to imagine several distinct manners in which they can be identified with each
other. There can be many possible different processes of identifications that reveal the
same identity.
To understand this last distinction between identity and identification, it is useful
to consider one single object H. If one reduces isomorphisms to just ‘possible equality’,
the notion of automorphism appears to be redundant—if not quite obscure. Since H is
certainly equal to itself, what would be the use of saying that, moreover, H is possibly
equal to itself? On the contrary, if one conceives a given isomorphism as an explicit
128Here is a subtle point that often creates confusion: isomorphic objects are not identified but
canonically isomorphic objects are. One speaks of “the” terminal object of a category (if it exists)
because between any two such terminal objects there is a canonical isomorphism. Given a finite-
dimensional vector space V , it is isomorphic to the dual V  and canonically isomorphic to V .
Accordingly, one distinguishes the first from the second but not from the third. This remark shows
that, in fact, isomorphism is not the ‘strongest possible claim about the equality of two abstract
entities’, as I have affirmed above. It is canonical isomorphism. For a beautiful discussion of this point,
see B. Mazur. “When is One Thing Equal to Some Other Thing?” In: Proof and Other Dilemmas:
Mathematics and Philosophy. Ed. by B. Gold and R. A. Simons. Spectrum Series. Mathematical
Association of America, 2008, pp. 221–242.
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identification, the situation changes: even though H is equal to itself, there is an
ambiguity in this claim, which is precisely captured by the existence of several different
possible self-identifications or automorphisms.
This is best illustrated by an explicit example. Take for H a set of two elements
and consider two copies of it129. If H is an abstract set, then, although we know the
two copies to be equal to each other, there are two possible identifications of them and
there is simply no possible way to determine which one is the correct:
(a) Picture of H ' H if isomorphism is
conceived as identity, for H an abstract
entity.
(b) Picture of H ' H if isomorphism
is conceived as identification, for H an
abstract entity.
Fig. I.1 – Difference between identity and identification for abstract entities.
This ambiguity finds its roots in the fact that, among the omitted data turning H into
an abstract entity, is the information allowing us to distinguish the two elements of
H. If this lacking information was somehow completely restored, so that H became a
particular set of two elements, there would no longer be a need to distinguish between
identity and identification: indeed, in this case the elements could be distinguished and
one could determine the unique correct identification of the two copies of H:
129For expository reasons, I have taken the simple example of a set with two elements to illustrate
my point. Isomorphisms are then bijective functions. But the argument does not depend on math-
ematical objects being sets (with possibly extra-structure). One might as well reason in terms of
transformations, as defined in category theory. However, this seemed an unnecessary complication at
this point.
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(a) Picture of H ' H if isomorphism is
conceived as identity, for H a particular
entity.
(b) Picture of H ' H if isomorphism is
conceived as identification, for H a par-
ticular entity.
Fig. I.2 – Difference between identity and identification for particular entities.
Thus, it is characteristic of the abstract to have a complex structure of self-identifications
which, in turn, is a manifestation of an essential ambiguity.
As a side remark, note that in this view of abstraction by deletion the notion of
isomorphism does not come first in the process of abstraction. Rather, one starts by
choosing certain properties that are to be retained—i.e. abstracted—, and only then
the relevant notion of isomorphism follows. In other terms, one first defines the abstract
entity H—for example, through an axiomatic presentation—and then isomorphism130.
This is the opposite of what the process of abstraction through equivalence suggested.
Let us sum up what has emerged during this discussion of the epistemological ac-
count of the abstract/particular distinction as a hierarchy of information. An abstract
entity is here understood as a particular entity for which only partial information is at
our disposal. Given this omission of information, there can be many particular enti-
ties that may be the abstract entity handled. Realizations are possible restorations of
the unknown. This explains the one-to-many relation, which is understood thus as a
modal relation, best described using isomorphisms-qua-possible-identifications. With
the information at our disposal, one can try to deduce some properties the abstract
entity must have. These properties are necessarily independent of the omitted data—
which explains the schematic nature of abstract entities. Finally, since any particular
130However, it would be a mistake to believe that the relevant notion of isomorphism follows im-
mediately once the choice of properties to be retained is fixed. The mathematicians’ struggle to find
the good notion of homeomorphism in point-set topology is a nice historical example of this. See,
G. H. Moore. “The Evolution of the Concept of Homeomorphism”. In: Historia Mathematica (2007),
pp. 333–343.
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realization of the abstract entity is possibly equal to it, all known properties of the
abstract must also hold for the particular. It is in this sense that the ‘properties of
the abstract are common to all the different realizations’. So, we see, this account of
abstraction can explain on its own the importance of isomorphisms and all features 1.
through 5. which were all emphasized by both von Neumann and Weyl (page 56).
Nonetheless, this view of how to make sense of notions such as ‘abstract Hilbert
spaces’ is not free of problems. The move of dissolving the abstract/particular as an
ontological distinction, eliminating the idea of abstract Hilbert spaces as objects in
their own right, and declaring that ‘any Hilbert space is a particular Hilbert space’,
has two main drawbacks. First, the whole point of view has now come to rest on the
notion of ‘particular entities’. And a clarification of what exactly is meant by this
is still lacking. This point seems especially pressing since we are here dealing with
the realm of Mathematics and it is by no means clear what a particular (as opposed
to abstract) mathematical object might be. If we were here concerned by general
abstraction, the notion of ‘particular objects’ would perhaps not be so suspicious. To
take a common example in the literature, the claim ‘The white queen is allowed to
move in any direction of the chess board’ can be thought as a claim about an abstract
entity (the white queen)131. Now, one can adopt exactly the same epistemological
account of abstraction and understand this as a claim valid for any white queen. ‘The
white queen’ is not a platonic abstract object and any white queen is some particular
white queen, having a specific shape, made of some specific material, etc. Whether it
is a plastic queen or a wooden queen is irrelevant to the claim, and the information is
judiciously omitted. Presumably, the concept of ‘particular objects’ does not seem to
pose any trouble in this case because there is an underlying ontology presupposed132.
Similarly, it appears that the above epistemological view on mathematical abstraction
needs to presuppose an analogous underlying ontology—one allowing to define what it
131Analogies with the game of chess are widespread in the work of Stewart Shapiro, one of the main
defenders of mathematical structuralism.
132In fact, even here one could argue that the notion of a ‘particular white queen’ is not so easily
dealt with. Consider for instance a game of chess on the internet between two players in different parts
of the world. To explain what kind of particular object is ‘the white queen’ to which both players
refer is certainly not an easy task...
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means to be a ‘particular mathematical object’. But this is a serious problem only if
one is wary of the idea of an underlying ontology in Mathematics. For if one is ready
to accept this possibility, all that has been said is in fact independent of what this
ontology might be133.
Second, by interpreting all statements about abstract entities as statements quan-
tified over a class of particular entities—symbolically: ‘abstract’ = ‘any particular’—,
this epistemological approach emphasizes the notion of generalization rather than ab-
straction. In fact, the process of abstraction by deletion appears simply to be the
creation of a language useful for expressing general statements. In this new language,
all superfluous details have indeed been deleted, but this is perceived as a useful way
of referring to many particulars at a single stroke, not as a way of conceiving a new
entity deprived from all these details. In short, abstraction is here considered to be
a mere form of generalization. Moreover, it is not difficult to find, in the writings of
some 19th century and early 20th century mathematicians, passages which seemingly
support this claim. For example, we can read Stephan Banach explaining that:
The aim of the present work is to establish certain theorems valid in different
functional domains, which I specify in what follows. Nevertheless, in order not to
have to prove them for each particular domain, I have chosen to take a different
route [...]; I consider sets of elements about which I postulate certain proper-
ties; I deduce from them certain theorems, and I then prove for each particular
functional domain that the postulates adopted are true for it.134
133For instance, one might adopt the extensional view that dominated Mathematics during the first
half of the 20th century and that still overwhelmingly dominates the Philosophy of Mathematics.
According to it, all mathematical objects are sets, explicitly constructed from the null set. To know
all the information about a particular object is then to know exactly which are the elements that
compose it. But this view has been recently criticized, both for mathematical and philosophical
reasons. For a nice description—geared to a philosophically-oriented audience—of some developments
in main stream contemporary mathematics pushing away from this view, see Marquis, op. cit.
134Quoted in J.-P. Marquis. “Mathematical Abstraction, Conceptual Variation and Identity”. In:
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 14th International Congress (Nancy).
Ed. by P. E. Bour et al. London: College Publications, 2014, pp. 299–322, p. 315.
This short passage may not do full justice to Banach’s conception of abstraction, but it does stress
how abstraction involves a form of generalization. Another example is found in the work of Maurice
Fréchet:
In modern times it has been recognized that it is possible to elaborate full mathematical
theories dealing with elements of which the nature is not specified, that is, with abstract
elements. A collection of these abstract elements will be called an abstract set. [...]
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The trouble with this claim is that it is clearly orthogonal to von Neumann’s
intentions when he introduced abstract Hilbert spaces in the context of Quantum
Mechanics. As we saw in subsection I.1.3 and subsection I.1.4, Dirac and von Neumann
conceived working with a specific realization of a Hilbert space to be tantamount to
working with a specific choice of coordinates. Now, we may ask: What does it mean
then to work with an abstract Hilbert space? A defender of the eliminative account of
abstraction would answer: it means to work with an arbitrary choice of coordinates.
However, this was not von Neumann’s answer: for him, it meant to work in a coordinate-
free formulation of the theory135. In other words, the eliminativist conceives these
abstract mathematical entities as abstract particulars, whereas the physicist, following
von Neumann, wants to conceive them as universals.
These remarks suggest that, despite its evident merits, the purely epistemological
account of the abstract/particular distinction as a hierarchy of information fails to do
justice to what is achieved through the introduction of these abstract mathematical
structures, and that one should try to develop yet another alternative account.
I.2.3 Mixture: the abstract/particular as hierarchy of identi-
ties
In a series of recent papers, Jean-Pierre Marquis has developed a description of
the abstract method, as used in modern and contemporary mathematics, which aims
It is necessary to keep in mind that these notions are not of a metaphysical nature; that
when we speak of an abstract element we mean that the nature of the element is indifferent,
but we do not mean at all that this element is unreal. Our theory will apply to all elements;
in particular, applications of it may be made to the natural sciences.
(M. R. Fréchet. “Abstract Sets, Abstract Spaces and General Analysis”. In: Mathematics
Magazine 24.3 (1951), pp. 147–155, p. 147, author’s emphasis.)
135Here is a perhaps more modern and precise rephrasing of this last point. Given an n-dimensional
abstract Hilbert space Hn, the choice of an orthogonal basis Bn = fe1; : : : ; eng induces a canonical
isomorphism Bn : Hn  ! Rn. This hints to the idea of perceiving isomorphisms between abstract
Hilbert spaces and particular realizations as choices of a basis. In fact, it is perfectly alright to define
a basis of Hn as such an isomorphism. Although technically more involved, the situation is essentially
the same for an infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert space H. There, one can always choose a
countable orthonormal basis B, and this choice will induce an isomorphism B : H  ! l2(N). In this
way, one has precisely the ‘equation’
particular Hilbert space = abstract Hilbert space + choice of a basis:
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to point at the inherent features of abstraction136. His detailed account presents the
abstract method as a process which is epistemological in nature but which nonetheless
culminates in the creation of new mathematical entities. It can therefore be perceived
as a mixture of the previous two approaches. In particular, Marquis emphasizes what I
take to be the main lesson of the isomorphism–qua–possible-identification conception:
the importance—often understated if not unnoticed—of reflecting on the criteria of
identity for abstract entities. But his merit is to do so without mention of any type
of modality and without such strong a reliance on the notion of ‘particulars’. In this
way, he is able to avoid the main drawback of the previous account: the reduction of
abstraction to a particular form of generalization. Therefore, the essence of Marquis’
point of view may be captured by the following three fundamental claims:
1. Abstraction is epistemological.
It is my profound belief that abstraction in mathematics is solely an episte-
mological issue and that the abstract character of mathematics is not an on-
tological property but rather derives from epistemological features of math-
ematical knowledge itself. I am not so much concerned with abstract objects
than with the process of abstraction and the abstract method. Some math-
ematical objects, or rather mathematical concepts, are abstracted. They do
not inherit a dubious ontological status for that reason.137
2. Abstraction is not generalization: the distinction lies in the creation of new enti-
ties in the process of abstraction.
One could [...] work in a purely formal fashion or consider that one is doing
algebra in the classical sense of that word, that is working on generalized
136J.-P. Marquis. “Mathematical Abstraction, Conceptual Variation and Identity”. In: Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 14th International Congress (Nancy).
Ed. by P. E. Bour et al. London: College Publications, 2014, pp. 299–322; J.-P. Marquis. “Stairway
to Heaven – The Abstract Method and Levels of Abstraction in Mathematics”. In: (forthcoming).
Besides these papers, which deal directly with the abstract method, at least two other articles
are relevant to the question of what ‘abstract’ means in the realm of mathematical entities. These
are: J.-P. Marquis. “Categorical Foundations of Mathematics – Or how to provide foundations for
abstract mathematics”. In: The Review of Symbolic Logic 6.1 (2013), pp. 51–75 and J.-P. Marquis.
“Categories, Sets and the Nature of Mathematical Entities”. In: The Age of Alternative Logics:
Assessing Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics Today. Ed. by J. van Benthem et al. Dordrecht:
Springer, 2006, pp. 181–192.
137Idem, “Mathematical Abstraction, Conceptual Variation and Identity”, p. 300, author’s emphasis.
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arithmetic operations. [...] The situation changes radically once it is clear
that it is possible to consider a new type of entities supporting these prop-
erties and relations. [...]
[F]rom an epistemological point of view, to focus on generality is to miss the
point of the conceptual difference between the two notions [of generalization
and abstraction].138
3. It is characteristic of abstract entities to have a complex identity structure.
[O]n any view of abstract mathematics, the notion of identity has a rich,
complex structure which is not prior to the abstract objects present.139
With this in mind, let us now review in some detail Marquis’ work. To describe
the process of abstraction, the author brings out three basic components that are to
constitute mathematical abstraction140:
– a domain of significant variation,
– a method of presentation and development,
– the extraction of a new criterion of identity.
The first two components are fairly intuitive. For there to be abstraction, one has to
encounter several objects which appear somehow radically different—they constitute
the domain of significant variation. Yet, one recognizes some invariant properties in
the domain under consideration. It is “this interplay of variation and invariance [that]
opens the door to the possibility of abstracting”141. In the main example we have been
considering, these significantly different objects are L2(R3) (functions on a continuous
space) and l2(N) (infinite series) and, among the invariant properties is, for instance, the
existence of a Hermitian product. Once these invariant properties have been recognized,
138Idem, “Stairway to Heaven – The Abstract Method and Levels of Abstraction in Mathematics”,
pp. 7–8 and 13.
139Idem, “Categorical Foundations of Mathematics – Or how to provide foundations for abstract
mathematics”, p. 27.
140The number and the description of these components varies slightly from one work to another,
but the ideas remain the same. This is the terminology of “Stairway to Heaven – The Abstract Method
and Levels of Abstraction in Mathematics”, p. 3. See also “Mathematical Abstraction, Conceptual
Variation and Identity”, pp. 308–309.
141Idem, “Mathematical Abstraction, Conceptual Variation and Identity”, p. 309.
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“the epistemic attention has to shift from certain pregnant features of the objects under
study to the invariant elements involved”142. In other words, for a given element f 2
L2(R3), one needs to ignore all questions about it being continuous or derivable—which
make sense because it is a function—and consider it solely as point on a Hilbert space.
Thus, one needs a method of presentation and development—a “systematic ignorance
of the specific properties of the objects” leading to an “appropriate language” in which
to present and investigate in an autonomous fashion the invariant properties143. In von
Neumann’s work, this method of presentation corresponds to the axiomatic definition
of a Hilbert space144.
Up to now, there is little novelty in this description of abstraction. Marquis’
“systematic ignorance” is essentially the same as Mac Lane’s “deletion”. Nonetheless,
this presentation shows already its usefulness, for it allows us to disentangle three
concepts that are often conflated: abstraction, the axiomatic method and formalism145.
As claimed by Marquis, the latter two should not be identified with abstraction, nor
are they essential elements of the process:
[...] in order to see the invariant features [...], one has to forget or ignore essential
aspects of the objects and their properties involved. One has to ignore key
properties of functions, of series, of the complex numbers, etc. One of the
ways to succeed this operation is to concentrate on the formalism, the symbols
and the operations on these symbols.146
A formalist approach to mathematics facilitates the access to invariant properties.
Nonetheless, it is but one possible methodological decision enabling to perform one
basic step of abstraction. In the same manner, the axiomatic method can be used as
142Idem, “Stairway to Heaven – The Abstract Method and Levels of Abstraction in Mathematics”,
p. 7.
143Ibid., p. 3, my emphasis.
144Von Neumann, op. cit., pp. 35–45.
145For example, the abstract and axiomatic method are used as if interchangeable concepts by Mac
Lane himself in the following passage: “The abstract or postulational development of these systems
must then be supplemented by an investigation of their “structure”.” (S. Mac Lane. “Some Recent
Advances in Algebra”. In: American Mathematical Monthly 46 (1939), pp. 3–19, pp. 17–18, cited in:
Marquis, op. cit., p. 8.)
146Ibid., p. 5, italics are from the author, bold typeface is mine.
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an implementation of the method of presentation and development characteristic of
abstraction. Again, it is just one possible method among others:
[...] axioms and the axiomatic method did play a key role in the rise of the
abstract method. The axioms capture the invariant features of the theories under
investigation. Once these have been identified, the axiomatic method allows for
the systematic and rigorous development of the consequences of these features.
One could use a different method of presentation of the invariant features. It
depends on the linguistic means available. For instance, nowadays, it would be
possible to use a graphical language to present a new theory by using what are
called sketches.147
Moreover, as the historical example of Euclidean geometry suffices to illustrate, this is
not the only use axioms may have in Mathematics. There are other contexts in which
axioms may be perceived as evident, basic truths. In fact, it is a feature of abstraction
that, whenever axioms appear, their role is not to assert but to present—axioms as
defining conditions, not as evident assertions148.
But, Marquis insists over and over, the process of abstraction is unfinished if one
stops here and ignores the third, fundamental component: the extraction of a crite-
rion of identity—this “blind spot in the mathematicians’ journey through the abstract
method”149. It is the central point which distinguishes his approach from the one
sketched in the previous section. He explains this as follows:
[...] it is not until the proper criterion of identity has been identified and applied
systematically that the theory acquires an autonomy, both epistemological and
ontological. Notice also that it is the presence of a new criterion of identity that
allows to say that we are indeed in the presence of a new type of abstraction, for
as we have seen, the usage of the axiomatic method in itself does not entail the
need of a new criterion of identity. [...] The identification of the proper criterion
of identity is of fundamental importance, since it allows to sift the properties of
147Ibid., p. 10, author’s emphasis.
148For an analysis of the different uses of axioms in the practice of Mathematics, see D. Schlimm.
“Axioms in Mathematical Practice”. In: Philosophia Mathematica 21 (2013), pp. 37–92.
149Marquis, op. cit., p. 11.
84 Chapter I. Mathematical Description of Physical Systems
the resulting theory from the properties of the previous theories. In other words,
it captures the process of abstraction itself.150
The fundamental thesis of Marquis’ account is then the following: to perceive the
new abstract entities as emerging, not from the definition of a new object, but rather
from the definition of a new criterion of identity. In this way, identity ceases to be
a universal and unrestricted notion, admitting one single form which applies to the
entire realm of Mathematics. Rather, the process of abstraction is better described
using a multi-sorted or typed logic, in which identity is contextual. For Marquis, “this
is precisely where certain aspects of abstract mathematics escape the standard analysis
or explication in terms of ZF-sets, or any other notion of sets based on extensional-
ity”151. In turn, type theory illuminates the complexity of identity: instead of describ-
ing identity of two objects as a property, the theory describes it as a structure152. The
multiplicity of possible identifications between two abstract objects, encountered in
the account of abstraction by deletion (Section I.2.2), is precisely the sort of structure
here mentioned. The realm of Mathematics is seen to be governed by a complex net
of different criteria of identity and the abstract/particular distinction appears as the
consequence of a hierarchy of identities. More precisely, the abstract/particular op-
position is dissolved and replaced by a ladder of levels of abstraction: a mathematical
entity is not either abstract or non-abstract, it is simply more or less abstract than
another entity.
This phenomenon of there being several different criteria of identity, associated
to different levels of abstraction, can very well be perceived in our main example with
Hilbert spaces. So far, the situation had been presented as having only two levels:
the one of ‘particular’ Hilbert spaces, such as L2(R) and l2(N), and the one of the
abstract Hilbert space H. Now, notice that in order to talk about the Hilbert space
L2(R) of (Lebesgue equivalence classes of) square-integrable functions over R, or about
150Ibid., p. 12.
151Idem, “Categorical Foundations of Mathematics – Or how to provide foundations for abstract
mathematics”, p. 58.
152For given a type T and objects X : T , Y : T , the proposition X =T Y is better captured as a type
IdT (X;Y ). In fact, a central idea of type theory is to view any proposition as a type. Some of the
main differences between set and type theory will be discussed in more detail in Subsection I.3.3.a.
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the Hilbert space of square-summable functions over N, one needs to be able to talk
about the field of real numbers R and about the natural number system N. But of
course, from a set-theoretical point of view, we know that R could equally well refer
to Dedekind’s model RD or to Cantor’s model RC , in the same way that N could refer
to von Neumann’s ordinals NN or to Zermelo’s numerals NZ . In other words, one can
only perceive L2(R) as being a well-defined specific entity if one decides to regard the
different models of R as being equal. Therefore, the situation we have been dealing with
is more accurately described as having (at least) three different levels of abstraction
and three criteria of identity:
(i) First level of abstraction, governed by identity =T1 . We have four entities:
l2(NN) 6=T1 l2(NZ) 6=T1 L2(RD) 6=T1 L2(RC):
The identity =T1 may be based for example in the usual extensionality for sets.
Then, NN and NZ are different sets and l2(NN) and l2(NZ) are different Hilbert
spaces.
(ii) Second level of abstraction, governed by identity =T2 . We have two entities:
l2(N) =T2 l2(NN) =T2 l2(NZ) 6=T2 L2(RD) =T2 L2(RC) =T2 L2(R):
With this second criterion of identity, one can conceive the abstract natural num-
ber system N and the abstract field of real numbers.
(iii) Third level of abstraction, governed by identity =T3 . We have one entity:
l2(N) =T3 l2(NN) =T3 l2(NZ) =T3 L2(RD) =T3 L2(RC) =T3 L2(R) =T3 H:
With this third criterion of identity, there is only the one abstract Hilbert space.
This remark simply points to the fact that in any mathematical situation there is
always an implicit threshold level of abstraction below which one will not descend.
We still have to explain the precise manner in which the new criterion of identity
is extracted. As Marquis emphasizes, the main reason for defining this new identity is
to switch from a point of view where properties are invariant to a point of view where
properties are intrinsic. Given a domain of variation, and a collection of invariant
properties that are to be retained, this move is achieved by the following two-step
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procedure. First, for any property P0 that is to be retained, and any two objects X;Y
of the domain of variation, the new identity =T2 should be constructed so that
if P0(X) and X =T2 Y; then P0(Y ) (I.14)
Second, one reverses the approach and uses =T2 to define what qualifies as an abstract
property P :
if P (X) and X =T2 Y; then P (Y ) (I.15)
The two steps (I.14) and (I.15) are not to be confused: in (I.14) the properties P0
are given and this allows us to define the new identity, whereas in (I.15) =T2 is given
and this allows to define the abstract properties P . Of course, the initially chosen
properties P0 become by construction abstract properties. It is precisely this move
that accomplishes the “shift of attention” mentioned by Marquis. Under the light of
the old criterion of identity, one could have X 6=T1 Y but P0(X) and P0(Y ). P0 was
then invariant by the change from X to Y . But under the light of the new criterion of
identity, there is no such variation from X to Y since X =T2 Y : P0 shows now to be an
intrinsic property of the abstract entity emerged through the newly defined identity.
Through this account, it appears (again) that it is “impossible to think of the
abstraction process in terms of an equivalence relation”153. Indeed, the choice of an
identity criterion strongly depends on the properties one is wishing to abstract:
One has to have the properties that will be abstracted in order to define the
criterion of identity between the abstract entities. In other words, the criterion
of identity can not be given a priori but is derived from the theory.154
One then needs to have an idea of the new abstract entity before considering the
definition of the equivalence relation, unlike what is claimed by the neo-Fregean account
of abstraction.
Now, the reader should be struck by the fact that the definition of the new ab-
stract identity =T2 coincides exactly with the definition of isomorphisms. These are
153Idem, “Mathematical Abstraction, Conceptual Variation and Identity”, p. 312.
154Ibid., p. 312.
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constructed precisely in order to preserve certain properties, as stated in definition
(I.14)—e.g., an isomorphism of finite-dimensional vector spaces is a morphism pre-
serving the linear structure and the dimension. In this way, one understands that
isomorphism is nothing but the identity governing the new level of abstraction. Here
is Marquis explaining this crucial point:
In fact, it might be wise to replace the term “isomorphism” by a more neutral
term that evokes a type of identity. Notice that one could stipulate that once the
proper criterion of identity has been discovered, then the meaningful properties
are precisely those that satisfy Leibniz’s principle. I would even dare suggest that
the latter is a key property of what it means to be abstract for mathematical
objects. [...]
For many mathematicians, being isomorphic is precisely what being abstract
amounts to. This means that X and Y are, from an abstract point of view,
essentially the same.155
Marquis is certainly not alone in claiming this. In fact, in “Towards a Categorical
Foundation of Mathematics”, the logician Michael Makkai has proposed to elevate
(I.15) to the rank of a principle, which he calls the “Principle of Isomorphism”156. He
considers it a crucial tenet of what Abstract Mathematics are. To wit:
[...] the Principle of Isomorphism itself appears to be a generally accepted idea in
Abstract Mathematics. [...] The basic character of the Principle of Isomorphism
is that of a constraint on the language of Abstract Mathematics; a welcome one,
since it provides for the separation of sense from nonsense. But the fact that
isomorphism is the real equality in Abstract Mathematics is also an
experience.157
155Idem, “Categorical Foundations of Mathematics – Or how to provide foundations for abstract
mathematics”, p. 58–59, my emphasis.
156The similarity between these two works is not surprising since Makkai’s attempts to develop a
foundations of Mathematics based on category theory has exerted a strong influence on Marquis’
ideas, as the latter has acknowledged in many occasions (see, for instance, ibid., p. 72).
157Makkai, op. cit., p. 161, author’s italics, boldtype face is mine.
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In view of the central role it plays in the process of abstraction, I propose to name
it the “Principle of Abstraction”158:
Principle of Abstraction: all grammatically correct properties of
abstract objects are to be invariant under the relevant isomorphism
type.
Through Marquis’ account of the method of abstraction, we have reached a better
understanding of what it means to conceive some mathematical entities abstractly. By
the same token, we now know which criterion of identity to use for the mathematical
description D(S) of the physical system S. Therefore, out of the three initial ques-
tions (cf. page 17), it only remains to elucidate the content of the requirement of
individuation. For this, we need to turn to an analysis of mathematical structuralism.
I.3 Abstract mathematical structures
In none of the last two accounts of abstraction the word ‘structure’ has appeared.
Yet, they both manage to explain the essential features about abstract Hilbert spaces,
abstract symplectic manifolds, abstract groups, etc. which were highlighted when an-
alyzing von Neumann’s work. These were: the hierarchy of levels, the one-to-many
relation, the uniqueness of kind, the commonality of properties and the schematic na-
ture of these new abstract entities (cf. pages 56–56). This poses the question of why
158 Makkai’s precise formulation is “Principle of Isomorphism: all grammatically correct proper-
ties of objects of a fixed category are to be invariant under isomorphism” (ibid., p. 161, my emphasis).
A major caveat of my terminological decision—besides the confusion it may create with the neo-
Fregean abstraction principles—is that the expression “Principle of abstraction” has already been used
before in a quite different sense. In The Principles of Mathematics, Bertrand Russell introduces an
axiom with this precise name and defined as follows:
“Every transitive symmetrical relation, of which there is at least one instance, is analyz-
able into joint possession of a new relation to a new term, the new relation being such
that no term can have this relation to more than one term, but that its converse does
not have this property.” This principle amounts, in common language, to the assertion
that transitive symmetric relations arise from a common property. (p. 220)
For a discussion on Russell’s principle of abstraction, see I. Angelelli. “Adventures of Abstraction”.
In: Poznarı́ Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (2004), pp. 11–35.
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the concept of ‘structure’ is present. Von Neumann talks of Hilbert spaces as “math-
ematical structures”; Weyl refers to an abstract group as “a structural entity”. Now,
if abstract Hilbert spaces and groups are best described as mathematical structures
and not simply as abstract mathematical entities, it is essential to understand which
features are intended to be captured by the concept of ‘structure’ that cannot be ac-
counted for by solely appealing to the concept of ‘abstraction’. In fact, it is my belief
that the whole philosophical discussion on mathematical structuralism often suffers
from not systematically distinguishing these two concepts.
A good example where this confusion is particularly evident is the role attributed
to isomorphisms. As we have seen in some detail in the previous section, from the above
description of the process of abstraction emerged the understanding that isomorphisms
are the pertinent identity criterion for abstract entities. Makkai wrote that “isomor-
phism is the real equality in Abstract Mathematics” and Marquis went almost as far as
claiming that “being isomorphic is precisely what being abstract amounts to”. But this
view appears to be quarrelsome, for it is not difficult to find, in the philosophy of math-
ematics literature, statements pulling in another direction. For instance, Andrei Rodin
explains how “the idea that isomorphic objects can be treated as equal is, in [his] view,
crucial for structuralism”159. Moreover, Steve Awodey has recently proposed that the
statement ‘isomorphic objects are identical’—that is, essentially the same statement
we have wished to call “Principle of Abstraction”—should be called the Principle of
Structuralism160. Thus, Awodey would be inclined to say that “isomorphism is the real
equality in Structural Mathematics”...
Our immediate goal becomes thus to clarify what is to be meant by ‘mathematical
structuralism’ and to understand what the concept of ‘structure’ adds to the above
account of the process of abstraction.
159Rodin, op. cit., p. 23.
160S. Awodey. “Structuralism, Invariance, and Univalence”. In: Philosophia Mathematica 22.1
(2014), pp. 1–11, p. 2.
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I.3.1 Mathematical structuralism
In any view of mathematical structuralism, mathematical structures are a spe-
cific kind of abstract mathematical entities. As such, the whole discussion of Section
I.2 immediately applies to the question of interpreting what mathematical structures
are. In the spirit of the epistemological approach to abstraction (subsection I.2.2),
some consider statements about mathematical structures to be implicit general state-
ments about all the systems which realize them. Following Charles Parsons, this view
which negates the existence of abstract mathematical structures is called eliminative
structuralism161. In contrast, in the spirit of the views on abstraction developed in
subsections I.2.1 and I.2.3, others insist on conceiving mathematical structures as en-
tities in their own right, independent from their realizations. This view is called ante
rem structuralism by Stewart Shapiro162 and sui generis structuralism by Geoffrey
Hellman163.
Before discussing the differences between these different approaches to mathe-
matical structuralism, we must however focus on what should be the first task in any
discussion of the subject: to characterize the common core which allows to consider the
two versions as being two versions of structuralism—in other words, to locate the essen-
tial features that distinguish structuralism from the general abstract method described
in Section I.2.
161“A reading [...] that seems to me to accord reasonably well [... holds] that statements about natural
numbers are implicitly general, about any simply infinite system. [...] It clearly avoids singling out
any one simply infinite system as the natural numbers and expresses the general conception I have in
mind in speaking of the structuralist view. [...] Such a program I will call eliminative structuralism.”
(C. Parsons. “The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects”. In: Synthese (1990), pp. 303–346, p.
307, author’s emphasis.)
162“Any usual array of philosophical views on universals can be adapted to structures. One can be a
Platonic ante rem realist, holding that each structure exists and has its properties independent of any
systems that have that structure. On this view, structures exist objectively, and are ontologically prior
to any systems that have them (or at least ontologically independent of such systems). Or one can
be an Aristotelian in re realist, holding that structures exist, but insisting that they are ontologically
posterior to the systems that instantiate them.” (S. Shapiro. “Mathematical Structuralism”. In:
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. url: http://www.iep.utm.edu/m-struct/, pp. 2–3.)
163See for example G. Hellman. “Structuralism”. In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathe-
matics and Logic. Ed. by S. Shapiro. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 536–562, p. 541
or G. Hellman. “Three Varieties of Mathematical Structuralism”. In: Philosophia Mathematica 9.3
(2001), pp. 184–211, p. 188.
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I.3.1.a Characterizing structuralism
This task is not always carefully carried out and some philosophers tend to at-
tribute to mathematical structuralism virtues that belong to Abstract Mathematics in
general. A striking example of this is the work of Steve Awodey on what he calls “cat-
egorical structuralism”. Thus, in the very first paragraphs of his article “An Answer to
Hellman’s Question: ‘Does Category Theory Provide a Framework for Mathematical
Structuralism?”’, the author describes categorical structuralism as follows:
As a first, very rough, approximation, we may say that the point of view that we
are going to describe emphasizes form over content, descriptions over construc-
tions, specification of assumptions over deductive foundations, characterization
of essential properties over constitution of objects having those properties.
[...] The ‘categorical-structural’ [view] we advocate is based instead on the
idea of specifying, for a given theorem or theory only the required or relevant
degree of information or structure, the essential features of a given situation, for
the purpose at hand, without assuming some ultimate knowledge, specification,
or determination of the ‘objects’ involved.164
Now, as a first description of what structuralism amounts to, this account should
be surprising. For, as the reader will immediately notice, this quote has little to do
with structuralism per se: the concept of structure does not seem to be doing any work
here. In fact, Awodey’s description applies admirably well to the abstract method in
general! However, this is but a “first, very rough, approximation” and one can hope
that, later on, mathematical structuralism—which is “a certain, now typical, ‘abstract’
way of practicing mathematics”165—will be clearly distinguished from all other types
of abstraction. But, in my opinion, Awodey fails to do so. A major part of his paper
concentrates on showing that “mathematical theorems are schematic”, characteristic
which is “clearly essential to this approach”166. He certainly makes a good point here,
164Awodey, “An Answer to Hellman’s Question: ‘Does Category Theory Provide a Framework for
Mathematical Structuralism?”’, p. 55–56.
165Ibid., p. 54, my emphasis.
166Ibid., p. 62.
92 Chapter I. Mathematical Description of Physical Systems
but the worry is he still seems to be talking about abstraction, not about structuralism.
Consider for instance the following passage:
The proof of a theorem involves the structures mentioned, and perhaps many
others along the way, together with some general principles of reasoning like
those collected up in logic, set theory, category theory, etc. But it does not
involve the specific nature of the structures, or their components, in an absolute
sense. That is, there is a certain degree of ‘analysis’ or specificity required for
the proof, and beyond that, it does not matter what the structures are supposed
to be or to ‘consist of’—the elements of the group, the points of the space, are
simply undetermined.167
Again, one can replace ‘structures’ by ‘abstract entities’ and the description continues
to be correct. So, perhaps, Awodey uses ‘structure’ as just another name for ‘abstract
entities’.
To find a definition of the former notion, one has to go back to his first article on
the subject, “Structure in Mathematics and Logic: A Categorical Perspective”. He has
the merit of clearly stating what is to be meant by ‘structure’:
The categorical notion of isomorphism may now serve as a definition of ‘having
the same structure of a given kind’.168
The idea here is that a category defines a kind of structure, and the morphisms are by
definition ‘structure-preserving maps’. Then, two objects of the category bear the same
structure if they are isomorphic. Hence, as Awodey himself explains in a much more
recent article, he is determining the concept of structure through a Fregean abstraction
principle of the form (I.7) (page 60):
8A;B 2 C0;
 
str(A) = str(B) ! A = B
167Ibid., p. 59, author’s emphasis.
168S. Awodey. “Structure in Mathematics and Logic: A Categorical Perspective”. In: Philosophia
Mathematica 4 (1996), pp. 209–237, p. 214.
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where C0 is the collection of objects of a given category C . In words: “The structure
of A is the same as the structure of B just in case A and B are isomorphic”169.
Now, as a terminological decision, there is nothing to be objected, as long as the
author takes good care to distinguish his use of the word from what ‘structure’ may
mean in other contexts. But Awodey’s whole defense of structuralism, as a philosoph-
ical position, is entirely based on the above definition—and this is a problem. One
needs to justify in which way the concept of structure so defined manages to capture
the main intuitions behind mathematical structuralism, and not simply those behind
abstraction. Thus, we are back to the question: What is the core of mathematical
structuralism, which distinguishes it from other methods of abstraction?
Let us return once more to Awodey. In the concluding paragraph of “Structure in
Mathematics and Logic: A Categorical Perspective”, he writes:
The structural perspective on mathematics codified by categorical methods might
be summarized in the slogan: The subject matter of pure mathematics is invari-
ant form, not a universe of mathematical objects consisting of logical atoms. [...]
The tension between mathematical form and substance can be recognized al-
ready in the dispute between Dedekind and Frege over the nature of the natural
numbers, the former determining them structurally, and the latter insisting that
they be logical objects.170
In my view, the key to clarifying the situation emerges here. Indeed, there are three
concepts at play: “(invariant) form”, “structure” and “logical atoms”. As we have seen,
the objects of abstract mathematics always come with a level of unspecification—part
of their “substance” is omitted—and, in this sense, they are not constituted by logical
atoms. If one defines “form” as what is generally obtained by the abstraction principle,
8A;B form(A) = form(B) ! A = B
then, together with Awodey, we can safely say: ‘the subject of Abstract Mathematics is
form, not substance’. This is the definition of Abstract Mathematics, not a statement
169Idem, “Structuralism, Invariance, and Univalence”, p. 3.
170Idem, “Structure in Mathematics and Logic: A Categorical Perspective”, p. 235.
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about them. The important point becomes then to understand the relation between
form and structure.
For Awodey and Rodin, these two words are synonyms171. This explains why much
of what they say fits very well with the method of abstraction in general. However, by
this decision, the concept of ‘structure’ becomes unnecessary... It seems the situation
is better understood if one keeps the three concepts distinct and claims that structure
is a particular kind of form. In this way, mathematical structuralism appears indeed
to be a particular method of abstraction and one may say: “the subject of Abstract
Mathematics is form, not substance; the subject of Structural Mathematics is structure,
not any form”.
What kind of process of abstraction would structuralism be? To see this, let us
contrast the different ways in which some of the main philosophers endorsing mathe-
matical structuralism have attempted to introduce and motivate the subject172:
– Geoffrey Hellman: “[C]ertain views called “structuralist” have become common-
place. Mathematics is seen as the investigation, by more or less rigorous deductive
means, of “abstract structures”, systems of objects fulfilling certain structural re-
lations among themselves and in relation to other systems, without regard to the
particular nature of the objects themselves.”173
– Stewart Shapiro: “The theme of mathematical structuralism is that what matters
to a mathematical theory is not the internal nature of its objects, such as its
numbers, functions, sets, or points, but how those objects relate to each other.
In a sense, the thesis is that mathematical objects (if there are such objects)
simply have no intrinsic nature.”174
171Prior to the last paragraph of his paper, Awodey never uses the concept of ‘form’. Hence, it is not
clear how he understands this. But the quote seems to suggest he indeed considers them as synonyms.
For Rodin, the situation is far clearer, since he declares that “invariant [form] in the given context
is just another word for structure” (Rodin, op. cit., p. 29) and that “the desired ‘purely structural’
mathematics would deal only with the ‘invariant Form’ (ibid., p. 31).
172Again, for the moment we are just trying to pinpoint the main intuitions attached to structuralism.
Thus we are interested in how the subject is introduced, and not that much in the detailed attempts
to articulate it.
173Hellman, “Structuralism”, p. 536.
174Shapiro, op. cit., p. 1.
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– Charles Parsons: “By the ‘structuralist view’ of mathematical objects, I mean
the view that reference to mathematical objects is always in the context of some
background structure, and that the objects involved have no more to them than
can be expressed in terms of the basic relations of the structure.”175
– Michael Resnik: “The underlying philosophical idea here is that in mathematics
the primary subject-matter is not the individual mathematical objects but rather
the structures in which they are arranged. The objects of mathematics, that
is, the entities which our mathematical constants and quantifiers denote, are
themselves atoms, structureless points, or positions in structures. And as such
they have no identity or distinguishing features outside a structure.”176
Evidently, there are some recurrent themes in these quotes. The first, most impor-
tant one, is the emphasis on relations. Above all, structuralism is the methodological
decision of never studying an entity in isolation but rather of considering a collection
of entities and focusing on the relations in which they stand. Then, one investigates
how much knowledge can be gained of these various entities through the sole considera-
tion of structural properties—i.e., those arising from the relations. Thus, structuralism
shows itself as one certain process of abstraction: one in which a decision is made to
retain only structural properties and to ignore the particular nature of the entities. By
this act of abstraction, the collection becomes an abstract structure.
As a method of study, structuralism appears to be interested in two types of
properties. On the one hand, it is wishes to investigate properties of the structure.
Hellman speaks of “investigating the abstract structures” and Resnik emphasizes that
the “primary subject-matter is the structures”. For example, one asks whether a given
group G admits finite linear representations, or whether a given field K admits proper
algebraic extensions, and these are questions that could even be positively investigated
without ever considering the “things” that constitute the structure. Let us call this first
type of properties ‘global properties’. On the other hand, even though the structuralist
is interested in the structure as an object of study, his interest also turns towards what
175Parsons, op. cit., p. 303.
176M. D. Resnik. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997,
p. 201.
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lies within the structure. This is particularly clear in the terminology of Parsons and
Shapiro, where the notion of ‘mathematical object’ is not used to denote a structure but
rather a place within a structure. The natural number structure may be a structure;
yet, it is made of natural numbers, and one asks whether any even number can be
written as the sum of two primes, or whether 8 and 9 are the only consecutive numbers
which are pure powers of non-zero integers177. Hence, structuralism also wishes to
investigate properties of the ‘things’ constituting the structure. Let us call this second
type of properties ‘internal properties’. In my opinion, both the holistic point of view—
which takes the structure as main object of study—and the internal point of view—
which takes the ‘things’ inside a structure as main object of study—are constitutive
of structuralism: the whole is always thought as composed of elements and, in return,
the elements can only be understood if conceived as part of a whole.
The holistic approach is always emphasized: do not study objects in isolation;
study relations between objects. But the importance of the internal point of view is
sometimes understated if not completely ignored. For all four philosophers, a structure
is always a collection. For Hellman, it is “a system of objects fulfilling certain structural
relations”178. For Shapiro, “a structure is the abstract form of a system, highlighting
the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do
not affect how they relate to other objects in the system”179. For Parsons, “[w]hat is
meant by a structure is usually a domain of objects together with certain functions and
relations on the domain, satisfying certain given conditions”180. And Resnik takes “a
pattern to consist of one or more objects, which [Resnik] call[s] positions that stand in
various relationships”181. I thus join Feferman in saying that the notions of collection
177The first problem is the famous Goldbach’s conjecture, which is still an open problem. The second
is the less known ‘problem of Catalan’, which was asked in 1842 and only solved recently by Preda
Mihăilescu (see Y. Bilu, Y. Bugeaud, and M. Mignotte. The Problem of Catalan. Springer, 2014).
178Hellman, loc. cit.
179S. Shapiro. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997, p. 74.
180Parsons, op. cit., p. 305.
181Resnik, op. cit., p. 203.
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and relation are the fundamental primitive notions on which structuralism rests182.
Hence, I take the core of mathematical structuralism to be the following:
Mathematical method of structuralism: to consider always col-
lections of things, among which some relations have been defined, and
to investigate which knowledge can be gained, about both the whole
collection and the individual things, by studying these relations and
the properties derived from them.
Collections, relations and the global/local two-fold level of study. These I take to be
the three essential components of structuralism as a method of study. They shape
what Structural Mathematics are, and I believe any version of structuralism, as a
philosophical position about Mathematics, should include them183.
182“The point is simply that when explaining the general notion of structure and of particular kinds
of structures such as groups, rings, categories, etc., we implicitly presume as understood the ideas of
operation and collection [...].” (S. Feferman. “Categorical Foundations and Foundations of Category
Theory”. In: Logic, Foundations of Mathematics, and Computability Theory (Proc. Fifth Internat.
Congr. Logic, Methodology and Philos. of Sci., Univ. Western Ontario). Philos. Sci. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: University Western Ontario, 1977, pp. 149–169, p. 150, author’s emphasis.)
183 In the light of this, let me continue commenting Awodey’s work. In his answer to Hellman, he
explains:
[...] the essential difference between the position being sketched here and old-fashioned,
relational structuralism is the idea of a top-down description, which presupposes no
bottom-up hierarchy of things. For Russell, every relation had to be a relation on some
things which, even if they were themselves analyzable into relations, had to be among
some other things, ... , and either this process had to stop somewhere (atoms), or an
account had to be given of infinite analysis.
The difficulty arises in the preoccupation with relations as the fundamental notion
of ‘structure’; for a relation presupposes its relata, and off we go into the descent of
Russellean analysis. If we take instead the perfectly autonomous notion of a morphism
in a category, we can build structures out of them to our heart’s content, without ever
having to ask what might be in them.
(Awodey, “An Answer to Hellman’s Question: ‘Does Category Theory Provide a Frame-
work for Mathematical Structuralism?”’, p. 61, author’s emphasis, bold typeface is
mine.)
Awodey’s move of completely ignoring the elements of the structure, of ‘never asking what might be
in them’, appears to be completely at odds from what other philosophers consider to be the essence
of structuralism, and it is not at all clear in which sense one can still talk about structuralism if the
notion of collection—and together with it, the internal level of interest—is evacuated, ignored. For
instance, Resnik goes as far as claiming:
[P]ositing mathematical objects that are not themselves taken as positions in a pattern
is to give up a basic structuralist thesis. (Resnik, op. cit., p. 205, author’s emphasis.)
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For Resnik, the primordial interest for a structuralist is to be found in what lies within the structure.
And, if one is giving up collections, relations and any interest in the interior of the structure, what
is there left of structuralism? What difference is there left to distinguish the structural method from
the abstract method? I would say there is none and that Awodey’s position is not a structuralist one.
Let me be clear: I am not criticizing Awodey for giving up the concepts of collection and relation.
I am criticizing him for giving them up and, despite of it, claiming he holds a structuralist view
of Mathematics. Rodin reaches a similar conclusion by distinguishing structural abstraction from
categorical abstraction, which
[...] forgets the fact that [these abstract mathematical entities] have elements and con-
siders only how they map to (i.e., transform into) one another. (Rodin, op. cit., p.
35.)
In fact, if the aim is to embrace the whole of Mathematics, I agree with Awodey there are very good
reasons to depart from those concepts—that simply means there are very good reasons to abandon
structuralism as a possible foundation for all of Mathematics. Indeed, contemporary Mathematics
has furnished objects that cannot be properly understood if they are conceived as ‘sets plus extra
structure’. In more technical terms, these correspond to the so-called not-concretizable categories. A
famous example is given by homotopy types: the category hTop, with topological spaces as objects
and homotopy classes of functions as morphisms, was proven to be non-concretizable by Peter Freyd
in 1970 (cf. his article “Homotopy is Not Concrete”). Marquis, in his article “Mathematical Forms
and Forms of Mathematics: Leaving the Shores of Extensional Mathematics”, discusses many other
examples, such as 1-categories and stacks.
As another witness that some parts of Mathematics are ‘leaving the shores of structuralism’, let me
close this digression with a quote of Yuri Manin:
[...] after Cantor and Bourbaki, no matter what we say, set theoretic mathematics resides
in our brains. [...] I cannot do otherwise. If I’m thinking of something completely new,
I say that it is a set with such-and-such a structure [...].
But fundamental psychological changes also occur. Nowadays these changes take the
form of complicated theories and theorems, through which it turns out that the place of
old forms and structures, for example, the natural numbers, is taken by some geometric,
right-brain objects.
Instead of sets, clouds of discrete elements, we envisage some sorts of vague spaces, which
can be very severely deformed, mapped one to another, and all the while the specific
space is not important, but only the space up to deformation. If we really want to
return to discrete objects, we see continuous components, the pieces whose form or even
dimension does not matter. [...]
I am pretty strongly convinced that there is an ongoing reversal in the collective con-
sciousness of mathematicians: the right hemispherical and homotopical picture of the
world becomes the basic intuition, and if you want to get a discrete set, then you pass
to the set of connected components of a space defined only up to homotopy.
That is, the Cantor points become continuous components, or attractors, and so on—
almost from the start. Cantor’s problems of the infinite recede to the background: from
the very start, our images are so infinite that if you want to make something finite out
of them, you must divide them by another infinity.
(I. Gelfand. “We Do Not Choose Mathematics as Our Profession, It Chooses Us: In-
terview with Yuri Manin”. Trans. by M. Saul. In: Notices of the AMS 56.10 (2009),
pp. 1268–1274, p. 1274.)
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I.3.1.b Eliminative vs. ante rem structuralism
An advantage of having already discussed the abstract method is that, since we
now understand structuralism as a particular process of abstraction, the different ap-
proaches to structuralism may be seen as a consequence of the many views on abstrac-
tion.
• Eliminative structuralism
In particular, the main ideas of eliminative structuralism exactly correspond with
the above account of abstraction by deletion (subection I.2.2). According to this point
of view, abstraction is but a method of generalization: to abstract is to leave unspec-
ified. All mathematical entities are particular entities and an abstract entity is one
for which some of the data has been omitted. This—we concluded—necessitates the
choice of a background ontology, which determines what is to be meant by a particular
object.
When applied to the particular case of mathematical structures, abstraction by
deletion yields an account of eliminative structuralism which is very similar to the one
provided by Shapiro, who starts by distinguishing two different perspectives one can
adopt towards the ‘things’ constituting a structure—which he calls “places”:
There are, in effect, two different orientations involved in discussing structures
and their places [...]. Sometimes the places of a structure are discussed in the
context of one or more systems that exemplify the structure. Call this the places-
are-offices perspective. This office orientation presupposes a background ontol-
ogy that supplies objects that fill the places of the structures. [...]
In contrast to this office orientation, there are contexts in which the places of
a given structure are treated as objects in their own right, at least grammatically.
That is, sometimes items that denote places are bona fide singular terms. [...]
Call this the places-are-objects perspective. Here, the statements are about the
respective structure as such, independent of any exemplifications it may have.184
184Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 82–83, author’s emphasis.
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and then adds:
For the eliminativist, the surface grammar of places-are-objects statements does
not reflect their underlying logical form, since, from that perspective, there are
no structures and there are no places to which one can refer. [...] The eliminative
structuralist holds that places-are-objects statements are just ways of expressing
the relevant generalizations [...].185
Hence, “the eliminative structuralism program paraphrases places-are-objects state-
ments in terms of the places-are-offices perspective”186.
A customary choice for the background ontology is to take an ontology of sets.
We then get the following standard account of structures as structured sets:
(i) All the mathematical objects considered are specific sets, explicitly constructed
from the null set.
(ii) Given an object E, an n-ary relation R is simply a subset of En. Functions
and n-ary operations are particular relations: a function f : E ! E is a binary
relation that is one-to-one in the first variable; an n-ary operation on E is a
function from En to E, thus it is a particular kind of (n+ 1)-ary relation.
(iii) A particular structure, or system, is a set E for which some relations R1;R2; : : :
have been defined.
(iv) Given two particular structures (E;R) and (E 0;R0), an isomorphism is a bijective
function  : E ! E 0 such that for any e1; e2; : : : elements of E, R(e1; e2; : : :) ,
R0((e1); (e2); : : :).
(v) An abstract structure is a particular structure for which the explicit construction
has been omitted and only the relations have been retained.
To take an example, consider the following three structures:
– S1  (E1;R1), with E1 =
n
;; f;g;f;g	o and R1  E21 the binary relation
defined by R1 =
n ;; f;g;  f;g;f;g	;  ;;f;g	o,
185Idem, “Mathematical Structuralism”, p. 6.
186Idem, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology, p. 86.
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– S2  (E2;R2), with E2 =
n
;; f;g;;; f;g	o and R2  E22 the binary relation
defined by R2 =
n ;; f;g;  f;g;;; f;g	;  ;;;; f;g	o,
– S  (E;R) with E = fe0; e1; e2g and R =

(e0; e1); (e1; e2); (e0; e2)
	
.
All three structures are isomorphic (they can all be thought as describing an ordered
set of three numbers, with the relation R(x; y) being conceived as “y is greater than
x”). All of them are particular structures but only for S1 and S2 all the information
has been given. For S, the explicit construction of the elements is not specified, and it
is because this knowledge is missing that S appears to be an abstract structure. The
distinction abstract/particular is not ontological but epistemological187.
As Shapiro explains, one of the main differences between the places-are-offices
perspective and the places-are-objects perspective lies in the way a statement like ‘e2 is
the biggest place of S’ is perceived. In the former, the copula is denotes a predication:
the statement is expressing one property amongst many others e2 may have. In the
latter, the copula is denotes an identity: the statement defines e2. It is in this sense
that Shapiro says places are treated “grammatically” as objects188.
However, as it is to be presently seen, the eliminative account is in fact a very
mild version of mathematical structuralism, one which is not quite faithful to the main
initial motivations. As we said earlier, the structuralist needs to articulate a clear
conception of what the places of an abstract structure are. By the double move of
first claiming there are only particular structures and then choosing a background
ontology upon which to base the construction of all these structures, the eliminativist
has addressed this issue directly. Indeed, the “things” constituting a given structure
are here specific sets. But, through this, it is now possible to conceive the places by
themselves, independently of the structures they may be part of. Returning to the
above example, it is possible to study e2 in isolation: as a place of the structure S, e2
187This view is very similar to that described by Hellman under the name of Structuralism in Set
Theory (STS), although he does not emphasize the epistemological interpretation of it. See Hellman,
op. cit., pp. 538–541.
188“It is common to distinguish the “is” of identity from the “is” of predication. The sentence
“Cicero is Tully” does not have the same form as “Cicero is Roman”. When in the places-are-objects
perspective [...], we use the “is” of identity. We could just as well write “=” or “is identical to”.
In contrast, when we invoke the places-are-offices perspective [...], we use something like the “is” of
predication [...].” (Shapiro, op. cit., p. 83.)
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acquires some structural properties (e.g., it is the greatest “thing” of S), but it also has
other properties which are completely independent of it being part of S (e.g., it makes
sense to ask which is the cardinality of e2). Therefore, in this view, the structuralist
emphasis on relations is just a matter of interest. He cannot claim structural properties
are all there is to an object: the latter may have—and indeed has!—non-structural,
‘intrinsic’ properties, but the structuralist takes the decision to focus on relations and
not to care about the remainder properties—which he leaves unspecified.
One may then wonder what knowledge of the individual places is gained through
the study of the structural properties. And the answer is worrisome. On the one hand,
any set whatsoever can be part of a particular structure which is isomorphic to S. The
statement “e2 is the greatest place of S” does not yield any information whatsoever
about e2, since e2 could be any set. On the other hand, the same e2 may be part of
infinitely many other structures—among which, for instance, a structure S 0  (E;R0)
with R0 = (e2; e1); (e1; e0); (e2; e0)	, isomorphic to S, and where e2 is now the smallest
place. The structural properties an object may acquire as a place of a structure are
therefore completely extraneous to the object: they are accidental properties which
reveal nothing of its essence.
After this remark, it is hard to still retain the interpretation of the structural
statement “e2 is the greatest place of S” as a predication about e2. Rather, since
whatever e2 turns out to be is completely irrelevant, one would like to interpret it
now as a predication about the structure. In other words, to read the statement “e2
is the greatest place of S” as rather being “S has a greatest place, which we call e2”.
But in this way the copula is becomes again a copula of identity and we seem to
be back to the places-are-objects perspective. The background ontology appears now
to be “an arbitrary and special fleshly clothing provided to pander to the need for
intuitiveness”189 which has nothing to do with the structure itself. There is then a
strong temptation of developing a framework in which to reify abstract structures and
set them free from the hypothetical and perhaps artificial background ontology.
189Schrödinger, op. cit., p. 58 (cf. footnote 65, page 39).
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• The idea of an ante rem structure
To be sure, the eliminative move, tying all statements to an underlying ontology,
appears to be at opposite ends from the philosophical motivations behind the struc-
turalist approach. The fundamental problem of this move is that it allows to conceive
the places of the particular structures by themselves, in isolation from all other places.
The elements become ontologically prior to the structure, and this undermines much
of the holistic ideas the structuralist wanted to emphasize. For Parsons, “reference
to mathematical objects is always in the context of some background structure”190.
Shapiro is also very clear about this point:
For us [structuralists], a real number is a place in the real-number structure. It
makes no sense to “postulate one real number”, because each number is part of
a large structure. It would be like trying to imagine a shortstop independent of
an infield, or a piece that plays the role of the black queen’s bishop independent
of a chess game. [... I]t is nonsense to contemplate numbers independent of the
structure they are part of.191
It thus becomes clear that the main goal of any non-eliminative structuralist is to
articulate an account of the structural method of abstraction in which the structure is
(onto)logically prior to the entities it contains. Such a conception of ante rem structures
adopts a places-are-objects perspective: a structure is not a particular arrangement of
objects which have an internal composition and can be conceived independently of the
structure they are part of. Rather, as Resnik puts it, these objects within a structure
“are structureless points [... which] have no identity or distinguishing features outside a
structure”192. All their properties stem from the relations defining the given structure.
However, already at this first conceptive level of an ante rem account of the struc-
tural method of abstraction, one can clearly perceive some serious difficulties such an
articulation will have to face. To eventually have a good conceptual hold of these
sought for sui generis structures, I believe it is important to have these prima facie
190Parsons, op. cit., p. 303.
191Shapiro, op. cit., p. 76.
192Resnik, op. cit., p. 201.
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problems in mind. So, for the moment, let us give a succinct account of what these
objections are, and expand on them later. We here closely follow the presentation of
Hellman193.
– Identity of structural indiscernibles. The idea that places of structures are to have
no identity or distinguishing features outside a structure suggests some sort of
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, where only relational properties are taken
into account. Thus, “any items bearing exactly the same intrastructural relations
to other items should be not many but one”194. But there are many familiar
mathematical situations where this seems to be false. The complex numbers i
and  i inside the structure C, or any two points of the Euclidean space are the
most famous examples. This can be seen as a proof that ante rem structures fail
to describe the objects they were designed for.
– Ontological priority of relations over relata. That structures are to be ontologi-
cally prior to the elements constituting it seems to necessitate that relations are
prior to relata. But “a relation presupposes its relata”195 and hence the “no-
tion of an ante rem structure seems to involve a vicious circularity”196. This
is thus a threat to the fundamental basic notion characteristic of Sui Generis
Structuralism.
– Multiple reductions. One of the main goals of ante rem structuralism is to make
sense of the discourse referring to, say, the infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert
space, in such a way that the explanation is consistent with the use of the definite
article “the”. However, given an ante rem structure (S;R), it seems that, by
simply permuting the places of the structure and redefining the relations, one
can define another structure (S 0;R0) that is just as valid a candidate for being
the structure.
Strong physico-mathematical and philosophical reasons tempted us towards the
193Hellman, op. cit., pp. 544–546.
194Ibid., p. 544.
195Awodey, op. cit., p. 61.
196Hellman, op. cit., p. 545.
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idea of an abstract structure as an independent entity. Yet, some conceptual difficulties
have immediately appeared. Any sound version of sui generis structures must give
clear answers to these three objections. Now, among the different points raised by
Hellman, the one which questions the notion of identity within an abstract structure
appears to be most relevant to our inquiries, for it is directly related to the requirement
of individuation (page 17). Indeed, in the mathematical description of classical and
quantum mechanical systems, points of an abstract symplectic manifold are used to
describe states of a classical system, rays of an abstract Hilbert space represent states
of a quantum system, elements of an abstract C-algebra refer to properties, etc. But
if these ‘things’ that constitute an abstract structure “have no intrinsic nature” and are
“structureless points with no identity or distinguishing features outside a structure”
(Resnik), how does one manage to identify the specific ‘thing’ which describes this
particular state or that given property?
For our investigation, it is therefore essential that we turn towards reflecting on
the interior of these mathematical structures and that we articulate a way of thinking
about the ‘things’ that constitute them.
I.3.2 Identity within an abstract mathematical structure
I.3.2.a The problem of the identity of indiscernibles
The problem of the identity of structural indiscernibles has raised an important
debate in the last decade. It is usually attributed to Jukka Keränen197 and John
Burgess198 who, in two independent papers, pointed to this fundamental objection
against non-eliminative structuralism. In the philosophy of physics literature, specially
when discussing the nature of space-time, this problem is sometimes called the “abysmal
embarrassment argument” in reference to the critique raised by Christian Wüthrich199.
197J. Keränen. “The Identity Problem for Realist Structuralism”. In: Philosophia Mathematica 9.3
(2001), pp. 308–330.
198Burgess, op. cit.
199C. Wüthrich. “Challenging the Spacetime Structuralist”. In: Philosophy of Science 76 (2010),
pp. 1039–1051.
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Keränen’s own exposition of the problem is extremely clear, so I will just describe the
basic steps of his argument.
First. The structuralist “must furnish an account of the identity for places”200.
This follows simply from the fact that “within a given theory, language, or framework,
there should be a definite criteria for identity among its objects [... and t]here is no
reason for structuralism to be the single exception to this”201, as Shapiro acknowledges.
Such an account amounts to completing the following ‘identity schema’:
for any x; y places of S; (x = y () ——)
Second. Keränen explains there are two ways of completing the identity schema:
“the account of identity will be either a general-property account or haecceity ac-
count”202. To understand the difference between both options, it is necessary to grasp
the concept of haecceity, or primitive thisness. This is nicely explained in the paper
“Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity” of Robert Adams:
Intended to be a synonym or translation of the traditional term “haecceity”, [...] a
thisness is the property of being identical with a certain particular individual.203
Hence, some thing has a thisness as long as it is an individual. Intuitively, this means
that the thing has a property that allows one to point at it in a precise way—to say,
in a meaningful way, ‘this thing’. On the other hand,
a property is purely qualitative—a suchness—if and only if it could be expressed,
in a language sufficiently rich, without the aid of such referential devices as
proper names, proper adjectives and verbs (such as ‘Leibnizian’ and ‘pegasizes’),
indexical expressions, and referential uses of definite descriptions.204
Now, the thisness of an object may or may not be reducible to a set of qualitative
properties. When it is not the case, one talks about a ‘primitive thisness’. This is, I
200Keränen, op. cit., p. 314.
201Shapiro, op. cit., p. 92, cited in Keränen, loc. cit.
202Ibid., p. 313.
203R. M. Adams. “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”. In: The Journal of Philosophy (1979),
pp. 5–26, p. 6.
204Ibid., p. 7.
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believe, the distinction Keränen has in mind: if one explains the identity of an object
by appealing to its primitive thisness, then one is using a haecceity account of identity;
if one explains the identity through the sole use of qualitative properties, then it is a
general-property account of identity. But for the non-eliminative structuralist, places
“have no more to them than can be expressed in terms of the basic relations of the
structure”205. Hence, “any haecceity account directly conflicts with the spirit and
motivations of realist structuralism”206 and we are left only with the second option.
Third. At this point, the identity schema the non-eliminative stucturalist needs
to provide appears to be of the following form:
for any x; y places of S;  x = y () (for any property P; P (x), P (y)):
But, as Keränen explains, “we need to be careful about which properties we admit”207.
The question becomes then to determine precisely which qualitative properties the
non-eliminative structuralist is allowed to use. To this, Keränen answers: “the places
of the structure S must be individuated by properties that are invariant under the
automorphisms of S”208.
Given this three steps, one finally arrives at the identity problem:
We are now ready to state the identity problem. Given a structure S, the schema
says that two singular terms denoting places of S denote the same place precisely
205Parsons, loc. cit. Cf. also Shapiro’s slogan: “There is no more to the individual numbers “in
themselves” than the relations they bear to each other” (Shapiro, op. cit., p. 73).
206Keränen, op. cit., p. 314.
207Ibid., p. 316.
208Ibid., p. 318. In fact, this is not the way Keränen first characterizes the grammatically correct
properties. He says:
We maintain that there are two crucial constraints [about which properties we admit]:
(1) No property the specification of which essentially involves an individual constant
denoting an element in S may be admitted. [...]
(2) No property the specification of which essentially involves an individual constant
denoting an element in S may be admitted. [...]
In sum, only the properties that can be specified by formulae in one free variable and
without individual constants may be admitted. (Ibid., pp. 316–317)
(Here S is the abstract structure and S is any system exemplifying it.) The author then proves that
any such properties are necessarily invariant under automorphisms and that any invariant property
satisfies the above two crucial constraints.
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when their referents have the same intra-structural relational properties that can
be specified without using individual constants. [...] The problem is that it
does not at all square with the use of the identity predicate in mathematical
discourse. For example, since 1 and  1 in any system (Z;+) have the same
intra-systemic relational properties, the realist structuralist must view ‘1’ and
‘ 1’ in the language of the structure (Z;+) as co-referential terms.209
The structuralist must conclude that 1 and  1 are equal. In the same way, he must
conclude that i and  i are not many but one, and that the Euclidean space contains
only one point, not infinitely many. These conclusions are clearly absurd—Wüthrich
would say: they are an abysmal embarrassment!
The reader may perhaps wonder how Keränen can be so confident about the fact
that 1 and  1 have the same relational properties within (Z;+). However, with the
notions of automorphism at our disposal, it is not hard to be convinced that this is
indeed so. For consider the general case of a structure S and two places x and y such
that there exists an automorphism  : S ! S relating them—i.e., (x) = y. Since any
qualitative property is invariant under automorphisms, we have, for any property P : if
P (x) then P (y). So, if the ante rem structuralist accepts the identity schema suggested
by Keränen, he must indeed conclude that any two places related by an automorphism
are equal. In other terms, Keränen’s Principle of Identity entails a structure should not
admit any automorphisms besides the trivial one. Thus, the identity problem arises for
any non-rigid structure210. In the case of the structure (Z;+), the transformation 
defined by (z) =  z for any place z of Z is a non-trivial automorphism (this is the case
for any non-trivial abelian group). Notice that this identity problem applies precisely
to those mathematical structures involved in the Mathematics of Mechanics: groups,
Hilbert spaces and symplectic manifolds admit many non-trivial automorphisms! In
sum, if he accepts the three steps of Keränen’s argument, the structuralist should
indeed be embarrassed.
209Ibid., p. 317. Again, bold characters refer to the structure whereas plain characters refer to the
systems.
210A structure S is said to be rigid if it its group of automorphisms Aut(S) is trivial. R, seen as
topological field, is an example of such a rigid structure.
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I.3.2.b First attempts at a solution
So much for the identity problem. Let us now look at how the ante rem structural-
ist may answer this objection. Certainly, all qualitative properties should be invariant
under automorphisms. I know of no structuralist that rejects this point, which has
been stressed many times: it can already be found in Rudolf Carnap
The structural properties are so to speak the invariants under isomorphic trans-
formation.211
in Hermann Weyl
A point relation is said to be objective if it is invariant with respect to every
automorphism.212
or, to take a recent example, it can also be found in F.A. Muller
[...] structuralism should be taken to include that all and only automorphic
subsets represent properties.213
From our perspective, since the structural method is a particular case of the ab-
stract method, this constraint of invariance under automorphism is simply the restate-
ment of the Principle of Abstraction (cf. page 88): the allowed, grammatically correct,
qualitative properties are those properties invariant under isomorphisms. Therefore, if
211R. Carnap. Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft, 2000, p. 74 (cited in G. Schiemer and J. Korbmacher. “What Are Structural Properties?”
Preprint available at http://www.jkorbmacher.com/, p. 8).
212This is taken from the passage where Weyl describes the problem of relativity. An extended
version of the quote would be
Our knowledge stands under the norm of objectivity. He who believes in Euclidean ge-
ometry will say that all points in space are objectively alike, and that so are all possible
directions. [...] Whereas the philosophical question of objectivity is not easy to answer in
a clear and definite fashion, we know exactly what the adequate mathematical concepts
are for the formulation of this idea. [...] An automorphism is a one-to-one mapping [...]
which leaves the basic relations undisturbed. [...] A point relation is said to be objective
if it is invariant with respect to every automorphism. In this sense, the basic relations are
objective, and so is any relation defined in terms of them.
(Weyl, op. cit., pp. 71–73.)
Replace “objective” by “structural” and you get a modern version of structuralism!
213F. A. Muller. “How to Defeat Wüthrich’s Abysmal Embarrassment Argument against Space-Time
Structuralism”. In: Philosophy of Science 78.5 (2011), pp. 1046–1057, p. 1051.
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the first two steps of the above argument are granted, the problem cannot be avoided.
One first strategy for the structuralist seems to be the rejection of the dichotomy
presented by Keränen: identity need not be grounded on primitive thisness or on
qualitative properties, understood as formulae in one free variable. For MacBride, this
dichotomy is “the most questionable feature of the argument”214. To overcome the
problem, the structuralist may try to furnish a third possible manner of completing
the identity schema. Now, since the whole point of structuralism is to put the emphasis
on relations between the places of a structure, the structuralist has a very natural place
where to start looking for a third alternative account of identity.
This is indeed the strategy followed by James Ladyman in his first attempt to
overcome the identity problem. In his short article “Mathematical Structuralism and
The Identity of Indiscernibles”, the author reactivates Quine’s distinction between three
different levels of discernibility. Two objects are said to be:
– absolutely discernible if there exists a one-place predicate that is true of one object
but not of the other,
– relatively discernible if there exists a two-place relation that is true of them in
one order but not in the other,
– weakly discernible if there exists a two-place relation, irreflexive for the pair and
that is true of them215.
Keränen considers only formulae in one variable and is therefore building his identity
schema based on absolute discernibility. By “demanding only weak, and not strong or
214“The most questionable feature of [Keränen’s] argument is its most basic assumption, the thesis
that necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of objects can and should be states in ex-
clusively property-theoretic terms.” (F. MacBride. “Structuralism Reconsidered”. In: The Oxford
Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Ed. by S. Shapiro. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005, pp. 563–589, p. 582.)
215In Word and Object, Quine only introduced the distinction between absolute and relative discerni-
bility. The third term was introduced later, in “Grades of Discriminability”, but there he changed
“relative discernibility” into “moderate discernibility”. However, Ladyman seems to be following the
terminology adopted by Simon Saunders (S. Saunders. “Physics and Leibniz’s Principles”. In: Sym-
metries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. Ed. by K. Brading and E. Castellani. Cambridge
University Press, 2003, pp. 289–308).
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relative, discernibility of numerically distinct individuals”216, the ante rem structuralist
can expect to solve the identity problem. And this is indeed the case for all the
examples discussed above. Therein the wished-for relation that is irreflexive for the
problematic pairs can readily be found: for the structure (Z;+), one can choose the
relation R(x; y)  ‘x is the additive inverse of y’ ( 1 is the inverse of 1, but 1 is not
its own inverse); this same relation allows to distinguish i from  i in the complex
field structure; and the Euclidean distance allows to distinguish any two points on the
space217.
The introduction of the symmetric/asymmetric and reflexive/irreflexive distinc-
tions among relations may appear as a rather ad hoc move from the structuralist who
is trying to overcome the identity problem. One can attempt to avoid any appeal to
this distinction by adopting a strategy slightly different from Ladyman’s: to treat all
relations indistinctly and build the identity schema from all of them. Indeed, one can
propose the following:
Relational Principle of Identity. Given a structure S, for any x; y places of S, x is
identical to y if and only if, for any n-ary relation R defined on S and any z1; : : : ; zn 1
places of S, we have:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(x; z1; : : : ; zn 1) 2 R  ! (y; z1; : : : ; zn 1) 2 R
(z1; x; : : : ; zn 1) 2 R  ! (z1; y; : : : ; zn 1) 2 R
...
(z1; : : : ; zn 1; x) 2 R  ! (z1; : : : ; zn 1; y) 2 R
If no relation can perceive the difference between two places—in other terms, if two
places are relationally indiscernible—then, these places must not be many but one.
This certainly appears to be a faithful implementation of the structuralist intuition
that there is no more to the places than the relations they bear to each other. This
relational account of identity within a structure is the precise answer given by Muller
216J. Ladyman. “Mathematical Structuralism and The Identity of Indiscernibles”. In: Analysis 65.3
(2005), pp. 218–221, p. 220.
217Ibid., p. 220.
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in the context of spacetime structuralism218.
Again, with this choice of identity schema, Keränen’s objection no longer holds in
the general case. Given x and y places of S related by an automorphism , one can no
longer conclude x = y from the data y = (x). Indeed, grammatically correct relations
are certainly also invariant under automorphisms, but this now means
(x; z1; : : : ; zn 1) 2 R $ ((x) = y; (z1); : : : ; (zn 1)) 2 R
and not at all
(x; z1; : : : ; zn 1) 2 R $ ((x) = y; z1; : : : ; zn 1) 2 R
It is thus a priori possible to find a relation R such that (x; z1; : : : ; zn 1) 2 R and yet
(y; z1; : : : ; zn 1) /2 R. If such a relation exists, one is forced to conclude x 6= y, unless
one is willing to abandon the usual axiom of substitution of identicals (sometimes also
called Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals).
Ladyman’s and Muller’s approaches have in common the fundamental idea of
building identity based on relations, not on properties. There are however some im-
portant differences as well. The latter seems to be more general than the former: for all
cases where weak discernibility applies, Muller’s relational principle of identity will do
the work as well, but it is not obvious that the converse is also true. Despite this, there
is at least one reason why one could prefer to stick to the Ladyman-Quine strategy:
the introduction of the two distinctions among relations, which are absent in Muller’s
account, allows Ladyman to keep the question of the discernibility of two places a local
matter. Given the places x and y, one can consider them in isolation and answer the
question of their identity without having to ever consider the remainder places of the
structure. This is far from true with Muller’s notion of relational indiscernibles—which
does not coincide with neither relative nor weak indiscernibles. As it is easy to see, with
the Relational Principle of Identity, the identity of x and y involves all other places of
the structure. Thus, Muller’s identity scheme is explicitly holistic; it involves the whole
218Muller, op. cit., p. 1054. I have generalized slightly Muller’s account. The author only considers
the n = 1 and n = 2 cases (that is, predicates and binary relations).
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structure! But, from the structuralist perspective, this holism should not be seen as a
drawback. On the contrary, it could be perceived as a welcomed feature, since—as I
explained in I.3.1.a, page 97—the local/global two-fold level of study is characteristic
of the structural method. After all, Shapiro does state that “an ante-rem structure is
a whole consisting of, or constituted by, its places and relations”219.
Either way, by considering not only properties but also relations as a means to
discern between two places, the ante rem structuralist seems to have at his disposal
a satisfactory and general answer to the objection. The situation is however more
involved and the structuralist cannot escape the identity problem so lightly. One first
way to see this is to notice the existence of mathematical objects which fail to meet
both the weak version of the Principle of Indiscernibles and the Relational Principle of
Identity! Button finds in graph theory two such examples220:
– G1: b   a  ! c
– G2:  b ! c 	
Therein, any relation that holds of (b; b) will be satisfied as well by (b; c); (c; b); (c; c),
and there is hence no hope of finding an (irreflexive) relation distinguishing b from c.
Leitgeb, Ladyman and Shapiro discuss very similar examples221.
These examples seem to condemn the idea of accounting for the identity of places
within a structure solely in terms of intra-structure relations and with no appeal to
primitive identity. But one can still try to “save” some version of ante rem structuralism
from accepting primitive identity facts by rejecting that Button’s examples be named
structures. That some mathematical objects should not be considered structures is not
an option for many philosophers endorsing mathematical structuralism. This is because
they regard mathematical structuralism as an attempt to build a foundation for the
219Shapiro, “Mathematical Structuralism”, p. 2, my emphasis.
220T. Button. “Realistic Structuralism’s Identity Crisis: A Hybrid Solution”. In: Analysis 66 (2006),
pp. 216–222, p. 218.
221Button’s graphG2 is very similar to the unlabelled graph with two nodes and no edges considered
by Leitgeb and Ladyman (H. Leitgeb and J. Ladyman. “Criteria of Identity and Structuralist Ontol-
ogy”. In: Philosophia Mathematica 16.3 (2008), pp. 388–396). This, in turn, corresponds precisely to
the ‘finite cardinal patterns’ considered by Shapiro (Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure
and Ontology, p. 115).
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whole of Mathematics. However, as I have emphasized several times already, these
foundational aspirations are extraneous to our purpose. We are trying to learn how to
conceive abstract mathematical structures because some of them play a fundamental
role in the foundations of Mechanics, and the question of whether all mathematical
objects are structures is of no matter to us222. Therefore, one could attempt to define
a structure as a collection of places and relations for which the Relational Principle of
Identity (or the Principle of Identity for weak Indiscernibles) holds. This move seems
to be alright as long as only artificially constructed objects—like the graphs G1 and
G2—are denied the status of abstract structures223.
However, even these precautions do not suffice. As Shapiro remarks, it is not clear
in which way some of the relations used to discern two places are different from a brute
non-identity relation. And this is a real worry for this strategy:
[...] if non-identity does count as an irreflexive relation for these metaphysical
purposes, then the distinguishing task is trivial, and unilluminating. The thesis is
just that distinct objects must be distinct. Notice that identity, or non-identity,
is presupposed in the very formulation of some of the requirements and the
examples.224
The problem is very well perceived if one considers vector spaces. Indeed, let V be an
222In fact, I believe the foundational aspiration of structuralism to be hopeless. To me, it has been
outdated by many of the objects pure mathematics has introduced in the last sixty years which do
not have an underlying set.
223Essentially, this is Button’s proposal. Structures satisfying the identity of weak indiscernibles,
which he calls “basic structures” are to be interpreted realistically; those structures which fail to meet
such an identity criterion, called “constructed structures” are treated eliminativistically (Button, op.
cit., p. 220). Nonetheless, this way out of the problem seems dubious. As noted by Ladyman,
“Graphs such as G0 [not satisfying weak discernibility] are not exceptional; all other
unlabelled graphs that contain at least two isolated nodes (for example, 11 out of the
156 possible unlabelled graphs with 6 nodes) include nodes that are not even weakly
discernible. Furthermore, an analogous point can be made about all unlabelled graphs
which include at least two distinct but isomorphic and unconnected components.”
(J. Ladyman. “Scientific Structuralism: On The Identity and Diversity of Objects in a
Structure”. In: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. Vol. 81. 1. Wiley Online
Library. 2007, pp. 23–43, p. 35.)
Thus, Button’s proposal seems to exclude all graph theory from an ante rem structural account.
224S. Shapiro. “Identity, Indiscernibility, and ante rem Structuralism: The Tale of i and  i”. In:
Philosophia Mathematica 16.3 (2008), pp. 285–309, footnote 2, p. 288.
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abstract vector space and 	1;	2 two distinct vectors. If one uses Ladyman’s identity
schema, what is the irreflexive relation distinguishing them? I claim it would have to
be something of the sort “ 	2 is not the additive inverse of 	1”. Of course, this can
also be stated as “the additive inverse of 	2 is not the additive inverse of 	1”, which
also means “	2 is not 	1”. Symbolically, the argument is to conclude that 	1 6= 	2
because 	1  	2 6= 0225. It can hardly get less illuminating than that...
On the other hand, Muller’s Relational Principle of Identity runs into similar
difficulties. To discern the two vectors 	1 and 	2, it would be enough to find any
(not necessary irreflexive) binary relation R for which there exists a third vector 	3
such that (	1;	3) 2 R and (	2;	3) /2 R226. Now, the existence of this sought-for
	3 would have to be proven by a demonstrative act: it would have to be exhibited,
explicitly constructed. This third vector cannot not be proven to exist in principle,
for that would presuppose we already knew 	1 6= 	2. But it is hard to see how one
could effectively exhibit one particular element of an abstract structure, which, by its
unspecified, freestanding nature cannot be laid ‘in front of our eyes’.
I.3.2.c The solution: primitive typed identity
All in all, it very well seems the ante rem structuralist cannot avoid committing
to some primitive identity facts. This conclusion is explicitly endorsed by Ladyman
and Leitgeb:
[...] the identity relation for positions in a structure is a relation that ought to
be viewed as an integral component of a structure in the same way as, for exam-
ple, the successor relation is an integral component of the structure of natural
numbers. [...]
225The situation is exactly the same for the important example of Hilbert spaces. Given an abstract
Hilbert space H and two elements 	1;	2 of same norm, one would mimic the case of the Euclidean
space and use the metric relation to distinguish them: d(	1;	2) 6= 0, and this seems alright. But
the notation is hiding the triviality of such a statement, since d(	1;	2) = jj	1   	2jj and thus
d(	1;	2) 6= 0() 	1  	2 6= 0.
226In his article, when discussing the identity of space-time points, Muller gives the following example:
consider the light cone relation R(x; r)  “r lies inside the light-cone of x”. Then, if for every point r
we have both R(x; r) and R(y; r), we can conclude that x = y. (Muller, op. cit., p. 1056).
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The fact that [the graph] G2 consists of precisely two nodes is simply part
of what G2 is; it is ‘built into’ its graph-theoretic structure. Adapting the
structuralist slogan on natural numbers [...], we are still allowed to say that
‘There is no more to the individual nodes “in themselves” than the relations
they bear to each other’, the only addition that we have to make is that we have
to count identity and difference of nodes among the very relations that the nodes
in a graph bear to each other.227
This is also the position adopted by Shapiro, who “wholeheartedly rejects the identity
of indiscernibles”228. When discussing his ‘finite cardinal structures’—which are finite
abstract sets—he says:
The cardinal-four structure is the worst offender of (IND) [absolute discernibility]
possible. Since there are no relations to preserve, every bijection of the domain is
an automorphism. Each of the four places is structurally indiscernible from the
others and yet, by definition, there are four such places, and so not just one.229
It is question-begging to demand the structuralist to justify why a graph with two nodes
has two nodes and not three nor one. The cardinality of a structure is an information
given a priori, not an information one acquires a posteriori. A graph with two nodes
has two nodes by definition.
It is easy to see this idea of a primitive cardinality is indeed faithful to the way
mathematicians work. As Leitgeb and Ladyman emphasize230, in graph theory one
never asks the question of how many nodes a given graph G has. Rather, the pertinent
question is to find how many different graphs with a given number of nodes there are.
Moreover, almost any description of an abstract structure includes an axiom about
its cardinality. To give some examples, to uniquely characterize the field of complex
numbers, one has to describe it as an algebraically closed field of characteristic zero and
of cardinality the continuum. If this choice of cardinality is not made, then the structure
227Leitgeb and Ladyman, op. cit., pp. 390 and 392–393.
228Shapiro, op. cit., p. 292.
229Ibid., p. 287.
230Leitgeb and Ladyman, op. cit., p. 392.
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is not fixed231. Second, in his Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, when
von Neumann defines Hilbert spaces, he includes an axiom about the cardinality of a
family of linearly independent vectors, besides the axioms of a vector space and of a
Hermitian inner product:
The properties A., B. [of linearity and Hermitian product] permit us, as we
see, to state a great deal about R [an abstract Hilbert space], yet they are not
sufficient to enable us to distinguish the Rn from each other and from R1. This
concept is clearly associated with the maximum number of linearly independent
vectors. If n = 0; 1; 2; : : : is such a maximum, then we may state for this n:
– [Axiom] C.(n) There are exactly n linearly independent vectors. [...]
If there exists no maximum number, then we have:
– [Axiom] C.(1) There are arbitrarily many linearly independent vectors.
[...] We obtain a different space R, depending on which we decide upon.232
Von Neumann could not be more transparent: the structural relations retained in the
process of abstraction are not enough to force upon us the number of places of the
structure. This cardinality can only be fixed by a decision we make.
In the light of all this, we conclude: Identity within an abstract structure is primi-
tive: it cannot be grounded on structural properties nor relations. This the structuralist
can no longer deny. The worry is to understand whether this return of primitive iden-
tity within a structure reduces the structuralist identity schema to a haecceity account.
If, indeed, the identity of the places of a structure is to be grounded on a primitive
intrinsic self-identity, the whole ante rem perspective on abstract structures would
be undermined. For it then would make perfect sense to consider abstract places in
isolation—and this would be to abandon one of the main tenets of structuralism: places
are nothing in themselves. Recall Shapiro: “It makes no sense to postulate one real
231This follows from Steinitz’s theorem which proves that, for every characteristic p > 0 and uncount-
able cardinal , there is, up to isomorphism, exactly one algebraically closed field of characteristic
p and cardinality  (E. Steinitz. “Algebraische Theorie der Körper”. In: Journal für die reine und
angewandte Mathematik 137 (1910), pp. 167–309).
232Von Neumann, op. cit., p. 45, my emphasis.
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number”233. Fraser MacBride encapsulates well the danger the structuralist is facing:
[The places of a structure] cannot simply be bundles of structural relations; they
are a separate, irreducible category of existent. So the structuralist must admit
(at least) a two-category ontology of objects and relations. The failure of property
reductionism indicates that mathematical objects [here: places of a structure] are
also the bearers of properties and relations that take them outside their parent
structure [...].234
If the last sentence is true, then sui generis structuralists need to postulate some
background ontology of abstract objects from which structures will be constituted.
But this was precisely what ante rem structuralism was trying to avoid in the first
place!
Luckily, the return to primitive identity within structures need not mean the
appeal to haecceity. Consider an abstract structure S and two places x; y. To ground
identity on haecceity means to claim:
1. that there exists a grammatically correct property Hx  ‘being identical with x’,
2. that x is different from y because Hx(x) is true and Hx(y) is false.
This move certainly goes against structuralism but also conflicts with the Principle
of Abstraction, for the haecceity Hx is in general not invariant under automorphisms.
However, this is not what ante rem structuralists are committed to. Rather, their claim
is:
i) that there exists a basic binary relation on S ‘being identical with’ and denoted
=S (in other words, such that z1 =S z2 () ‘z1 is identical with z2’),
ii) that x is different from y because x =S y is false.
At first sight, this may appear to be a trivial restatement of the haecceity account,
but in fact it is not. The first thing to notice is that now the conflict with the Principle
of Abstraction has evaporated: =S is manifestly invariant under any automorphism
and is hence a grammatically correct relation. But to stop at this remark would be to
miss the really crucial point. What makes the structural account of identity radically
233Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology, p. 76, my emphasis.
234MacBride, op. cit., p. 584.
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different from a haecceity account is that this primitive identity =S is a relation that
only makes sense within the given structure. Whereas a haecceity account of identity
may suggest—to say the least—the existence of an independent entity named x, the
structuralist once more insists on the importance of remembering the context inside
which the identity claims are being made. Identity is primitive, but identity is also
contextual. Therefore, the ante rem structuralist escapes MacBride’s conclusion that
‘places can be taken outside of their structure’. Ladyman rightly insists on this point,
by distinguishing intrinsic and contextual individuality—distinction which he borrows
from Stachel235:
[...] primitive contextual individuality is different to primitive intrinsic indi-
viduality [...], for only the latter and not the former implies haecceitism. If
individuation is intrinsic, and not grounded in qualitative properties but is ei-
ther ungrounded or grounded in haecceities, then the identity of an individual
objects is determinate in other counterfactual situations [...]. On the other hand,
if individuality is contextual then there is in general no reason to regard talk of
the same object in another relational structure as intelligible.236
In sum, we have arrived to the following conclusion:
Identity within a structure: For an ante rem structuralist, identity
of places within an abstract structure is primitive. But it is not
absolute, unrestricted primitive identity; rather, it is primitive typed
identity.
I.3.3 Individuation within an abstract mathematical structure
The previous section considered the question of what grounds identity within an
abstract mathematical structure, and the conclusion was that, in fact, this internal
identity is in general ungrounded: given places s1; s2 of an abstract structure S, their
235J. Stachel. “Structural Realism and Contextual Individuality”. In: Hilary Putnam. Ed. by
Ben-Menahem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 203–219.
236Ladyman, op. cit., p. 37, my emphasis.
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difference is a primitive statement which is stipulated and needs not be justified. Yet,
the existence of a primitive typed identity does not render superfluous all discussion
about discernibility within an abstract structure. It still remains an important ques-
tion to understand precisely which are the available descriptive resources inside a given
abstract structure. For indeed our interest lies not so much in determining whether
two places ares different but, foremost, in determining whether a particular place (de-
scribing a specific state or a given property of the system) can be objectively singled
out among all abstract places. In other words, we ask about the possibilities of indi-
viduation within a structure, or, in Hermann Weyl’s more elegant language, about the
possibility of a “conceptual fixation of points [...] that would enable one to reconstruct
any point when it has been lost”237.
To capture precisely what is at stake, we need to take a small detour and fully
pursue the consequences of what emerged in the last few pages.
I.3.3.a Abstract structures as structured types
The need for ante rem structuralists to appeal to a primitive typed identity points
to the crucial idea that type theory, and not set theory, is the natural home for con-
ceiving abstract structures. Once this has been hinted at, it may appear as a blunder
not having considered it from the start. For the tokens-to-type relation has the perfect
characteristics to capture exactly the places-to-structure relation that ante rem struc-
turalist advocates. To understand why this is so, it is important to recall the main
conceptual differences between set theory and type theory.
As the Univalent Foundations Program explains in the introduction of its book,
“[o]ne problem in understanding type theory from a mathematical point of view, how-
ever, has always been that the basic concept of type is unlike that of set in ways that
have been hard to make precise”238. Nonetheless, some pages later they describe a first
fundamental difference:
237Weyl, op. cit., p. 75.
238The Univalent Foundations Program. Homotopy Type Theory: Univalent Foundations of Mathe-
matics. Institute for Advanced Study: http://homotopytypetheory.org/book, 2013, p. 2, authors’
emphasis.
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[...] if the type A is being treated more like a set than like a proposition [...], then
“a : A” may be regarded as analogous to the set-theoretic statement “a 2 A”.
However, there is an essential difference in that “a : A” is a judgment whereas
“a 2 A”” is a proposition. [...]
A good way to think about this is that in set theory, “membership” is
a relation which may or may not hold between two pre-existing objects “a”
and “A”, while in type theory we cannot talk about an element “a” in
isolation: every element by its very nature is an element of some type,
and that type is (generally speaking) uniquely determined. Thus, when we say
informally “let x be a natural number”, in set theory this is shorthand for “let
x be a thing and assume that x 2 N”, whereas in type theory “let x : N” is an
atomic statement: we cannot introduce a variable without specifying its type.239
The relation between a token a and its type A is not a proposition because it is not a
statement susceptible of being proven. Rather, the statement a : A is a definition that
allows to render explicit a context, and the set-theoretic statement :(a 2 A) simply
cannot be transposed into type theory.
An immediate consequence of the difference between “a : A” in type theory and
“a 2 A” in set theory is the difference in the treatment of identity. Since the types are
inseparable from the entities, identity statements must always be considered within
a given type. Given a : A and b : B, it makes no sense in general to consider the
proposition a = b. Equality statements can only make sense for tokens of the same
type: only for a; b : A, one can ask whether a =A b. Unlike in set theory, in type
theory the equality sign always comes with a subscript. This means that identity is
a dependent type: in addition to the invariant element =, one always has to add a
variable specifying the context in which equalities are being predicated.
In sum, as Makkai succinctly puts it:
“[In type theory] both equality and membership are denied the free reign they
enjoyed in the standard [set theoretical] foundation.”240
239Ibid., p. 18, authors’ italics, bold emphasis is mine.
240Makkai, op. cit., p. 156.
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Now, compare this quote with Shapiro’s:
In mathematics, at least, the notions of “object” and “identity” are unequivocal
but thoroughly relative. Objects are tied to the structures that contain them.241
It should strike how good a fit this is. The type-theoretical insistence that tokens
should not be considered in isolation is a familiar one for any structuralist. But the
rules of type theory are much stronger than just this. It is not that one should not
talk about tokens in isolation (methodological decision granted by any structuralist);
it is that one cannot talk about the tokens without at the same time talking about
the types (ontological constraint adopted only by non-eliminative structuralists). The
token is not a pre-existent object, prior to the type; it is not the case that the type
A is defined extensionally, by the collection of its tokens. It is the other way around.
Here is again Makkai explaining it:
An entity belonging to a type cannot be discussed without reference to the type;
the type logically precedes the entity, and the type is inseparable from the en-
tity.242
As we have already seen, this (onto)logical priority of the structure is characteristic of
non-eliminative structuralists. Recall the insistence of Shapiro on this point:
Structures are prior to places in the same sense that any organization is prior to
the offices that constitute it. The natural number structure is prior to ‘6’, just
as ‘baseball defense’ is prior to ‘shortstop’ or ‘U.S. Government’ is prior to ‘Vice
President’.243
Therefore, by conceiving abstract structures as structured types, many objections
against sui generis structuralism vanish into thin air. Type theory provides the ante
rem structuralists with both a relation capturing the places-to-structure relation they
advocate, and a treatment of identity allowing them to solve the problem of identity
for structural indiscernibles. As indicated by Benacerraf, the structuralist way out to
241Shapiro, op. cit., p. 81.
242Makkai, loc. cit.
243Shapiro, op. cit., p. 9.
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the (in)famous “Julius Caesar problem”, posed by Frege, is another good example of
the usefulness of type theory:
To speak from Frege’s standpoint, there is a world of objects [...] in which the
identity relation had free reign. [...] Hence the complaint at one point of his
argument that, thus far, one could not tell whether Julius Caesar was a number.
I rather doubt that in order to explicate the use and meaning of numbers one
will have to decide whether Julius Caesar was (is?) or was not the number 43. [...]
I propose to deny that all identities are meaningful [...]. Identity statements make
sense only in contexts where there exist possible individuating conditions.244
As Shapiro stresses, “a good philosophy of mathematics need not answer questions like
“Is Julius Caesar = 2?” and “Is 1 2 4?” Rather, a philosophy of mathematics should
show why these questions need no answers [...]”245. And this is precisely what the
appeal to type theory does: it simply dissolves such questions by considering them as
grammatically incorrect!
In the light of this, it is surprising that, despite the natural match between the
language of types and the main ideas of ante rem structuralists, the use of type theory in
the philosophical discussion of abstract structures still has a feeble existence. Therein,
model theory and set theory overwhelmingly dominate. In fact, it seems that when the
type-to-tokens relation is invoked, it is usually done in order to capture the structure-
to-systems relation and not the structure-to-places relation246. To my knowledge, only
Michael Makkai has tried to develop a systematic account of abstract structures using
type theory. He calls it the Structuralist Foundation of Abstract Mathematics (SFAM),
and the central notion allowing to describe abstract structures is that of “abstract set”:
In Abstract Mathematics, we find the intuitive idea of abstract sets one whose
244P. Benacerraf. “What Numbers Could Not Be”. In: Philosophical Review 74 (1965), pp. 47–73,
p. 64. For that matter, one could also recall one of the main disputes between Benacerraf’s “two
militant logicists” Ernie and Johnny on whether 3 belonged to 17. Using von Neumann’s ordinals,
Ernie answers positively whereas Johnny, using Zermelo’s numerals, answers negatively. Therein, the
discussion was dominated by the set-theoretical conception of membership, and this allowed questions
about membership to be considered pertinent, well-posed questions.
245Shapiro, op. cit., p. 79.
246Examples of this are: Resnik, op. cit., p. 228; Shapiro, op. cit., p. 85; C. Chihara. A Structural
Account of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 170.
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elements are characterless, nevertheless distinct, points. An “abstract” structure
is one whose underlying set is an abstract set.247
But contrary to what the name seems to indicate, “abstract sets” are not sets in the
sense of ZFC set-theory and are better thought as types. The distinction between
these abstract sets and the “concrete” ZFC sets is crucial, and many objections to ante
rem structuralism originate in a failure to see this. It is thus important to focus our
attention for a while on this notion.
As Marquis points out, the idea of abstract sets can already be found in the
early work of Fréchet248 and is discussed at length in Lawvere’s 1976 article “Variable
Quantities and Variable Structures in Topoi”:
The traditional view that membership is primary leads to a mysterious absolute
distinction between x and fxg, to agonizing over whether or not the rational
numbers are literally contained in the real numbers, [...] to debates over whether
the members of the natural number 5 are 0, 1, 3, 4 or not, and all that is clearly
just getting started [...]. I believe the conclusion is that membership-as-primary
entails membership as global and absolute whereas in practice membership is local
and relative [...].
These considerations lead one to formulate the following “purified” concept
of (constant) abstract set as the one actually used in naive set-theoretic practice
of modern mathematics: An abstract set X has elements each of which has no
internal structure whatsoever; X has no internal structure except for equality and
inequality of pairs of elements, and has no external properties save its cardinality
[...].249
Notice once again the importance of departing from the usual, absolute set-theoretical
notion of membership.
247Makkai, op. cit., p. 157.
248M. R. Fréchet. “Les ensembles abstraits et le calcul fonctionnel”. In: Rendiconti del Circolo
Matematico di Palermo (1884–1940) 30 (1910), pp. 1–26. See also the quote of footnote 134, page 79.
249F. W. Lawvere. “Variable Quantities and Variable Structures in Topoi”. In: Algebra, Topology
and Category Theory - A collection of Papers in Honor of Samuel Eilenberg. Ed. by A. Heller and
M. Tierney. London: Academic Press, 1976, pp. 101–131, pp. 118-119.
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These abstract sets are obtained by applying the method of abstraction, as de-
scribed by Marquis (subsection I.2.3). In this case, one first has a domain of significant
variation which includes “concrete” sets of very different sorts—sets of points, sets of
transformations, sets of numbers, etc. Along with the cardinality of these sets, one
then decides to retain solely the relation of identity and omit all the remainder infor-
mation. The transformations that preserve this chosen information are the bijections.
And one finally arrives to abstract sets, as entities on their own, by declaring that
bijection is the relevant criterion of identity for sets: “what can be declared in the
given [new] language is that abstract sets can be isomorphic”250. Hence, one gets to
the notion of abstract sets by a process of structural abstraction. Clearly, for abstract
sets cardinality is given a priori and identity within a set is primitive.
Even though the notion of abstract set is certainly not Makkai’s invention, he is,
to my knowledge, the only one that captures their nature. The structural process of
abstraction applied to concrete ZFC sets, which culminates in the notion of ‘abstract
sets’, does not produce sets but rather produces types:
[An abstract] set a is a type, and a variable x may be declared to be of type a.
“x 2 a” will not be a predicate subject to free manipulation with the connectives
and quantifiers as fullfledged predicates will be; for instance, we will never write
:(x 2 a). The statement “x 2 a” will have the role of defining contexts of
variables, in the style of P. Martin-Löf and Cartmell. Thus SFAM is a type
theory.251
Hence, following Makkai, we shall now say that an abstract structure is a type
equipped with some relations between its tokens. This in particular holds for an ab-
stract Hilbert space, which is a type H such that the usual Hilbert space axioms are
250Marquis, op. cit., p. 62.
251Makkai, op. cit., p. 156.
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met by its tokens252.
I.3.3.b Abstract sets vs. abstract collections
As we have just explained, abstract sets can be seen as the result of an abstraction
process that starts from ‘concrete’, ‘material’ sets (which include both sets of physical
objects and ZFC-sets) and then declares bijection to be the new criterion of identity.
Therefore, it would be most natural that, at some point of the discussion on abstract
sets, the reader may have had the impression that these abstract entities were nothing
more than the usual Frege-Russell numbers. Recall the two logicians’ definition of
cardinal numbers: these are equivalence classes of sets under the bijection relation.
Moreover, were the reader familiar with Shapiro’s work, the notion of ‘finite cardinal
structure’ would have also come to mind and strengthened this impression: by their
definition—Shapiro defines the n cardinal structure to be the structure common to all
collections of exactly n objects253—they look very much like our abstract sets, by their
name—finite cardinal structures—they suggest the link with cardinal numbers.
Nonetheless, the two notions—of ‘abstract set’ and ‘cardinal number’—should be
252I should mention a post from Michael Schulman in the n-category café blog where Makkai’s idea
that abstract structures are in fact structured types is also discussed. He says:
Now, the sets in a material set theory are admittedly closer to the natural-language
meaning of “set”: a set of three sheep can be distinguished from a set of three chairs,
and each of the sheep and chairs might also be an element of other sets. However, the
claim is that the sets in a structural set theory are closer to the way sets are used in
mathematics. These “structural sets” are also very similar to the types in a type the-
ory (regarded as the object-theory, as suggested in the previous post). In fact, Toby
[Bartels] has convinced me that it’s difficult to decide exactly where to draw the line
between type theory and structural set theory, although there are differences in how the
words are most commonly used. It might be better, terminologically speaking, if
mathematicians had used a word such as “type” instead of “set” all along.
But by now the notion that (for instance) a group is a set equipped with
an identity and a multiplication is so firmly entrenched in most mathemati-
cians’ consciousnesses that I think there’s little point trying to change it.
Anyway, as I mentioned in the previous post, “set” and “type” and “class” are basi-
cally fungible words—especially when used structurally. (https://golem.ph.utexas.
edu/category/2009/12/syntax_semantics_and_structura_1.html, italics are Schul-
man’s, bold emphasis is mine.)
We here find again the typical terminological problem: ‘material sets’ correspond to Makkai’s ‘concrete
sets’, whereas ‘structural sets’ are Makkai’s ‘abstract sets’.
253Shapiro, op. cit., p. 115.
Chapter I. Mathematical Description of Physical Systems 127
distinguished, for abstract sets furnish a perfect example of why the structural process
of abstraction produces entities which cannot be thought as equivalence classes.
As Lawvere insists, abstract sets are more complex than cardinal numbers:
[...] an abstract set is more refined (less abstract) than a cardinal number in
that it does have elements while a cardinal number does not. The latter feature
makes it possible for abstract sets to support the external relations known as
mappings, which constitute the second fundamental concept of naive set theory
(cardinal numbers would admit only the less refined external relations expressed
by one being less than another or not).254
A good way to understand Lawvere’s quote is to insist on the difference between an
abstract set and an abstract collection. On the one hand, an abstract set, says Lawvere,
“has no internal structure except for equality and inequality”. But it is the presence
of this identity relation that makes abstract sets structural. Abstract sets are abstract
structures—indeed, the simplest of all—and they are so because they are collections
equipped with an identity relation that holds within them. For that reason, abstract
sets are also sometimes called “structural sets”255. Makkai puts it nicely:
[An abstract] set is a relatively orderly part of the world in which an equality
predicate reigns. The elements of a set are individuated with respect to each
other. However, there is no global equality present for all things simultaneously.
An equality predicate is an equivalence relation on the given set. In fact, the set
is the underlying collection together with its equality predicate.256
On the other hand, one can decide to push the abstract method one step further by
deciding to omit the identity relation within abstract sets. The more abstract entities
thus obtained I call ‘abstract collections’. As I will now try to argue, abstract collections
behave very much like cardinal numbers.
254Lawvere, op. cit., p. 119, author’s emphasis.
255This seems to be the terminology adopted by the community involved in the nLab project (e.g.,
John Baez, Toby Bartels, Michael Schulman, Urs Schreiber). See for instance the entry Structural Set
Theory in nLab. http://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/structural+set+theory
256Makkai, loc. cit.
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Following Lawvere’s suggestion, this is best captured by reflecting on the mor-
phisms between these entities. Consider for instance two abstract sets E;F of cardi-
nality n  1 and n. To the question “How many different injective morphisms from E
to F are there?”, the mathematician will answer that there are n! many of them. The
subsequent reasoning is one possible way to arrive to this answer. Start by stating the
usual identity criterion for functions: given two morphisms f; g : E  ! F , we have
(f =Hom(E;F ) g)()
 
if x =E y then f(x) =F g(y)

Notice that, since we are dealing with types, we need to specify the type in which each
identity relation is being stated. To explicitly construct one such injective morphism
g : E  ! F , choose first a token of F that will not have a preimage—call it fn—and
then choose one particular bijection between E and the remainder tokens of F—call
them f1; : : : ; fn 1. It is now clear why there are n! injective morphisms from E to F :
there are n ways of choosing the element fn and (n   1)! different bijections between
two abstract sets of cardinality n 1. If one defines the relation on abstract sets “‘F is
bigger than E’ when there exists an injective morphism from E to F”, what the above
shows is that the ‘bigger than’ relation has a more complex structure for abstract sets
than for numbers: there is a plurality of ways in which the set F is bigger than the set
E, plurality that is clearly absent for numbers. In this sense, the external relation is
“less refined” for numbers, as Lawvere claims.
However, if a decision is taken to omit the relations =E and =F , this plurality
is immediately lost as well. Indeed, the determination of the multiplicity of differ-
ent morphisms rested on the identity criterion for functions, which crucially involved
the primitive identities within both E and F allowing to decide whether x =E y
and whether f(x) =F g(y). This phenomenom can also be perceived in the way the
monomorphism g was constructed, as “a function which reaches all elements of F ex-
cept this particular one”. But this is possible because, once an element or token of
the abstract set F has been chosen, the primitive (typed) identity that holds within
F allows to distinguish the given element from all others—in virtue of the irreflexive
non-identity relation, elements of an abstract set are indeed relationally discernible.
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Therefore, with the deletion of primitive identities, it is no longer possible to deter-
mine the difference between two functions. Even worse: it is not even possible to
define the notion of a function! (For how does one check that it is one-to-one and not
one-to-many?)
The situation can also be pictured through the conception of morphisms as trans-
formations. When dealing with abstract sets, the primitive typed identities allow to
‘follow’ the transformation of each token. The arrow E g ! F is conceived as a collection
of local arrows —“this token of E gets transformed into that token of F”. On the con-
trary, by omitting primitive identities the tokens become strongly indistinguishable—
that is: they cease to be even weakly discernible. Then, when considering abstract
collections, the transformation can only be considered externally, as a whole. In this
way, whereas there are many transformations from the abstract set (E;=E) to the
abstract set (F;=F ), there is on the contrary only one unique way of transforming the
abstract collection E into the abstract collection F , namely: “add one element”. In
this sense, abstract collections and numbers look very much alike.
The distinction between abstract sets and abstract collections is summed up in
the following figure257:
257With this distinction in hand, we can now comment in some more detail on Shapiro’s “finite car-
dinal structures”. The essential trait of the n cardinal structure is that any concrete set of cardinality
n should be seen as a realization of it. Therefore, it is clear that the n cardinal structure and the
abstract set of cardinality n are intended to be the same abstract structure. However, I only partially
agree with Shapiro’s description of this structure. He says:
The finite cardinal structures have no relations and so are as simple as structures get.
(Shapiro, loc. cit.)
True: finite cardinal structures or abstract sets are the simplest of all structures, since any abstract
structure is an abstract set on which some further relations have been defined. Wrong: finite cardinal
structures or abstract sets do have one relation, namely primitive typed identity. Otherwise, they
would be abstract collections and would not be able to support functions on them.
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(a) Two abstract sets E and F with their
primitive identity relations =E and =F .
A transformation from E to F may be
depicted by an internal (local) diagram.
In red and blue are represented two dif-
ferent injective morphisms from E to F .
(b) The abstract collections, as a result
of the omission of the identity relations.
A transformation from E to F can only
be seen as an external (global) diagram
and there is now only one possible injec-
tive morphism from E to F .
Fig. I.3 – Difference between abstract sets and abstract collections.
I.3.3.c Four grades of discernibility
The discussion has hinted at the fact that abstract sets differ from abstract col-
lections inasmuch as it is possible to discern and name the tokens of the former but




The idea of this triad is certainly not new. Already Cantor had stressed the
importance of distinguishability within a set:
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By a ‘set’ we mean any collection M into a whole of definite, distinct objects m
(called ‘elements’ of M) of our perception or our thought.258
On the other hand, the intimate relation between abstracts sets and labeling was clearly
put forward by Lawvere:
The only possible use of abstract sets T is the possibility of indexing or para-
metrizing things by the elements of T in the hope of clarifying actual relations
between the things [...].259
In fact, although I had not emphasized it at the time, we had already encountered the
idea in Weyl’s description of how to obtain abstract groups:
This [the obtention of an abstract group] is accomplished by attaching arbitrary
labels to its elements and then expressing in terms of these labels for any two
group elements s, t what the result u = st of their composition is.260
Nonetheless, we still need a better conceptual grasp of the triad. In particular, we
need to further clarify the kind of discernibility which is present in abstract sets but
absent from abstract collections. So far, we have come across four different grades of
discriminability within structures:
i) the case of the real number 1, which can be distinguished from all other numbers
through the property: P (x)  ‘for any y : R; xy = y’,
ii) the case of two points x and y of a homogeneous metric space (M;d), which can
be distinguished through the relation d(x; y) 6= 0,
iii) the case of two elements of an abstract set (or of an abstract vector space), which
can be distinguished through a primitive typed identity,
iv) the case of two elements of an abstract collection, which cannot be distinguished
in any way.
258“Unter einer ‘Menge’ verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung M von bestimmten wohlunterschiede-
nen Objekten m unserer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens (welche die ‘Elemente’ von M genannt
werden) zu einem Ganzen”. Both the original German quote and the English translation are cited in
Y. I. Manin. “Georg Cantor and His Heritage”. In: Tr. Mat. Inst. Steklova 246 (2004), pp. 208–216,
p. 214, my emphasis.
259Lawvere, op. cit., pp. 120–121.
260Weyl, Symmetry, p. 145, emphasis is mine.
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The Quine-Muller terminological distinction—absolute and relational discernibility—is
not powerful enough to describe the full situation, for it was constructed to capture
the distinction between the first case and the second. We thus need more terminology:
Definition I.1 (Individuals). A collection within which an identity predicate reigns
will be called a collection of individuals.261
This terminological decision serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it points
to the fact that tokens of abstract sets and, more generally, places of any abstract
mathematical structure are individuals. And this is so by definition of what abstract
sets and abstract structures are. In other terms, it points to the fact that, from the
very start, abstract sets are not metaphysically neutral: they cannot serve to describe
any-thing, but only a “relatively orderly part of the world”262, namely: collections of
individuals. It automatically extends the conclusion of French and Krause on material
set theory:
[...] standard set theories involve a theory of identity which takes the elements
of a set [...] to be individuals of a kind.263
In fact, the realization of the metaphysical commitments of set theory was already
emphasized by the mathematician Yuri Manin264 and has been one motivation to
261The concept of “individuality” has received many different characterizations in the philosophical
literature. My terminological decision is strongly influenced by the ideas developed by Steven French
and Décio Krause (particularly in their joint work Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical,
and Formal Analysis). Therein, they develop a conception of “individuality in terms of self-identity”
(p. 15)—or, what amounts to the same, they
[...] defend the claim that the notion of non-individuality can be captured [...] by formal
systems in which self-identity is not always well defined, so that the reflexive law of
identity, namely 8x (x = x), is not valid in general. (pp. 13-14)
This is also similar to the notion of individuals presented by Lowe in his chapter “Individuation” of
the Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. He says:
[...] for many kinds of entity, identity and countability are indeed inseparable—and
it is these entities that may properly be described as being ‘individuals’ or as having
‘individuality’. (p. 78)
262Makkai, loc. cit. See page 127.
263S. French and D. Krause. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 240.
264Thus, he says: “The birth of quantum physics [...] made clear that Cantor’s famous definition of
sets represented only a distilled classical mental view of the material world as consisting of pairwise
distinct things residing in space [...]. Once this view was shown to be only an approximation to the
Chapter I. Mathematical Description of Physical Systems 133
construct alternative theories265.
On the other hand—and here I follow French and Krause again—this choice of ter-
minology allows to conceptually separate “individuality” from “distinguishability”. It
thereby introduces new degrees of discernibility. Indeed, since non-equality is a gram-
matically correct irreflexive relation, individuals of a same structure are, by definition,
relationally discernible. But there is little point in keeping this lax use of relational
discernibility. Rather, we will say that places of a structure are primitively discernible.
The interesting question is then to investigate whether this primitive discernibility can
be described without appealing to the primitive typed identity. That is to say, to
investigate whether the non-trivial relations of the structure are powerful enough to
account for the discernibility of places266.
Given an abstract collection C, the question on discernibility is thus : “Is this a
collection of discernible individuals?” The above mentioned four cases correspond to
the four possible answers:
incomparably more sophisticated quantum description, sets lost their direct roots in reality.” (Manin,
op. cit., p. 9.)
265Two examples of these are:
1. The theory of quasets, developped by Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia, which “have a
cardinal but not an ordinal” and are not determined extensionally but intensionally (see e.g.
M. L. Dalla Chiara and G. Toraldo di Francia. “Individuals, Kinds and Names in Physics”. In:
Bridging the Gap: Philosophy, Mathematics, Physics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1993, pp. 261–283).
2. The theory of quasi-sets, introduced first by Newton da Costa and then also developed by Krause
and French: “It is important to realize that quasi-set theory may be said to be inspired by the
idea that the concept of identity might not be applicable to elementary particles, as Schrödinger
claimed. The limitation imposed on the concept of identity will offer us the opportunity to
elaborate a mathematical theory in which we can talk of indistinguishable but not identical
objects, as we will see.” (French and Krause, op. cit., p. 241)
266A very similar point is made by Muller: “The aim is not, when we begin with a differentiable
manifold of infinitely many distinct space-time points, to find out whether there really is more than
one space-time point [...] but the aim is to find out whether the distinctness of the points can be
grounded qualitatively, physically, and structurally, and that has not been assumed tacitly” (Muller,
op. cit., p. 1057, my emphasis). What Muller meant by the possibility of “grounding physically” the
distinctness of points of a differentiable manifold remains obscure to me. But the point he is making
is essentially the same as mine.
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Definition I.2 (Four Grades of Discernibility).
i) A collection of qualitatively (or absolutely) discernible individuals is a
collection such that
for any x; y : C; 9P; P (x) and :P (y)
where P is invariant under automorphisms.
ii) A collection of comparatively discernible individuals is a collection such
that i) fails but one has
for any x; y : C; 9R; 9z : C; R(x; z) and :R(y; z)
where R is an invariant relation other than the primitive typed identity267.
iii) A collection of indiscernible individuals is a collection such that i) and ii) fail
but there is a primitive typed identity.
iv) A collection of non-individuals (thus strongly indiscernible things) is a collec-
tion for which i), ii) and iii) fail.
Of course, as French and Krause very well emphasize, the conceptual distinction
between individuality and discernibility is only useful in practice if there are legitimate
cases of indiscernible individuals—that is: if there are cases of (contextual) primitive
thisness268. But we have already seen that mathematics has plenty of those (abstract
sets, abstract vector spaces, etc.).
What precedes should dissolve what Lawvere calls the “strong contradiction” of
abstract sets: their points are completely distinct, because they are individuals, and
yet are indistinguishable, because no relation other than the primitive identity can
discern them269.
267For simplicity, I have here only considered binary relations. Following Muller’s approach, one can
extend this definition in the obvious way so to include all n-ary relations.
268They say: “Our conceptual distinction between individuality and distinguishability can then only
be maintained in practice under [the] view that individuality is grounded on something else, ‘over and
above’ properties.” (French and Krause, op. cit., p. 16.)
269“Yes, the notion of an abstract set (Cantor’s Kardinalzahl) is a strong contradiction: its points
are completely distinct and yet indistinguishable.” (F. W. Lawvere. “Foundations and Applications:
Axiomatization and Education”. In: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9.2 (2003), pp. 213–224, p. 215.)
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With these four grades of discernibility within a collection properly distinguished,
we can finally render precise the content of the requirement of individuation for physical
states and properties (page 17).
Definition I.3 (Individuation). We say that an element x of an abstract structure
S can be individuated if, for all y : S such that y 6=S x, x and y are qualitatively
discernible individuals.
By the above definitions, it follows that two elements of an abstract structure
which are related by an automorphism cannot be qualitatively discerned from each
other. This simple remark is actually quite fruitful, for it furnishes a practical tool to
find the ‘amount of individuation’ that can be achieved within a given mathematical
structure S. It now appears that this information can be easily read off from the action
of the group of automorphisms Aut(S) on S: the orbits O 2 S/Aut(S) are the smallest
parts of the structure which can be individuated270.
I.4 Conclusion
Let me now briefly summarize what has emerged in the course of this chapter and
put it in perspective with respect to the main goal of this thesis. To recall: the intention
is to provide a clear conception of what quantization means—and, in particular, to
grasp the “real difference between Classical and Quantum Mechanics”271 by plunging
as much as possible into the depths of the mathematical formalisms underlying both
theories. Now, as Darrigol reminds us, “any application of [quantization] starts with
formally defining a classical system, and the quantum theoretical level is then reached
by applying a precise mathematical procedure”272. It thus has seemed to me that any
attempt to understand quantization should deal first with the concept of “mathematical
270 Given the left action of a group G on a set E, the orbit Ox of an element x 2 E is the subset
Ox :=

y 2 E  9g 2 G; y = g  x	.
271This expression is the title of a conference given on February 13th 2014 by Andreas Döring at the
Workshop “Philosophy of Mechanics: Mathematical Foundations” held in Paris.
272Darrigol, op. cit., p. xvi, my emphasis.
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description of a physical system”. Accordingly, the first part of this work has been
devoted to a general reflection on this notion.
Therein, the main driving question was: Which is the role theoretical physicists
expect to confer to these mathematical descriptions? Many different expectations are
of course possible (and indeed found amongst the scientific community), but I have
chosen to focus on the more ambitious one, which I have dubbed the “descriptive
perspective”: it considers the goal of these mathematical descriptions to provide a
full and unambiguous intrinsic characterization of the physical systems being thus
described. Even though such an aspiration may appear as quite naive an utopia,
adopting it as a working hypothesis and seeking to push it to its limits can yield
interesting insights in theoretical physics—as I hope the remainder of this work will
show. As Gabriel Catren beautifully puts it: “It is necessary to be programmatically
ambitious in order to fail in a productive way”273.
The mathematical description of a generic physical system can be thought as a
map D : Tphys  ! Tmath from a certain class of physical systems (e.g., non-relativistic
systems with finitely many degrees of freedom) towards a specific class of mathematical
objects. Given a physical system S, the mathematical object D(S) is usually intended
to furnish a description of the geometry of the state space and/or of the algebra of
properties. To give a precise content to the expectation of an intrinsic characterization
portrayed in the descriptive perspective, I have formulated two requirements these
mathematical objects should meet: first, the faithfulness requirement (page 15), which
demands that the mapD be injective, and thus concerns identity between mathematical
objects; second, the requirement of individuation (page 17), which demands that both
states and properties of the system be qualitative discernible individuals, and therefore
focuses on individuation within mathematical entities.
The next step is to understand the particular nature of the mathematical objects
customarily involved in the formalisms of both Classical and Quantum Mechanics.
For only once this nature has been properly grasped, will one clearly understand the
specific conditions imposed by both requirements. After having taken a closer look
273G. Catren. “A Throw of the Quantum Dice Will Never Abolish the Copernican Revolution”. In:
Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development 5 (2009), pp. 453–500, p. 470.
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at the turning years during which the foundations of Quantum Mechanics were first
developped, I have proposed that mathematical objects appearing at this fundamental
level of Mechanics should be conceived as abstract structures. Sections I.2 and I.3 were
dedicated to the clarification of what is meant by this. As it appears in the case of
von Neumann, one is pushed towards abstraction by the will of finding an intrinsic
description of physical systems. Abstract mathematics allow to answer the question:
Where, in the formalism, should we look for the relevant physical information? Indeed,
through its systematic use of isomorphisms as equalities—which constitutes the core of
abstraction—, it manages to precisely define a level in which the physical information is
to be found. Mathematical objects become “schematic” and one no longer worries about
the “arbitrary and special ‘fleshly clothing’” of the formalism274. On the other hand,
structural mathematics is the answer to the question: How, from the formalism, should
we recover the relevant physical information? It is so because, with the requirement of
individuation in mind, the look for discernible individuals becomes one of the main goals
of the analysis and structuralism proves to be extremely useful in this regard. First, I
have shown how it allows to distinguish four different grades of discernibility within a
collection—qualitatively discernible individuals, comparatively discernible individuals,
indiscernible individuals and non-individuals (page 134). Second, it furnishes practical
tools to extricate from within the abstract structure those individuals that can be
qualitatively individuated. This last point is accomplished by use of the pivotal group
of automorphisms: qualitative discernible individuals correspond exactly to the orbits
of the structure under the defining action of this group.
I have tried as much as possible to discuss the issues about Abstract and Structural
Mathematics in their natural general context. As a result of this, Sections I.2 and I.3
may have seemed to the reader too long a detour from the main subject of the thesis.
I hope nonetheless that they present an interest in their own right. Be that as it may,
with this conceptual background firmly understood, we are now ready to analyze, in
all the technical detail they deserve, both Classical and Quantum Kinematics. The
unfolding of this analysis will be the content of the remaining two chapters.
274Schrödinger, “On The Relation Between The Quantum Mechanics of Heisenberg, Born, and Jor-
dan, and That of Schrödinger”, p. 58.

Chapter II
The Classical and Quantum
Kinematical Arenas
In their standard formulation, the Classical and the Quantum are respectively
casted into the language of symplectic (or Poisson) manifolds and Hilbert spaces. Their
use is so widespread among theoretical physicists that one may be tempted to write
the following definitions:
Classical System 1. A classical system is characterized by an abstract symplectic
manifold (S; !).
Quantum System 1. A quantum system is characterized by an abstract Hilbert
space H.
The first definition is in fact readily found in many standard textbooks1, whereas
one can easily have the impression that the second is latent in many works on the
subject2. However, from the perspective that is ours, it is clear that both definitions
1For example, see C. Rovelli. Quantum Gravity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004,
p. 100, N. Woodhouse. Geometric Quantization. 2nd. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 155, or M.
Puta. Hamiltonian Mechanical Systems and Geometric Quantization. Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, p. 28.
2Thus, Livine declares that “[i]n order to talk about the quantum theory [of gravity], we should
precisely define the Hilbert space and our quantum states of space(-time) geometry”. (E. Livine. “Co-
variant Loop Quantum Gravity?” In: Approaches to Quantum Gravity. Ed. by D. Oriti. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 253–271, p. 262).
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are wrong: neither the simple data of a symplectic manifold nor that of a Hilbert space
can be enough to characterize a physical system. This may be seen in two ways:
– Failure to meet the faithfulness requirement. As we have already mentioned,
when von Neumann introduced the notion of a Hilbert space, he also proved
the categoricity of the axioms: up to isomorphism, there is only one separable
Hilbert spaces for a given dimension3. Thus, if there is more than one quantum
system—which is obviously the case—the faithfulness requirement fails. The
classical analogue of this is Darboux’s theorem4: any two symplectic manifolds
of same dimension are locally isomorphic. For a given dimension, we thus get
infinitely many non-isomorphic symplectic manifolds, but all differences are only
of a global nature. Although strictly speaking this does not suffice to prove the
failure of the faithfulness requirement in the classical case, it strongly suggests
there are not enough differences between symplectic manifolds to account for the
actual variety of physical systems. The next point will confirm this impression.
– Failure to meet the requirement of individuation. Instead of looking at the identity
between various Hilbert spaces or symplectic manifolds, one can focus on the
descriptive power within these objects. The group of automorphisms of a Hilbert
space is the group U(H) of unitary transformations. Given any two unit vectors
 and  , there exists a unitary transformation relating them. Said differently,
the action of the group U(H) on the projective Hilbert space PH is transitive5.
Exactly the same result holds in Classical Kinematics: for a given connected
symplectic manifold S, any two points can be transformed into each other by a
symplectomorphism6.
3J. von Neumann. Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Trans. by R. T. Beyer.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, section II.2., pp. 46–59.
4Cf. R. Abraham and J. E. Marsden. Foundations of Mechanics. 2nd ed. Redwood City: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, 1978, p. 175.
5This is fairly obvious for finite dimensions. The proof that this result also holds for the infinite-
dimensional case can be found in R. Cirelli, M. Gatti, and A. Manià. “The Pure State Space of
Quantum Mechanics as Hermitian Symmetric Space”. In: Journal of Geometry and Physics 45.3
(2003), pp. 267–284. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0202076.
6See W. M. Boothby. “Transitivity of the Automorphisms of Certain Geometric Structures”. In:
Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 137 (1969), pp. 93–100, Theorem A, p. 98 or
P. W. Michor and C. Vizman. “N–transitivity of Certain Diffeomorphism Groups”. In: Acta Math.
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It thus appears that both (projective) Hilbert spaces and (connected) symplectic
manifolds are homogeneous structures: their points cannot be qualitatively discerned
and it is therefore impossible to make unambiguous reference to any such point with-
out appealing to primitive thisness. The upshot is that neither of these structures
are sophisticated enough to describe, on their own, all the physical information of a
mechanical system. This conclusion is of course not new and statements of the like are
scattered through the literature, particularly in the context of Quantum Mechanics7.
Confronted with this, one option would be to discard Hilbert spaces and symplec-
tic manifolds from the outset and start looking for completely different mathematical
structures that could do a better job. But this would be to miss the point of the above
criticism towards the standard formalisms of Mechanics. The goal is not to drive us
away from these frameworks, but rather to urge us to take a closer look at them. For
indeed the practice of theoretical physics never considers bare Hilbert spaces—that is,
abstract Hilbert spaces and nothing else. Nor does it consider bare symplectic mani-
folds. Explicitly or implicitly, these structures always come along with other additional
mathematical structures. For instance, when Ashtekar and Lewandowski explain that
when considering “a ‘free’ particle on the group manifold of a compact Lie group G [...],
the Hilbert space of quantum states can be taken to be the [Hilbert] space L2(G; dH)
of square integrable functions on G with respect to the Haar measure”8, they have in
mind not only a Hilbert space but, in fact, a particular unitary representation of the
group G—namely, the so-called regular representation. Thus, they are describing the
quantum space of states by an abstract Hilbert space together with additional data—
here, the choice of a particular morphism of groups  : G  ! U(H). This extension,
from the sole data of the abstract H to the more sophisticated structure of a triple
Univ. Comenianae 63.2 (1994), pp. 221–225. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/dg- ga/9406005#,
Theorem (4), p. 221.
7For example, Landsman expresses this in quite the same vein: “all Hilbert spaces of a given
dimension are isomorphic, so that one cannot characterize a physical system by saying that ‘its Hilbert
space of (pure) states is L2(R3)’.” (N. P. Landsman. “Lecture Notes on C-algebras, Hilbert C-
modules, and Quantum Mechanics”. In: (1998). url: http://arxiv.org/abs/math-ph/9807030,
p. 6.)
8A. Ashtekar and J. Lewandowski. “Background Independent Quantum Gravity: A Status Report”.
In: Classical and Quantum Gravity 21.15 (2004). url: http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0404018,
pp. 25–26.
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(H; G; ), appears naturally in the quantum formalism precisely because of the failure
of Hilbert spaces to meet the requirement of individuation. And a similar phenomenon
occurs in the Classical realm.
The point here is to emphasize the existence of a fundamental tension between the
intended purpose of the mathematical descriptions of physical systems and the basic
formalism used in the theory. This translates into a crucial question:
How can we break homogeneity and introduce qualitative
discernibility into the mathematical structures underlying
the formalisms of Classical and Quantum Mechanics?
I claim this should be recognized as a driving force in the Foundations of Mechanics, in
the sense that many developments in the field can be retrospectively read as attempts
to overcome this tension and answer the question. Surely, attempting to justify this
claim will be one major point underlying the remainder of this work.
From this emerges a conceptual scheme, or program of investigation, that I will
develop in the next two chapters and have wished to call The Chase for Individuation.
It is the following. First, Hilbert spaces and symplectic manifolds appear simply as the
starting point of the formalism: they represent, so to speak, the homogeneous recepta-
cle or the arena in which the kinematical description of physical systems takes place.
Notwithstanding their homogeneity and lack of discernibility, this 0-level involves many
sophisticated mathematical structures whose interplay reveals many conceptually in-
teresting features. The seeds of the mechanisms that will allow the introduction of
discernibility are already present, and this chapter is dedicated to a careful analysis of
this.
Once the structure of this 0-level will be properly understood, the next move, to
be studied in Chapter III, will be to start constructing candidates for a mathematical
description of a physical system by breaking the homogeneity of the kinematical arenas
studied in Chapter II. The general strategy, which involves the the introduction into
the picture of additional external structures, is explained in section III.1. Then, we
study in detail the particular case of one type of such structures: groups. At every
stage of the road towards individuation, the mathematical mechanisms introduced in
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Classical and Quantum Kinematics will be compared, thus shedding some light on the
procedure of quantization. At the end, we hopefully will have a better understanding
of the real difference between the Classical and the Quantum.
II.1 The double role of properties in standard Kine-
matics
The kinematical description of a physical system attempts to completely charac-
terize each possible state and to understand all the possible properties of the system.
The two fundamental notions are here “state” and “property”. Assuredly, an analyti-
cally inclined reader will immediately raise an eyebrow and ask with suspicion: What
exactly do these two words mean? And the question would be legitimate for both no-
tions often hide strong metaphysical commitments. For example, depending on one’s
favourite ontology of objects persisting in time, one will have a different conception
of “states”: an endurantist may perhaps be inclined to conceive “states” as instanta-
neous points in the evolution of the system, whereas, on the contrary, a perdurantist
may tend to consider “states” as extended processes in time—in which case they are
often called “histories”9. Moreover, a realist may regard “properties” as true qualities
possessed by the system, while an empiricist will insist on thinking them as the result
of an interaction with an observer—in which case calling them “observables” seems
more convenient. And so it continues, with a plethora of other difficult metaphysical
debates underlying the use and meaning of these two fundamental words.
It is therefore possible to feel that, before immersing ourselves in the conceptual
analysis of Kinematics, it is necessary to first clarify the spectrum of all metaphysical
positions one may adopt towards the basic notions. This is not, however, the path I
shall follow. Indeed, my wish is to turn all attention to what can be learned from the
formalism itself : instead of approaching the mathematics of Kinematics through some
9Although the question of temporal parts goes back at least to the Greeks, the debate between
endurantism and perdurantism was introduced, in these terms, by David Lewis in On the Plurality
of Worlds (p. 202). A good general introduction to the subject is M. J. Loux. Metaphysics, a
Contemporary Introduction. 3rd. New York: Routledge, 2006, Chapter 8.
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firmly constructed looking glass, to carefully and patiently listen the “inner voice” of
these structures10. Hence, the notions of “state” and “property” should carry as light a
metaphysical baggage as possible, and to achieve this I will simply leave the two words
somewhat undefined.
Prima facie, the conceptual skeleton of Kinematics may therefore appear to be
captured by this simple duality diagram11:
states ? // properties.oo
And the first obvious relation one can think of is the fact that “states take definite
values of properties”: given a property f and a well-chosen state q, one can assign a
number to the pair (f; q). This number, denoted by f(q)—or by hf; qi if one wants
to stress the dual role of properties and states in the assignment of a number—allows
to partially characterize the specificities of the state p. Under this light, the role of
properties is to introduce discernibility and separate states. Typical questions will then
concern:
i) the conditions under which such a pairing can be done (e.g.: Given a property f ,
can we assign a number to any state q? Given a state q, can we assign a number
to any property f?),
ii) the knowledge we can gain from this pairing (e.g.: Given a state q, can we find
a set of properties ff1; : : : ; fng such that the numbers
hf1; qi; : : : ; hfn; qi	 fully
characterize the state?).
There is however a second role played by properties in Kinematics. Besides their
relation to numbers, properties are also related to transformations. In my view, the
consciousness of this relation, progressively built during the 20th century, is one of
the major conceptual achievements of modern physics. One most commented instance
of this is of course Noether’s theorem, which relates the existence of symmetries to
10Cf. Grothendieck’s quote at the end of the Introduction (page 9).
11I here use the term “duality” in the rather loose sense of a “contrast between two notions”. The
link with the precise mathematical notion of duality will be commented later on.
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the existence of conserved quantities12. To realize the importance this theorem has
acquired, it suffices to read what Robert Mills writes:
It seems to me quite possible that Noether’s theorem is the more fundamental
fact—that the physical theories that we devise to describe the universe about
us have the structure they do because of this fundamental relationship between
symmetries and conservation laws. If this is so, then Noether’s theorem becomes
a principle rather than a theorem.13
But the link between properties and transformations does not restrict to this symmetry-
conservation relationship. In fact, in modern expositions of Mechanics, transformations
are often used to define properties. To attest, we learn in Towsend’s textbook on
Quantum Mechanics that
[...] the best way to define the momentum operator is as the generator of trans-
lations, just as we defined the angular momentum operators as the generators
of rotations and the Hamiltonian, or energy operator, as the generator of time
translations.14
Properties play then a double role: as quantities, they allow to separate states and
as transformations, they allow to relate states. This fact is clearly known to physicists
and mathematicians15, but its conceptual significance has been largely ignored. One
12In fact, Noether proved two theorems and only one of them—the one dealing with global
symmetries—deals with conserved quantities. The second theorem, dealing with infinite-dimensional
groups—and hence with local gauge transformations—is much less known. A good concise review for
the precise content of both Noether’s theorem is K. Brading and H. R. Brown. “Noether’s Theorems
and Gauge Symmetries”. In: arXiv preprint (2000). url: http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0009058.
A more exhaustive discussion of the subject is the excellent Y. Kosmann-Schwarzbach. Les Théorèmes
de Noether. Invariance et lois de conservation au XXème siècle. Palaiseau: Les éditions de l’école
polytechnique, 2004.
13R. Mills. “Gauge fields”. In: 100 Years of Gravity and Accelerated Frames: The Deepest Insights
on Einstein and Yang-Mills. Ed. by J.-P. Hsu and D. Fine. Vol. 9. Singapore: World Scientific, 2005,
pp. 512–526, p. 513.
14J. S. Townsend. A Modern Approach to Quantum Mechanics. Sausalito: University Science
Books, 2000, p. 156.
15For example, Guillemin and Sternberg mention it explicitly: “[...] in classical mechanics as in
quantum mechanics there is a double role: a function is an observable and it also determines an
infinitesimal symmetry of the space of observables [...].” (V. Guillemin and S. Sternberg. Variations
on a Theme by Kepler. Vol. 42. American Mathematical Soc., 2006, p. 9.)
Also, this double role appears to be one major motivation underlying the book of Alfsen and Shultz
on operator algebras, as they explain in the preface: “[...] it is an important feature of quantum
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notable exception is the work of Gabriel Catren, who has insisted in the importance of
the number-transformation double facet of properties:
The twofold role played by classical observables in mechanics—as functions that
can be evaluated on states and as generators of canonical transformations—is
considered here a fundamental feature that deserves further attention.16
His influence on the conception of my work is substantial, and I here follow Catren
in considering the double role of properties a key feature that should be made a cor-
nerstone on which to center the conceptual analysis of Kinematics. To clearly dis-
tinguish both roles, I will often talk of “properties-as-quantities” and “properties-as-
transformations”.
In the light of this, the supposed state-property duality explodes and becomes the







Fig. II.1 – The fundamental conceptual triad of Kinematics.
The remainder of this chapter is a detailed analysis of this triad for the homoge-
neous arenas of the Classical and the Quantum. I start with their standard formula-
tions.
mechanics that the physical variables play a dual role, as observables and as generators of transfor-
mation groups. The observables are random variables with a specified probability law in each state
of the quantum system, while the generators determine one-parameter groups of transformations of
observables (Heisenberg picture) or states (Schrödinger picture). [...] Both aspects can be adequately
dealt with in C-algebras.” (E. M. Alfsen and F. W. Shultz. State Spaces of Operator Algebras.
Boston: Birkhäuser, 2001, pp. vii-viii.)
16G. Catren. “On Classical and Quantum Objectivity”. In: Foundations of Physics 38.5 (2008),
pp. 470–487. url: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4298/, p. 485.
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II.1.1 Standard Classical Kinematics
Classical Hamiltonian Mechanics is casted in the language of symplectic geome-
try. There are many excellent expositions of the subject. Some of the most standard
references, in which all the technical details of this section can be found, are:
– J.-M. Souriau. Structure des systèmes dynamiques. Paris: Dunod, 1970
– P. R. Chernoff and J. E. Marsden. Properties of Infinite Dimensional Hamiltonian
Systems. Lecture Notes in Mathematics. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1974
– R. Abraham and J. E. Marsden. Foundations of Mechanics. 2nd ed. Redwood
City: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978
– V. I. Arnold. Mathematical Methods of Classical Mechanics. Trans. by K. Vogt-
mann and A. Weinstein. 2nd ed. Vol. 60. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989
– M. Puta. Hamiltonian Mechanical Systems and Geometric Quantization. Dor-
drecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993
– J. E. Marsden and T. S. Ratiu. Introduction to Mechanics and Symmetry. A
Basic Exposition of Classical Mechanical Systems. 2nd ed. New York: Springer,
1999
The space of states is described by a finite-dimensional symplectic manifold
(S; !). This is a differentiable manifold S equipped with one extra-structure: a 2-form
! that is closed and non-degenerate. This means:
i) ! 2 
2(S),
ii) d! = 0,
iii) 8p 2 S; 8v 2 TpS (v 6= 0); 9v0 2 TpS; !(v; v0) 6= 0:
The dimension d of a symplectic manifold is necessarily even: d = 2n. A state of the
system is described by a point of the state space.
The Lie group of global transformations is the group Aut(S) = Symp(n) of
symplectomorphisms17. It is the subgroup of diffeomorphisms  : S  ! S leaving
invariant the symplectic 2-form: ! = !, where ! is the pull-back of the symplectic
17Sometimes, these transformations are also called canonical transformations.
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form18.
The Lie algebra of infinitesimal state transformations is the Lie algebra
associated to the group of global transformations. It is the Lie algebra  (TS)! of
vector fields leaving invariant the symplectic 2-form:  (TS)! = fv 2  (TS) jLv! = 0g
where L denotes the Lie derivative19.
Finally, the algebra of properties is described by a Poisson algebra (UR;•; ?).
Definition II.1. A Poisson algebra is a real (usually infinite-dimensional) vector
space equipped with two extra-structures: a Jordan product • and a Lie product ? such
that
i) • is a bilinear symmetric product,
ii) • is associative,
iii) ? is a bilinear anti-symmetric product,
iv) ? satisfies the Jacobi identity: f ? (g ? h) + g ? (h ? f) + h ? (f ? g) = 0,
v) ? and • satisfy the Leibniz rule: f ? (g•h) = (f ? g)•h+ g•(f ? h).
The Lie product of a Poisson algebra is very often called a Poisson bracket and denoted
by f; g.
A property is described by an element of such an algebra. We see that it presents
a structure slightly more involved than what we have encountered so far. Let us make
a series of comments on this. First, axioms iii) and iv) turn (UR; ?) into a Lie algebra.
Second, the Jacobi identity can be read in at least three different ways: using the
anti-symmetry of the Lie product, one may write it as
f ? (g ? h)  (f ? g) ? h =  (f ? h) ? g
18A diffeomorphism  : S  ! S induces a transformation  : C1(S;R)  ! C1(S;R) defined by:
8f 2 C1(S;R); (f)(p) = f((p)):
This in turn allows to define the push-forward  of vector fields and the pull-back  of n-forms by:
8v 2  (TS); (v)[f ] := v[f ]
8 2 
n(S); ()(v1; : : : ; vn) := (v1; : : : ; vn):
19For a given two-form  2 
2(S), the Lie derivative with respect to the vector field v 2  (TS) is
given by the so-called “Cartan’s magic formula”: Lv = (vd+ dv), where v := (v; ) 2 
1(S).
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and it then expresses the non-associativity of the Lie product. But one may also write
it as
f ? (g ? h) = (f ? g) ? h+ g ? (f ? h)
and the Jacobi identity then captures the fact that, for any property f 2 UR, the map
vf : UR  !UR
g 7 !vf (g) := f ? g
is a derivation with respect to the Lie product. Third, the Leibniz rule is the only one
establishing a relation between the Jordan and Lie structures and it implies the map
vf is a also derivation with respect to the Jordan product. There is hence a map
v  : UR  !Der(UR)
f 7 ! vf
from the algebra of properties to the derivative operators on that algebra. This remark
furnishes us the third possible reading of the Jacobi identity. Indeed, it may be now
rewritten as
[vf ; vg](h) = vf  vg(h)  vg  vf (h) = vf?g(h) (II.1)
which expresses the fact that the map v , assigning operators to properties, is a mor-
phism of Lie algebras. If we denote by Der(UR)H the image of UR by the map v  (that
is, the Lie subalgebra of derivative operators arising from properties), and by Z(UR)
the center of (UR; ?), we then have the isomorphism of Lie algebras20
UR/Z(UR) ' Der(UR)H : (II.2)
This says that, up to an element of Z(UR), a classical property may as well be thought
as a derivative operator, as far as the Lie structure is concerned. If one takes into
account the commutative Jordan product, this is no longer true since the algebra
of derivative operators is just a Lie algebra and cannot be naturally equipped with
20This follows immediately from the fact Z(UR) is the kernel of the map v .
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a Jordan product21. In any case, this shows that, already at the level of classical
mechanics, there is a close connection between physical properties and linear operators.
In fact, this remark may be seen as one of the fundamental points in the rationale of
geometric quantization22.
So far, I have discussed the Poisson algebra of classical properties without any
mention to the space of states in order to stress what can be learned from the sole
algebraic structure. Nonetheless, the back and forth between the geometrical picture
naturally attached to states and the algebraic picture naturally attached to properties
is a fundamental movement to properly understand the Kinematical arena. Of course,
classical properties are most commonly described as smooth real-valued functions over
the state space:
(UR;•; ?) ' (C1(S;R); ; f; g):
The commutative and associative Jordan product • is nothing but the usual point-wise
multiplication , whereas the anti-commutative Lie product ? is more commonly called
in this context the Poisson bracket and denoted by f; g. Now, derivative operators of
an algebra of functions over a smooth manifold are nothing but vector fields:
Der(UR) '  (TS)
and the derivative operator vf associated to the property f is usually called the Hamil-
tonian vector field associated to f23.
Both the Poisson bracket and the Hamiltonian vector field can alternatively be
defined in terms of the symplectic structure. Since ! is non-degenerate, for any p 2 S
21Indeed, neither the composition nor the anti-commutator of derivative operators yield another
derivative operator. Thus, the purported analogue of Equation II.1
[vf ; vg]+(h) = vf  vg(h) + vg  vf (h) = vf•g(h)
fails to be true.
22For a detailed analysis of this last point, see Catren, “On Classical and Quantum Objectivity”.
23More generally, the adjective “Hamiltonian” will almost systematically mean “arising from a
property” (e.g. a Hamiltonian curve, a Hamiltonian vector field, a Hamiltonian g-action (cf. Definition
III.2, page 247), etc.).
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it establishes an isomorphism
!p(; ) : TpS   ! T pS
v 7 ! !p(v; )
which allows to define the Hamiltonian vector field associated to the property f by
!(vf ; ) := df:
Therefore, the Hamiltonian vector field vf is sometimes also called the symplectic gra-
dient of f . Given this, the Poisson bracket of two functions f and g can be now defined
as
8f; g 2 C1(S;R); ff; gg := !(vg; vf ):
The fact that ! is a 2-form implies the anti-commutativity of the bracket, whereas
the closedness of the symplectic form forces the Jacobi identity.
Conversely, the data of a bracket f; g turning (C1(S;R); ; f; g) into a Poisson
algebra is (almost) enough to define a symplectic structure on S. Indeed, given such a
bracket, one can define a smooth antisymmetric tensor field B 2  (^2(S)), called the
Poisson tensor, by the equation ff; gg = B(df; dg). In virtue of the Jacobi identity,
it will automatically satisfy a condition analogue of d! = 024. Equipped with this
structure, (S;B) is a Poisson manifold25 but not necessarily a symplectic manifold. In
fact, a Poisson manifold is symplectic if and only if, locally, any possible transformation
of the space is generated by a property. In other words, when we choose the space
of states of a system to be symplectic, we are forcing any two states to be related
by a locally Hamiltonian curve26. This is precisely the feature that conveys to a
symplectic manifold its homogeneity and provokes the failure to meet the requirement
of individuation. Were the space of states a general Poisson manifold, there would be
infinitesimal state transformations not arising from properties and states impossible to
24This condition is: given any 3-form  2 
3(S), BdB = 0, where B := (B ^ ) 2 
1(S).
(See N. P. Landsman. Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics. New York:
Springer, 1998, p. 66)
25See ibid., Definition I.2.3.1, p. 66, and the comments following it.
26Cf. ibid., Proposition I.2.3.7, p.68.
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connect by a Hamiltonian curve. As we will see later, this is the classical analogue of
the quantum superselection rules.
The point of the last two paragraphs was to show that the Lie structure present
on the algebraic side of properties is the exact analogue of the symplectic structure
present on the geometric side of states. Either of them can be seen as induced by
the other. Now, let us discuss the relation with the fundamental conceptual triad of
Kinematics.
It is tempting to conclude that the existence of two structures on the algebra of
properties is a manifestation of the two roles of properties-as-quantities and properties-
as-transformations. This is enforced by the remark that the Jordan product is point-
wise multiplication and therefore relies on the fact that, when evaluated on a state,
the properties produce real numbers. Moreover, it can be shown that all Hamiltonian
vector fields preserve the symplectic structure and are thus infinitesimal state trans-
formations (in the specific sense given above). The following picture emerges: classical
properties are defined by their numerical role, which yields the commutative algebra
(C1(S;R); ) of properties-as-quantities. To this is added a second structure, the Lie
product or Poisson bracket, which allows to introduce the second, transformational
role of properties. The map
v  : C1(S;R)  !  (TS)H
f 7 ! vf = ff; g
is presently seen as the technical device that captures the role of properties-as-transfor-
mations. The Lie algebra—a fortiori non-commutative algebra—of properties-as-trans-
formations is then the algebra of Hamiltonian vector fields ( (TS)H ; [; ]). As as I
have explained in the short discussion following Equation II.2, this algebra is almost
the same as the algebra (C1(S;R); f; g): it becomes exactly the same if, instead of
considering the algebra of functions over the state space, one considers functions “up
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to a constant”27:
( (TS)H ; [; ]) ' (C1(S;R)/fdf = 0g; f; g):
In any case, the role of properties-as-transformations is indeed completely governed by
the algebraic Lie structure or by the geometric symplectic structure. Under this light,
the existence of a symplectic two-form on the space of states is a necessary manifestation
of the fundamental transformational role of properties in Classical Kinematics.
All in all, the double-role of properties provides us with a rather satisfactory
conceptual understanding of the mathematical arena of Classical Kinematics. Let us
summarize the picture in a diagram:





f 7 ! vf //





Fig. II.2 – The role of properties in the standard formulation of Classical Kinematics
From this perspective, it becomes transparent that one cannot capture the tran-
sition from the Classical to the Quantum by a loose statement such as: “quantization
is the transition from the commutative to the non-commutative”—statement unfortu-
nately far too common in the literature. A similar claim may perhaps be pertinent,
but it has to be rendered much more precise than this. Before turning to a description
of Quantum Kinematics in its standard formulation, let us make some final remarks
on the state-quantity-transformation interplay in the Classical context:
27Indeed, the center of the Lie algebra (C1(S;R); f; g) is the set of locally constant functions, as
may easily be seen from the definition of the Hamiltonian vector fields in terms of the symplectic
structure. If one considers only connected symplectic manifolds, then the center of the Lie algebra are
just the constant functions: Z(C1(S;R) ' R.
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– States and values. Define a valuation on a real algebra UR as a function  :
UR  ! R for which the functional composition principle (FUNC) holds—that is:
if f; g 2 UR are such that g = A(f) for some real-valued function A 2 C1(R)
then [g] = A[(f)]28. Any state p 2 S obviously defines a valuation p on the
algebra of properties C1(S;R) by p(f) = f(p). This means there is a consistent
way of assigning a well-defined value to any physical property for any classical
state. This is certainly a pedantic formulation of a trivial fact, but it becomes
pertinent when compared to the Kochen-Specker theorem in Quantum Mechanics
(cf. next section, page 164).
– Quantities and transformations. The condition of anti-symmetry of the Lie prod-
uct may as well be read as a condition of invariance. Because of the linearity of
the product, we have:
 8f; g 2 C1(S;R); ff; gg =  fg; fg()  8f 2 C1(S;R); ff; fg = 0:
The right hand side of the equivalence says that the function f is left invariant by
the infinitesimal transformation vf . Thus, the anti-symmetry of the product is
equivalent to demanding any property to be invariant under the transformations
it generates. In other words, defining on the space of states the equivalence
relation: p f q iff there exists a Hamiltonian curve generated by f relating p and
q, we have
p
f q =) f(p) = f(q):
28See for example C. Isham and J. Butterfield. “Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem:
I. Quantum States as Generalized Valuations”. In: International Journal of Theoretical Physics 37
(1998), pp. 2669–2733. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9803055, p. 2671. FUNC formalizes
the intuition that, if f is to have the value , then e.g. f2 ought to have the value 2.
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We therefore arrive to the following compatibility condition of the two funda-
mental role of properties:
Kinematical compatibility of transformations with quantities: states
that are distinguished by a property-as-quantity cannot be related by the as-
sociated property-as-transformation.
The converse is however not true, as is immediate by considering constant func-
tions: states that are indistinguishable for a given property-as-quantity are not
necessarily related by the property-as-transformation.
– States and transformations. A state p is invariant under the transformations
generated by the property f only when p is a critical point of the function.29
II.1.2 Standard Quantum Kinematics
We now turn to the Quantum arena. In order to facilitate the comparison with the
Classical case, the goal is to analyze the standard formulation of Quantum Kinematics,
following as much as possible the analysis of the previous section. The standard for-
mulation of Quantum Kinematics is casted into the language of Hilbert spaces, and the
first thing to do is to identify again the four fundamental structures: the space of states,
the Lie group of transformations, the Lie algebra of infinitesimal transformations and
the algebra of properties.
However, a small cautionary remark is necessary before we proceed. Indeed, be-
cause any Hilbert space H is at the same time a manifold and a vector space, there is
a natural isomorphism between the tangent bundle TH and HH. It is the following:
given (;  ) 2 H H, define V 2 T H by






29Indeed, to say that the state p is invariant under the transformations generated by the property f
is equivalent to demanding the Hamiltonian vector field vf to vanish at point p. Since, by definition,







= 0, which means p is a critical point of the function f .
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As a result of this, there is a constant ambiguity on the nature of the objects being
handled in this formalism. In particular, it is so for operators, which can be conceived
in at least two ways:
i) an operator is a map F : H  ! H that to an element  associates a new element
F (). From this usual point of view, an operator is therefore a transformation of
the Hilbert space onto itself.
ii) an operator is a map F : H  ! TH that to an element  associates the vector
VF () 2 TH (defined through Equation II.3). From this point of view, an opera-
tor appears now to be a vector field on H. Accordingly, some vector fields on H
are oftentimes described as operators.
The subtle point one needs to be cautious about is that the two points of view are
not equivalent, for there are expressions which make sense from the former perspective
but not from the latter. For example, the composition of two operators is perfectly
well defined from the point of view of operators as transformations, but is impossible
to understand from the point of view of vector fields30. On the other hand, other
expressions, such as the commutator, make sense from both perspectives. With this in
mind, let us proceed.
The space of states is described by a (usually infinite-dimensional) Hilbert space
H. This a complex vector space equipped with one extra-structure: a hermitian inner
product defining a norm k  k such that (H; k  k) is a complete metric space. States
of the system are described by rays of the space of states—that is, by one-dimensional
subspaces of H.
The (Lie) group of global transformations is the group Aut(H) = U(H) of
unitary transformations. It is the subgroup of linear operators A : H  ! H such that
A 1 = A31.
The Lie algebra of infinitesimal state transformations is the Lie algebra
30Diagrammatically, this is obvious. If F is an arrow H F ! H, then F 2 is simply the arrow
H F //
F 2
77H F // H . But if F is an arrow H F ! TH, then F 2 is a mystery...
31Strictly speaking, U(H) is only a Lie group when H is finite-dimensional. When this fails to be
the case, U(H) is not even a manifold because it is infinite-dimensional.
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(BiR(H); [; ]) of (bounded) anti-hermitian operators32. This is precisely a point where
we take advantage of the ambiguity inherent to Hilbert spaces and describe vector fields
as linear operators. Then, the Lie product [; ] of the Lie algebra (BiR(H); [; ]) may
be thought of as the commutator of operators, or as arising in the usual way from the
composition law of the group U(H).
Finally, the algebra of properties is described by a non-associative Jordan-Lie
algebra (UR;•; ?).
Definition II.2. A non-associative Jordan-Lie algebra is a real (usually infinite-
dimensional) vector space equipped with two extra-structures: a Jordan product • and
a Lie product ? such that
i) • is a bilinear symmetric product,
ii) • is not associative: (F•G)•H   F•(G•H) = (F ? H) ? G (associator rule),
iii) ? is a bilinear anti-symmetric product,
iv) ? satisfies the Jacobi identity: F ? (G ? H) +G ? (H ? F ) +H ? (F ? G) = 0,
v) F ? (G•H) = (F ? G)•H +G•(F ? H)33.
A physical property is described by an element of such an algebra. Of course,
quantum properties are standardly described as bounded self-adjoint operators:





32Again, for finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, this is clear: any operator V 2 BiR(H) defines a
one-parameter group of unitary operators through exponentiation: etV 2 U(H); t 2 R. In the infinite-
dimensional case, despite the fact that U(H) is not a Lie group, one is still allowed to claim that
the Lie algebra u(H) associated to the group U(H) consists of all anti-self-adjoint (not necessarily
bounded) operators. This is because of Stone’s theorem which shows there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between anti-self-adjoint operators and continuous one-parameter unitary groups. For a precise
discussion of Stone’s theorem, see R. Abraham, J. E. Marsden, and T. S. Ratiu. Manifold, Tensor
Analysis, and Applications. 2nd ed. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988, pp. 529–536.
33The name of this type of algebras comes from the fact that, given these axioms, (UR; ?) is a Lie
algebra and (UR;•) is a Jordan algebra. A real Jordan algebra (UR;•) is a commutative algebra such
that F•(G•F 2) = (F•G)•F 2 (Landsman, op. cit., Definition I.1.1.1., p. 37). Thus, although in
general a Jordan algebra need not be associative, it must be power-associative. These algebras are of
course called after Pascual Jordan, who introduced them in 1933 when trying to abstract the algebraic
structure of quantum properties. An excellent introduction to the mathematical subject of Jordan
algebras is found in K. McCrimmon. A Taste of Jordan Algebras. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2004.
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The Jordan and Lie products are related to the composition of operators , by means
of the anti-commutator and (i-times) the commutator respectively:












(F G+G  F )34:
Comparison with the algebra of classical properties shows these two algebras are
strikingly similar. The only point where they differ is axiom ii): whereas the Jordan
product of classical kinematics is associative, the quantum one is not. However, some
suspicion may be raised against this comparison, for indeed the anti-commutator be-
tween two different self-adjoint operators barely ever shows up in Quantum Mechanics.
One may then wonder whether the quantum Jordan product has not been artificially
introduced here in order to force the analogy with the Classical case. But this suspi-
cion fades away as soon as one realizes the intimate connection between the Jordan
product and the familiar—and certainly fundamental!—operation of taking squares35.
Indeed, with only the Lie product at our disposal, there would be no way of defining
the square F 2 of a given property F , since F ? F = 0 (? is anti-symmetric). With the
introduction of the Jordan product, one simply puts F 2 := F•F . Conversely, if one
supposes the square F 2 to be somehow a meaningful operation, then it is possible to




(F +G)2   (F  G)2:
34The choice of representing properties by bounded self-adjoint operators is not without contro-
versies. In particular, this restriction excludes the usual position and momentum operators, but in
return, it greatly simplifies the mathematical treatment. For instance, if we remove the boundedness,
it is simply false that the set of all self-adjoint operators is closed under i2 [; ].
Moreover, it is important to stress that the Lie product on bounded self-adjoint operators is not the
commutator: the multiplication by the complex number i in the definition is a necessary one. This
is because the commutator of two self-adjoint operators yields an anti-self-adjoint operator. On the
other hand, the two factors 12 are only a convenient normalization in order to obtain the associator
rule as written in axiom ii), but other choices are possible. For instance, another normalization is
F ? G := i~ [F;G], which forces  = ~
2
4 (cf. the next definition), but allows to write the canonical
commutation relations between position and momentum operators as P ? X = 1.
35Recall, for example, the opening question of Heisenberg’s seminal paper of 1925: “If instead of
a classical quantity x(t) we have a quantum-theoretical quantity, what quantum-theoretical quantity
will appear in place of x2(t)?” (see section I.1.1.a, page 21).
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Therefore, if one is willing to consider squares of quantum properties, one is forced to
consider the quantum Jordan product36.
The comparison of the algebraic structure of classical and quantum properties mo-
tivates the definition of a general (not necessarily non-associative) Jordan-Lie algebra,
which encapsulates both the classical and the quantum cases37:
Definition II.3. A general Jordan-Lie algebra is a real (possibly infinite-dimensional)
vector space equipped with a Jordan product • and a Lie product ? such that
i) • is a bilinear symmetric product,
ii) ? is a bilinear anti-symmetric product,
iii) ? satisfies the Jacobi identity: F ? (G ? H) +G ? (H ? F ) +H ? (F ? G) = 0,
iv) F ? (G•H) = (F ? G)•H +G•(F ? H),
v) there exists  2 R such that (F•G)•H F•(G•H) = (F ?H) ?G (associator
rule).
Only the last axiom differentiates classical and quantum properties. When  = 0,
the Jordan product is associative and one gets the definition of a Poisson algebra
describing classical properties (cf. Definition II.1, page 148). When  = 1, one gets
the previous definition for the algebra of quantum properties with a non-associative
Jordan product. In fact, whenever  6= 0, one may always rescale the Lie product as
to yield  = 1. Therefore, the world of Jordan-Lie algebras is sharply divided into the
sole cases of  = 0 (corresponding to Classical Mechanics) and  = 1 (corresponding
to Quantum Mechanics). In this precise sense, one can say that the transition from
classical properties to quantum properties is the transition from associativity to non-
associativity—rather than from commutativity to non-commutativity—and that the
real difference between classical and quantum properties lies on the Jordan side.
36This point of view on the Jordan product is expressed in J. C. Baez. “Division Algebras and
Quantum Theory”. In: Foundations of Physics 42.7 (2012), pp. 819–855. url: http://arxiv.org/
abs/1101.5690, p. 8.
37Landsman, op. cit., Definition I.1.1.2., pp. 37–38.
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That this is so need not be a surprise. With the previous experience of Classical




to be valid also in the quantum arena. And it seems reasonable to say that the most
important differences between classical and quantum properties involve their behavior
as quantities.
One particular way of perceiving the difference of behavior between classical and
quantum properties-as-quantities is the following. Suppose we have at our disposal
some ‘numerical pairing’ h; i which allows to assign a number hf; i to any given state
 and property f , and consider the collection of numbers
N f := fhf; i; hf 2; i; hf 3; ; i; : : :g
where each power fn is constructed using the Jordan product (e.g., f 3 := f•f•f). The
set N f may be seen as encoding the numerical role of the property f with respect to the
state . Now, one can ask: Is there more information contained in the data of the whole
of N f than in the data of the single number hf; i? In Classical Mechanics, the answer
is negative: the numerical pairing hf; i is the evaluation of the real-valued function
f on the point  and the Jordan product is point-wise multiplication. Therefore, by
definition, one has hfn; i = (hf; i)n: the whole set of numbers N f is known if one
knows the first element hf; i. In other words, the numerical role of classical properties
is single-layered: it may be reduced to the data of a single number (the value of the
property on the state). In Quantum Mechanics, on the other hand, the situation is
very different. Take for example the numerical pairing h; i to be defined by:
8F 2 BR(H);8[] 2 PH; hF; []i := (; F)
(; )
(II.5)
where (; ) is the Hermitian product on H. According to the standard statistical
interpretation, the number hF; []i does of course not represent the definite value of
the property F on the state [], but rather the expected value. Therefore, in general
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hF 2; []i 6= (hF; []i)2, and the collection of numbers N F[] is not determined by the data
of one single number: the numerical role of quantum properties is in fact a complex,
multi-layered structure38. Now, this existence of multiple layers in the numerical role
of quantum properties simply encodes the statistical nature of Quantum Mechanics.
Indeed, the standard deviation F ([]) of the property F at the state []—which
is a sensible numerical quantity only insofar as the theory is statistical: a classical
property has a definite value on a state and there is nothing more to it—is exactly a
measure of the non-coincidence between the first two numerical layers of the quantum
property-as-quantity:
F ([]) =
hF 2; []i    hF; []i2 12 :
Hence, under the light of the familiar fact that Quantum Mechanics is statistical in
nature whereas Classical Mechanics is not, the statement that “the real difference
between the Classical and the Quantum lies on the quantitative side of properties”
appears as a very natural remark.
This provides some heuristic control over the plausibility that, indeed, the al-
gebraic Jordan structure is the one which encapsulates the differences between the
two Kinematics. But the associations (II.4) remain to be checked in detail for the
Quantum case. That the Lie structure encapsulates again the role of properties-as-
transformations may easily be seen, for most of what has been said in the previous
section concerning the algebra of classical properties can automatically be transposed
in similar terms to the Quantum. In particular, the quantum analogue of the classical
map v  : C1(S;R)  !  (TS)H , used to capture the transformational role of classical
38At this point, one could perhaps speculate that this feature is highly dependent on our choice for
the numerical pairing h; i, and that a modification of Equation II.5 could yield a set of numbers NF[]
that behave exactly as the classical N f . In this regard, the much discussed Kochen-Specker theorem
is a no-go. It establishes that, if dim(H) > 2, it is simply not possible to choose in the Quantum
Kinematical arena a numerical pairing such that hFn; []i = (hF; []i)n. More precisely, it says that
no valuations on BR(H) exist (cf. page 154 for the definition of a valuation). For a short discussion
on the Kochen-Specker theorem see for example R. Hermens. “Quantum Mechanics, From Realism
to Intuitionism”. MA thesis. Radboud University Nijmegen, 2010. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/
1002.1410, pp. 32-ff.
162 Chapter II. Classical and Quantum Kinematical Arenas
properties, is here defined as
V  : BR(H)  !BiR(H)
F 7 ! VF := iF: (II.6)
In other words, given a quantum property F , the associated infinitesimal state trans-
formation is simply the anti-hermitian operator obtained multiplying by i. In fact, this
relation—between the existence of a Lie structure on the algebra of properties and the
transformational role of properties in Kinematics—works even better than in Classi-
cal Kinematics, since the map V  is a canonical isomorphism of Lie algebras between
(BR(H); i[; ]) and (BiR(H); [; ]).39 This means: to consider quantum properties solely
in their role of properties-as-transformations—that is, to ignore their role of properties-
as-quantities—corresponds exactly to forgetting the algebraic Jordan structure. In other
words, the map from properties to properties-as-transformations may be written








En passant, this last point shows that, whereas in Classical Kinematics there
was an emphasis on properties-as-quantities and properties-as-transformations were
secondary—properties were first defined as functions and only then one could associate
vector fields to them—, Quantum Kinematics, at least in its standard Hilbert space for-
mulation, presents the reverse situation: we clearly have properties-as-transformations
and the reading of properties-as-quantities is more involved. This sheds light on the
fact that quantum properties are easier to define through their transformational role
(cf. the citation from Townsend on page 145). Thus, we have the diagram:




:=  iF. With this new choice, the one-parameter group of unitary transformations
associated to the property F is the group of operators exp( itF ), as usual. The (slight) default is
that the map V  becomes an anti-isomorphism of Lie algebras.
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Fig. II.3 – The role of properties in the standard formulation of Quantum Kinemat-
ics.
As a side remark, comparison of Figure II.3 and Figure II.2 (page 153) clearly
shows in which way the widespread image
“classical = commutative ; quantum = non-commutative”
arises from of a wrong analogy between the two Kinematics. Indeed, instead of com-
paring either the full algebras of properties (with both the Jordan and Lie structures),
or else the two non-commutative algebras of properties-as-transformations, the wrong
characterization of the Classical/Quantum transition compares the primary algebra of
classical properties with the primary algebra of quantum properties. It therefore com-
pares classical properties-as-quantities with quantum properties-as-transformations...40
40This mistake was there since the very beginning of Quantum Mechanics. In his seminal paper,
Heisenberg writes:
Whereas in classical theory x(t)y(t) is always equal to y(t)x(t), this is not necessarily
the case in quantum theory.
(W. Heisenberg. “Quantum-theoretical Re-interpretation of Kinematic and Mechanical
Relations”. In: Sources of Quantum Mechanics. Ed. by B. Van der Waerden. New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1967, pp. 261–276, p. 266)
In the same vein, one can find in the second paper from Born, Heisenberg and Jordan:
We introduce the following basic quantum-mechanical relation: pq   qp = h2i1. [...]
One can see from [this equation] that in the limit h = 0 the new theory would converge
to classical theory, as is physically required.
(M. Born, W. Heisenberg, and P. Jordan. “On Quantum Mechanics II”. in: Sources of
Quantum Mechanics. Ed. by B. Van der Waerden. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1967, pp. 321–384, p. 327)
It is clear that they were comparing the commutator in Quantum Mechanics with point-wise multi-
plication in Classical Mechanics (despite the fact that, by the time of the second quoted paper, Dirac
had already shown the quantum commutator should be compared to the classical Poisson bracket).
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Returning to the discussion of the double role of properties in the quantum arena,
it is interesting to note that two of the most notable distinguishing features of the
Quantum with respect to the Classical Kinematics—namely, the existence of a condi-
tion for states to have a definite value of a property, and the existence of a compatibility
condition for properties—may be reformulated as invariance conditions:
1. Existence of a condition for states to have a definite value of a property. As we
have already commented, not all states have a definite value of a property. This
is the case if and only if the variance fF 2   ( ~F )2 vanishes, which happens to be
so if and only if  is an eigenvector of the self-adjoint operator: F = ~F ().
In other words, the operator F must leave the state [] invariant (since the rays
[ ~F ()] and [] are equal). In this way, we arrive at the following statement: a
physical state [] has a definite value of the property F if and only if it is invariant
under the transformations generated by the property41.
2. Existence of a compatibility condition for properties. Two properties are said to
be compatible if they are simultaneously measurable. As von Neumann showed
in his book, properties are compatible if and only if their commutator vanishes42.
But, since i[F; ] is the infinitesimal transformation associated to the property F ,
this is readily reformulated in terms of invariance: two quantum properties F and
G are compatible if and only if F is invariant under the transformations generated
by G (or viceversa).
The possibility of this reformulation hints to the idea that the Quantum is characterized
by a particular interplay between the transformational and numerical role of properties.
This idea will be become more and more precise as we advance in the analysis of the
two kinematical arenas. It is also at the origin of an attempt, developed by Gabriel
Catren, to construct a group-theoretical ontology of Mechanics43. For the moment, we
will content ourselves with leaving the idea latent in the background.
41A familiar example of this is given by the fact that states with a sharply defined value of energy
are called stationary states (since they can analogously be defined as states that do not evolve in time
(i.e., are invariant under time translations)).
42Von Neumann, op. cit., p. 228.
43See for instance Catren, op. cit. or G. Catren. “On the Relation Between Gauge and Phase
Symmetries”. In: Foundations of Physics 44 (2014), pp. 1317–1335.
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All of this having been said, the relation between the numerical role of quantum
properties and the Jordan structure remains nonetheless obscure. In this regard, the
present account of the Quantum arena is still frustrating. Moreover, we have here com-
pletely lost the interplay, which was felt so satisfactory in the Classical arena, between
the algebraic picture arising from properties and the geometric picture arising from
states. This motivates the attempt to change our perspective and describe Quantum
Kinematics with a more geometric language, somewhat leaving ashore the standard
Hilbert space formalism.
II.2 The Quantum seen from the Classical: the ge-
ometric formulation
The comparison of the standard formulations of both Kinematics has brought out a
striking structural similarity between the algebras of classical and quantum properties.
They both present two products—one commutative and one anti-commutative—whose
existence may be seen as a manifestation of the fundamental double role of the prop-
erties of a physical system. On the other hand, the classical and quantum descriptions
of the space of states seem at first sight not to have any points in common. Ashtekar
and Schilling nicely explain the situation:
While the classical framework is geometric and non-linear, the quantum descrip-
tion is intrinsically algebraic and linear. Indeed, the emphasis on the underlying
linearity is so strong that none of the standard textbook postulates of quantum
mechanics can be stated without reference to the linear structure of H.44
One could then be inclined to think that, although the non-associativity of the Jordan
product has been spotted as the main difference between classical and quantum prop-
erties, the really crucial difference between Classical and Quantum Kinematics lies in
the nature of the space of states. For in the popular conception of Quantum Mechanics,
44A. Ashtekar and T. A. Schilling. “Geometrical Formulation of Quantum Mechanics”. In: On
Einstein’s Path: Essays in Honor of Engelbert Schücking. Ed. by A. Harvey. New York: Springer,
1997, pp. 23–65. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9706069, p. 25, authors’ emphasis.
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the linearity of the space of states is concomitant of the superposition principle, which
in turn is often regarded as one—or perhaps the—fundamental feature of the theory,
as Dirac asserts:
For this purpose [of building up quantum mechanics] a new set of accurate laws
of nature is required. One of the most fundamental and the most drastic of these
is the Principle of Superposition.45
With this principle in hand, the knowledge of any two different states of the physical
system being considered allows one to construct a whole set of new states. In the
Hilbert space picture, given the states ;  2 H, this new collection is simply the set of
all possible complex linear combinations ' = a+ b , for a; b 2 C. At best, physicists
had previously encountered superposition of waves and solutions to linear equations
of motion, but this superposition of states certainly was a first, with no analogue in
Classical Mechanics. Here is again Dirac insisting on this point:
The nature of the relationships which the superposition principle requires to exist
between the states of any system is of a kind that cannot be explained in terms
of familiar physical concepts. One cannot in the classical sense picture a system
being partly in each of two states and see the equivalence of this to the system
being completely in some other state. There is an entirely new idea involved, to
which one must get accustomed and in terms of which one must proceed to build
up an exact mathematical theory. [...]
It is important to remember, however, that the superposition that occurs in
quantum mechanics is of an essentially different nature from any occurring in
the classical theory.46
From this perspective, the apparently radical difference between the geometric
space of classical states and the linear space of quantum states may be perceived as
the natural—and almost necessary—manifestation of this “drastic” new feature of the
Quantum. But in claiming so, one forgets a central point, which indicates this whole
45P. A. M. Dirac. The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1958, p. 4, Dirac’s emphasis
46Ibid., pp. 12–14, Dirac’s emphasis.
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idea cannot be the end of the story: unlike in the classical arena, in the quantum arena
states are not described by points of the Hilbert space. Rather, states are described by
rays.
This sole remark suffices to raise great deal of suspicion towards Hilbert spaces.
In a letter to Garrett Birkhoff, von Neumann mentions it as one motivating reason to
seek a reformulation of the quantum theory in new terms:
I would like to make a confession which may seem immoral: I do not believe
absolutely in Hilbert spaces any more. [...] Because:
(1) The vectors ought to represent the physical states, but they do it redun-
dantly, up to a complex factor, only.47
Be that as it may, it is certainly a sufficient remark to realize that quantum mechanics
is not as obviously linear as one initially may have thought: the “true” quantum space,
in which points do represent states, is the projective Hilbert space PH, a genuine
non-linear manifold.
The principle of superposition has certainly been a powerful idea, with a strong
influence on the heuristics of the Quantum, and its link with the linearity of Hilbert
spaces has been in my opinion one of the main reasons for the widespread use of the
standard formalism. However, in the attempt to compare Classical and Quantum
Kinematics, due care should be taken to express both Kinematics in as similar terms
as possible. It becomes therefore natural to attempt a reformulation of quantum me-
chanics in a language resembling the classical one—that is, to forget Hilbert spaces
47Letter from von Neumann to G. Birkhoff, J. von Neumann. John von Neumann: Selected Letters.
Ed. by M. Rédei. History of Mathematics. American Mathematical Society, 2005, p. 59, author’s
emphasis. In fact, this was not the unique—and not even the main—reason for von Neumann to be
dissatisfied with Hilbert spaces, as is clear from the continuation of the letter:
(2) And besides the states are merely a derived notion, the primitive (phenomenologically
given) notion being the qualities, which correspond to the linear closed subspaces.
But if we wish to generalize the lattice of all linear closed subspaces from a Euclidean space
to infinitely many dimensions, then one does not obtain Hilbert space, but that configuration
that Murray and I called “case II1”.
For a careful discussion of von Neumann’s attitude towards Hilbert spaces, see M. Rédei. “Why John
von Neumann Did Not Like The Hilbert Space Formalism of Quantum Mechanics (and What He
Liked Instead)”. In: Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and
Philosophy of Modern Physics 27.4 (1996), pp. 493–510.
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and to develop the quantum theory directly in terms of the geometry of PH. In partic-
ular, this means redefining the algebra of properties—since one needs to forget about
operators—and giving a new, geometrical account of the principle of superposition.
The task of this reformulation is sometimes referred to as the “geometric or de-
linearization program”. Its explicit goal is to reestablish the fruitful link, witnessed
in the Classical arena, between the geometry of the space of states and the algebraic
structures of properties. Kibble’s article “Geometrization of Quantum Mechanics”48
is often cited as the initiator of the program, although many ideas and results were
previously known, as one may see from the introduction of that article49. I regard the
works of Ashtekar and Schilling on one side, and Cirelli, Manià and their collaborators
on the other, as those having managed to pursue this road the furthest50. The for-
mer provides an excellent physical insight into what is gained from this reformulation,
while the latter furnishes the most elegant mathematical description of the geometrical
setting. Hughston and people surrounding him have also played an important role51.
They all clearly express the goals of their program:
The delinearization program, by itself, is not related in our opinion to attempts
to construct a non linear extension of QM with operators which act non linearly
on the Hilbert space H. The true aim of the delinearization program is to free
the mathematical foundations of QM from any reference to linear structure and
to linear operators. It appears very gratifying to be aware of how naturally
geometric concepts describe the more relevant aspects of ordinary QM, suggesting
that the geometric approach could be very useful also in solving open problems
48T. Kibble. “Geometrization of Quantum Mechanics”. In: Communications in Mathematical
Physics 65.2 (1979), pp. 189–201.
49There is for example Mielnik’s article “Geometry of Quantum States” which tries to describe
physical systems in terms of the geometry determined by the transition probability structure and
argues against “the old opinion that the only reasonable mathematical schemes to describe quantum
phenomena [are] those related to Hilbert spaces”.
50See in particular: T. A. Schilling. “Geometry of Quantum Mechanics”. PhD thesis. The Penn-
sylvania State University, 1996; Ashtekar and Schilling, op. cit.; Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, op. cit.
51See D. C. Brody and L. P. Hughston. “Geometric Quantum Mechanics”. In: Journal of geometry
and physics 38.1 (2001), pp. 19–53. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906086, and references
therein.
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in Quantum Theories.52
In the same vein, Schilling writes in the introduction of his Ph.D. thesis:
The goal of this thesis is a formulation of the postulates of standard quantum
mechanics in a language which is intrinsic to the true space of states. The intent
is to lay a foundation by which one may study, for example, the classical limit
[...]. The desired formalism shall be valid for the generic quantum theory [...].
It should be emphasized that we are seeking a description of ordinary quantum
mechanics; we introduce no new input, but merely acknowledge mathematical
structures which are already inherent to the standard formalism. The difference
is one of semantics, but a potentially useful one.
The description presented here allows one to adopt a viewpoint in which
the Hilbert space is a fiducial structure, not an essential ingredient.53
In regard to the questions that concern us in this chapter—namely, the link be-
tween: i) the two-fold role of properties, ii) the Jordan and Lie structures of the algebra
of quantum properties, iii) the geometric structures present on the space of states—the
hope is that the geometric reformulation of the quantum arena will provide us with
new insights54.
* * * * *
The main result from which the whole geometric program springs is the fact that
the projective space PH is a Hermitian symmetric space with automorphism group
G = U(H)55. This furnishes a completely new start to the description of the quantum
52Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, op. cit., p. 268.
53Schilling, op. cit., p. 4, Schilling’s emphasis.
54It is important to clearly distinguish the ‘geometric or delinearization program’ from the program
of ‘geometric quantization’ which we won’t discuss here and is completely unrelated. The first aims
at a reformulation of quantum mechanics which avoids Hilbert spaces. The second is geared towards
an explicit construction of the quantum description of a system for which the classical description is
given. But the resulting quantum description is still “intrinsically algebraic and linear”, since it is
based on Hilbert spaces. What is ‘geometric’ about geometric quantization is the means by which the
Hilbert space is constructed: roughly, one starts with the symplectic manifold describing the classical
system, considers a complex line bundle over it and defines the Hilbert space in terms of the sections of
this bundle. The program of geometric quantization was started by Jean-Marie Souriau and Bertram
Kostant. A standard reference is Woodhouse, op. cit.
55Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, op. cit., section 2.
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kinematical arena, which strongly resembles the standard description of the classical
kinematical arena of subsection II.1.1. It is the following.
The quantum space of states is described by a (usually infinite-dimensional) Her-
mitian symmetric space (M;G; s; !; J). This is a symmetric space (M;G; s)56 equipped
with two extra-structures: a symplectic 2-form ! and an integrable almost complex
structure J57 that is compatible with the symplectic structure: for any two vectors
v; w 2 TxM , !(Jv; Jw) = !(v; w). A state of the system is described by a point of the
state space.
Given these geometrical structures, one can naturally define a Riemannian metric
g on the quantum space of states by:
8v; w 2 TxM; g(v; w) := !(v; Jw):
In fact, a Hermitian symmetric space is usually defined as a quintuple (M;G; s; g; J)
where g is a Riemannian metric and J is an invariant almost complex structure58.
The previous equation is then perceived as the definition of the symplectic form. The
important fact for us is that the quantum space of states is both a symplectic manifold
and a Riemannian manifold, and has thus a very rich geometry whose meaning will be
explored in the following subsections..
The Lie group of global transformations is the group G of automorphisms of
the Hermitian symmetric space. By supposition, one takes G ' U(H), as would be the
case for a projective Hilbert space. These transformations are diffeomorphisms that
are both symplectomorphisms and isometries.
56A symmetric G-space is a homogeneous space (M;G) together with an involutive diffeomorphism
s : M !M which has an isolated fixed point. A homogeneous G-space is a manifold M on which: i)
G acts smoothly and transitively, and ii) for any x 2 M , the isotropy group Gx is a Lie subgroup of
G. (See Note 7 of S. Kobayashi and K. Nomizu. Foundations of Differential Geometry. Vol. 1. New
York: Wiley, 1963, pp. 300-ff or, for the infinite-dimensional case Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, op. cit.,
p. 3.)
57An almost complex structure is a smooth tensor field J 2  (TM 
 T M) such that for all x 2
M;J2x =  1.
58Associated to the Riemannian metric, there is a unique torsion-free metric compatible affine
connection r (the so-called Levi-Civita connection). An almost complex structure J is said to be
invariant if rJ = 0. See for example S. Kobayashi and K. Nomizu. Foundations of Differential
Geometry. Vol. 2. New York: Wiley, 1969, p. 259, and also Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, op. cit., p. 6.
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The Lie algebra of infinitesimal state transformations is the Lie algebra
associated to the group of global transformations. It is hence isomorphic to the algebra
(BiR(H); [; ]) of bounded anti-self-adjoint operators, but is here interpreted as the
algebra of smooth vector fields which preserve both the symplectic and Riemannian
structures.
Now, the first important step in the route to a complete geometrical formulation
of the quantum kinematical arena is to provide a geometrical description of the non-
associative Jordan-Lie algebra of quantum properties. With the classical arena in mind,
the natural strategy is to consider the collection C1(PH;R) of smooth functions over
the quantum space of states, and to define two products • and ?, induced by some of the
geometrical structures of the quantum space of states, so that (BR(H); 12 [; ]+; i2 [; ]) is
isomorphic to (C1(PH;R);•; ?) or to a subalgebra of it. Here, there are no surprises:
the anti-commutative Lie product will be defined by means of the anti-symmetric
bilinear form !, whereas the commutative Jordan product will be defined by means of
the symmetric bilinear form g. But to see this, it is necessary to understand the link
between the geometry of the projective Hilbert space and the operations of the original
Hilbert space.
II.2.1 The quantum space of states as a classical space of states
Symplectic geometry is not characteristic of Classical Mechanics. As has been
hinted at and will now be explained in detail, it plays an equally important role in
the Quantum arena. Any space of states, be it classical or quantum, is a symplectic
manifold and the difference between both arenas is to be looked for elsewhere. In a
way, this was expected: section II.1 showed us that classical and quantum properties-
as-transformations behave in exactly the same way, and that the symplectic form could
be perceived as the geometrical manifestation of the transformational role of properties.
All the geometrical features of the projective Hilbert space can be understood in
purely group-theoretical terms, using the “well known” theory of Hermitian symmetric
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spaces as can be found in the book by Kobayashi and Nomizu59. This is the approach of
Cirelli and his collaborators. However, our aim for a new geometrical characterization
of quantum properties necessitates we approach the geometry of the “true” quantum
space of states in a somewhat indirect fashion, passing through the geometric structures
already present at the level of the Hilbert space H. In this, we follow the approach of
Ashtekar and Schilling.
As they explain, in order to clearly perceive the geometrical structures inherent
to Hilbert spaces, it is best to change perspectives and consider H from the point of
view of real numbers rather than complex numbers. First, one views H as real vector
space equipped with a complex structure J . This simply means that the multiplication
of a vector by a complex number is now considered as the result of two operations—
multiplication by real numbers and action of the linear operator J : for z 2 C and
 2 H, we have z = Re(z) + Im(z)J. Second, one also decomposes the hermitian
product of two vectors into its real and imaginary parts, and uses once again the
canonical identification TH ' HH60 to define the tensor 
 2  (T H
 T H) by

(V; V ) := 4Im(h;  i): (II.7)
The skew-symmetry of the hermitian product h;  i =  h ; i entails the anti-sym-
metry of 
, which is hence a 2-form. The fact that the hermitian product is positive-
definite and non-degenerate implies 
 is both closed and non-degenerate. Thus, we
arrive at the following:
Result: By means of Equation II.7, a Hilbert space H may naturally be endowed with
a symplectic structure 
.61
Note that, since by definition unitary transformations preserve the hermitian prod-
uct, they automatically preserve the symplectic structure as well: U(H)  Symp(H).
59As John Baez once wrote on the n-category café blog: “‘well-known’, in the peculiar sense that
mathematicians use this term, meaning at least ten people think it’s old hat”. (Entry of November
25th 2010, https://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2010/11/stateobservable_duality_part_
1.html)
60Cf. the comment opening subsection II.1.2, page 155.
61Ashtekar and Schilling, op. cit., p. 6.
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The whole machinery of symplectic geometry can now be deployed in the context
of Hilbert spaces. In particular, to any smooth real-valued function on H, one can
associate a vector field which preserves the symplectic structure (it is the symplectic
gradient, as defined on page 151) and the algebra C1(H;R) becomes a Poisson algebra,
with Poisson bracket denoted f; gH.
In relation to what has been already discussed about the Quantum Kinematical
arena, the immediate question is: does the symplectic geometry inherent to Hilbert
spaces furnish a new point of view from which to understand both the Lie structure
and the transformational role of quantum properties? The answer is of course positive,
and to see this it suffices to consider again the map  that, to a self-adjoint operator,
associates its (unnormalized) expectation value function:
: BR(H;R)  ! C1(H;R)
F 7 ! eF where eF () := h; Fi:
The first thing to notice is that the symplectic gradient V eF of the function eF coincides
with the infinitesimal state transformation associated to the quantum property F (cf.
page 162). In other terms, we have:
V eF = VF =  iF: (II.8)
Moreover, the map  is evidently injective (if the expectation value of an operator F
vanishes for all vectors in H, then F = 0), and is in fact a morphism of Lie algebras62:
f ~F; ~KgH = i
2
[^F;K]: (II.9)
We therefore get the injection
(BR(H;R); i2 [; ]) (C1(H;R); f; gH)
Together, equations II.8 and II.9 show that, as far as the Lie structure of quantum
62See ibid., equation 2.6., p. 8, or Landsman, op. cit., equation I.2.38., p. 74. The difference of
factors and signs corresponds to different choices for the normalization of the symplectic structure
and the definition of the Poisson bracket.
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properties-as-transformations is concerned, we might as well forget the commutator of
self-adjoint operators and reason in terms of the inherent symplectic structure of H
and the Poisson bracket of expectation-value functions.
This is certainly a very satisfactory point of view but it is not yet what we are
looking for. Recall: our goal is to characterize the algebra of quantum properties in
terms of the inherent geometry of the “true” quantum space of states PH. Moreover,
we cannot yet forget self-adjoint operators altogether since the definition of quantum
properties-as-transformations still involves them...
With the role of symplectic geometry at the level of H well understood, it is now
easier to discuss the projective space PH. The idea is to consider the unit sphere
SH—i.e. the set of all unit vectors in H—and to use the pair of arrows
H SH PHi  (II.10)
to induce a geometry on PH from the geometry of the Hilbert space. The left arrow
is simply the injection saying that SH is a submanifold of H. The right arrow is
the projection describing the unit sphere as a U(1)-fiber bundle over the projective
Hilbert space. In other words, it describes PH as a quotient: PH ' SH/U(1). Then,
the symplectic form on the new quantum space of states is simply the unique non-
degenerate and closed 2-form ! 2 
2(PH) such that  ! = i
 (the pull-back of ! to
the unit sphere coincides with the restriction to SH of the symplectic form on H)63.
The induced Poisson bracket on C1(PH;R) will be denoted by f; gPH.
63Of course, one needs to be sure that such a 2-form does exist. There are several ways to see this is
indeed the case, but it necessitates a technical machinery that goes beyond was has been explained so
far. For completeness, I here shortly mention two closely related constructions involving the so-called
symplectic reduction.
First, from the point of view of Hamiltonian constrained systems, one considers H as the initial
phase space, equipped with the first class constraint C() := h; i 1 = 0. The constrained surface is
then SH and the reduced phase space is PH. Since the initial phase space was symplectic, one knows
from the general theory of reduced phase spaces that the result is also symplectic. (See Schilling,
op. cit., pp. 28–31.)
Second, from the point of view of the Marsden-Weinstein reduction, one considers the natural action
of U(1) on H. This is a strongly Hamiltonian action and the momentum map  : H  ! u(1) ' R is
given by () = h; i. Then, PH '  1(1)/U(1). (See Landsman, op. cit., p. 328)
For a third point of view, using the decomposition in symplectic leaves of any Poisson space, such
as H := H n f0g, see ibid., p. 74.
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The route towards a full geometrical description of quantum properties-as-transfor-
mations is continued by repeating the above procedure for Hilbert spaces. Indeed,
consider the following map associating a real-valued function on the space of states to
a self-adjoint operator:
b : BR(H)  ! C1(PH;R) (II.11)
F 7 ! bF with bF (p) = h; Fi and  2  1(p)64:
As was the case at the level of H, we apparently have now two different ways in which
to assign a smooth vector field on PH to a self-adjoint operator F 2 BR(H):
i) by means of the vector field VF defined on H: define vF 2  (TPH) by vF := VF
(the push-forward of VF is possible since it is tangent to SH),
ii) by means of the newly defined function bF : define v bF 2  (TPH) as the symplectic
gradient of bF .
Happily, it just so happens that the two definitions coincide:
vF = v bF : (II.12)
In other words, the symplectic flow on PH generated by the function bF coincides with
the projection of the unitary flow on H generated by the self-adjoint operator F 65.
Moreover,b is again a morphism of Lie algebras66:
f bF ; bKgPH = i
2
\[F;K] (II.13)
and we get the injection
(BR(H); i2 [; ]) (C1(PH;R); f; gPH): (II.14)
There is however no hope for this map to be an isomorphism, as may be seen by
considering finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces: in this case, BR(H) is finite-dimensional
whereas C1(PH;R) is infinite-dimensional. The Lie algebra of self-adjoint operators is
64This definition of bF (p) is clearly independent from the choice of the representative  2  1(p).
65Cf. Ashtekar and Schilling, op. cit., p. 12, or Landsman, op. cit., eq. I.2.45, p. 75.
66See Ashtekar and Schilling, op. cit., eq. 2.14, p. 12, or Landsman, op. cit., eq. I.2.42, p. 75.
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in fact a quite small subalgebra of the algebra of smooth functions!
We can now safely conclude: in the Quantum Kinematical arena, the algebra of
properties, with regard to its Lie structure, may be viewed as a subalgebra
of (C1(PH;R); f; gPH), the algebra of smooth real-valued functions over the
space of states equipped with the Poisson bracket. This algebraic Lie
structure—or equivalently, the geometric symplectic structure that induces
it—completely describes the role of quantum properties-as-transformations.
This should be felt as an impressive merger of the Quantum and Classical Kine-
matical arenas. For if one omits the underlined word “subalgebra”, this conclusion
applies equally well to the Classical! Or, to put it in another way, as long as one
chooses the right algebra of properties from the start, if one considers the quantum
space of states and pretends it is a classical space of states by focusing solely on its
inherent symplectic structure, one will get nonetheless the right quantum properties-
as-transformations. The remark of this led Kibble to claim, in his seminal article on
the geometry of Quantum Mechanics:
From this point of view, the essential difference between classical and quantum
mechanics lies not in the set of states (save for the infinite dimensionality) nor
in the dynamic evolution [i.e, nor in properties-as-transformations], but rather
in the choice of the class of observables, which is far more restricted in quantum
than in classical mechanics.67
This restriction in the choice of the class of properties may appear mysterious.
Any property is described by a real-valued function on the space of states, yet not
any function describes some quantum property. Why is it so? But to ask this is to
forget that, in the game of perceiving the Quantum through the looking glass of the
Classical, we have been ignoring a large part of the geometry inherent to the Quantum.
If we have not yet managed to provide an intrinsic characterization of the algebra of
quantum properties, it is precisely because we have so far only considered the symplectic
structure of the quantum space of states. However, as was quickly explained just before
the beginning of subsection II.2.1, there is at least one additional geometric structure:
67Kibble, op. cit., p. 190.
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a Riemannian metric g. If one takes it into account, the geometric definition of a
kinematical property becomes possible and is beautiful in its simplicity:
Physical properties: a property of a physical system is a smooth real-valued
function on the space of states S to which an infinitesimal state transformation can
be naturally associated. That is, it is a function whose associated transformation
preserves all the available structures present in the kinematical space of states. The
set of these is denoted C1(S;R)K.
This definition is explicit in the work of Ashtekar and Schilling68. It applies
equally well to Classical and Quantum Kinematics. Infinitesimal state transformations
are vector fields preserving all the available kinematical structure. In the classical case,
this means only to preserve the symplectic structure, and any smooth function f may
thus do the job, as its symplectic gradient vf automatically verifies Lvf! = 0. But in
the quantum case, there is also the metric to preserve. Accordingly, only those functions
for which the symplectic gradient is as well a Killing vector will qualify as properties.
As the two authors prove, these functions exactly coincide with the functions bF that
are real expectation-value maps of self-adjoint operators F 69. It is important to notice
that this last point only applies to the projective Hilbert space. Were one to insist
on working at the level of H, this geometrical characterization of properties would
fail, for there are too many functions preserving both the symplectic and Riemannian
structures which do not arise as expectation-value maps of operators.
The general definition of a physical property enlightens the importance of their
double role. For it is precisely this two-fold role, numerical and transformational, that
serves as a definition of what a physical property is. The standard definition of classical
properties only involved their numerical role—they were defined as functions on the
space of states—and did not apply to Quantum Kinematics. Conversely, the standard
68 Ashtekar and Schilling, op. cit., See Corollary 1, p. 14, and the comment following it.
69The proof of this result may also be found in Schilling, op. cit., Corollary 3.5, p. 41, or in
R. Cirelli, M. Gatti, and A. Manià. “On the Nonlinear Extension of Quantum Superposition and
Uncertainty Principles”. In: Journal of Geometry and Physics 29.1 (1999), pp. 64–86, Proposition
5.2., p. 75. This result is also mentioned in N. P. Landsman. “The Infinite Unitary Group, Howe
Dual Pairs, and the Quantization of Constrained Systems”. In: arXiv preprint (1994). url: https:
//arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9411171, p. 15.
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definition of quantum properties only involved their transformational role—they were
defined as operators acting on states—and did not apply to Classical Kinematics. A
posteriori, it is therefore most natural that the general definition of a physical prop-
erty, be it classical or quantum, should explicitly mention properties-as-quantities and
properties-as-transformations.
From this perspective, Kibble’s enthusiastic claim appears to be partially wrong.
True: “the essential difference between classical and quantum mechanics lies [...] in the
choice of the class of observables”. But, against Kibble, this difference is also present in
the set of states: the quantum one is equipped with an additional geometric structure.
Thus, the “real” difference between the two kinematical arenas lies no more in the
algebraic structure of the properties than in the geometry of the states. Properties and
states are the two Janus faces of Kinematics and in both may one clearly perceive the
distinction70. We turn now to the investigation of this additional geometrical structure
of the Quantum.
II.2.2 The additional geometric structure of the Quantum
The conceptual analysis of section II.1 showed two important drawbacks of the
standard formulation of Quantum Kinematics were: the difficulty to relate the alge-
braic structures of properties to geometric features of states, and the obscure physical
meaning of the Jordan product. The geometric formulation of quantum mechanics
obviously tries to address the first point and the hope is that by doing so, as a spin-off,
it will also clarify the second one. In relation to this, the realization of there being
two geometrical structures on the quantum side can only be felt as encouraging: there
were two algebraic structures (a Jordan and a Lie product) and two roles for properties
(numerical and transformational). Moreover, the essential difference between classical
and quantum properties was found to lie on the Jordan side of properties, and it now
seems to be found as well on the Riemannian side of states. Hence, it is hard not to
70Janus is the roman god of beginnings and ends and is almost systematically represented as a head
with two faces looking in opposite directions. I take this image from a conference given in Paris by
Klaas Landsman.
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conjecture the following links:
properties-as-transformations Lie algebra symplectic geometry
properties-as-quantities Jordan algebra Riemannian geometry.
Now, recall the definition of the symplectic structure at the level of the Hilbert
space H: it involved the imaginary part of the hermitian product (Equation II.7,
page 172). By analogy, one may use the real part to define a second tensor G 2
 (TH
 TH) by:
G(V; V ) := 4Re(h;  i): (II.15)
This time, the skew-symmetry, positive-definitiveness and non-degeneracy of the hermi-
tian product respectively imply the symmetry, positive-definitiveness and non-degenera-
cy of G. Thus, we have:
Result: By means of Equation II.15, a Hilbert space H may naturally be endowed
with a Riemannian metric G.71
Again, since by definition unitary transformations preserve the hermitian product,
they automatically preserve the Riemannian structure as well: U(H)  Isom(H). At
the level of H, it therefore becomes transparent why the vector field associated to a
self-adjoint operator is a Killing vector.
At this point, we may use again diagram II.10 (page 174) to induce a Riemannian
metric on the space of states. In the symplectic case, we regarded the isomorphism
SH/U(1) ' PH as the second stage of symplectic reduction and this sufficed to insure
PH was also symplectic. Instead, we now adopt towards this isomorphism a different
perspective, called by Ashtekar and Schilling the “Killing reduction”72. It is the fol-
lowing: first, the restriction iG of the metric G to the unit sphere is again a metric
and SH becomes then a Riemannian manifold in its own right. Second, one regards
the action of U(1) on H as the one-parameter group of transformations generated by
the vector field VId 2  (TH) associated to the identity self-adjoint operator. By the
71Ashtekar and Schilling, op. cit., p. 6.
72See ibid., pp. 12–13, and also Schilling, op. cit., pp. 33–38.
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comment just above, we know that VId is a Killing vector for G. Moreover, this vector
field is tangent to SH and is hence also a Killing vector for iG. In this way, the
isomorphism SH/U(1) ' PH describes the projective Hilbert space as the space of all
trajectories of the Killing vector field VId. By a result of Geroch73, we know that the
resulting manifold is also Riemannian. We denote the Riemannian metric on PH by g.
Hence, the Riemannian and symplectic structures of the quantum space of states
PH may be seen as arising from the decomposition of the hermitian product of H into
its real and imaginary part. Combine to this the fact that, for self-adjoint operators,
the Jordan product • = 1
2
[; ]+ and Lie product ? = i2 [; ] may also be seen as arising
from the decomposition into real and imaginary parts of the usual composition of
operators74:
for A;B 2 BR(H); A B = A•B   iA ? B
and you get a new strong hint that the algebraic Jordan structure of quantum properties
must be governed by the Riemannian geometry of the states.
This conjectured Riemann-Jordan link is finally proven by defining the following
commutative product on C1(PH;R):
8f; k 2 C1(PH;R); f  k := g(vf ; vk) + f  k:
To the usual point-wise multiplication of functions f g, the metric adds a “Riemannian
bracket” (f; k) := g(vf ; vk). Thus, in a loose sense, the presence of the Riemannian
structure allows to deform the usual commutative and associative algebra of functions
into a commutative but non-associative algebra.
Because of the similarity with the definition of the Poisson bracket, this definition
of the Riemannian bracket seems most natural. There is however a sense in which it is
misleading: it explicitly involves the symplectic gradient of the functions and it would
therefore seem that the new commutative product depends on both the metric and the
symplectic structure of the space of states. However, this is not true: as is shown by
73Appendix of R. Geroch. “A Method for Generating Solutions of Einstein’s Equations”. In: Journal
of Mathematical Physics 12.6 (1971), pp. 918–924, cited in Ashtekar and Schilling, op. cit., p. 12.
74In the same way that for a complex number z, Re(z) and Im(z) are both real while z is not, here
A•B and A ? B are both self-adjoint even though A B is not.
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Schilling, it depends only on the Riemannian metric75.
Now, as Ashtekar and Schilling show, the morphism b : BR(H)  ! C1(PH;R)
respects the Jordan product76:
F^  K^ = 1
2
\[F;K]+: (II.16)
This equation finishes the complete geometrical characterization of the quantum alge-
bra of properties, for both its Lie and Jordan structures, for we now have the following





[; ] '  C1(PH;R)K; ; f; gPH: (II.17)
With this geometrical reformulation of the quantum kinematical arena, it is easier
to understand the sought-for link between the numerical role of properties and their
Jordan structure. This may also be now translated as the question of the link between
the properties-as-quantities and the geodesical structure of the space of states. As is
well known, one crucial characteristic of the Quantum is its probabilistical or statistical
dimension. This can be separated into two different yet related aspects:
i) The value of a property: given a property f and a state p, one cannot in general
assign a definite value of the property to that state. Instead, one associates an
expected value f(p) and an indeterminacy f(p).
ii) The probability of a value: given a property f and a possible value  of that
property, to each state p one can assign a probability Pr(p; ) of finding  as
result of a measurement.
A very satisfactory insight of the present geometrical reformulation is that it allows
to understand these two aspects of quantum properties-as-quantities in terms of two
different yet related operations on the space of states enabled by the presence of the
Riemannian structure, namely:
75Schilling, op. cit., eq. 2.42, p. 24.
76Ashtekar and Schilling, op. cit., eq. 2.23, p. 15.
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1) The definition of a length for tangent vectors:
for v 2 TPH; kvk2 := g(v; v):
2) The definition of a distance between two states:





   2 Path(p; q)	:
where Path(p; q) is the set of parametrized paths between p and q. In the same
way, one can define a distance between a state p and a subset of states   PH,
which we denote by the same symbol dg(p;)77.
The two results which render manifest the relation between i), ii) and 1), 2) are the
following. For a quantum property f 2 C1(PH;R)K, a state p 2 PH,  a possible
value of the property and   PH the set of all states having  as definite value of










) = f•f(p)   f(p)2; (II.18)
Pr(p; ) = cos2(dg(p;)): (II.19)
The last equation explains in which way the probabilistic features of the quantum
kinematical arena are completely governed by the geodesical structure of the quantum
space of states. It is useful to rewrite it in terms of two vectors  and  of the initial
Hilbert space. It then says that, for the respective two points [ ]; [] 2 PH, we have
dg([ ]; []) = arccos(jh ; ij):
From this, it is clear that there exists a maximum distance between any two states,
called the diameter of PH. Two states separated by such a maximal distance are called
antipodal. As is transparent from the equation, antipodality at the level of PH is the
geometrical translation of orthogonality at the level of H79. The further two states are




78See ibid., eq. 2.26, p.15, and eq. 2.34, p. 20, or also Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, “The Pure State
Space of Quantum Mechanics as Hermitian Symmetric Space”, p. 12 and p.8.
79See ibid., p. 8.
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from each other, the less probable is a transition between them. In other words, the
quantum transition probability is nothing else than a measure of the separation between
states!
On the other hand, Equation II.18 is conceptually very rich and well deserves a
few comments. First, it shows that the quantum indeterminacy of a property may be
equally well characterized in terms of the Riemannian structure or in terms of the Jor-
dan structure. Second, since (f)2 = hf 2i   hfi2, the expression of the indeterminacy
in terms of the Jordan product implies that hf 2i = f•f . Specifically, if the property
f is represented by the function f , then the property f2 is represented by the function
f•f and not by the function f 2 = f f as one could have naively thought. This clearly
establishes—if there were still doubts—that the Jordan product defined through the
Riemannian structure is the true commutative product of quantum properties.
Third, and most important for us, this same equation sheds a new light on the
relation between the two roles of properties in Quantum Mechanics, for it expresses
the beautiful and satisfactory fact that the indeterminacy of a physical property-as-
quantity is precisely a measure of how much a state is changed by the property-as-
transformation. In particular, we recover as a special case the invariance $ definite-
valuedness relation already noticed with the standard Hilbert space formulation (cf.
page 164): states with definite values of the property f correspond to those being
invariant under the transformations generated by f . Also, as noted by Ashtekar and
Schilling, we rederive the geometric interpretation of the uncertainty in energy found
by Anandan and Aharonov in 1990:
[...] the uncertainty in energy E for an arbitrary quantum system [...] is
the magnitude of the velocity of the system in the projective Hilbert space. It
follows that the evolution of the system in PH completely determines E; no
other information from H is needed to determine E.80
From a conceptual perspective, this is, in my opinion, one of the most important
results of the whole geometric reformulation of the quantum kinematical arena. It
80J. Anandan and Y. Aharonov. “Geometry of Quantum Evolution”. In: Physical review letters
65.14 (1990), pp. 1697–1700, p. 1699
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brings to the fore the existence of an interplay, characteristic of the quantum, between
properties-as-quantities and properties-as-transformations:
Quantum interplay of quantities and transformations. Properties-as-
quantities provide a quantitative description of how the respective properties-as-
transformations affect each state of the system.
We had earlier seen how the transformational role of properties was consistent
with its numerical role: properties-as-transformations only related states that were not
separated (distinguished) by the property-as-quantity (cf. page 155). This compatibil-
ity was valid for both Classical and Quantum Kinematics. But now we see that, in the
Quantum, a second compatibility condition is required, one which establishes a recip-
rocal interdependence of the two roles: the transformation respects the quantity and,
in return, the quantity describes the transformation. This trait—which had already
been hinted at in the discussion of the standard Hilbert space formulation of Quan-
tum Mechanics (cf. page 164)—is completely absent in the classical realm: classical
properties-as-quantities are independent of properties-as-transformations; the former
do not seem to encode any information whatsoever about the latter, and it is because
of this that classical uncertainties are unheard of.
In the same spirit, it is possible to provide a geometrical interpretation of Heisen-
berg’s famous indeterminacy principle. To recall, instead of considering the indetermi-
nacy of one single property f , Heisenberg’s principle considers a pair of them. In the






That is, the product of the indeterminacies in F and K must be bigger than the mean
value of the property i
2
[F;K]. Now, using Equations II.13 (page 175), II.19 (page 182)
and the definition of the Poisson bracket in terms of the symplectic form (page 150),
this inequality can be rewritten as
kv bFk kv bKk > j!(v bF ; v bK)j:
As noted by Cirelli, Gatti and Manià, this simply expresses the uniform continuity
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of the symplectic form with respect to the topology induced on the tangent space by
the Riemannian metric81. This constitutes yet another blow to the popular view that
swiftly opposes the Quantum to the continuum: Heisenberg indeterminacy principle,
often perceived as one of the most striking features characteristic of the Quantum,
appears as a statement of continuity of the geometrical structures on the quantum
space of states82!
Table II.1 below summarizes the conceptual understanding of the kinematical are-
nas as for now. Following Schilling, it could be tempting to say that, from the geomet-
rical point of view, the “fundamental distinction between the classical and quantum
formalisms is the presence, in quantum mechanics, of a Riemannian metric. While the
symplectic structure serves exactly the same role as that of classical mechanics, the
metric describes those features of quantum mechanics which do not have classical ana-
logues.”83 This is the view found in the vast majority of works on the geometrization
of quantum mechanics: the quantum would have one additional geometric structure,
81Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, op. cit., p. 12.
82Of course, the view which systematically associates Quantum Mechanics with some sort of funda-
mental discretization of physical phenomena has been incessantly criticized from the very beginning
of the theory. For example, in the seminal “three-man paper” “Zur Quantenmechanik II” from 1925,
one can read the following:
[...] a particularly important trait in the new theory [of Quantum Mechanics] would
seem to us to consist on the way in which both continuous and line spectra arise in it on
equal footing, i.e., as solutions of one and the same equation of motion [...]; obviously, in
this theory, any distinction between ‘quantized’ and ‘unquantized’ motion ceases to be at
all meaningful, since the theory contains no mention of a quantization condition [...].
(Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan, op. cit., pp. 322–323, my emphasis.)
In the same vein, only a few weeks after this paper, the physicist Cornelius Lanczos wrote:
This much, however, we do believe that we are allowed to conclude [...]: that the modi-
fications, which we must apply to our classical views in order to reach an understanding
of the quantum problems, must lie in a totally different direction than could be char-
acterized simply by the contrast between continuum and discontinuum; and that the
solution of the quantum mystery should have hardly anything to do with a quantum-like
re-interpretation of geometry or infinitesimal calculus.
(C. Lanczos. “Über eine feldmäßige Darstellung der neuen Quantenmechanik”. In:
Zeitschrift für Physik 35 (1926), pp. 812–830, cited in J. Mehra and H. Rechenberg.
The Historical Development of Quantum Theory. Volume 3: The Formulation of Matrix
Mechanics and Its Modifications. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982, p. 216)
Despite this, the association Quantum–Discrete still seems to have a strong heuristic influence,
specially in the research of quantum gravity.
83Schilling, op. cit., p. 48.
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Classical Kinematics Quantum Kinematics
States
points p of a symplectic
manifold
(M;!)
















 a symplectic 2-form !
Two geometric structures:
 a symplectic 2-form !





 Anti-commutative Lie product




f•k = f  k
Two algebraic structures:
 Anti-commutative Lie product








Two roles of properties:
 Properties-as-transformations
captured by Lie product
♡ properties-as-quantities
captured by Jordan product
f = 0
independent of transformations
Two roles of properties:
 Properties-as-transformations
captured by Lie product
♡ properties-as-quantities
captured by Jordan product
f = g(vf ; vf )
dependent on transformations
Table II.1 – Comparison of the two kinematical arenas in their geometric formula-
tion.
with no analogue in the classical, and, in a loose sense, to quantize would mean to add
a Riemannian metric to the space of states.
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Nonetheless, this does not seem to be the impression conveyed by the comparative
table. By the end of section II.1, we had felt the description of the quantum kinematical
arena was not quite right. The harmonious balance between the geometric structures,
the algebraic structures and the double role of properties displayed in standard classical
kinematics was not found in standard quantum kinematics. But at present the situation
seems to have surprisingly reversed: the quantum description shines, and the praised
beauty of the classical has somewhat faded away. For something seems to be missing
in the description of classical kinematics—more precisely, one geometrical structure on
the space of states that would induce the associative Jordan product. In fact, one gets
the impression that this structure is the “Riemannian metric” g = 0. Indeed, setting
g to vanish in the quantum formulas yields the classical ones. Of course, g = 0 is not
an actual metric, so it cannot be that simple. But this does suggest there may be yet
another way of formulating the two kinematical arenas. A way in which they both
exhibit the same two kinds of geometrical structures, but it just so happens that one
of these structures is trivial—and hence unnoticed—in Classical Kinematics.
The search for this lost structure of the Classical constitutes my main motivation to
explore the C-algebraic formulation of Mechanics. This will be investigated in the next
section. However, before we turn to this, let me close the discussion of the geometric
formalism by one small subsection. It lies somewhat aside the main discussion of the
conceptual triad of Kinematics and may be skipped by the reader.
II.2.3 The geometrical formulation of the superposition prin-
ciple
As I commented at the beginning of section II.2, the idea of “superposition” has
been perceived, since the early stages of the theory, as one of the hallmarks of quantum
mechanics. Moreover, this “most fundamental and most dramatic law of nature” has
been almost systematically associated to the mathematical idea of “linearity”, up to
the point physicists often refer to the “quantum principle of linear superposition”. This
is most explicitly stated in Dirac’s Principles of Quantum Mechanics:
The superposition process is a kind of additive process and implies that states
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can in some way be added to give new states. The states must therefore be
connected with mathematical quantities of a kind which can be added together
to give other quantities of the same kind. The most obvious of such quantities
are vectors.84
But this association is also manifest in much more recent literature on the foundations
of Quantum Mechanics. For example, in their attempt to present a modification of
standard Quantum Mechanics that would solve the measurement problem—which is
now known as the GRW model—Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber declare:
Despite the success of quantum mechanics in accounting with striking accuracy
for a vast variety of physical phenomena, this theory presents crucial conceptual
difficulties, about which a lively scientific debate is still going on. Almost all
the difficulties can be traced back to the problem of accounting for the behavior
of macroscopic objects and for their interactions with microscopic ones, and are
strictly related to the occurrence (allowed by the theory) of linear superpositions of
macroscopically distinguishable states of a macroscopic system (a typical example
being the macroscopically different pointer positions of a measuring apparatus).
This very fact, i.e., that the linearity of quantum theory unavoidably leads one to
consider such superpositions, constitutes a basic difficulty for all trials of deriving
a unified description of the physical reality from microscopic to macroscopic
phenomena.85
Yet, after discovering the geometrical reformulation of quantum mechanics, we
know that the association of superposition and linearity is not inherent to Quantum
Mechanics but rather emerges from a particular formulation of it. We know the de-
linearization program must provide a description of the principle of superposition that
does not appeal to linearity in any way. But the precise translation of this principle
into geometrical ideas remains yet to be seen. A discussion of this important point is
surprisingly lacking in the exposition of Ashtekar and Schilling, but the details can be
found in the article by Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià (section 3) or in the article of Brody
84P. A. M. Dirac. The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1958, p. 15.
85G. C. Ghirardi, A. Rimini, and T. Weber. “Unified Dynamics for Microscopic and Macroscopic
Systems”. In: Physical Review D 34.2 (1986), pp. 470–491, p. 470, emphasis is mine.
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and Hughston (section 4). There is also a nice short article by Alejandro Corichi
dedicated solely to this issue86.
In its core, the Quantum Superposition Principle is a claim about the ability to
generate new possible states from the knowledge of just a few: given the knowledge of
states p1 and p2, one can deduce the existence of an infinite set Sp1;p2 of other states
which are equally accessible to the system87. In the standard Hilbert space formalism,
superposition is described by C-linearity: for two different states  1;  2 2 H, any
superposition of them can be written as  = a 1+ b 2, with a; b 2 C. If one only cares
about the set of all superpositions of two states, one may then argue that the principle
of superposition is captured by the canonical association of a two-dimensional complex
vector space to any pair of states. In other words, it is captured by the existence of a
map
V : HH  ! Hom(C2;H)
where the linear map V 1; 2 : C2 ! H is an injection iff  1 and  2 are independent
vectors.
This slight reformulation of the linear superposition paves the way to its geo-
metrical translation. Indeed, one only needs to replace the Hilbert space by the real
quantum space of states PH, and the linear space C2 by its projective analogue, the
complex projective line PC2. In this way, the quantum superposition principle is now
86A. Corichi. “Quantum Superposition Principle and Geometry”. In: General Relativity and Grav-
itation 38.4 (2006), pp. 677–687. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0407242.
87In his article, Corichi argues there are two different ideas usually associated to the notion of
“superposition”, and that due care should be taken to distinguish them. On the one hand, there is the
particular relation between states that allows one to construct new states from old ones. On the other
hand, there is the important idea of quantum interferences, manifest for example in the treatment
of the double-slit experiment. Therein, one separately considers the experimental setups with only
one slit: first, only slit S1 exists and this produces the probability amplitude  1, then only slit S2
exists and produces the probability amplitude  2. The probability amplitude resulting from the actual
double slit experiment is then found by adding  1 and  2. Therefore, one studies a given experimental
arrangement by decomposing it into basic blocks, and then superposing the effects of each of these
blocks. Corichi calls the first idea the principle of superposition of states, and corresponds to the
notion of “generation of states” we have just mentioned in the main text. It is a kinematical relation
valid for any quantum-mechanical system. The second idea he calls the principle of decomposition,
and is more related to particular experimental setups than to the consideration of general physical
systems.
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translated into the existence of a map
S : PH PH  ! Hom(PC2;PH)
where, for p1 6= p2, the map Sp1;p2 is now a monomorphism in the category of Hermitian
symmetric spaces (or, equivalently, in the category of Kähler manifolds). Since the
complex projective line is in fact (isomorphic to) the Riemannian sphere—and thus,
as real manifolds, one has PC2 ' S2—the geometrical reformulation of the quantum
superposition of states becomes quite simple:
Geometrical reformulation of the superposition principle: given a
quantum system with space of states M and two states p1; p2 2 M , there
exists a canonical two-sphere Sp1;p2 ' S2 M containing them.
This two-sphere can be thought as the non-linear span generated by the two states.
As noted by Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, Sp1;p2 can equivalently be characterized as the
smallest totally geodesic submanifold of the space of states containing p1 and p288.
One may however worry that this geometrical reformulation only deals with the
set of all superpositions as a whole, but does not allow to describe single superpositions
in the way it can be achieved in the Hilbert space formalism. But this is not so. For,
given two states p1 and p2, the task of characterizing the different states which arise
as superposition of these two is simply the task of defining, for the two-sphere Sp1;p2 ,
a coordinate system in which the points p1 and p2 play a preferred role. And there
is no obstruction for this to be done. For example, if one recalls that the complex
projective line PC2 is equivalently defined as the manifold obtained by adding a point
at infinity to the complex plane, one sees that any point of Sp1;p2 may be characterized
by a number z 2 C [ f1g such that, moreover, z(p1) = 0 and z(p2) =189.
88Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià, op. cit., p. 9. A totally geodesic submanifold of M is a submanifold
S M for which all geodesics inM through any point p 2 S lie in S (for small values of the parameter
of the geodesics). This purely metric characterization of the set of superpositions of two states is also
found in V. Cantoni. “Superposition of Physical States: a Metric Viewpoint”. In: Helvetica Physica
Acta 58 (1985), pp. 956–968, p. 961.
89To deal with single superpositions, Cirelli, Gatti, and Manià adopt a different strategy, based on a
close examination of the geodesic structure of PH. Instead, I have here followed the simpler approach
of Corichi.
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Now, whereas the association of the set Sp1;p2 of all superpositions for a given pair
of states p1 and p2 was canonical, the ‘coordinatization’
z : Sp1;p2  ! C [ f1g
p 7 ! z(p)
on the contrary, is not: it depends on arbitrary choices. Of course, the same is true in
the language of Hilbert spaces, and it is interesting to recall how this characterization of
single superpositions with numbers z 2 C[f1g is achieved in this latter setting. Given
two independent vectors  1;  2 2 H, there is a canonically associated two-dimensional
complex vector space V 1; 2 and there is a unique way in which to write each of its
elements in terms of  1;  2:
8 2 V 1; 2 ; 9!(a; b) 2 C2;  = a 1 + b 2:
To describe the states found by superposition—that is, the relevant rays of the Hilbert
space—one needs to arbitrarily choose one representative vector for each ray. This is
achieved by an arbitrary choice of normalization (e.g.,  = 1pjaj2+jbj2 (a 1 + b 2)) and
of an overall phase factor (e.g,. a 2 R). Only after this do we find that any state []
which arises as a superposition of the states [ 1] and [ 2] is uniquely written as
(z) =
1p
1 + jzj2 ( 1 + z 2); where z :=
b
a
2 C [ f1g
Therefore, in this unnecessarily twisted fashion, we reach the same ‘coordinatization’
of the space of all superpositions as we had arrived at straightforwardly through the
geometric formulation. In particular, we see that (0) =  1 and (1) =  2.
We have then a complete description of all the features of the Quantum Superposi-
tion Principle which entirely avoids any mention to C-linearity and Hilbert spaces. To
conclude this discussion on the geometric superposition principle, it should be noted
that the two-sphere property of the quantum space of states may be perceived as one
of its fundamental geometric features. Indeed, as it will be seen when discussing al-
gebraic mechanics, it turns out that the two-sphere property is one of the very few
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axioms needed to characterize the pure state space of a C-algebra90. In this way,
the principle of superposition becomes indeed one of the most basic laws of Quantum
Mechanics.
II.3 The Classical seen from the Quantum: the al-
gebraic formulation
As became evident by the end of section II.1, the standard perspective on Kine-
matics fails to provide a satisfactory articulation of the Classical and the Quantum.
And—it was felt—the main reason for this failure was the clumsy description of quan-
tum states in the Hilbert space formalism. From the standard point of view of Classical
Hamiltonian Mechanics—which, in order to describe a physical system, specifies first
a space of states, and only then considers the algebra of functions—this was a con-
sequence of not considering from the start the right quantum space of states. The
natural strategy was hence to reformulate the Quantum directly from the projective
Hilbert space PH. As we have seen in section II.2, this geometric program achieves its
aims exceedingly well.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of Quantum Mechanics, this geometric strat-
egy is certainly not the most natural one. For the strength of the Hilbert space formalism
lies in its description of the algebra of quantum properties. Indeed, in the same way
that given a differentiable manifold the set of all smooth real valued functions is a
very natural real algebra to consider, given a Hilbert space it is also quite natural
to study the algebra of self-adjoint operators. Thus, in the standard quantum for-
malism, the description of the algebra of properties is straightforward. This is to be
contrasted with the situation in the geometrical formulation: one should not forget
that it took almost twenty years to find the geometrical characterization of quantum
properties—from Kibble’s articles to the theorems of Schilling. With this remark taken
to its full-blown consequences, the problematic description of quantum states of the
90See Landsman, Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics, pp. 105–107,
and also the end of section II.3 of this thesis (page 229).
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Hilbert space formalism is perceived under a very different light. The deep roots of the
problem appear not to lie in the fact we had started the kinematical description with
the wrong space of states, but rather: in the fact we had insisted on starting with a
space of states instead of starting with an algebra of properties.
Accordingly, the main strategy of the algebraic approach to Mechanics is to re-
verse the order in which a physical system is described: specify first an abstract algebra
of properties, and only then construct a space of states. It explores another possible
dynamic of the State/Property couple, complementary to the one examined by the ge-
ometric program. This will furnish a reformulation of the Quantum arena from within,
but it will accentuate the apparent “incommensurability” of the Classical/Quantum
couple. To overcome it, the classical arena will also need to be rethought.
Historically, this algebraic strategy was the first serious attempt to reformulate
Quantum Mechanics after von Neumann’s introduction of Hilbert spaces. Already in
1934, only two years after the publication of his book, von Neumann himself started
investigating this route in a joint paper with Jordan and Wigner91. The geometric
formulation came only much later: it had to wait for the revival, in the second half of
the twentieth century, of the interest for the foundations of Classical Mechanics and
the progressive understanding of the importance of symplectic geometry in this setting.
Thus, the algebraic approach overwhelmingly dominated the landscape of research in
quantum foundations. It developed mainly into two different branches which may both
be seen as originating from works published by von Neumann in 1936:
– Quantum Logic. It was launched by the joint paper of von Neumann and Garrett
Birkhoff “The Logic of Quantum Mechanics”92 and continued to be developed in
the 1960’s, principally by Josef-Maria Jauch and his student Constantin Piron in
Geneva, so that this approach is sometimes referred to as the “Geneva approach
91P. Jordan, J. von Neumann, and E. P. Wigner. “On an Algebraic Generalization of the Quantum
Mechanical Formalism”. In: Annals of Mathematics 35 (1934), pp. 29–64. (Reprinted in: J. von
Neumann. Collected Works. Ed. by A. H. Taub. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1961, Vol. II, pp.
409–444).
92J. von Neumann and G. Birkhoff. “The Logic of Quantum Mechanics”. In: Annals of Mathematics
37.4 (1936), pp. 823–843. (Reprinted in: J. von Neumann. Collected Works. Ed. by A. H. Taub.
Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1961, Vol. IV, pp. 105–125).
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to quantum mechanics”93.
– C-algebras. It started with von Neumann’s paper “On an Algebraic Generaliza-
tion of The Quantum Mechanical Formalism (Part I)”94. A decisive contribution
was that of Irving Segal’s 1947 article “Postulates for General Quantum Mechan-
ics”95, which made heavy use of the mathematical formalism developped by the
Russian school of Israel Gelfand (to be explained in the following section). Later,
the approach was taken on by Rudolf Haag and Daniel Kastler and applied to
Quantum Field Theory96.
A nice collection of some of the most important papers in the development of both
approaches can be found in Hooker’s The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quantum Me-
chanics. Volume I: Historical Evolution97. Here, I will concentrate only on the C-
algebraic approach because it connects beautifully with the geometrical approach.
Philosophically, the algebraic strategy has oftentimes been motivated by a certain
underlying operational view of Physics. According to this view, the fundamental con-
cepts, upon which the physical theories are to be based, must result from a detailed
analysis of the experimental procedures as they take place in an actual laboratory. In
other terms, a framework is operational if “all aspects are introduced with specific ref-
erence to events to be experienced”98. And since physical systems are only accessible
93C. Piron. “Axiomatique quantique”. In: Helvetica Physica Acta 37 (1964), pp. 439–468.
J.-M. Jauch. Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1968.
J.-M. Jauch and C. Piron. “What is Quantum Logic?” In: Quanta, Essays in Theoretical Physics,
dedicated to Gregor Wentzel. Ed. by P. Freund, C. Goebel, and Y. Nambu. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970, pp. 166–181.
94J. von Neumann. “On an Algebraic Generalization of The Quantum Mechanical Formalism (Part
I)”. in: Receuil Mathématique 1.4 (1936), pp. 415–484. (Reprinted in: J. von Neumann. Collected
Works. Ed. by A. H. Taub. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1961, Vol. III, pp. 492–559).
95I. E. Segal. “Postulates for General Quantum Mechanics”. In: Annals of Mathematics 48.4 (1947),
pp. 930–948.
96R. Haag and D. Kastler. “An Algebraic Approach to Quantum Field Theory”. In: Journal of
Mathematical Physics 5.7 (1964), pp. 848–861.
R. Haag. Local Quantum Physics – Fields, Particles, Algebras. 2nd ed. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag,
1996.
97C. Hooker. The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quantum Mechanics. Volume I: Historical Evolu-
tion. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel Publishing Company, 1975.
98D. Aerts and S. Aerts. “Towards a General Operational and Realistic Framework for Quantum
Mechanics and Relativity Theory”. In: Quo Vadis Quantum Mechanics? Ed. by A. C. Elitzur, S.
Dolev, and N. Kolenda. Berlin: Springer, 2005, pp. 153–207, p. 153.
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through a series of measurements, they should be defined by the set of measurable
properties—or, to adopt just once the operationalist language, by the set of observ-
ables. A flavor of this was certainly present in the main motivation advanced by von
Neumann to develop Quantum Mechanics in terms of algebras:
[...] the states are merely a derived notion, the primitive (phenomenologically
given) notion being the qualities [...].99
But most importantly, operationalism was explicitly endorsed by the other main con-
tributors to the C-algebraic approach. Irving Segal opened his seminal article on al-
gebraic quantum mechanics by claiming that his theory was “strictly operational”100,
and later wrote an article specially dedicated to defending this position101. In a similar
spirit, Haag and Kastler decided to “base their discussion on the notions of “opera-
tions””102 and all of their writings are full of operational arguments to motivate their
choices and definitions103. More recently, in Strocchi’s excellent introductory textbook
to the C-algebraic approach to Quantum Mechanics, one finds that
[...] it is not justified to extrapolate to the microscopic level the prejudices derived
from our experience with the macroscopic world. The only guide [for establish-
ing the mathematical description of quantum systems] must be the recourse to
operational considerations [...].104
Beyond the question “Is it possible to start the description of a physical system by
99Letter from von Neumann to G. Birkhoff, J. von Neumann, John von Neumann: Selected Letters,
p. 59, author’s emphasis
100Segal, op. cit., p. 930.
101I. E. Segal. “The Mathematical Meaning of Operationalism in Quantum Mechanics”. In: The
Axiomatic Method. With Special Reference to Geometry and Physics. Proceedings of an International
Symposium held at UC Berkeley, Dec. 26 1957-Jan. 4, 1958. Ed. by L. Henkin, P. Suppes, and A.
Tarski. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1959, pp. 341–352.
102Haag and Kastler, op. cit., p. 850.
103To give one example, in their joint article, they wrote: “We may say therefore that we have a
complete theory if we are able in principle to compute such probabilities for every state and every
operation when the state and the operation are defined in terms of laboratory procedures.” (Ibid., p.
850, my emphasis.)
104F. Strocchi. An Introduction to the Mathematical Structure of Quantum Mechanics. 2nd ed.
Singapore: World Scientific, 2008, p. 42.
196 Chapter II. Classical and Quantum Kinematical Arenas
its algebra of properties?”, the mathematical physicist with such philosophical motiva-
tions will attempt to answer the more ambitious question “Is it necessary to start the
description of a physical system by its algebra of properties?”. This rather extremist
view has been called “Algebraic Imperialism” by Arageorgis105 and has received serious
criticisms106, up to the point that Haag acknowledged that the “specific mathemati-
cal structure of Quantum Mechanics [...] is not so easily derivable from operational
principles”107. But, as Laura Ruetsche rightly remarks, one need not adhere to any op-
erationalist view whatsoever to become interested in the algebraic approach108. Rather,
it becomes interesting to look carefully at the details of the mathematical structures
involved to see whether they point in a particular direction of this debate. Under this
light, the back-and-forth between states and properties acquires a new philosophical
relevance.
In my opinion, the two most important clichés emerging from the C-algebra
formulation of Mechanics are the following:
 Quantum = Non-commutative. C-algebras cover both classical and quantum
systems. The first are described by commutative C-algebras, the second by
non-commutative ones. Quantization is thus the passage from commutativity to
non-commutativity.
 Quantum = Operational. A classical system may equivalently be described by
105A. Arageorgis. “Fields, Particles, and Curvature: Foundations and Philosophical Aspects of
Quantum Field Theory in Curved Space-Time”. PhD thesis. University of Pittsburgh, 1995.
106See for example L. Ruetsche. Interpreting Quantum Theories. The Art of the Possible. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011, Section 6.4., pp. 132–143, and also S. J. Summers. “On the Stone – von
Neumann Uniqueness Theorem and Its Ramifications”. In: John von Neumann and the Foundations
of Quantum Physics. Ed. by M. Rédei and M. Stöltzner. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2001, pp. 135–152.
107Haag, op. cit., p. 7. See however Aerts and Aerts, op. cit. for a recent attempt of building a
(generalized) quantum theory from an operationalist stance.
108She writes: “The adamantly operationalist original axiomatizers establish the association between
regions and their local algebras by the interpretive maneuver of identifying elements of U(O) with
observables measurable by means of actions confined to the region O. But the association between
local observables U(O) and regions O needn’t be mediated by the notion of measurement or ideologies
totemizing that notion. [...] The operationalism of the original axioomatizers is one interpretative
option.” (Ruetsche, op. cit., pp. 104–105, author’s emphasis.)
Although Ruetsche’s comment is originally intended for Algebraic Quantum Field Theory, it equally
well applies to the algebraic formulation of non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics.
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its states or its properties. In the Quantum, this equivalence fails and a system
must be defined by the algebraic structure of its properties/observables. This
shows that, at the fundamental level, one must adopt an operational description
of physical systems.
These are both widespread claims. They swamp all the literature discussing Quantum
Mechanics—be it research articles on foundations or popular accounts of the theory.
Again, a nice example of this can be found in Strocchi’s book. He says:
In this perspective, since a physical system is described in terms of measurements
of its observables, one may take the point of view that a classical system is
defined by its physical properties, i.e. by the algebraic structure of the set of
its measurable quantities, which generate an abstract abelian C-algebra A with
identity.109
And also:
The deep philosophical conclusion [...] is that for the mathematical description of
atomic systems one needs an algebra of observables which is non-abelian. Clearly,
as always in the great discoveries, this is not a mathematical theorem and a
great intuition and ingenuity was involved in Heisenberg foundations of Quantum
Mechanics. To give up the abelian character of the algebra of observables may
look as a very bold step, but it should be stressed that the commutativity of
observables is a property of our mathematical description of classical macroscopic
systems [...].110
In the following subsections, I will present the main points of the algebraic ap-
proach and discuss its relevance for the conceptual analysis of Kinematics we have here
undertaken. In the course of it, we will see there are many doubts—to say the least—
concerning the validity of the two mainstream claims. All of the technical material
is standard and there exist many excellent expositions of it. I will mainly follow the
first chapter of Landsman’s enlightening Mathematical Topics Between Classical and
Quantum Mechanics. Other important references are (from the most introductory to
109Strocchi, op. cit., p. 15, Strocchi’s emphasis.
110Ibid., pp. 41–42.
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the most advanced):
– F. Strocchi. An Introduction to the Mathematical Structure of Quantum Mechan-
ics. 2nd ed. Singapore: World Scientific, 2008,
– J. Dixmier. Les C-algèbres et leurs représentations. 2nd ed. Paris: Gauthiers-
Villars, 1969,
– J. M. G. Fell and R. S. Doran. Representations of *-Algebras, Locally Compact
Groups, and Banach *-Algebraic Bundles. Vol. 1. San Diego: Academic press,
1988,
– E. M. Alfsen and F. W. Shultz. State Spaces of Operator Algebras. Boston:
Birkhäuser, 2001,
– M. Takesaki. Theory of Operator Algebras Vol. I. New York: Springer, 2003.
II.3.1 The grand algebraic analogy
Considering the description of classical and quantum properties of the first two
sections, it may be surprising to hear that the “commutativity/non-commutativity”
picture is still under consideration. As we have repeated many times, both classical
and quantum properties fall under the general concept of Jordan-Lie algebras. Thus,
any algebra of physical properties may be seen as composed of a commutative Jordan
algebra of properties-as-quantities and a non-commutative Lie algebra of properties-
as-transformations . In this setting, the distinction between classical and quantum lies
in the associativity/non-associativity of the Jordan product. It would therefore seem
that the commutativity/non-commutativity picture is but an antiquated miss-analogy
one should better forget.
The story is however more involved than this simple account, based solely on the
perspective of Jordan-Lie algebras. For other important types of algebras appear in
both kinematical arenas. This can be seen as a consequence of a movement in striking
analogy with the one that had launched the geometric program. Recall: the geometric
structures of the quantum arena had emerged after a change in the point of view
towards the space of states: switch from complex numbers to real numbers. As we will
see, the powerful C-algebraic structures will emerge from the exact complementary
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movement—change the perspective on the algebra of properties: extend from real
numbers to complex numbers.
Jordan-Lie algebras are algebras defined over the field of real numbers. We now
introduce two new different types of algebras defined over the field of complex numbers.
Definition II.4. A *-algebra is a complex associative algebra with an involution.
That is, it is a complex algebra (U ; ) together with a real-linear map  : U ! U such
that, for all A;B;C 2 U and  2 C, we have
i) (A B)  C = A  (B  C),
ii) A = A,
iii) (A B) = B  A,
iv) (A) = A.
Definition II.5. A C-algebra (U ; ; ; k  k) is a *-algebra together with a norm
such that
i) (U ; k  k) is a complex Banach space,
ii) for all A;B 2 U ; kA Bk 6 kAkkBk,
iii) for all A 2 U ; kAAk = kAk2.
A *-algebra or a C-algebra is said to be commutative if the associative product 
is commutative: 8A;B 2 U ; A B = B  A.
The canonical example from quantum mechanics which motivates these definitions
is the algebra (B(H); ; y; k  k) of bounded linear operators on a Hilbert space H,
with the usual composition of operators as the associative product, and the action of
taking adjoints as involution111. Of course, this is a non-commutative C-algebra. The
canonical example of a commutative *-algebra is the algebra C(M;C) of continuous
complex-valued functions over a topological space M , with complex conjugation as
111The fact of considering only bounded operators is crucial for two reasons. First, it is necessary
to insure that the map y : A 7! Ay is an involution and thus that B(H) is a *-algebra. Indeed, the
identity Ayy = A is in general not true for unbounded operators of an infinite-dimensional Hilbert
space. Second, the boundedness condition is also necessary to define the norm that turns it into a
C-algebra. Recall the definition of the norm for a bounded operator A 2 B(H) (see Landsman,
op. cit., p. 39):
kAk := supkA k 2 SH	:
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involution and the usual point-wise multiplication as the associative product112.
In fact, the famous Gelfand-Naimark theorem shows that any C-algebra falls into
one of these two fundamental examples. First, given any C-algebra U , there exists a
Hilbert space H such that U is isomorphic to a norm-closed *-subalgebra of B(H)113.
Second, given a commutative C-algebra U , there exists a locally compact topological
space X such that U ' C0(X;C)114. Thus, in the context of C-algebras, and only in
this context, the following associations can be made:
commutative algebra ! functions over a topological space (II.20a)
non-commutative algebra ! operators over a Hilbert space: (II.20b)
This means that any commutative C-algebra can be thought as an algebra of
functions over some topological space, whereas any non-commutative C-algebra can
be thought as an algebra of bounded operators on some Hilbert space.
Now, as we saw in section II.1, the standard description of Kinematics suggests
we should also make the associations
classical properties ! functions over a differentiable manifold (II.21a)
quantum properties ! operators over a Hilbert space (II.21b)
which, combined with II.20a and II.20b, seems to lead to the common-place picture
classical physical systems = commutative C-algebra (II.22a)
quantum physical systems = non-commutative C-algebra: (II.22b)
Nevertheless, this train of thought, swiftly leading to such a conclusion, should be
regarded with suspicion. There are two main reasons for this: on the one hand, as the
112To turn this into a commutative C-algebra, one needs either to require the topological space
M to be compact, or else to restrict attention to the algebra C0(M;C) of continuous complex-valued
functions that vanish at infinity. Recall the definition of the norm of a continuous function f on a
compact space M :
kfk := supjf(p)jp 2M	:
113See ibid., Theorem I.1.1.8., p. 40, or Strocchi, op. cit., Theorem 2.3.1., p. 47.
114Landsman, op. cit., Theorem I.1.2.3, p. 42.
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geometric reformulation of Mechanics has clearly shown, quantum properties may also
be described by functions over a differentiable manifold. Thus, it is not at all clear in
which way the Function/Operator couple can be used to distinguish the Classical from
the Quantum. On the other hand—and this has been perhaps the most important
point throughout—the truly relevant object in the description of physical properties is
their abstract mathematical structure. That is, our attention should focus more on the
collection of algebraic operations attached to the set of properties than in the particular
nature of the elements of this set. Classical properties may be described by the set
C1(M;R), but it is a completely different thing whether one considers this set equipped
with point-wise multiplication or with the Poisson bracket. Quantum properties may
be described by the set BR(H), but it is a completely different situation whether one
considers this set equipped with the commutator or with the anti-commutator.
Therefore, to have a proper understanding of the (in)validity of “equations” (II.22a)
and (II.22b), one needs to understand the precise mathematical relation between these
newly defined complex algebras (*-algebras and C-algebras) and the real algebras we
had already encountered (Jordan, Jordan-Lie and Poisson algebras). The example
of bounded operators, which form a non-commutative C-algebra, and bounded self-
adjoint operators, which form a non-associative Jordan-Lie algebra, indicates these two
types of algebras should indeed be closely related.
With C-algebras it is the first time we explicitly consider the existence of a norm
on the algebra of physical properties. Thus, it is best to start by also introducing a
norm on their real counterparts.
Definition II.6. A Jordan-Lie-Banach algebra (or JLB-algebra for short)115 is a
real Jordan-Lie algebra (UR;•; ?) equipped with a norm k  k such that
i) (UR; k  k) is a Banach space,
ii) for all A;B 2 UR, we have kA•Bk 6 kAkkBk and kAk2 6 kA2 +B2k.
Analogously, one gets the concept of a Jordan-Banach algebra (or JB-algebra for
short) by norming a real Jordan algebra (UR;•)116.
115Ibid., Definition I.1.14., p. 38.
116For the definition of a Jordan algebra, see footnote 33 (page 157).
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Now, given the natural definition of morphisms between JLB-algebras and between
C-algebras117, the relation between all these algebras is captured in the following two
facts:
Theorem II.1. There is an equivalence between the category JLB of Jordan-Lie-
Banach algebras and the category CStar of C-algebras. Moreover, this restricts to
an equivalence between the full subcategories aJLB of associative JLB-algebras and
cCStar of commutative C-algebras.118
Theorem II.2. The category aJLB is equivalent to the category aJB of associative
Jordan-Banach algebras119.
Let us comment on these results. Theorem II.1 states that, although JLB-algebras
and C-algebras are seemingly different types of algebras, they are in fact the same:
one can switch from one point of view to the other without any loss of information. It
is useful to see how this back-and-forth can be performed:
1. From C*-algebras to JLB-algebras: given a C-algebra (U ; ; ; k k), consider the
set UR of all self-adjoint elements in U . Then, equipped with the two operations
A•B := 1
2
(A B +B  A) and A ? B := i
2
(A B  B  A);
(UR;•; ?; k  k) is a real JLB-algebra.
2. From JLB-algebras to C-algebras: conversely, given a JLB-algebra (UR;•; ?; kk),
consider its complexification (UR)C. For any A;B 2 UR, equip (UR)C with the
117A morphism of JLB-algebras is a continuous linear map  : UR  ! BR respecting both the Jordan
and Lie structures: for all A;B 2 UR, (A•B) = (A)•(B) and (A ? B) = (A) ? (B) (cf ibid.,
Definition I.1.1.3., p. 38). On the other hand, a morphism of C-algebras is a linear map  : U  ! B
respecting both the associative product and the involution: for all A;B 2 U , (A B) = (A)  (B)
and (A) = (A) (cf ibid., Definition I.1.1.7., p. 40).
Note that, for C-algebras, one does not need to require the morphisms to be continuous, as this
is automatically satisfied (cf. J. Dixmier. Les C-algèbres et leurs représentations. 2nd ed. Paris:
Gauthiers-Villars, 1969, p. 7).
118The main content of the theorem can be found in Landsman, op. cit., Theorem I.1.1.9., p. 40, but
the result is not stated in terms of categories. The proof of the equivalence of categories is sketched
in Nlab: http://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/Jordan-Lie-Banach+algebra.
119Ibid., p. 38.
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operations
A B := A•B   iA ? B and (A+ iB) := A  iB
and with the norm kCk2 = kC Ck, for any C 2 (UR)C. Then,
 
(UR)C; ; ; k k

is a C-algebra120.
Thus, the movement from complex algebras to real algebras is performed by restricting
to the real subset and splitting the product  into its real and imaginary parts. The
converse movement is achieved by extending the real algebra and unifying the two
algebraic structures into one single product. These two constructions are compatible




R ' UR and (UR)C ' U . Thus, any JLB-algebra may be seen
as the real part of a C-algebra121.
Moreover, Theorem II.1 shows that associativity at the level of JLB-algebras is
equivalent to commutativity at the level of C-algebras. In the presence of this equiva-
lence, one could be tempted to see the confirmation of the validity, in the context of C-
algebras, of the commutativity/non-commutativity picture of the Classical/Quantum
couple. Classical properties are described by associative Jordan-Lie algebras (i.e. by
Poisson algebras); quantum properties are described by non-associative Jordan-Lie al-
gebras. Thus—it would seem—by the above theorem, this is equivalent to equations
II.22a and II.22b (page 200).
Yet, one must be careful to distinguish Jordan-Lie algebras from Jordan-Lie-
Banach algebras. For the introduction of a norm is not an innocent move. Theorem
II.1 reduces the question of the relation between C-algebras and Jordan-Lie algebras
to the investigation of which Jordan-Lie algebras can be turned into JLB-algebras.
120Here, the associative product is first defined for elements of UR and then extended by C-linearity
to any element of U . One may alternatively define it by the quite obscure formula
(A+ iB)  (C + iD) := (A•C +B ? C +A ? D  B•D) + i(B•C +A•D +B ? D  A ? C)
whose only merit is to define the product  directly on the whole complex algebra. See for example
http://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/Jordan-Lie-Banach+algebra.
121En passant, this finally explains the notation we have adopted from the beginning for abstract
Jordan-Lie algebras.
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Theorem II.2 partially answers this later question. It states that a JLB-algebra is as-
sociative if and only if its Lie structure vanishes. In other words, non-trivial Poisson
algebras (e.g. the algebra of smooth functions over a symplectic manifold) cannot in
general be normed and therefore do not fall under the theory of JLB-algebras. By the
same token, it appears that the theory of C-algebras is unable to capture precisely
those algebraic structures which describe classical properties! Quite to the opposite
of what could have been initially thought, the combination of the above two theorems
definitively invalidates the idea that quantization is the transition from commutativity
to non-commutativity. For to equate classical systems with commutative C-algebras
would amount to boldly ignoring the symplectic structure of Classical Kinematics...
Despite the failure of C-algebras to encompass all of Classical and Quantum
Kinematics, there is no doubt of the fruitfulness of this algebraic approach to Quan-
tum Mechanics. While the machinery of C-algebras may be unable to perceive the
Poisson structure of Classical Kinematics, it nonetheless may be used to have new
insights on the meaning of the algebraic Jordan structure, as will be seen in the next
section. Moreover, this algebraic approach has already provided another interesting
characterization of the distinction between classical and quantum properties. Before,
the world of Jordan-Lie algebras was sharply divided into two groups, depending on
the value of  in the associator rule (F•G)•H F•(G•H) = (F ?H)?G122. Either
 = 0 and you were in the Classical arena dealing with Poisson algebras; or  = 1
and you were in the Quantum arena dealing with non-associative Jordan-Lie algebras.
But the conceptual meaning of this change, from associativity to non-associativity, was
not transparent. Now, with the introduction of *-algebras, we see that non-associative
Jordan-Lie algebras precisely correspond to those Jordan-Lie algebras arising as the
real part of complex *-algebras. Thus, instead of using the associator rule as a means
to classify Jordan-Lie algebras, we use the relation with the category Star of *-algebras.
Either the Jordan-Lie algebra stems from a *-algebra, in which case you are dealing
with an algebra of quantum properties; or the Jordan-Lie algebra cannot be com-
plexified into a *-algebra, in which case you are dealing with an algebra of classical
122Cf Definition II.3 (page 159) and the paragraph following it.
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properties123.
This new characterization of the distinction between quantum and classical prop-
erties serves well our purpose of understanding the two-fold role of physical properties
in Mechanics. For it shows that, in the quantum arena, when passing from real num-
bers to complex numbers, the Jordan and Lie structures appear as two faces of one
single structure. This unification of the two algebraic structures is impossible in the
classical case and thus characterizes the Quantum.
Quantum unification of Jordan and Lie. The Jordan and Lie structures defined
on the set of quantum properties may always be seen as originating from one single
structure: they are the real and imaginary part of the associative product of a
C-algebra.
Since the Jordan and Lie structures respectively govern the numerical and transfor-
mational roles of physical properties, this is the algebraic reformulation of the quantum
interplay of quantities and transformations (cf. page 184).
The relation between the different types of algebras used to describe classical and
quantum properties is summarized in Figure II.4 below.
II.3.2 States and representations of algebras
Recall: in the algebraic formulation of Kinematics, the starting point of the math-
ematical description of a physical system should be an abstract algebra, which is in-
tended to describe the properties of the system. The point of the last section was to
clarify the precise algebras that must be considered for this purpose in both kinemat-
ical arenas: in the classical case, one should start from a real Poisson algebra; in the
123One may wonder what is found by complexifying the real algebra of classical properties. Given a
Poisson algebra (UR; ; f; g), one can analogously consider its complexification (UR)C and define the
operations: A  B := A  B   ifA;Bg and (A + iB) := A   iB, where A;B 2 UR. The problem is
that the product  is no longer associative:  (UR)C; ; ) is a non-associative complex algebra with
involution. This is a mathematical structure of a much less studied type than *-algebras. Moreover, if
one considers a non-associative algebra with involution (U ; ; ), its real part will in general fail to be
a Poisson algebra. Thus, the equivalence between the complex and real points of view on the algebra
of physical properties is lost in the classical arena.





















































Fig. II.4 – The grand algebraic analogy. Jordan-Lie algebras are the only type of algebras
able to cover both classical and quantum kinematics. These are real algebras equipped with two
products. By complexification, the quantum side may be equivalently be stated in terms of C-
algebras. In this movement, the two products are unified into one single associative product. This
product is commutative if and only if the Lie structure trivially vanishes. Thus, commutative C-
algebras correspond to no physical system whatsoever and quantum systems are described by non-
commutative C-algebras or, equivalently, by non-associative Jordan-Lie-Banach algebras.
quantum case, one has the choice between real JLB-algebras and complex C-algebras.
From these, the goal is now to define states and investigate the structure of the space
of states. In the following subsections, I present and comment the main definitions and
results of the algebraic formulation of Quantum Kinematics. Then, we will turn to the
Classical arena.
The fundamental relation that allows to define the notion of “state” from that of
“property” is the numerical pairing between the two: from a property f and a state
, one should be able to produce a number hf; i. In the geometric approach, the
primitive concept was that of state and the property f was defined by the collection
of these numbers for all different states. In other words, properties were defined as
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functions over the space of states and the numerical pairing was rather denoted as f()
(read: ‘f of ’). In the algebraic approach, this is simply turned around: the property
is the primitive concept and states are defined by the collection of the pairings hf; i
for all different properties. Accordingly, the numerical pairing will now be denoted by
(f) (read: ‘ of f ’).
Definition II.7. Given an abstract unital124 C-algebra U , a state  is a normalized
positive linear functional over U125. This means:
i) it is a linear map  : U  ! C,
ii) for all A 2 U+R , (A) > 0, where U+R := fBB
B 2 Ug (positivity),
iii) (I) = 1 (normalization).
The definition may equivalently be stated in terms of JLB algebras126. The set of
states is denoted by S(U).
One can immediately remark that, so defined, the space of states is not a linear
space—fact we had already insisted upon in the geometric formulation. Indeed, as
linear functionals, one can consider complex linear combinations of the two given states
 and . But, because of the positivity and normalization conditions, the resulting
functional a + b will in general fail to be a state, unless a; b 2 R+ and a + b = 1.
Whenever these two conditions are met, then the combination a+b of the two states
is again a state. In other words, the space of states fails to be a complex linear space
but is, instead, a convex set. This important fact motivates the following definition:
Definition II.8. A pure state is a state lying on the boundary of S(U)—that is, it
is a state that cannot be written as a weighted sum of two different states. The space
of pure states is denoted by P(U). By definition, we have P(U) = @S(U). A state that
is not pure is called a mixed state.
124The unit I of a C-algebra, if it exists, is the neutral element of the associative product: for all
A 2 U ; A  I = I  A = A. Any non-unital C-algebra can be turned into a unital C-algebra in a
canonical fashion (in categorical terms, this means that the forgetful functor from the category CStar 1
of unital C-algebras to the category CStar has a (left) adjoint). The same holds for JLB-algebras,
where the unit is the neutral element of the Jordan product. Thus the restriction to unital algebras
is of no consequence and will be often tacitly assumed. (Cf. ibid., Proposition I.2.1., p. 41.)
125Alfsen and Shultz, op. cit., p. 50.
126In which case one regards a state as a linear map  : UR  ! R and U+R := fA2
A 2 URg.
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As usual, it is insightful to consider the two main examples of C-algebras. First,
if one takes U = B0(H) (the non-commutative C-algebra of compact operators), then
S(U) is the set of all density matrices and the pure state space is P(U) = PH127: given
an element [ ] 2 PH, the corresponding state  is defined by
for all A 2 B0(H);  (A) := h ;A ih ;  i
which obviously does not depend on the choice of the representative  2 H of [ ] 2 PH.
Second, if one takes U = C0(X;C) (the commutative C-algebra of compact functions),
then S(U) is the set of all probability measures on X, and the pure state space is
P(U) ' X128. Thus, the algebraic definition of pure states exactly corresponds to the
usual “states” we have been handling in this chapter, whereas mixed states correspond
to the notion of state of classical or quantum statistical physics.
Another crucial notion in this algebraic formulation of Kinematics is that of a
representation.
Definition II.9. A representation of a C-algebra U (on a Hilbert space H) is a
morphism of C-algebras  : U  ! B(H). Analogously, a representation of a JLB-
algebra UR is a morphism of JLB-algebras  : UR  ! BR(H).
Of course, a representation of a C-algebra induces a representation of the associ-
ated JLB-algebra of self-adjoint elements. A representation is non-degenerate if 0 is
the only vector belonging to the kernel of all the representatives:
(for all A 2 U ; (A) = 0) =)  = 0:
A representation on H is cyclic if there exists a vector  2 H such that (U) is
dense in H129. In other words,  is a cyclic vector for the representation  if the
smallest closed subspace containing  which is invariant under all (U) is the whole
Hilbert space H. A closely related notion is that of an irreducible representation:
127Landsman, op. cit., Corollary I.1.1.6., p. 57 and Proposition I.2.1.2., p. 61.
128Ibid., p. 55 and Proposition I.2.1.4., p. 61.
129A subspace K is said to be dense in H if, for every  2 H, there exists a sequence of elements of
K which converges to  in the norm of H.
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this is a representation  for which there are no closed subspaces of H invariant under
all (U) (other than the trivial ones: the whole space H and the 0 vector). Hence,
a representation is irreducible if—and, in fact, only if—any non-zero vector in H is
cyclic130. Finally, two representations 1 and 2 are equivalent (denoted 1  2)






















From the abstract point of view that is ours, two equivalent representations are con-
sidered to be equal131.
In fact, the notions of “states” and “representations of the algebra of properties”
are closely related. Indeed, we have the two following ‘movements’:
 Representations allow to define states. Given a C-algebra U and a representation
 of it on a Hilbert space H, any non-zero vector in H allows to define a state
 by
for all A 2 U ;  (A) := h ; (A) ih ;  i :
States of U arising in this way are called vector states. For non-degenerate
representations, it is clear that two vector states are equal if and only if the
vectors defining them are collinear.
♡ States allow to define representations. The fact that the information contained
in a representation of a C-algebra is enough to build some states should not
surprise. Much less evident is the converse statement. This is known as the GNS
construction (Gelfand-Naimark-Segal) and is certainly a fundamental result in
130Ibid., Proposition I.2.2.2, p. 63). For representations of JLB-algebras, it is this last property
which defines the notion of irreducibility (N. P. Landsman. “Classical and Quantum Representation
Theory”. In: arXiv preprint (1994). url: http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9411172, Definition 6, p.
23).
131In other words, in the category Rep(U) of all representations of the algebra U , equivalence is the
pertinent notion of isomorphism.
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the theory of C-algebras. Given a state , there exists a triple (H; ;  ) such
that  : U ! B(H) is a cyclic representation of U and   is a normalized cyclic
vector such that, for all A 2 U , (A) = h ; (A) i132.
Through the GNS construction, the algebraic problem of studying representations
and the geometric problem of studying states become entangled. Much of the strength
and conceptual importance of the GNS construction comes from the unveiling of this
entaglement. This can be very well perceived by investigating the back-and-forth be-
tween states and representations established by the two complementary movements 
and ♡:
1. First, does any state arise from some representation of the algebra of properties
U through ? Answer: Yes. This is clear from the GNS construction, since for
any  2 S(U) we have (A) = h ; (A) i for all A 2 U . In other words, all
states are vector states.
2. Conversely, does any representation arise from a state through ♡? Answer: No,
since GNS representations are necessarily cyclic whereas a general representation
of U need not be so. However, any non-degenerate representation is a direct
sum of cyclic representations133. Therefore, the problem of classifying all non-
degenerate representations may be reduced to the problem of classifying all cyclic
representations: they constitute, so to speak, the basic building blocks. The
132Roughly, the construction is as follows. First, one considers the set N := fA 2 U
(AA) =
0g = fB 2 U+R
(B) = 0g. This may be thought as the subset of positive properties which are
invisible to the state , in the sense that, for any physical property C and any “invisible” property
B, the two numbers (C + B) and (C) are equal. Thus, from the point of view of the state  it
makes better sense to consider physical properties only “up to invisible properties”. This is done by
defining the quotient U/N. The Hilbert space is then the closure of this quotient H := U/N. The
representation is defined simply by projecting left multiplication to the quotient: for A;B 2 U , we
have (A)[p(B)] := p(A  B), where p : U  N is the projection. Finally, the cyclic vector   is
defined as the projection of the unit of the C-algebra :   := p(I). For a detailed description of
the GNS construction, see Alfsen and Shultz, op. cit., pp. 51–53. The original construction (which
is casted in terms of normed *-rings and does not mention yet the notion of “state”) is found in
I. Gelfand and M. Naimark. “On the Imbedding of Normed Rings Into the Ring of Operators in
Hilbert Space”. In: Matematicheskii Sbornik 12 (1943), pp. 197–213, pp. 204-ff. The construction as
it is now known, in terms of C-algebras and states, was first described in I. E. Segal. “Irreducible
Representations of Operator Algebras”. In: Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 61 (1947),
pp. 69–105, pp. 77–78.
133Landsman, Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics, Proposition I.1.5.2,
p. 53.
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appropriate question is thus:
2bis. Does any cyclic representation arise from a state through ♡? Answer: Yes.
Given a cyclic representation (U) on H and a cyclic vector  2 H, the GNS-
representation associated to the vector state  is equivalent to (U)134.
In the light of this, the algebraic classification problem can be solved by studying
the geometry of the space of states. More precisely, if one denotes by Cycl (U) the set
of all equivalence classes of cyclic representations (the description of which is the main
goal of the algebraic problem just mentioned), and one defines on the space of states
the equivalence relation
(  )() ( is equivalent to )
then, by the points 1 and 2bis above, we have
Cycl (U) ' S(U)/  : (II.23)
The problem is now to understand which states are equivalent. In particular,
one may wonder what happens if one applies twice the GNS construction. Consider
the following sequence (cf. diagram below): i) start with a state ; ii) construct the
associated GNS representation (H; ;  ); iii) consider a vector  6=   2 H and
the associated vector state  ; iv) apply again the GNS construction to define the
representation (H ;  ;   ).
States   






As we have already commented, in general the states  and  will differ: only by
choosing  collinear to  , will the two states be equal. Moreover, it is clear that if
 2 H is not itself a cyclic vector for , the representations  and  cannot be
134Ibid., Proposition I.1.5.5, p. 54.
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equivalent135. But one may still hope for the two states to be equivalent whenever  
is a cyclic vector for . This would be a nice feature, furnishing some kind of stability
of the GNS construction: given a representation and a vector, one would like the GNS
construction to produce the same initial representation. And this is indeed the case136:
   () ( is cyclic for ):
Of particular interest are then those representations for which any vector of the
carrier Hilbert space is cyclic. These are the only representations not containing the
seeds of any other representation. They are completely stable in the sense that, from
any such representation , the GNS construction will inevitably lead back to the start-
ing point. Symbolically, this may be written as
 stable () ♡  ()  :
It turns out this stability property characterizes both irreducible representations and







This triangle allows one to understand much of the geometry of the pure state
space. First, it provides a connection between geometry and algebra analogous to
Equation II.23, but at the level of pure states this time:
bU := Irrep(U) ' P(U)/  : (II.24)
135Indeed, there are two ways to perceive  : as a vector state defined by  or, after the second
GNS construction, as a vector state defined by   . In other words, supposing both vectors to be unit
vectors, we have, for all A 2 U , h ; (A) i = h  ;  (A)  i. If  and  are equivalent, since
  is cyclic, then  must also be.
136Ibid., Proposition I.1.5.5., p. 54.
137Ibid., Proposition I.2.2.2, p. 63 and Theorem I.2.2.3, p. 64.
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The equivalence classes of pure states are labelled by irreducible representations of
the algebra of properties. Moreover, an irreducible representation  : U  ! B(H)
allows to define many different equivalent states. In fact, given a state , any other
state equivalent to it will arise as a vector state of the Hilbert space H constructed by
the GNS construction. Thus, there is a bijection between the set of states equivalent
to  and PH. This yields the following result138:
Theorem II.3. Given an abstract C-algebra U , its space of pure states is described





Through this theorem, the algebraic formulation of Quantum Kinematics succeeds
in making contact with the geometrical approach. It shows the extent to which the
use of C-algebras as starting point in the definition of physical systems is a gener-
alization of the previous two formulations. For only when bU = fg will one recover
the description of the quantum space of states as a projective Hilbert space (or as a
Hermitian symmetric space). In particular, it is so when U = B(H) (the unique irre-
ducible representation being then the defining one) or when U is the Weyl C-algebra
AW (the uniqueness of the irreducible representation being proven by the Stone-von
Neumann theorem)139. As Landsman points out, these are the most common exam-
ples of non-relativistic quantum systems and, because of this, one may have the im-
pression that the C-algebraic formalism truly constitutes a generalization only when
considering infinite-dimensional systems—that is, quantum fields. But, as we will see
in the next chapter, this is far from true, as there are many important examples of
C-algebras admitting inequivalent irreducible representations which are pertinent in
the non-relativistic context140.
138Ibid., Theorem I.2.5.4, pp. 72–73.
139The precise definition of the Weyl C-algebra may be found in Strocchi, op. cit., pp. 60–61. More
generally, whenever U is a simple C-algebra (in the sense it admits no non-trivial ideals), the dual
space bU will be reduced to one single point.
140See N. P. Landsman. “Quantization and Superselection Sectors I. Transformation Group C-
algebras”. In: Rev. Math. Phys 2 (1990), pp. 45–72.
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It is therefore important to truly consider the quantum space of pure states in its
wholeness, instead of considering separately each “leaf” PH as had been done so far.
This means to rethink in this slightly more general setting the results of the geometric
approach (section II.2). In particular, we must investigate whether it is still possible
to reconstruct the algebra of properties from the space of states.
II.3.3 Reconstructing the algebra of properties from the pure
state space
At the risk of becoming repetitive, let me recall once again the conceptual issues
at stake in this task of studying the oscillations between states and properties. There
is first the obvious question of the logical relation between these two fundamental
notions of Kinematics: are properties/observables logically prior to states? By defini-
tion of what operationalism is, any such approach to Physics seems forced to answer
positively to this question: the entire description of a physical system must be based
upon experimental facts—and hence the notion of ‘state’ must be constructed from the
measurable quantities (cf. page 195). Now, the algebraic formulation has succeeded in
showing that the algebraic structure of properties can indeed be the starting point of
the descriptions of quantum systems. This is certainly an encouraging result for oper-
ationalism. But, needless to say, there is a big step between possibility and necessity,
between what can be and what must be. The success of the algebraic approach only
shows operationalism is a technically viable philosophical position. If one is seeking
for mathematical reasons of preferring it over other philosophical perspectives, then
one should attempt to prove that “states” cannot be perceived as the primitive notion.
This means attempting to prove that one cannot reconstruct the C-algebra of proper-
ties from the geometry of the space of pure states. If this reconstruction turns out to
be possible in the general case—as it was for UR = BR(H)—then it would appear that
the mathematical formalism of Mechanics is neutral regarding the logical hierarchy
between states and properties.
Second, there is the question of articulating the numerical and transformational
roles of properties. A recurrent point in the analysis of the different formalisms in
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which to cast the kinematical arenas has been the quantum compatibility between
both roles. This was first hinted at in the standard Hilbert space formalism (page 164)
and progressively became more precise with the geometric formulation (page 184) and
the C-algebras (page 205). Thus, it remains to see how—if at all—this important
trait manifests itself at the level of the quantum space of pure states.
As I have already mentioned, in the setting of C-algebras, the cornerstone result
around which one must reflect in order to understand the precise interplay between the
algebraic and geometric aspects is the following:
Theorem II.4 (Commutative Gelfand-Naimark). For any commutative C-algebra U ,
there is a canonical isomorphism between U and C0(P(U);C), given by the Gelfand
transform:
b : U  ! C0(P(U);C)
A 7 ! bA where bA() := (A):
The space of pure states P(U) is a locally compact Hausdorff space. Moreover, it is
compact if and only if U is unital141.
Thus, commutative C-algebras may effectively be reconstructed from states. This
is a very well-known and much commented result from 1943142. Now, even better, the
equivalence between the algebraic and spatial points of view can be stated in the most
precise mathematical manner if one restricts attention to unital C-algebras and uses
the language of category theory:
Theorem II.5. The categories cCStar 1 of unital commutative C-algebras and Cpt
of compact Hausdorff spaces are dual to each other. That is, cCStar 1 and Cpt op are
equivalent.143
141Idem, Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics, Definition I.2.1.6 and
Theorem I.2.1.7, p. 62.
142Gelfand and Naimark, op. cit.
143The equivalence is given by the functors P : cCStar 1  ! Cptop (which associates to a C-algebra
U its pure state space P(U)) and C : Cpt  ! cCStar op1 (which associates to a space X the algebra of
complex valued continuous functions C(X)). The Gelfand transform is thenb= C P and the theorem
says this functor is naturally isomorphic to the identity functor 1cCstar1 . For the equivalence stated
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This is sometimes called the Gelfand duality (or Gelfand-Naimark duality)144. It
is a very suggestive theorem since it shows that many properties of compact spaces
(in fact, any construction or theorem expressed in the language of categories) can
be immediately reformulated in terms of unital commutative C-algebras (and vice-
versa)145 . This is certainly one of the main reasons of the mathematical interest for
this type of algebras and it explains why the general study of C-algebras is often
called “non-commutative topology”. Moreover, this theorem is oftentimes regarded as
the result that truly launched the whole algebraic approach146.
Notwithstanding this, our primary interest lies, of course, in non-commutative
C-algebras (recall Figure II.4, page 206) and we must thus study the possibility of
reconstructing the algebra also in this case. Here, it is important to stress the existence
of many different spaces from which one could expect this reconstruction to be possible.
in terms of these two functors, see for example J. M. Gracia-Bondı́a, J. C. Várilly, and H. Figueroa.
Elements of Noncommutative Geometry. Boston: Birkhäuser, 2011, pp. 9-10.
144As a side remark—and for completeness—let us note that this duality does not hold if one considers
non-unital commutative C-algebras (or locally compact Hausdorff spaces): the category cCstar is
not equivalent to LocCptop. Indeed, the commutative Gelfand-Naimark theorem asserts that the
functor C0 : LocCpt  ! cCStar op (which associates to a space X the algebra of complex valued
continuous functions C(X) vanishing at infinity) is essentially surjective. However, this functor fails
to be full. Despite this, the procedure of unitalization of a commutative C-algebra (which may be
seen as a functor ()+ : cCStar  ! cCStar 1) does admit an analogue on the topological side: it is
the Alexandroff one-point compactification of locally compact Hausdorff spaces (which may be seen
as a functor ()+ : LocCpt  ! Cpt). If one denotes by X+ the resulting compactified space, one has
C0(X)
+ ' C(X+). For details, see I. Dell’Ambrosio. “Categories of C-algebras”. Lecture Notes.
url: http://math.univ-lille1.fr/~dellambr/exercise_C_algebras.pdf.
145For a nice dictionary between topological concepts and their algebraic translation, see N. E.
Wegge-Olsen. K-theory and C-algebras: a Friendly Approach. New York: Oxford University Press,
1993, p. 24.
146Here is Strocchi commenting on it: “From the point of view of general philosophy, the picture
emerging from the Gelfand theory of abelian C-algebras has far reaching consequences and it leads
to a rather drastic change of perspective. In the standard description of a physical system the geom-
etry comes first: one first specifies the coordinate space, (more generally a manifold or a Hausdorff
topological space), which yields the geometrical description of the system, and then one considers the
abelian algebra of continuous functions on that space. By the Gelfand theory the relation can be
completely reversed: one may start from the abstract C-algebra, which in the physical applications
may be the abstract characterization of the observables, in the sense it encodes the relations between
the physical quantities of the system, and then one reconstructs the Hausdorff space such that the
given C-algebra can be seen as the C-algebra of continuous functions on it. In this perspective, one
may say that the algebra comes first, the geometry comes later. The total equivalence between the
two points of view indicates a purely algebraic approach to geometry [...].” (Strocchi, op. cit., p. 15,
author’s emphasis.)
Chapter II. Classical and Quantum Kinematical Arenas 217
Indeed, given a C-algebra U , one can consider147:
– the space of pure states P(U),
– the space bU of equivalence classes of irreducible representations,
– the space 
(U) = HomCStar (U ;C) of all non-zero C-morphisms from U to C,
– the space M(U) of maximal ideals of U ,
– the space Prim(U) of primitive ideals of U148.
These are all a priori different yet related spaces. For example, elements of 
(U) are
particular instances of elements of bU (they are one-dimensional irreducible representa-
tions), and are also particular elements of P(U) (they are pure states which are also
multiplicative). Thus, we have bU  - 
(U) ,! P(U) but it is clear that, in the general
case, these injections are not bijections.
However, it just so happens that in the commutative case this plethora of different
spaces is invisible, for all these notions of space coincide:
if U 2 ob(cCstar ); then P(U) ' bU ' 
(U) 'M(U) ' Prim(U)149:
The space is then called the (Gelfand) spectrum of the commutative C-algebra and
is denoted Spec(U)150. The points of the spectrum are sometimes called the characters
147Here, I just give the definition of these spaces as sets. The complete definition should also mention
the particular topology defined on each of these sets, but to do so would imply an excessively technical
digression for the purpose at hand.
148An ideal is said to be primitive if it is the kernel of an irreducible representation of U . See for
example Alfsen and Shultz, op. cit., Definition 5.20., p. 208.
149The bijection between bU and 
(U) is proven by Schur’s lemma (Landsman, op. cit., Proposition
I.2.2.2., p. 63). Since all irreducible representations are one dimensional, then for  2 bU , PH is
reduced to a point and it becomes clear from Theorem II.3 (page 213) that P(U) ' bU . Finally, the
proof of the bijection between 
(U) and M(U) is found in M. Takesaki. Theory of Operator Algebras
Vol. I. New York: Springer, 2003, Proposition 3.8, p. 15.
150The terminological choice is of course not innocent, as this new notion of spectrum generalizes the
usual notion of spectrum of a linear operator. Recall: for a linear operator A, its spectrum is the set
Sp(A) =

z 2 C(A   zI) is not invertible	. This definition works for any element of a unital (non-
commutative) C-algebra U . The result which establishes the link between both notions of spectrum
is the following: given A 2 U , consider the commutative C-algebra generated by A and I, denoted
C(A). Then, Spec(C(A)) ' Sp(A) (Landsman, op. cit., Theorem I.1.2.4.2.).
For a more extensive investigation on the notion of spectrum (in particular, on the link with the
physicists’ use of the word “spectrum” for light and atoms), see the interesting article (in french) P.
Cartier. “Notion de spectre”. In: Première école d’été : Histoire conceptuelle des mathématiques -
Dualité Algèbre-Géométrie. Maison des Sciences de l’Homme. Universidade de Brasilia, 2008, pp. 232–
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of U . The commutative Gelfand-Naimark theorem shows there is the same information
in the commutative algebra U or in its spectrum Spec(U).
When turning to the non-commutative case, the spatial degeneracy splits and the
question arises of which space to choose in order to extend the Gelfand duality151. In
the context of our investigations, it seems we must choose the space of pure states as
hypothetical starting point, but it is important to keep in mind that this is not the
only mathematically sound possibility152. This is the route followed by Landsman: he
presented an explicit reconstruction of the algebra of properties from the space of pure
states in his article “Poisson Spaces With a Transition Probability”153.
The steps of Landsman’s construction are best understood when compared to the
work of Schilling and Ashtekar. As already noted, most of the tasks of the geometric
program may be seen as particular instances of the general problems arising in the C-
algebraic approach. Indeed, with the Gelfand theory at hand, we can now recognize
that the key map considered by Ashtekar and Schilling, which allowed to transform self-
adjoint operators into real-valued functions over the projective space (Equation II.11,
page 175), is nothing but the Gelfand transform for the JLB-algebra UR = BR(H) (in
which case P(UR) = PH). In their case, the map was found to be injective (Equa-
tion II.14, page 175) and this fact showed there was indeed hope of reconstructing the
242. url: http://semioweb.msh-paris.fr/f2ds/docs/dualite_2008/dualite_doc_final_2008.
pdf.
151There is also the terminological question of whether one should keep using the word “spectrum”
for non-commutative C-algebras. The most common decisions seem to be either: i) to reserve the
notion of “spectrum” only for commutative C-algebras (e.g. Dixmier, Landsman, Takesaki); ii) to
define the spectrum of a general C-algebra as Spec(U) := bU equipped with the so-called Jacobson
topology (e.g., Alfsen and Shultz, p. 210 and also Fell and Doran, p. 556).
152For example, Akemann has shown how to reconstruct the C-algebra from the space of maximal
ideals (C. Akemann. “A Gelfand Representation Theory for C*-algebras”. In: Pacific Journal of
Mathematics 39.1 (1971), pp. 1–11).
153N. P. Landsman. “Poisson Spaces With a Transition Probability”. In: Review of Mathematical
Physics 9.1 (1997), pp. 29–57. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9603005. His reconstruction
may also be found in the third section (“From Pure States to Observables”) of the first chapter of his
book Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics. As he explains, many ideas
are motivated by the work of Alfsen, Hanche-Olsen and Shultz, who characterized those compact
convex sets arising as space of states of a C-algebra (E. M. Alfsen, H. Hanche-Olsen, and F. W.
Shultz. “State Spaces of C-algebras”. In: Acta Mathematica 144 (1980), pp. 267–305 and F. W.
Shultz. “Pure States as Dual Objects for C-algebras”. In: Communications in Mathematical Physics
82 (1982), pp. 497–509).
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algebra of properties as functions over the space of states. In fact, the result is more
general154:
Proposition II.6. Let UR be any JLB-algebra and denote by cUR its image through
the Gelfand transform b : UR  ! C(P(UR);R) (defined as before by bA() := (A) for
A 2 UR and  2 P(UR)). Then, as partially ordered Banach spaces, we have
UR ' cUR  C(P(UR);R):
In other words, whenever the Gelfand transform is considered as defined only on
the real algebra UR, it will always be an injection. As Landsman stresses, the theorem
fails if the Gelfand transform is extended to the whole C-algebra. From this point of
view, it is thus better to work in the category of real JLB-algebras, the extension to
their complex counterparts being useful only for commutative C-algebras.
Therefore, we know that, even in the general situation, the algebra of physical ob-
servables lies somewhere inside the set of all real-valued functions over the space of pure
states. The task remains then to characterize the JLB-algebra cUR inside C(P(UR);R).
The general solution provided by Landsman will mimic in every aspect the defini-
tion of physical properties found by Ashtekar and Schilling for the particular case of
UR = BR(H): in order to characterize cUR inside C(P(UR);R), we will need to first bring
out the structures naturally present in any pure state space. cUR will then appear to be
the subset of functions respecting those additional structures155.
Since the space of pure states P(U) can always be described as a disjoint union
of projective Hilbert spaces, the relevant mathematical structures need to be some-
how generalizations of the symplectic and Riemannian structures present in each leaf
PH156. In his article, Landsman proposes the following two structures:
154Landsman, Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics, Theorem I.2.1.7.,
p. 62.
155Let me be clear: I am not claiming that these results of Landsman’s work were influenced by the
work of Schilling. My claim is simply that, given the particular order of exposition I have chosen for
this chapter, we can conceptually relate both works and use Schilling’s to help us understand the core
of Landsman’s reconstruction.
156A disjoint union of symplectic manifolds is not necessarily a symplectic manifold: it may not even
be a manifold!
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Definition II.10. A Poisson space157 is a Hausdorff topological space P together
with a collection S of symplectic manifolds, as well as continuous injections  : S ,!





Definition II.11. A symmetric transition probability space158 is a set P equipped
with a function Pr : P  P  ! [0; 1] such that for all ;  2 P
i) Pr(; ) = 1 ()  = ,
ii) Pr(; ) = Pr(; ) (i.e. Pr is symmetric).
The function Pr is called a transition probability159.
The notion of a Poisson space coined by Landsman should not come as a surprise.
First, it is clear that pure state spaces are indeed Poisson spaces: the notion is almost
hand made in order to cover them. Moreover, it sounds reasonable to say they are a
generalization of the notion of a symplectic manifold. In fact, the definition is strongly
motivated by the important result that any Poisson manifold can be written as a
disjoint union of symplectic manifolds160.
Less transparent is the fact that the transition probability structure is the correct
generalization in the present context of the Riemannian structure found on the pro-
jective Hilbert spaces. Recall the two main functions of the Riemannian metric g on
PH: first, it allowed to define a distance dg(p; q) between two states p and q; second,
it enabled to construct the Jordan product between two properties. In turn, dg(p; q)
157Ibid., Definition I.2.6.2, p. 76. This notion was introduced for the first time by Landsman in
“Poisson Spaces With a Transition Probability”, p. 38. His definition also includes a linear subspace
UR(P)  C1L (P;R) which separates points and is closed under the Poisson bracket: ff; gg((q)) =
ff; gg(q), where q 2 S. I nonetheless find the inclusion of this subspace slightly unnatural at
this point. This subspace UR(P) will only become important when defining the key notion of a Poisson
space with transition probability (cf. Definition II.12 and footnote 164, page 222).
158Landsman, Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics, Definition I.2.7.1,
pp. 80–81.
159This concept was introduced for the first time in 1937 by von Neumann in a series of lectures
delivered at Pennsylvania State College. The manuscript was only published in 1981, after von
Neumann’s death (J. von Neumann. Continuous Geometries with a Transition Probability. Vol. 252.
American Mathematical Society, 1981).
160This is the so-called “symplectic decomposition of a Poisson manifold” (see Landsman, op. cit.,
Theorem I.2.4.7, p. 71). For the definition of a Poisson manifold, see page 151.
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was used to define the crucial transition probability function Pr(p; q) := cos2(dg(p; q)).
In the present context, however, this definition does not suffice, for it only allows to
compute the transition probabilities between equivalent states—that is, between pure
states belonging to the same leaf PH. From the point of view of Riemannian ge-
ometry, the question of the transition probability between inequivalent states appears
to be non-sensical, and it is so because the distance between two points belonging to
different leaves of the pure state space cannot be defined. Yet, there are strong indi-
cations these transition probabilities should be defined. Indeed, there is the following
alternative characterization of inequivalent pure states due to Hepp:
Two pure states  and  of a C-algebra U are inequivalent if and only if, for
each representation (U) on a Hilbert space H containing unit vectors  and '
such that  =  and ' = , one has h ; (A)'i = 0 for all A 2 U .161




2(dg(; )) if ;  2 PH
0 if   :
(II.25)
In this way, the pure state space of a C-algebra is equipped with a transition prob-
ability and becomes a symmetric transition probability space. In fact, as Landsman
explains, Mielnik has shown that the boundary @K of any compact convex set K (such
as P(U) = @S(U)) may naturally be equipped with a transition probability, and it can
be proven that Mielnik’s transition probability coincides with the one just defined162.
This shows that the function Pr is indeed an intrinsic object attached to the pure
state space. Therefore, as long as states are concerned, one could attempt to ignore
the Riemannian structure and place the transition probability structure as the central
concept. The problem of course is to know whether the Jordan product can also be
defined solely in terms of the transition probability stucture.
161K. Hepp. “Quantum Theory of Measurement and Macroscopic Observables”. In: Helvetica Physica
Acta 45 (1972), pp. 237–248, Lemma 1, p. 240 (cited in N. P. Landsman. “Between Classical and
Quantum”. In: Philosophy of Physics (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science) 2 volume set. Ed. by
J. Butterfield and J. Earman. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 2007, pp. 417–554.
url: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0506082, p. 502).
162For the details, see idem, “Poisson Spaces With a Transition Probability”, pp. 33-ff.
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Now, recall Ashtekar and Schilling’s geometric characterization of the algebra of
properties (page 177). Associated to the symplectic structure ! was the set of functions
C1(S;R)! preserving it. Similarly, to the Riemannian metric g one associated the set
C1(S;R)g. Then, the algebra of properties was simply found to be
C1(S;R)K := C1(S;R)! \ C1(S;R)g:
This idea may be immediately transposed to the general situation. One considers the
function space CProb(P ;R) intrinsically related to a transition probability space and
the function space C1Pois(P ;R) intrinsically associated to a Poisson space163. Then, for
a space that is both a Poisson space and a transition probability space, one defines:
UR(P) = C1Pois(P ;R) \ CProb(P) (II.26)
At this point, it is not clear what the structure of this algebra of functions is.
It nonetheless allows to define the key concept and state the two main theorems of
Landsman’s construction:
Definition II.12. A Poisson space with a transition probability164 is a set that
is both a transition probability space and a Poisson space and for which:
i) UR(P) separates points,
ii) UR(P) is closed under the Poisson bracket,
iii) the Hamiltonian flow defined by each element of UR(P) preserves the transition
probabilities (unitarity condition).
163These function spaces are defined as follows. C1Pois(P;R) is the set of all f 2 C(P;R) such
that their restrictions to any S is smooth: f 2 C1(S;R). (Idem, Mathematical Topics Between
Classical and Quantum Mechanics, Definition I.2.6.2.3, p. 76.)
On the other hand, the definition of CProb(P) is more involved. One considers first the functions
Pr : P ! R such that Pr() := Pr(; ), and defines C00Prob(P) as the real vector space generated
by these functions. Then CProb(P) :=
 C00Prob(P). The reason why this is the function space
intrinsically associated to a transition probability space is not clear to me. This is however explicitly
stated by Landsman on repeated occasions. (Ibid., Definition I.3.1.1, p. 84.)
164Since my notion of Poisson space differs from Landsman’s, this definition is different from the one
found in Landsman’s book (Definition I.3.1.4, p. 86). However, my notion of Poisson space with a
transition probability should coincide with Landsman’s.
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Theorem II.7. The pure state space of a C-algebra is a Poisson space with transition
probability165.
Theorem II.8. Let U be a C-algebra, UR be the JLB-algebra of self-adjoint elements




Theorem II.7 recognizes the kind of spaces under which fall the pure state spaces
of a C-algebra. Theorem II.8 is two-fold. First, it implicitly says that the algebra
UR(P) intrinsically associated to a Poisson space with a transition probability may be
endowed with a Jordan product • and a norm in such a way that UR(P) becomes
a JLB-algebra. It turns out that this Jordan product is defined solely in terms of
the transition probability, as was needed167. Moreover, the unitarity condition is a
compatibility condition recognizing the fact that the two fundamental structures of
the pure state spaces are not independent from each other. This is the analogue, at
the level of states, of the Leibniz rule—which relates, at the level of properties, the
otherwise independent Jordan and Lie structures168.
Second, in the same way that the Gelfand-Naimark theorem shows that any JLB-
algebra may be realized as a certain subalgebra of bounded self-adjoint operators on a
Hilbert space H, this theorem shows that any JLB-algebra may equally well be realized
as a certain subalgebra of real-valued functions over some topological space. Thus, the
association of non-commutativity to operators (II.20b, page 200) is by no means a nec-
essary one. More importantly, it appears that any C-algebra, be it commutative or
not, can be recovered from its space of pure states. This establishes, for the quantum
kinematical arena, the complete equivalence between the point of view of states and
165Ibid., Theorem I.3.1.5, p. 86.
166Ibid., Theorem I.3.2.1 (combined with equations (3.2) and (3.6)), pp. 85–88.
167The explicit construction is found in ibid., Section I.3.3., pp. 88–90. It uses the fact that any
element F 2 UR(P) can be uniquely written as a linear combination of functions of the type Pr
(spectral resolution). In turn, this allows to define the square of a property F 2 and subsequently the
Jordan product by the formula F•G = 14
 
(F +G)2   (F  G)2.
168Ibid., Section I.3.4., pp. 90–92. See also the definition of a Poisson algebra and the comment
following it (page 148).
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the point of view of properties. This is summarized in the following diagram169 (Fig-
ure II.5), which replaces and generalizes the one emerging from the geometric program























Fig. II.5 – The interplay between the geometry of states
and the algebra of properties in Quantum Kinematics.
II.3.4 New look into the Classical and characterization of the
Quantum
As the last three subsections show, through the C-algebraic approach we reach a
transparent understanding of the conceptual structure of Quantum Kinematics. The
main three highlights were:
1. The realization that the quantum compatibility between the numerical and trans-
formational role of properties could be characterized by the possibility of unifying
the two real algebraic structures of properties into a single complex one (subsec-
tion II.3.1).
2. The unveiling of the close relation between states of a physical system and rep-
resentations of the algebra of properties (subsection II.3.2).
169See also ibid., Table 1, p. 8.
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3. The proof of the complete equivalence between the definition of physical systems
based upon properties or based upon states, and the establishment of a precise
dictionary between the geometric and algebraic structures (subsection II.3.3).
However, since Poisson algebras escape from the theory of C-algebras, we have
focused on the discussion of Quantum Kinematics, somehow losing grasp on Classical
Kinematics and forgetting the task of comparing the two arenas. Recall the drawback
of C-algebras in regard to the Classical: the only Poisson algebras arising as the real
part of a C-algebra are those whose Poisson bracket trivially vanishes (cf. Figure II.4,
page 206). Hence, from their point of view, the Lie structure of classical properties
is invisible. This phenomenon can also be understood geometrically. If one considers






of the pure state space into a disjoint union of symplectic manifolds still holds, but be-
comes now a trivial decomposition: each projective Hilbert space is reduced to a point
and the decomposition simply says that the space of pure states is the disjoint union
of its points, considered as symplectic 0-dimensional manifolds. Thus, what remains
unexplained from the point of view of C-algebras is the fact that, beyond the sym-
plectic structure of each leaf PH, in Classical Mechanics there is also a “transversal”
symplectic structure tying together the different leaves.
Yet, C-algebras do perceive the Jordan product of Classical Mechanics and the
insights from Landsman’s construction may be used in order to adopt a new look at
the geometric origin of this structure. Recall: in the geometrical formulation of Clas-
sical Kinematics, it had appeared that the presence of a Jordan product for classical
properties—which in this case is simply point-wise multiplication—was not mirrored
by the existence of some particular structure on the classical space of states (cf. Ta-
ble II.1, page 186). This lack of a structure on the classical space of states which would
be the analogue of the Riemannian metric found on the quantum space was one of
the main drawbacks of the whole geometric approach to Kinematics (as presented in
section II.2). But we now know that the quantum Jordan product may equally be
226 Chapter II. Classical and Quantum Kinematical Arenas
thought as stemming from a transition probability. It is then natural to attempt to
see the classical Jordan product as arising from this same structure.
In the case of a commutative C-algebra, Equation II.25 (page 221) reduces to:
Pr(; ) = ; =
8><>:1 if  = 0 if  6=  (II.27)
and indeed the Jordan product defined by this transition probability coincides with
point-wise multiplication170. This is a completely trivial structure, adding no further
information to a topological space171. Because of this, it had been (rightly) disregarded
in Classical Kinematics. Nonetheless, the presence of this trivial transition probability
in the classical kinematical arena becomes interesting when compared to the Quantum.
One realizes that, although C-algebras are unable to cover both quantum and classical
systems, the type of spaces emerging from this approach—that is, Poisson spaces with
a transition probability—do encompass classical and quantum spaces of states: both
pure state spaces of non-commutative C-algebras and symplectic manifolds equipped
with the trivial transition probability (II.27) satisfy the axioms of Definition II.12
(page 222).
Therefore, it becomes natural to compare the two kinematical arenas in the com-
mon geometric language of Poisson spaces with a transition probability. As it will
turn out, this language manages to capture with unmatched clarity the conceptual
difference between Classical and Quantum Kinematics. The key lies in comparing the
way in which the two geometrical structures interact with each other. In the quantum
case, the unitarity condition imposes a very strong constraint to the Poisson structure:
given the space PH and the transition probabilities (II.25, page 221), the requirement
of unitarity uniquely determines the symplectic structure172. In turn, in the classical
170Cf. the comment following Proposition 3 in idem, “Poisson Spaces With a Transition Probability”,
p. 44.
171In the sense that any topological space may be seen as a transition probability space equipped
with the trivial transition probability.
172Idem, Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics, Theorem I.3.8.2, p. 103.
Therein, the Poisson bracket is determined up to a multiplicative constant. However, if one further im-
poses that the associator rule of the Jordan-Lie algebra be given by (f•g)•h f•(g•h) = fff; hg; gg
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case, the exact opposite happens: since the transition probabilities are trivial, any sym-
plectic structure whatsoever will automatically be unitary. Thus, although unitarity is
present in both kinematical arenas, the effect of this compatibility condition is radically
different in the two situations. Whereas in the Quantum unitarity closely ties together
the two fundamental geometric structures of the space of states, in the Classical unitar-
ity imposes no restriction and the Poisson structure remains completely independent
from the transition probability structure. Either the two geometric structures go hand
in hand, or they do not discuss with each other173.
This last point can be rendered more precise if one considers the following two
equivalence relations on the space of states:
– Equivalence defined by the Poisson structure: two states  and  are said to be
transformationally equivalent if they can be connected by a piecewise smooth
Hamiltonian curve. We denote this equivalence by  
T
 and the equivalence
classes under this relation are called the symplectic leaves of the space of states174.
– Equivalence defined by the transition probability structure: two states  and 
are said to be numerically equivalent if they belong to the same sector175. We
denote this equivalence by  
N
 and the equivalence classes under this relation
are by definition the sectors of the space of states.
These two different equivalence relations may be seen as two different notions
of connectedness of the space of states. ‘Transformational equivalence’ is connect-
edness from the point of view of properties-as-transformations: two states  and 
(instead of (f•g)•h  f•(g•h) = fff; hg; gg as Landsman does), then the determination becomes
unique.
173As Landsman points out, this feature of the Quantum could have been already noticed in sec-
tion II.2. Indeed, given the natural symplectic form on PH, the Riemannian metric g is completely
fixed (up to a constant) by the demand that it be invariant under the Hamiltonian flows generated
by the functions eF 2 C1(PH;R). (Idem, “Poisson Spaces With a Transition Probability”, p. 47)
174The terminological decision of calling this equivalence relation “transformational” is mine. For
the rest, cf. idem, Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics, definition I.2.4.3.,
p. 70.
175Given a transition probability space (P;Pr), two subsets S1 and S2 are said to be orthogonal if,
for any  2 S1 and any  2 S2, Pr(; ) = 0. A subset S  P is said to be a component if S and P nS
are orthogonal. Finally, a sector is a component which does not have any non-trivial components (cf.
ibid., Definition I.2.7.2., p. 80).
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are transformationally inequivalent ( 
T
) if and only if it is impossible to con-
nect them by a physical transformation—that is, if and only if it is impossible to
find gf 2 Aut(P) generated by a physical property f such that gf () = . In other
words, a symplectic leave is by definition a transformationally connected component
of the space of states. In the same way, ‘numerical equivalence’ is connectedness from
the point of view of transitions: two states are numerically inequivalent ( 
N
) if
and only if it is impossible to find a collection of intermediate states 1; : : : ; n such
that the chain of transitions or ‘transitional path’  ! 1 ! : : : ! n !  has a
non-vanishing probability—that is, if and only if for any choice 1; : : : ; n 2 P , one
has Pr(; 1)Pr(1; 2) : : :Pr(n 1; n)Pr(n; ) = 0. Thus, a sector is a transitionally
connected component of the space of states.
Therefore, each of the two geometric structures of the space of states produces a
certain ‘image’ of this space. In Classical Kinematics, where one considers as space of
states Pcl a symplectic manifold with transition probabilities Pr(; ) = ;, the two
images are at odds from each other: from the point of view of the Poisson structure,
the space of states is completely connected (any two states are transformationally
equivalent), whereas from the point of view of the transition probability structure
the space of states is completely disconnected (no two different states are numerically
equivalent). In other words, we have
 = (Pcl/ 
T
) 6= (Pcl/ 
N
) = Pcl:
On the other hand, in Quantum Kinematics the hand-in-hand of the two geometric
structures is captured in the fact the two images coincide. That is, we have the following
result176:
Quantum compatibility of Poisson and transition probability structures.
On the quantum space of states Pqu, the notions of transformational equivalence
and numerical equivalence coincide:  
T
 ()  
N
. In other words,
(Pqu/ 
T
) = (Pqu/ 
N
)
176That this holds for the pure state space of any C-algebra should be clear from Theorem II.3
(page 213).
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In the light of the whole analysis we have undertaken in this chapter, the existence
of such a quantum compatibility condition should not come as a surprise. After all, this
statement, expressed in the intrinsic language of the space of states as Poisson space
with a transition probability, is the analogue of the quantum unification of the Jordan
and Lie structure (page 205), or of the quantum interplay between the numerical and
transformational roles of properties (page 184).
The surprising fact, that was perhaps difficult to foresee in the previous formula-
tions, is that this compatibility between properties-as-transformations and properties-
as-quantities constitutes precisely the core of the difference between Classical Mechan-
ics and Quantum Mechanics. Indeed, given a Poisson space with a transition proba-
bility P , Landsman has provided the following axiomatic characterization of when a
space is a quantum space of states177:
Theorem II.9 (Characterization of the quantum space of states). A uniform Poisson
space with a transition probability P is the pure state space of a finite-dimensional
C-algebra if:
QM 1) The sectors and the symplectic leaves of P coincide,
QM 2) P has the two-sphere property.178
Axiom QM 2) encodes the quantum superposition principle (cf. subsection II.2.3,
page 192); axiom QM 1) encodes the quantum compatibility between properties-as-
quantities and properties-as-transformations. These two may be seen as the real fun-
damental differences between the Classical and the Quantum. The former has been
stressed since the birth of Quantum Mechanics (cf. Dirac’s quote on page 166). The
latter seems to have been the blind spot on the conceptual analysis of Quantum Kine-
matics.
177Ibid., Theorem I.3.9.2., p. 105 and Corollary I.3.9.3., p. 106.
178Two more technical axioms are necessary in the case of infinite-dimensional C-algebras.
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II.4 Conclusion
The key remark that launched our analysis of the Classical and the Quantum
Kinematical arenas was the realization of the two-fold role of physical properties with
respect to states. To distinguish them, I introduced the terminology of properties-as-
quantities and properties-as-transformations. From that moment on, the conceptual
discussion of Kinematics became subject to the requirement of building articulations
for three couples of fundamental concepts: Classical/Quantum, State/Property and
Quantity/Transformation179. Out of the three, the first pair is the most slippery one
and the main goal concerning it has been simply to get a hold on it: to find all-
embracing languages in which it is possible to cast both theories and formulate their
distinction. In other words, regarding the Classical/Quantum couple, we have just
been searching for perspectives from which to take a static picture with the two poles
clearly distinguished. Thus, at this stage of the investigation, we have not yet been
concerned with the possible transitions between these poles—“quantization” and, in
the opposite direction, “classicalisation” (as Brody and Hughston propose to name
it180). On the contrary, regarding the other two couples, the point of interest has
lied in their dynamics. For the State/Property couple, it has been the movement of
oscillation—Is it possible to freely transit from states to properties, and from proper-
ties to states, or is there some kind of priority of one pole over the other?—and, as we
179Here, the word “articulation” is meant in the precise sense found in the work of the French
philosopher Gilles Châtelet. He says:
Articulation does not claim to reconcile two contrasts A and  A; it gets round
their confrontation. [...T]o articulate is always to allow oneself a new envelopment, to
discover a material that is more ductile than that of the sides. An articulation does not
link together two contents or two separate segments which preexisted it; it grasps the
very emergence of these sides from an indifference point.
In its fork, the articulation carries the product and productivity. It always partic-
ipates in the liberation of a dimension. [...] It is indeed the articulation that makes it
possible to situate oneself beyond all opposition, and therefore to overcome all opposi-
tion. For it is a matter neither of saving the old dualisms (subject/object, form/content,
etc) nor of letting one self be submerged in the confusion of some ‘primordial soup’. A
suitable articulation no doubt allows a positive integration of all the forces imprisoned
by contrasts, but it is always accompanied by the birth of a singularity.
(G. Châtelet. Figuring Space: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics. Trans. by R. Shore
and M. Zagha. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Science & Business Media, 2000,
p. 94)
180Brody and Hughston, op. cit., p. 2.
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have seen, this question is intimately linked with the articulation of the couple Geome-
try/Algebra in Mathematics. For the Quantity/Transformation, the question has been
to understand the precise interplay between these two fundamental roles of physical
properties. Therefore, from the State/Property and Quantity/Transformation couples
sprang several questions tending to order the conceptual analysis of the Classical and
Quantum kinematical arenas (see Figure II.6 below).
•	   •	  
•	  •	  
States	   Proper,es	  
Quan,ty	  
Transforma,on	  
CLASSICAL	   QUANTUM	  
•	  
•	  •	   •	   •	  
•	  •	   •	  
Fig. II.6 –The conceptual tensions of the analysis. The dynamical articulations
of the couples State/Property and Quantity/Transformation lead to a static picture
of the Classical/Quantum couple.
In the last three sections, we have performed this analysis from the perspective
of three different mathematical formulations and it seems we have finally reached a
satisfactory global picture of the situation, which helps us in clarifying the concep-
tual difference between the Classical and the Quantum. It is the following (cf. also
Figure II.7, page 234).
Common to both Kinematical arenas is the fact that the full description of physical
properties is the conjunction of properties-as-quantities and properties-as-transforma-
tions. At the algebraic level of properties, this two-fold role gets translated into the
existence of two real structures: a Jordan product which governs the numerical role,
and a Lie product which governs the transformational role. Accordingly, the language
of Jordan-Lie algebras is the common algebraic language which covers both Classical
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and Quantum Kinematics. The geometrical level of states mirrors the algebraic level in
every respect: herein, the two-fold role manifests itself by the presence of two geometric
structures—a probability structure and a Poisson structure (which respectively stem
from the Jordan and Lie product and from which the Jordan and Lie product can be
defined)—and the common geometric language is that of uniform Poisson spaces with
a transition probability. One often restricts attention to the simpler case where the
Poisson space has only one symplectic leaf. Then, the Poisson structure is equivalent to
a symplectic 2-form and the non-trivial transition probability structure of the Quantum
may be perceived as arising from a Riemannian metric (the transition probability is
the distance between two points). In this way, one recovers the geometric formulation
of Classical and Quantum Kinematics in terms of symplectic manifolds and Hermitian
symmetric spaces.
With the use of either Jordan-Lie algebras or Poisson spaces with a transition
probability, one may sharply characterize the difference between the two Kinematics.
At the algebraic level, the difference lies in the associativity/non-associativity of the
Jordan product, whereas at the geometric level it lies in the triviality/non-triviality
of the probability structure. In other words, from the restricted point of view of the
symplectic/Lie structure, the Classical and the Quantum are indistinguishable. At the
conceptual level, this means that the real difference between Classical and Quantum
lies in the numerical role of properties.
The numerical role of a property f vis-à-vis a given state  is captured by the
string of numbers
N f = ff(); f 2(); f 3(); : : :g
found by repeated use of the Jordan product. In Classical Mechanics, the Jordan




we see that the Jordan product of classical properties-as-quantities is precisely defined
in such a way that there is no more information in the data of the whole N f than in
the first term of the string. Accordingly, one may reduce the numerical role of classical
properties to the datum of the sole number f(). This is to be contrasted with the
situation in Quantum Kinematics. Therein, the non-associativity of the Jordan product
(or equivalently the non-triviality of the transition probability structure) entails that
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there is no general relation between the numbers of N f and one cannot reduce the
information contained in N f to the data of some of the numbers in the string. In
this sense, the complete description of a quantum property-as-quantity is achieved by
a complex, multi-layered structure, whereas a classical property-as-quantity is single-
layered. But the existence of multiple numerical layers in the numerical role of quantum
properties simply encodes the statistical nature of Quantum Mechanics. Therefore, the
statement that “the real difference between the Classical and the Quantum lies on the
numerical side of properties” appears as a very natural remark.
We still need to describe the articulation between the two roles of properties.
There is a first compatibility condition which holds in the two kinematical arenas.
At the geometrical level, this is captured by unitarity: the Hamiltonian flow of any
physical property preserves the transition probabilities. At the algebraic level, the
kinematical compatibility becomes the Leibniz rule: properties-as-transformations act
as derivations on properties-as-quantities. At the conceptual level, this simply means
that the transformational role of properties respects their numerical role. On top of
this, Quantum Kinematics exhibits a second compatibility condition which ensures the
complete consistency between the two roles of physical properties. Algebraically, this
is seen in the unification of the two real structures into a single complex one (which
in turn allows to reformulate Quantum Kinematics in terms of C-algebras instead of
non-associative JL-algebras); geometrically, it is expressed in the coincidence of the
natural foliations of the pure state space produced by the two geometric structures.
Conceptually, this highlights the fact that, in Quantum Kinematics, the Quantity must
describe the Transformation (e.g. the indeterminacy of the property-as-quantityf()
describes the change of the state by the property-as-transformation).
This may be turned around: given the two-fold role of properties in Kinematics,
the demand that the two roles be consistent with each other may be seen as the defining
trait of the Quantum. This Quantum compatibility condition forces the numerical
role to be multi-layered, the Jordan product to be non-associative and the transition
probability to be non-trivial.
Figure II.7 below attempts to summarize the situation we have reached.



















































































































Fig. II.7 – The structure of the kinematical arenas.
Chapter III
Constructing the Mathematical
Description of a Physical System
The preceding chapter was devoted to the study, from several perspectives, of the
fundamental mathematical structures underlying the formalisms of Classical and Quan-
tum Kinematics. But these abstract mathematical structures—symplectic manifolds,
Poisson algebras, Hilbert spaces, C-algebras, etc.—furnish only the general theoretical
tools used to describe the Kinematics of any given physical system. They constitute, so
to speak, the bare canvas supporting the paintings of Classical and Quantum systems.
Just as the artist, who first needs to carefully study the raw material he has decided
to work with, and to become familiar with the constraints and possibilities it offers, so
we had to get acquainted with these homogeneous Kinematical arenas. Accordingly,
our aim in Chapter II was to understand at this very broad level the subtle interplay
between the two major concepts of Kinematics: states and properties. Now, the time
has come to embark in the actual process of constructing the mathematical description
of a physical system. This means starting our “chase for individuation” and consider-
ing different techniques used in mathematical physics to break the homogeneity of the
Classical and Quantum Kinematical arenas in order to introduce discernibility into the
picture.
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III.1 The general strategy for introducing discerni-
bility
So far, the problem has been presented from the perspective of states: given a
connected symplectic manifold S (respectively, a projective Hilbert space PH), the
action Aut(S)  S (resp. Aut(PH)  PH) is transitive. This entails that, considered
as elements of abstract mathematical structures, the points of the state space are
qualitatively indiscernible individuals. But, if we endorse the descriptive perspective
on the mathematical description of a physical system (Chapter I, page 15), we expect
all the physical information to be encoded in the mathematical structure itself. In
particular, we expect the different states of the system to be individuated without the
need for an arbitrary coordinate frame. Therefore, the consideration of bare symplectic
manifolds or projective Hilbert spaces does not suffice, and we need to look for ways of
enriching these initial structures, thus endowing them with enough descriptive power
to individuate each point of the state space. Now—it is important to remark this—the
problem could have been equally well analyzed from the point of view of properties:
if the set of all properties of a physical system is to be described by a mathematical
structure UR, and if one expects to be able to talk about the representative f 2 UR of
the physical property f, then there must be an intrinsic structural way of individuating
f among the various elements of UR.
Of course, the problem of individuating states and the problem of individuating
properties are just two sides of the same problem. If one prefers to develop the theory
from the point of view of states, the starting point is the abstract space of states P
and the set of properties is then conceived as a particular set of functions on this
space: UR ' C1(P ;R)K. Two states x and y are qualitatively indiscernible (denoted
by x  y) if they are related by an automorphism of P , and one may use this to define
indiscernible properties by the following requirement:
f  g () 8x 2 P ;9 2 Aut(P) such that g(x) = f((x)): (III.1)
Conversely, if one prefers to develop the theory from the point of view of properties,
Chapter III. Constructing the Mathematical Description of a Physical System 237
the starting point is the abstract algebra of properties UR and states are conceived
as a particular kind of linear functionals on this algebra. In this case, two properties
f and g are qualitatively indiscernible (denoted by f  g) if they are related by an
automorphism of UR, and indiscernible states are defined by the analogue of (III.1):
x  y () 8f 2 UR;9 2 Aut(UR) such that y(f) = x((g)): (III.2)
These two approaches to discernibility coincide, in the sense that x  y , x  y
and f  g , f  g. Indeed, any automorphism of the space of states P induces an
automorphism of the algebra of properties UR, and vice-versa1.
(III.1) and (III.2) show that the ability to individuate all states is equivalent
to the ability to individuate all properties: if it is possible to individuate any state,
(III.1) becomes f  g , f = g. However, one must be careful with the fact that the
introduction of some degree of individuation within the abstract structure of properties
does not necessarily entail an introduction of some degree of individuation within the
space of states. In other words, the homogeneity of the space of states does not
imply the homogeneity of the algebra of properties. Indeed, there exist qualitatively
discernible properties even when any two states are qualitatively indiscernible (to see
this, it suffices to consider two properties f; g 2 UR whose spectra do not coincide)2.
1More precisely, on the classical side one has a canonical isomorphism between Aut(S) and
Aut(C1(S;R)): given any morphism of Poisson algebras Lalg : C1(S1;R) ! C1(S2;R), there ex-
ists a unique morphism of symplectic manifolds Lgeo : S2 ! S1 such that Lalg = Lgeo (see N. P.
Landsman. Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics. New York: Springer,
1998, corollary I.2.6.5, p. 77).
On the quantum side, one has Aut(BR(H))  Aut(PH). The difference between automorphisms
of the quantum space of states and automorphisms of the quantum algebra of properties lies in the
possibility of considering anti-unitary operators on H (which are anti-linear and hence do not belong
to the C-algebra of bounded linear operators). Put differently, Aut(PH) is canonically isomorphic
to the group of automorphisms and anti-automorphisms of BR(H). Indeed, as we will see later in
greater detail, Wigner proved that any automorphism of PH is induced by a unitary or anti-unitary
operator on H. On the other hand, Kaplansky proved in 1952 that, for von Neumann algebras which
are type I factors (as is the case of B(H)), all *-automorphisms are inner: for any  2 Aut(B(H)),
there exists a unitary operator U such that (A) = UAU, for any A 2 B(H). In other words,
Aut(B(H)) ' U(H)/U(1) (I. Kaplansky. “Algebras of Type I”. in: Annals of Mathematics 56.3
(1952), pp. 460–472, Theorem 3, p. 470).
2According to equation (III.1), two properties f and g are qualitatively indiscernible if there exists
an automorphism  of the space of states such that f is the pull-back of g by . But the pull-back
of a function has the same spectrum as the initial function. Hence, properties whose spectra do not
coincide are necessarily discernible.
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This need to go beyond the Kinematical arena studied in Chapter II in order to
describe a physical system can therefore be perceived from both the geometric and
algebraic perspectives. And indeed, one finds in the literature of both fields statements
where the problem is touched upon. A clear example of this is Brody and Hughston’s
article “Geometric Quantum Mechanics”, where the two authors write:
The specification of a physical system implies further geometrical structure on
the state space [than the data of a projective Hilbert space]. Indeed, the point
of view we suggest is that all the relevant physical details of a quantum system
can be represented by additional projective geometrical features.3
At the other side of the spectrum, there is for instance the abstract algebraic work of
Irving Segal:
The set of all self-adjoint elements of an abstract C-algebra forms then a physical
system [...].
The complete description of a physical system involves however not only the
statement of the mathematical character of the algebra of bounded observables,
but also a labelling of the observables, a kind of physical-mathematical dictionary.
This is clearly visible e.g. in the fact that in elementary quantum mechanics it is
assumed that the bounded observables consist of all bounded hermitian operators
on a countably-dimensional Hilbert space, irrespective of the number of degrees
of freedom of the system.
Now there is evidently no mathematical labelling scheme that will be appli-
cable to a perfectly general C-algebra of observables. However, the physically
relevant C-algebras all involve implicitly or explicitly a labelling scheme whose
mathematical structure is of essential importance in the theory. [...] The treat-
ment of these labelling matters involves additional elements of mathematical
structure [...].4.
3D. C. Brody and L. P. Hughston. “Geometric Quantum Mechanics”. In: Journal of geometry and
physics 38.1 (2001), pp. 19–53. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906086, p. 25, authors’
emphasis. Their insistence on representing “all the relevant physical details” can also be seen as a
perfect illustration of what I have called the ‘descriptive perspective’.
4I. E. Segal. “Mathematical Problems of Relativistic Physics”. In: Proceedings of the Summer
Conference, Boulder, Colorado. Ed. by M. Kac. American Mathematical Society, 1960, pp. 8–9, my
emphasis.
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The latter passage seems particularly enlightening to understand our goal. The
construction of the physical-mathematical dictionary, the making explicit of the “la-
belling scheme” which allows to identify the physical properties and/or states is pre-
cisely what we are after. But the important point stressed here by Segal is that the
labelling of properties/states cannot be just the subjective and ethereal move of fixing,
once and for all, a choice of names for the elements of the mathematical structures.
Rather, if the labelling is to have some definite, unambiguous meaning, then it must
inescapably be governed by some additional mathematical structures yet to be consid-
ered5.
Let me shortly comment a simple and concrete situation to illustrate the point:
the mathematical description of a non-relativistic quantum particle in one-dimensional
space. We consider two operators J and K on a Hilbert space H of which we know
only that they obey the algebraic relation
i[J;K] = I;
and which we of course intend to represent position and linear momentum. Then, the
question is: which operator should we pick to represent linear momentum and which
should we pick to represent position? Finding an answer would amount to finding a
5The idea that the meaning of a labelling scheme must be printed in the formalism itself is also
highlighted in Michael Dickson’s review of the philosophical problems arising in non-relativistic Quan-
tum Mechanics. Therein, he devotes one section to discuss “the issue of how the formalism of quantum
theory gets empirical content” and poses the following question:
[...] we have been allowing observables such as Su to ‘represent’ spin in the u-direction,
but what precisely is this relationship of ‘representation’? How may the connection
between formalism and physical fact be made, or understood? [...]
It is crucial to understand that the issue here is not about how to engineer a spin-
measuring device, for example. Rather, it is about what it means to ‘have’ spin-
up in the u-direction (for example) and how this meaning is captured in the
formalism.
[...] What, in other words, is the relationship between the elements of the mathematical
formalism that we have described and physical matters of fact? And finally, why do we
pick one map (POVM) rather than another to represent some given physical
quantity?
(M. Dickson. “Non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics”. In: Philosophy of Physics (Hand-
book of the Philosophy of Science) 2 volume set. Ed. by J. Butterfield and J. Earman.
Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 2007, pp. 275–415. url: http:
//philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3321/, pp. 327-328. The italics are from the author,
the bold type is mine.)
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labelling scheme. Now, since position Q and momentum P should verify
i[P;Q] = I
a plausible choice would be P = J (meaning: “the physical property ‘momentum’ is
represented by the operator J”) and Q = K. But, with the information at our dis-
posal, this choice is completely arbitrary: one could equally well decide at this stage
that P =  K and Q = J , or that P = J + K and Q = K, etc. This is the type of
situation to be avoided if one adheres—as Segal, Brody and Hughston seem to do in
the above quotes—to the descriptive perspective on mathematical definitions of phys-
ical systems. The existence of several different choices on the physical interpretation
of the abstract mathematical elements is felt as the indication that the description is
still incomplete: the definition of position and momentum must involve further mathe-
matical structures than the sole commutation relation, and the goal becomes to reveal
what these structures are.
All attempts to elucidate the labelling scheme at work in Classical and Quantum
Kinematics follow the same strategy: roughly, one introduces into the kinematical
arena new abstract mathematical structures which clothe the bare initial kinematical
structures, and thus partially break the homogeneity. To be more precise, we need to
first distinguish between three sorts of structures:
– First, there are what I call the fundamental kinematical structures. These are
the abstract mathematical structures that constitute the starting point in the
description of the Classical and Quantum kinematical arenas. For example, from
the algebraic perspective of properties, these could be an abstract Poisson al-
gebra for Classical Kinematics and an abstract non-commutative C-algebra for
Quantum Kinematics.
– Moreover, there are what I call internal structures. These are structures explicitly
built from—and therefore, by definition, intrinsically related to—the fundamental
kinematical structures. In the previous chapter, we encountered many of those:
given an abstract symplectic manifold (S; !), it is for instance possible to con-
struct the Poisson algebra
 C1(S;R); ; f; g, the group Aut(S), the Lie algebra
 (TS)H of Hamiltonian vector fields, etc.
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– Finally, there are what I call external! structures. Contrary to the previous
case, these are abstract structures with a priori no relation to the fundamental
kinematical structures.
Now, because of the difference in the type of relation they bear to the kinematical
arena, internal and external structures will have quite different roles in the mathemat-
ics of Kinematics. The consideration of structures of the first sort allows to gain insight
about the constitution of the kinematical arena6. The whole previous chapter can be
seen as an example of this, but a simpler example is the fact that the group of automor-
phisms captures the degree of discernibility within an abstract structure. Therefore,
the typical questions arising in this context will involve the amount of information
about the initial structure encoded in a second structure. The question may take the
form of a reconstruction problem—e.g., is it possible to recover the symplectic mani-
fold (S; !) from the Poisson algebra
 C1(S;R); ; f; g?—or, when the reconstruction
is impossible, of a loss of information problem—e.g., which information of the symplec-
tic manifold is invisible when considering its group of automorphisms? Crucial for our
purposes is the remark that internal structures are unable to break the homogeneity
of the kinematical arena, since they do not introduce any new information into the
picture. At best, they allow to capture an intrinsic trait of the fundamental structure
which could have been spotted by other means (for example, the degree of discernibil-
ity within (S; !) could have been studied using the Poisson algebra of functions and
definition (III.2, page 237), instead of using the action of the group of automorphisms).
Therefore, the addition of further elements of mathematical structure will neces-
sarily involve the consideration of external structures. Since these have a priori no
relation to the fundamental kinematical structures, the additional information will lie
precisely in the specification of a relation between an internal structure and an external
one. If we denote by K the fundamental kinematical structure (a symplectic manifold,
6This should resonate with the words of Weyl: “[...] what has indeed become a guiding principle
in modern mathematics is this lesson: Whenever you have to do with a structure-endowed entity 
try to determine its group of automorphisms, the group of those element-wise transformations which
leave all structural relations undisturbed. You can expect to gain a deep insight into the constitution
of  in this way” (H. Weyl. Symmetry. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952 (reprinted in
1989), p. 144, author’s emphasis).
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a Jordan-Lie algebra, etc.) and by E a certain external structure, the new abstract
data that we wish to use to describe a physical system will then be a triple (K; E ; )
where  establishes a relation between K and E .
At this point, it just remains to clarify this key notion of relation. This is most
naturally achieved by recasting the whole discussion in the language of category theory.
The general strategy appears then to be as follows:
i) Start with two categories Ext and Kin . An object E of Ext is an external abstract
structure, and an object K of Kin is the fundamental kinematical structure. For
example, Kin would be the category PoissMan of Poisson manifolds or the cate-
gory JL of Jordan-Lie algebras, and Ext could be Grp (the category of groups).
ii) Internal structures correspond to the images of the objects of Kin by various func-
tors F : Kin  ! D. Precisely, it would be the functoriality of the assignment
F that would convey a definite meaning to the notion of an “intrinsic construc-
tion”. In this way, the problems about the possible reconstructions or losses of
information would translate into questions about whether the functor F admits
an adjoint or, better, whether it establishes an equivalence of categories.
iii) The choice of a relation between a fundamental kinematical structure K and an
external structure E is now given by the choice of two functors F1 : Kin  ! D
and F2 : Ext  ! D and a morphism  : F2(E)  ! F1(K). Accordingly,  is
more often called a representation of E in K.7.
It thus appears that, in our chase for individuation, the central problem will be to
study the possible transits between internal and external structures. In particular, this
general representational strategy for adding new elements of mathematical structure
into the kinematical arena raises three main questions:
7Despite its elegance, this categorical account of the general strategy strategy has one major caveat.
The problem is that there are many constructions that one would clearly would like to qualify as
‘intrinsic’ but nonetheless fail to be functorial. The most compelling example is the assignment which
associates to a given structure its group of automorphisms: in general, a morphism X  ! Y in a
certain category C does not induce a morphism of groups between AutC (X) and AutC (Y ). Sufficient
conditions on the category C for the automorphism assignment to be a (contravariant) functor are
found in M. Linckelmann. “Alperin’s weight conjecture in terms of equivariant Bredon cohomology”.
In: Mathematische Zeitschrift 250.3 (2005), pp. 495–513, Proposition 2.2.
Notwithstanding this, I will keep its main idea: that the key objects are morphisms, in a certain
category D, between objects built out of an abstract external structure and objects built out of the
fundamental kinematical structure.
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a) Choice of the type of external structures. Which type of external structures are
relevant to the mathematical description of a physical system?
b) The representation problem. For a fixed type of external structures, there will
be in general many different ways of representing them in the kinematical arena:
there will be different natural candidates for the category C and different pos-
sible choices for the object C (K) within this category. How do these different
representations compare and is there a privileged choice?
c) The individuation problem. For a fixed representation of an external structure,
has the homogeneity of the kinematical arena been completely broken? In other
terms, does a given triple (K; E ; ) satisfy the requirement of individuation?
In what follows we shall consider in turn the representation and individuation
problems for one particular type of structures which have played a crucial role in the
foundations of Mechanics: groups.
III.2 Introducing discernibility through groups (1):
the representation problem
It comes as no surprise that the first type of external structures we will consider are
(Lie) groups, and their infinitesimal version Lie algebras. Their paramount importance
in the development of Classical and Quantum Mechanics is beyond doubt and a striking
evidence of this is the fact that the first book ever written on the foundations of
Quantum Mechanics was Weyl’s Quantenmechanik und Gruppentheorie of 1928. Since
then, the crucial role of groups in both Classical and Quantum Mechanics has been
underlined almost systematically. Thus, I feel there is no need to justify my choice of
studying group-theoretical techniques in Kinematics.
However, before we plunge into a detailed analysis of the formalism related to
groups, I should make a preliminary comment, for there is an important point in which
my motivation for such a study greatly differs from the traditional point of view on
the role of groups in Physics. A simple and clear account of this usual conception
of groups may be found—again—in Dickson’s excellent review of the philosophical
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problems arising in Quantum Mechanics. He writes:
There is a traditional account of one way that groups have been related to em-
pirical content. Take any group G, and consider its action on a set S. If two
elements of S are connected by an element of G, then call them “equivalent”.
One can readily verify that G thus partitions S into equivalence classes, and
we can say, then, that G is a group of symmetries on S, in the sense that the
elements of S connected by an element of G are in some important sense ‘the
same’.8
Thus, because of their relation to symmetries, groups are most often perceived
as a means to introduce a certain notion of sameness into the space of states of a
physical system. From the general lines of our discourse, it should be clear that this
is not the way external groups should be considered here. In our case, the necessity
of considering groups stems from the requirement of breaking the homogeneity of the
kinematical arena. The present situation is therefore the exact opposite of the one
described by Dickson: given the abstract data of e.g. a symplectic manifold S, all its
elements are a priori ‘the same’ and we are interested in finding “some important sense
in which they would be ‘different’”. And we are hoping groups will indeed furnish such
a sense. Thus, we are here trying to perceive groups as a means to introduce a certain
notion of difference—in other words, as a means to define labels of properties and to
introduce discernibility among states9.
Luckily, despite this important conceptual difference between the present approach
and the usual one, all group-theoretical techniques remain useful. Indeed, whether one
is interested in implementing the notion of symmetry in Mechanics (as were Weyl
and Wigner) or trying to break the homogeneity of the kinematical arena by means
of groups (as we are), the technical question it leads to remains the same: given an
abstract group G, what does it mean to introduce it or represent it in the homogeneous
arena?
There is, in mathematics, a general notion of group representation:
8Dickson, op. cit., p. 328.
9Again, it is important to insist on the fact that the groups we are here considering in order to
introduce discernibility are external groups, rather than internal (cf. page 241).
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Definition III.1. Given an abstract group G and an object C of a certain category
C , a representation of G on C is a morphism of groups L : G  ! AutC (C).10
In this sense, we see that a representation of an abstract group on C is almost the
same as the choice of a privileged subgroup among all automorphisms of the abstract
object. Here, this subgroup is simply the set L(G)  AutC (C) of representatives of
elements of G11.
Whenever it happens that both G and AutC (C) are Lie groups, a representation
of G on C allows to define also a representation on C of the infinitesimal version of the
group, the Lie algebra g. This is achieved through the functor Lie from the category
of Lie groups to the category of Lie algebras. The induced representation of g on C is
simply the morphism Lie(L) : g  ! Lie(AutC (C)). More generally, a representation
of g on C is a morphism of Lie algebras
 : g  ! Lie(AutC (C)):
Those g-representations that are of the form  = Lie(L) for some G-representation L
are called integrable.
With these notions at hand, it would thus seem that the technical manner in which
groups and Lie algebras are introduced into Kinematics is transparent. However, as
we will now see, the situation is in fact more involved.
III.2.1 In Classical Kinematics
We first specialize the above discussion to the context of Classical Kinematics.
Therein, the starting point can be taken to be either a symplectic manifold (S; !)
(geometric point of view, emphasis on states) or its Poisson algebra of real-valued
10See, for example, S. Lang. Algebra. 3rd ed. New York: Springer GTM, 2002, p. 54.
11The remark that any group may be seen as a category (with only one object and only invertible
arrows) provides a categorical reformulation of the general notion of group representation. Given an
abstract group G, a representation of it is simply any functor from G. Accordingly, one sometimes
finds that a general functor F : C ! D is called a representation of the category C in the catgeory D.
However, this functorial point of view on representations seems to me less natural when working with
representations of other algebraic structures which cannot so easily be viewed as special categories
(such as Lie algebras, Poisson algebras or C-algebras).
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functions
 C1(S;R); ; f; g (algebraic point of view, emphasis on properties). As we
saw in the last chapter, one may choose any of the two points of view, since they are
equivalent. For simplicity, we will often adopt the geometric point of view.
In this case, AutC (C) becomes Symp(S), the group of all symplectomorphisms of
the space of states S12, and the general notion of group representation yields what is
usually called a symplectic or Poisson G-action on S13—that is, a morphism of
groups
G Aut(S)14:L
The infinitesimal analogue of these group actions is immediate. A Poisson g-action on
S is a Lie algebra morphism
g  (TS)!

where  (TS)! is the Lie algebra of vector fields preserving the symplectic structure15.
12Hereafter, I will take a morphism of symplectic manifolds  : S S0 to be a morphism of
differentiable manifolds such that the pull-back  : C1(S0;R) C1(S0;R) is a morphism of
Poisson algebras. This choice is by no means undisputed: Alan Weinstein has been suggesting for
some time that the correct “symplectic category” to consider for Classical Mechanics should rather be
defined in such a way to include Lagrangian correspondences as morphisms. For the detailed reasons
pushing him to do so, see A. Weinstein. “Symplectic Categories”. In: Proceedings of Geometry
Summer School, Lisbon. 2009. url: https://arxiv.org/pdf/0911.4133v1.pdf.
13One can also sometimes find the term “canonical action” (for example in J. E. Marsden and T. S.
Ratiu. Introduction to Mechanics and Symmetry. A Basic Exposition of Classical Mechanical Systems.
2nd ed. New York: Springer, 1999), which is related to the use of “canonical” in the expression
“canonical commutation relations”. “Canonical” having such a different meaning in mathematics (as
in “canonically isomorphic”), I will try to avoid the use of the word in its first sense.
14From the algebraic point of view, one would have rather considered a morphism Lalg : G  !
Aut
 C1(S;R). But since Aut(S) and Aut C1(S;R) are canonically isomorphic the algebraic and
geometric notions of classical G-representation coincide. I will refrain from systematically presenting
the two points of view, as this would considerably weigh down the reading, and will only perform this
oscillation when there is an insight to gain in doing so.
15There are some technical subtleties I am omitting here, which are related to the ambiguity of
the expression “the Lie algebra of vector fields”. If one considers the Lie algebra of vector fields
 (TS) with the usual commutator, a left G-action induces a map  : g ! ( (TS); [; ]) which is in
fact a anti-morphism of Lie algebras. In other words, when integrable, a morphism of Lie algebras
 : g! ( (TS); [; ]) integrates to a right G-action (which is a group anti-morphism R : G! Aut(S)).
Of course, it suffices to consider the Lie algebra ( (TS); [; ]) in order to make the statement in the
main text rigorously true: a left G-action induces a morphism of Lie algebras  : g! ( (TS); [; ]).
Because one wants to perceive  as (Lie)(L), one sometimes says that “the Lie algebra of the group of
diffeomorphisms is the Lie algebra of vector fields with minus the commutator”, but this is again not
rigorous since neither Diff(S) nor Symp(S) are Lie groups. (See for example D. Alekseevsky and
P. W. Michor. “Differential Geometry of g-manifolds”. In: Differential Geometry and its Applications
5.4 (1995), pp. 371–403. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/math/9309214.)
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Now, it would be wrong to think that Poisson actions are necessarily the central
notion by means of which Lie groups and Lie algebras are introduced into Classical
Kinematics. In practice, groups are introduced through a more specific type of actions,
namely (strongly) Hamiltonian actions. These are usually defined as follows16.
Definition III.2. A Poisson G-action on a symplectic manifold (S; !), with associated
Poisson g-action  : g !  (TS)!, is said to be Hamiltonian if, for any X 2 g, the
1-form !((X); ) is exact.17
The condition that !((X); ) be exact implies the possibility of constructing a
linear map called the co-momentum map, defined by
bJ : g  ! C1(S;R)
X 7 ! bJ(X) where d bJ(X) := !((X); ):
From this, one can construct a second map, called the momentum map, defined by:
J : S  ! g
x 7 ! J(x) where J(x)[X] := bJ(X)(x):
Definition III.3. A Hamiltonian G-action L : G ! Aut(S) is said to be strongly
Hamiltonian if the momentum map is Co-equivariant—that is, if, for every g 2 G,






16Again, all the definitions and technical details that follow are standard and may be found in
several textbooks. In my opinion, the best place to learn about group actions in Classical Mechanics
is Marsden and Ratiu’s Introduction to Mechanics and Symmetry. A Basic Exposition of Classical
Mechanical Systems. They spend several chapters discussing Hamiltonian actions and provide an
extensive list of examples. For a conceptual understanding of the general situation, the few pages
of Landsman’s Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics on the subject are
particularly enlightening (pp. 178-191). Finally, Iglesias-Zemmour’s Symétries et moment was also
an important reading for my understanding of this topic.
17P. Iglesias-Zemmour. Symétries et moment. Paris: Hermann, Éditeurs des Sciences et des Arts,
2000, pp. 101–102. Note that, for any Poisson G-action, the 1-form !((X); ) is necessarily closed.
Indeed, since by definition (X) preserves the symplectic structure, we have L(X)! = 0 = (X)d!+
d(!((X); )) = d(!((X); )).
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where Co : G! Aut(g) denotes the co-adjoint action18.
Definition III.4. A Hamiltonian g-action is said to be strongly Hamiltonian19 if
the co-momentum map bJ is a morphism of Lie algebras—that is, if, for every X;Y 2 g,
we have bJ([X;Y ]) = f bJ(X); bJ(Y )gS:
In this latter case, one sometimes says that the momentum map is ‘infinitesimally
equivariant’. This is because the Co-equivariance of the momentum map implies its
infinitesimal equivariance (in other words, if L : G! Aut(S) is strongly Hamiltonian,
then so is the associated g-action dL). The converse is true only if G is connected20.
In its modern form, the momentum map was independently introduced around
1965 by the American mathematician Bertram Kostant and the French Jean-Marie
Souriau, although, with the wisdom of hindsight, a version of it can already be found
in the work of Sophus Lie (1890)21. This concept has become a notion of the uttermost
importance for the foundations of Classical Kinematics. Marsden and Ratiu describe
18 The co-adjoint action of G on g is usually defined in terms of the adjoint action of G on g by:
8 2 g;8X 2 g; (Co(g))(X) := (Ad(g 1)X). In turn, the adjoint action is defined by: if X 2 g is
the tangent vector at the identity to the parametrized curve , then Ad(g)X is defined as the tangent











= X and (0) = e:
See Landsman, op. cit., p. 184.
19A remark on terminology, for there are slight variations from one reference to another with re-
spect to the various notions I have just introduced. First, there is the harmless variation between
‘momentum’ and ‘moment’ map (or mapping). This is explained from the fact that the terminology
was introduced in French by Jean-Marie Souriau in his article “Quantification géométrique. Applica-
tions”. Therein, he used the word “moment” because it generalized the notion of angular momentum
(in French: “moment angulaire”). Despite this, the first usages of this notion in English kept the
French word (e.g. Marsden and Weinstein’s “Reduction of Symplectic Manifolds With Symmetry” in
1974, and also the English translation of Souriau’s book). Nowadays, most people use “momentum”
but notable exceptions are Guillemin and Sternberg (who use “moment”, perhaps because it also
generalizes the notion of moment of inertia (in French: “moment d’inertie”)) and Woit (who uses
“momentum map” to refer to what I have called co-momentum).
One needs to be a little bit more careful with the notion of “Hamiltonian action”. I am here using
the terminology of Landsman, which also agrees with that of Iglesias-Zemmour. However, in many
textbooks (e.g., Abraham and Marsden, Marsden and Ratiu, Puta), ‘Hamiltonian actions’ refer to
what I call ‘strongly Hamiltonian actions’...
20Marsden and Ratiu, op. cit., Theorem 12.3.2, p. 402.
21For more extensive references of the original papers dealing with the momentum map, see ibid.,
pp. 369–370.
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it as a “rich concept that is ubiquitous in the modern developments of geometric me-
chanics” and that “has led to surprising insights into many areas of mechanics and
geometry”22. Even stronger, Souriau turns the existence of a momentum map into one
of the four fundamental principles of non-relativistic symplectic mechanics23.
III.2.1.a Importance of (strongly) Hamiltonian actions
The question for us is: Why? Why do Hamiltonian actions and the momentum
mapping play such an important role in the foundations of Classical Mechanics? Why
should we consider classical state spaces endowed with an action of G and a momentum
map, instead of simply considering general Poisson actions?
An often cited motivation for introducing the momentum map is its relation to
Noether’s theorem. Given a Hamiltonian action G  S with momentum map J ,
and a property h 2 C1(S;R) which is G-invariant, then any property of the formbJ(X) 2 C1(S;R) (for X 2 g) is constant along the flow of the Hamiltonian vector field
vh
24. This result is the geometric reformulation of Noether’s first theorem. Indeed,
if one thinks of h as the Hamiltonian of the system, the above statement is saying
that whenever G is a symmetry group of the Hamiltonian, the functions bJ(X) are
conserved quantities. The co-momentum map appears thus as a very powerful tool to
build conserved quantities for a system with symmetries.
But this clearly cannot be the whole story. The relation to Noether’s theorem
only succeeds in explaining why Hamiltonian actions are something valuable in the
light of a particular quest, but not why they appear as a vault upon which rests the
general theory. In other words, it only allows to understand why they are convenient,
22Ibid., p. 365.
23J.-M. Souriau. Structure of Dynamical Systems. A Symplectic View of Physics. Trans. by C.
Cushman-de Vries. Boston: Birkhäuser, 1997, p. 155. The other three principles are: i) that the space
of motions be a connected symplectic manifold; ii) that the space of motions of a composite system
of independently evolving parts be the symplectic direct product of the spaces of motions of each
part; iii) that for an isolated system, the space of motions be endowed with a Poisson action of the
Galileo group. Recall that, for Souriau, the fundamental symplectic manifold appearing in Classical
Mechanics should not be viewed as the space of instantaneous states but rather as the space of states
extended in time (that is, the space of motions).
24See Landsman, op. cit., Proposition I.1.2.2.
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but not why they are fundamental25. Contrary to the utilitarian approach in which the
concept becomes meaningful a posteriori, through the usefulness of its applications, we
are looking for a perspective presenting Hamiltonian and strongly Hamiltonian actions
as something natural to consider in the first place—that is, a perspective from which
one could almost anticipate the concept before its introduction26.
A resolute attempt to answer the question in these terms is found in Gabriel
Catren’s article “On the Relation Between Gauge and Phase Symmetries”. Therein, it
is argued that the existence of a momentum map in the classical space of states should
be perceived as a footprint left by Quantum Mechanics inside Classical Mechanics27. It
nonetheless seems to me that one should at least try to understand the central impor-
tance of Hamiltonian actions without any mention of the Quantum, thus attempting
to consider the momentum map as an entirely classical notion.
A step in the sought-for direction is to take seriously the representation problem
alluded to at the end of the introduction to this chapter. Indeed, Definition III.1
(page 245) recognizes the fact that, from any mathematical structure whatsoever, it
25Moreover, there are many other reasons why the momentum map is useful. As Marsden and Ratiu
say, “this concept is more than a mathematical reformulation of a concept that simply describes the
well-known Noether theorem” (Marsden and Ratiu, loc. cit.). Important examples of other applica-
tions are the construction of new symplectic manifolds out of Hamiltonian actions by means of the
so-called ‘Marsden-Weinstein reduction’ (Landsman, op. cit., section IV.1.5.) and the classification
of transitive symplectic actions by Kostant’s coadjoint orbit covering theorem (Marsden and Ratiu,
op. cit., Theorem 14.4.5., p. 465).
26The naturalness of mathematical concepts is here an essential point, and a philosophical clarifica-
tion of this idea would certainly constitute a valuable work which is largely overdue in the philosophy
of mathematics. Very few authors seem to tackle this question. David Corfield spends a small section
of his book Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics trying to elucidate this issue (“The Conceptual
and the Natural”, pp. 223-230). More recently, Luca San Mauro and Giorgio Venturi have published
an article solely dedicated to the notion of naturalness (L. San Mauro and G. Venturi. “Naturalness
in Mathematics”. In: From Logic to Practice. Ed. by G. Lolli, M. Panza, and G. Venturi. Springer,
2015, pp. 277–313), but further work remains to be done. Let me just briefly comment that I do
not regard ‘naturalness” as an intrinsic property of a concept, but rather as a property of the place a
concept occupies within an expository discourse. The general idea would be that the naturalness of a
concept is intimately linked to the notion of continuity (of the process of developing a theory) or of
inevitability (of the introduction of the concept). Thus, a concept would appear as unnatural when its
introduction into the exposition constitutes a moment of rupture which could not have been foreseen.
27Indeed, Catren’s approach emphasizes the idea that g “encodes the unitary representation theory
of [the group] G” (p. 1321). This is inspired by Kirillov’s orbit method, which establishes for certain
Lie groups (e.g., abelian, nilpotent) a correspondence between the Co-adjoint orbits g/G and the
unitary irreducible representations of the group. Hence, the presence of a momentum map in Classical
Mechanics can only be fully understood from the vantage viewpoint of Quantum Mechanics and its
Hilbert space formulation.
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is possible to define at least one group: the automorphism group. But besides this
general representational strategy, there exist other equally sound possibilities which
are attached to the particularities of Classical Kinematics. These alternatives stem
from two sources: the ability to define several different Lie algebras from a symplectic
manifold, and the ability to construct both a Poisson space and a Poisson algebra from
a given Lie group.
Let us review these various notions of representation on the classical arena. First,
given a symplectic manifold (S; !), there are at least three different Lie algebras one
can construct:
i)  (TS)! (vector fields preserving the symplectic structure),
ii)  (TS)H (Hamiltonian vector fields),
iii)
 C1(S;R); f; g (smooth real-valued functions where one forgets point-wise mul-
tiplication and keeps only the Poisson bracket).
These are related by the following diagram of Lie algebras:
R C1(S;R)  (TS)H  (TS)!v   (III.3)
where the first two arrows form a short exact sequence (the image of one arrow is the
kernel of the next one) and capture the fact that  (TS)H ' C1(S;R)/R (properties-
as-transformations are properties ‘up to a constant’). The existence of this triple
of internal Lie algebras furnishes three possible ways of representing Lie algebras in
the Classical arena—just consider morphisms from g to any of  (TS)!,  (TS)H or
C1(S;R). In fact, these three notions of representation exactly coincide with the three
different notions of g-actions on S we have already discussed:
– a Poisson g-action is a morphism of Lie algebras g  (TS)!;
– a Hamiltonian g-action is a morphism of Lie algebras g  (TS)H28;H
28Indeed, the requirement that the 1-form !(H(X); ) be exact (cf. Definition III.2, page 247)
means there exists f 2 C1(S;R) such that !(H(X); ) = df . In other terms, H(X) is a Hamiltonian
vector field.
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– a strongly Hamiltonian g-action is a morphism of Lie algebras g C1(S;R)29:bJ
Second, given a Lie algebra g, it is possible to show that its topological dual g
is a Poisson manifold (or, equivalently, that C1(g;R) is a Poisson algebra). This
important result is summarized in the following
Theorem III.1. Consider the injection g C1(g;R) provided by the canonical
identification of g with g. Then, there exists a unique Poisson structure on g such
that the above map is an injection of Lie algebras: f eX; eY gg := [^X;Y ], where X;Y 2 g
and eX := (X).30
This then seems to furnish two additional strategies for representing the Lie algebra
g in the classical arena: one can either consider representations of C1(g;R) on S
(that is, morphisms of Poisson algebras C1(g;R) C1(S;R))J or realizations
of g on S (that is, morphisms of Poisson manifolds S g)31:J Nonetheless, we
have the following equivalence32:
Poisson realization
of g on S
Poisson representation
of C1(g;R) on S
strongly Hamiltonian
g-action on S
29More precisely, this last arrow is the unique infinitesimally equivariant co-momentum map associ-
ated to the strongly Hamiltonian action. The latter is the morphism  induced by the co-momentum
map through the diagram
g C1(S;R)  (TS)H  (TS)!:bJ

v  
30Cf Landsman, op. cit., p. 179, Definition III.1.1.1. and the comment following it. Most
usually, the Poisson structure on g is defined explicitly by: ff; ggg() = ([df j; dgj]), where
f; g 2 C1(g;R);  2 g and where one uses the identifications T  g ' g ' g.
31See ibid., Definition I.2.6.1., p. 76, and also N. P. Landsman. “Lie Groupoids and Lie Algebroids
in Physics and Noncommutative Geometry”. In: Journal of Geometry and Physics 56.1 (2006), pp. 24–
54. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/math-ph/0506024, p. 41.
32By ‘equivalence’, I mean here the existence of a canonical bijection between these three sets of
arrows. For the upper equivalence, see idem, Mathematical Topics Between Classical and Quantum
Mechanics, Corollary I.2.6.5, p. 77. For the lower right equivalence, see ibid., Theorem III. 1.1.7., p.
181, or Marsden and Ratiu, op. cit., pp. 403–405 and in particular Remark 1, p. 405.
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The first of these equivalences we already knew: a Poisson realization S J ! g
induces a Poisson representation by taking the pullback J, and every Poisson repre-
sentation is the pullback of some Poisson realization. The second equivalence stems
from two facts. First, the co-momentum map bJ is a morphism of Lie algebras if and
only if the momentum map J is a morphism of Poisson manifolds33. Moreover—and
this is the crucial point—a Poisson representation C1(g;R) J ! C1(S;R) induces a
Poisson g-action through the diagram (where all arrows are morphisms of Lie algebras)
g C1(g;R) C1(S;R)  (TS)H  (TS)!:

J v  
In other words, as soon as one is given a Poisson realization S J ! g and considers
its pull-back C1(g;R) J ! C1(S;R), one can generate a diagram defining a strongly
Hamiltonian g-action: infinitesimally equivariant momentum maps are just a particular
instance of the more general concept of Poisson realizations, and the co-momentum map
is simply the map bJ := J  .
Hence, strongly Hamiltonian g-actions are precisely those g-actions which are
induced by a Poisson representation/realization. Through this change of emphasis—
from the notion of action to the notion of Poisson representation—the problem of
studying all possible strongly Hamiltonian actions of g is no longer understood as a
problem focusing on a restricted class of g-actions; rather, it is the problem of studying
all the possible representations of the Poisson algebra C1(g;R).
All in all, the classical representation problem (for Lie groups and Lie algebras)
boils down to the comparison of the three different types of g-actions. The situation is
summarized in Figure III.1 below.
The first point highlighted by this figure is how little groups are actually involved in
these constructions. Both the notions of Poisson representation and Poisson realization
only appeal to the infinitesimal information of the group, and the same holds for the
notions of Hamiltonian and strongly Hamiltonian action. Because of this, it is better
33Landsman, op. cit., Proposition III.1.1.2, p. 179, or Marsden and Ratiu, op. cit., Theorem 12.4.1,
p. 403.



















Fig. III.1 – The Classical representation problem for Lie groups and Lie algebras
(or how to introduce them into Classical Kinematics).
On the top right and bottom left of the ‘diagram’ are the initial external and internal struc-
tures. Squiggle arrows represent intrinsic constructions of new structures (some of which,
but not all, being functorial), while all other arrows represent morphisms in the appropriate
category. The coloured arrows represent the various a priori different transits between the
external and the internal structures.
to leave groups and the question of integrability of g-actions somewhat aside and focus
mainly on the three central lines of the diagram.
So far, this more systematic exploration of the several possible transits between
the external and the internal has allowed us to understand why both Hamiltonian and
strongly Hamiltonian actions appear as natural objects to consider in our attempt to
construct the mathematical characterization of a classical system using Lie groups and
Lie algebras. Presently, they are perceived as a representational strategy that stands
on the same footing as Poisson actions. But this is not enough. If we wish to provide a
rationale for Souriau’s fourth axiom of non-relativistic symplectic mechanics, we need
to explain why we should not consider general Poisson actions. In other terms, we
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need to explain why we should consider (strongly) Hamiltonian actions as the preferred
representational strategy.
Here, the conceptual framework developed in the preceding chapter offers us a clear
answer. As we have just seen, the introduction of an abstract external Lie algebra into
the Classical arena will, in all representational strategies, lead to a distinguished set
of infinitesimal state transformations (it is the image of g by the action ). However,
if these distinguished transformations are to be useful in the definition of the proper-
ties of the classical system being described, if they are to provide a labelling scheme
for physical properties, then it is essential that the chosen representational strategy
reflects the fundamental conceptual triad which constitutes the core of Kinematics
(Figure II.1, page 146). In other words, it is essential to be able to interpret the
represented transformations as transformations generated by properties. This means
g should be represented, not by general transformations, but rather by properties-as-
transformations. And this point is precisely what distinguishes Hamiltonian actions
from general Poisson actions.
III.2.1.b Hamiltonian vs. strongly Hamiltonian actions
Both Hamiltonian and strongly Hamiltonian actions respect the transformational
role of properties, as they both allow to associate to each element of the external
Lie algebra g a property-as-transformation. Despite this, there also seems to be a
clear advantage of the latter type of actions: they represent the external infinitesimal
transformations directly as properties. In this way, strongly Hamiltonian actions appear
as those g-actions which respect both the transformational and numerical role of physical
properties. In the light of this, it would seem that one should also discard the use of
Hamiltonian actions and restrict attention solely to strongly Hamiltonian actions.
However, as we will now see, the difference between Hamiltonian and strongly
Hamiltonian actions is in fact not that important. To have a better grasp of this
difference, it is useful to compare the diagrams defining these two types of actions.
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Recall: strongly Hamiltonian actions are defined by the diagram
g C1(S;R)  (TS)H  (TS)!bJ
H
v   (III.4)
where all arrows are morphisms of Lie algebras, while Hamiltonian actions are defined
by the diagram
g C1(S;R)  (TS)H  (TS)!bJ
H
v   (III.5)
where now the co-momentum map bJ is only a morphism of vector spaces (equivalently,
the momentum map J : S ! g is only a morphism of differentiable manifolds, instead
of being a Poisson realization; or the pull-back J : C1(g;R) ! C1(S;R) is only a
morphism of commutative algebras instead of being a Poisson representation) and the
remaining arrows are morphisms of Lie algebras.
Diagrams (III.4) and (III.5) may look very similar. Nonetheless, they present
an essential conceptual difference, which lies in the possible oscillations between the
morphisms bJ and H . For strongly Hamiltonian actions, one can either: start from
the data bJ and deduce the data H (one defines it as H := v   bJ), or start from
the g-action and deduce the map bJ (the equivariant co-momentum map is uniquely
defined for a strongly Hamiltonian action). This freedom of circulation breaks down
for Hamiltonian actions: given a smooth map S J ! g, the induced map v   bJ is no
longer guaranteed to be a morphism of Lie algebras. Moreover, given a Hamiltonian
action, one cannot associate to it one single smooth map S J ! g but rather a class
of such maps (the momentum map is not uniquely defined). In other words, whereas
strongly Hamiltonian actions of g on S and Poisson realizations of g on S are equivalent
(one can freely circulate between the two), the notion of Hamiltonian action is prior to
the non-equivariant momentum map (one must start from the data g H !  (TS)H).
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Having said this, let us describe the obstructions for a Hamiltonian g-action to be
strongly Hamiltonian34. We have the following:
Theorem III.2. The second cohomology group of g with values in R governs the
obstruction to have strongly Hamiltonian actions. In other terms, any Hamiltonian
g-action is strongly Hamiltonian if and only if H2(g;R) = 0.35
Once the locus of the obstruction is properly pointed out, the immediate question
becomes to investigate strategies to bypass such an obstruction. In this case, there are
34In order not to be drowned by the technical details in what is about to come, I have decided to
develop part of the formalism in the footnotes. The general picture should be understandable without
the reading of these. A precise exposition is found in Landsman, op. cit., Section I.1.1, pp. 178–183.
35Given a diagram of the form (III.5), the default of H to be strongly Hamiltonian is closely related
to the default of some associated co-momentum map bJ to be a morphism of Lie algebras, which in
turn is captured by the map
  : g g  ! R
(X;Y ) 7 !  (X;Y ) := bJ([X;Y ])  f bJ(X); bJ(Y )gS :
(Strictly speaking, the definition shows  (X;Y ) to be an element of C1(S;R). Nonetheless, the fact
that both  and v  are morphisms of Lie algebras enforces the basic identity v bJ([X;Y ]) = vf bJ(X); bJ(Y )gS ,
which in turn implies, if S is connected, that, in fact,  (X;Y ) is just a real number.)
Because of the anti-symmetry and Jacobi identity of both the Lie product [; ] on g and the Poisson
bracket f; g on S, the bilinear map   satisfies two similar properties:
i)  (X;Y ) =   (Y;X),
ii)  (X; [Y; Z]) =  ([X;Y ]; Z) +  (Y; [X;Z]).
A bilinear function on g  g satisfying these two properties is called a 2-cocycle on g with values
in R. The set of all such 2-cocycles, denoted by Z2(g;R), captures therefore the obstruction to the
(infinitesimal) equivariance of the co-momentum map bJ .
However, because the (co-)momentum map is not uniquely determined by the Hamiltonian action
(each bJ(X) is defined only up to a constant), the obstruction of a given (co-)momentum map to
be equivariant is not quite the same as the obstruction of the g-action to be strongly Hamiltonian.
Indeed, if one considers bJ2 := bJ   , where  2 g, we have:bJ2([X;Y ])  f bJ2(X); bJ2(Y )gS = bJ([X;Y ])  f bJ(X); bJ(Y )gS   ([X;Y ])
=  (X;Y )  ([X;Y ]):
A 2-cocycle for which there exists  2 g such that  (X;Y ) = ([X;Y ]) is said to be trivial and their
set is denoted by B2(g;R). The last equation shows that, whenever   is trivial, one can effectively
overcome the obstruction and find an equivariant momentum map by a simple redefinition (whence
the adjective “trivial”).
To build an object which does not depend on the arbitrary choice of a momentum map—and is
therefore intrinsically related to the Hamiltonian action under consideration—one should identify
2-cocycles whose difference is trivial but not necessarily zero. Thus, one considers the quotient
H2(g;R) := Z2(g;R)/B2(g;R)
called the second cohomology group of g.
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two possible strategies, each of them shedding a new light onto the notion of ‘Hamil-
tonian actions’. They both have in common the fundamental idea of transforming the
negativity of the obstruction into a positive fact: instead of considering an obstruction
as a default to meet some “nice” conditions (negativity), one views them as enabling
the possibility of constructing new structures (positivity):
1. Absorb the obstruction by modifying the Poisson algebra C1(g;R). Instead of
considering the dual of the momentum map as an arrow
 C1(g;R); f; gg  C1(S;R); f; gSJ
which fails to preserve the Poisson structures, one can define a new Poisson
structure on g so that the arrow J appears as a morphism of Poisson algebras
 C1(g;R); f; g g  C1(S;R); f; gS36:J




of the algebra C1  (g;R)
2. Absorb the obstruction by modifying the initial Lie algebra g. Instead of viewing
the second cohomology group H2(g;R) as the locus of obstructions to strongly
Hamiltonian g-actions, one views it as the classifier of central extensions of g.
Given a Hamiltonian g-action with cocycle  , this allows to construct a new Lie
36This is achieved in the following way. Define the modified Poisson structure on g by:
f eX; eY g g := f eX; eY gg    (X;Y )
for any X;Y 2 g. In this way, the equation
J
 f eX; eY gg  fJ( eX); J(eY )gS =  (X;Y )
may be rewritten as
J
 f eX; eY g g  fJ( eX); J(eY )gS = 0:
This shows that the dual of the momentum map is indeed a representation on S of the Poisson algebra
C1  (g;R).
37Ibid., Theorem III.1.1.7, p. 181.
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algebra g  which has a strongly Hamiltonian action on S38. From this perspec-




in which the center acts trivially
The first move shows Hamiltonian actions to fall under the theory of Poisson rep-
resentations/realizations, as it was the case for strongly Hamiltonian actions. Through
the second move, we see that, lurking behind a Hamiltonian action of some Lie algebra,
there is always a strongly Hamiltonian action of another closely related Lie algebra. In
this way, the problem of studying all Hamiltonian actions of some fixed Lie algebra may
be restated as the problem of studying strongly Hamiltonian actions of a certain range
of Lie algebras (the central extensions of g). The result is summarized in Figure III.2.
38 A central extension g  of g is a short exact sequence 0 ! R ! g  ! g ! 0 such that, in
addition, for any T 2 R and X 2 g, [X;T ]g  = 0. This implies g  = g R as vector spaces and also
the existence of   : g g! R such that
[X;Y ]g  = [X;Y ]g +  (X;Y )T:
Again, from the anti-symmetry and Jacobi identity for [; ]g  , it follows that   is a 2-cocycle. En
passant, notice that, as a Lie algebra, C1(S;R) is a central extension of the Lie algebra of Hamiltonian
vector fields  (TS)H .
Two central extensions g  and g are said to be equivalent if there exists an isomorphism of Lie
algebras g   ! g such that the following diagram commutes
g 
0 R g 0
g
This is the case if and only if the 2-cocycles   and  belong to the same cohomology class. There is
thus a bijection between the cohomology group H2(g;R) and the set of equivalence classes of central
extensions of g. (For an excellent exposition of this, see G. M. Tuynman and W. Wiegerinck. “Central
Extensions and Physics”. In: Journal of Geometry and Physics 4.2 (1987), pp. 207–258.)
Now, the construction of a strongly Hamiltonian action of a central extension of g from a Hamilto-
nian action g H  !  (TS)H , may be captured in the following commutative diagram:
 (TS)H C1(S;R) R
g g  R
Given the Hamiltonian g-action (in green), one constructs the central extension and its strongly
Hamiltonian action (in red) by pull-back.
39Landsman, op. cit., Proposition III.1.1.9, p. 182.
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Hamiltonian
g-actions g C1(g;R)  (TS)H











Fig. III.2 – Bypassing the obstruction of Hamiltonian actions.
All diagrams are commutative and dashed arrows are the only ones which are not
morphisms of Lie algebras. The bypassing of the obstruction can be visualized by the
shifting of   as we move downwards throughout the diagram: from being a subscript
characterizing the failure of an arrow to be a Lie algebra morphism (top line), it
becomes a subscript characterizing a modification of the Poisson algebra (middle
line), and finally a subscript of a modification of the initial Lie algebra (bottom
line).40
40Let us pause for a moment, and adopt a more distant point of view on the local phenomenon
we are discussing in order to connect it with more general discussions on the methodologies of con-
temporary mathematics. In his book Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics, Fernando
Zalamea tries to pinpoint some of the “minimal characteristics” of contemporary mathematics which
any philosophical approach of the subject should try to capture. Among them, there is the require-
ment of “presenting a full and faithful vision of mathematical practice, particularly sensitive to a
pendular weaving between transferences and obstructions, and between smoothings and
residues”. He writes:
[...] mathematical practice turns out to be much closer to a vision that genuinely and
persistently seeks to detect, between minimal contexts of adequation, both transferences
and obstructions alike. The notions of obstruction and residue are fundamental here,
since the incessant survey of obstructions, and the reconstruction of entire maps of
mathematics on the basis of certain residues attached to those obstructions, is part and
parcel of both mathematical inventiveness and its subsequent demonstrative regulation.
Now, the obstructions and residues acquire meaning only locally, with respect to certain
contexts of adequation [...].
(F. Zalamea. Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics. Trans. by Z. L.
Fraser. Urbanomic/Sequence Press, 2012, pp. 127–128, author’s empasis)
This passage fits particularly well with our present situation: we study transferences (from external
structures to internal structures) and find obstructions to them. The residue attached to the obstruc-
tion is here the 2-cocycle. By including them in new contexts of adequation (central extensions of
Lie algebras), the residues are reinterpreted and allow to invent new structures which smooth out the
initial obstructions.
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* * * * *
Given an external Lie algebra g, there are three ways of introducing it into the
Classical Kinematical arena, which stem from the possibility of constructing three
different Lie algebras out of the homogeneous symplectic manifold (S; !). First, one can
construct the Lie algebra  (TS)! of vector fields preserving the symplectic structure,
and then consider morphisms g!  (TS)!. This yields the notion of Poisson g-actions.
But these fail to take into account that physical transformations are generated by
properties. Second, one can construct the Lie algebra  (TS)H of Hamiltonian vector
fields, and then consider morphisms g!  (TS)H , called Hamiltonian g-actions. These
now take into account the transformational role of properties but ignore their numerical
role. Finally, one can use C1(S;R) seen as a Lie algebra to consider morphisms g !
C1(S;R). These define strongly Hamiltonian g-actions and they take into account
the fundamental double role of physical properties. This is best seen from the fact
they involve the full Jordan-Lie structure of the algebra of properties, as strongly
Hamiltonian actions are equivalent to Poisson representations of C1(g;R). Therefore,
from the systematic consideration of all the several different ways of representing Lie
algebras into the classical arena and the requirement of respecting the two-fold role of
properties in Kinematics, we arrive at the following conclusion:
As far as Lie groups and Lie algebras are concerned, strongly Hamil-
tonian actions should be the central objects through which to build
the description of a classical system.
In fact, this will also include Hamiltonian actions since if g is the central extension
of some other Lie algebra h, then, by studying all possible strongly Hamiltonian g-
actions one is automatically studying, among other things, all possible Hamiltonian
h-actions. In other words, morally, Hamiltonian actions may be considered as induced
actions of particular subalgebras of the initial external Lie algebra, the action of which
is strongly Hamiltonian.
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Therefore, the essential distinction, as Souriau insisted, is that between Poisson
and Hamiltonian actions41.
III.2.2 In Quantum Kinematics
Let us now turn to the Quantum. Applied to the standard Hilbert space formalism,
the general definition of group representation (cf. Definition III.1, page 245) yields the
notion of unitary representations. These are morphisms of groups
G U(H)U
where U(H) is the group of all unitary operators on H42.
41As a side remark, I should mention the mathematical treatment of the obstruction of a Poisson
action to be Hamiltonian. This allows to perceive how (un)restrictive this condition actually is. The
main result is the following:
Theorem III.3. The first cohomology group of g with values in the first de Rham cohomology group
of S governs the obstruction to have Hamiltonian actions. In other words, any Poisson action is
automatically Hamiltonian if and only if H1(g;R)
H1dR(S;R) = 0.
That de Rham cohomology captures part of the obstruction for Hamiltonian actions is not sur-
prising: the difference between Poisson and Hamiltonian g-actions is that, while the first represent
g as symplectic vector fields, the second represents it as Hamiltonian vector fields. In turn, if  is
a symplectic vector field, we have d!(; ) = 0 (it is a closed 1-form), whereas if  is a Hamiltonian
vector field, we have !(; ) = df (it is an exact 1-form).
In particular, the theorem shows that there exist no Poisson actions which are not Hamiltonian
whenever H1dR(S;R) = 0 (this is the case of projective Hilbert spaces) or [g; g] = g (this is the case of
the Poincaré group).
For the details, see Iglesias-Zemmour, op. cit., p. 103 or Marsden and Ratiu, op. cit., pp. 370–371.
42It is tempting to write U(H) = AutHilb(H)—that is, to view unitary operators on H as automor-
phisms of H in the category of Hilbert spaces where morphisms H1 ! H2 are isometries. However,
this is not the category of Hilbert spaces usually considered. Instead, one chooses as morphisms con-
tinuous linear maps, and in this case the group of automorphisms of H is not U(H). For an excellent
exposition of the reasons leading to such a choice for the category Hilb, see J. C. Baez. “Quantum
Quandaries: a Category-Theoretic Perspective”. In: The Structural Foundations of Quantum Grav-
ity. Ed. by S. French, D. Rickles, and J. Saatsi. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. url:
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0404040. Notwithstanding this, I will sometimes write Aut(H)
for the group of unitaries in order to stress the similarities with Classical Kinematics.
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Associated to a unitary G-representation is its infinitesimal version, called a quan-
tum g-representation. This is a morphism of Lie algebras43
 : g  !  BiR(H); 1
2
[; ]:
Now, from the perspective of Hilbert spaces, one could naively think that unitary
G-representations G U(H)U are the quantum analogue of Poisson G-actions
G Aut(S):L However, we know from the preceding chapter that Hilbert spaces
should not be viewed as one of the main mathematical structures of the quantum
kinematical arena. Instead, the starting point should be either the projective Hilbert
space PH (geometric point of view, emphasis on states) or the JLB-algebra BR(H)
(algebraic point of view, emphasis on properties)44. Therefore, the natural sort of
morphisms to consider in the Quantum, which are analoguous to Poisson G-actions,
are in fact ray representations:
G Aut(PH);L
where Aut(PH) is the group of continuous maps of PH into itself which preserve both
the symplectic and Riemannian structures (cf. section II.2)45.
Given this, an obvious question arises: If ray representations are the quantum
analogue of Poisson actions in Classical Kinematics, which are the quantum analogues
of Hamiltonian and strongly Hamiltonian actions?
43A word of caution however. The relation between G-representations and g-representations in the
quantum case is quite delicate. There is first the problem that, whenH is infinite-dimensional, U(H) is
not a Lie group (it is not a manifold). We have already mentioned this problem in chapter II and how
to deal with it using Stone’s theorem (cf. footnote 32, page 157). Morever, a unitary G-representation
is usually not smooth over all of H, fact which renders more difficult to define an associated g-action.
This is nonetheless possible in a dense subset of H called the essential G-smooth part of H. See, for
example, Marsden and Ratiu, op. cit., pp. 322–323.
44In the first point of view, one then views BR(H) as the algebra of functions C1(PH;R)K. In the
second point of view, one views PH as the space of pure states P(BR(H)).
45This of course was stressed from the very beginning by Weyl and Wigner. Cf., for example, this
well-known passage of Weyl: “In quantum theory the representations take place in system space [in
our terminology: space of states of the system]; but this is to be considered as a ray rather than a
vector space, for a pure state is represented by a ray rather than a vector” (H. Weyl. The Theory of
Groups & Quantum Mechanics. Trans. by H. Robertson. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1931,
pp. 180–181).
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III.2.2.a The quantum analogue of (strongly) Hamiltonian actions
To answer this, it helps to start by establishing the quantum representation prob-
lem, analogue of Figure III.1. Recall: the classical representation problem had stemmed
from the existence of the following diagram of internal Lie algebras (cf. III.3, page 251):
R C1(S;R)  (TS)H  (TS)!:v  
It turns out that, in the Quantum, a similar diagram of internal groups exists:
U(1) U(H) AutU(PH) Aut(PH):p  (III.6)
Let us explain this diagram. First, a unitary operator U 2 U(H) induces a ray trans-
formation U 2 Aut(PH) by U['] := [U'], where ' 2 H and ['] 2 PH. The set of all ray
transformations which are induced by unitary operators on H is denoted AutU(PH).
Now, two unitary operators differing only by a complex number will define the same
ray transformation. Hence, elements of AutU(PH) are in fact what Bargmann calls
“unitary operator rays”46—that is, elements of the quotient group U(H)/U(1). In
other words, we have the isomorphism AutU(PH) ' U(H)/U(1). The left hand side
of the diagram is then fairly obvious: it states that U(1) is a subgroup of U(H) and,
since it is a normal subgroup, the quotient U(H)/U(1) is itself a group.
Second—this is the more difficult part—we need to understand whether or not any
particular ray transformation may be seen as stemming from some unitary operator on
H. In other words, we ask whether the injection U(H)/U(1) Aut(PH) is also a
surjection. This question was settled in 1931 by Wigner in his book Group Theory and
Its Applications to the Quantum Mechanics of Atomic Spectra47. The proof of Wigner’s
theorem is also found in S. Weinberg. The Quantum Theory of Fields. Vol. 1. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 91–96.
46V. Bargmann. “On Unitary Ray Representations of Continuous Groups”. In: Annals of Mathe-
matics 59.1 (1954), pp. 1–46.
47For a clean and simple mathematical exposition of this, I nonetheless refer the reader to
Bargmann’s article “On Unitary Ray Representations of Continuous Groups”.
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Theorem (Wigner). Consider the group eU(H) of all unitary and anti-unitary oper-
ators on H. Then, one has the isomorphism of groups:
Aut(PH) ' eU(H)/U(1)48:
In other words, to get all possible automorphisms of the quantum space of states,
one needs to consider both unitary and anti-unitary operators. This may come as
a surprise, for anti-unitary operators are scarcely ever used in non-relativistic Quan-
tum Mechanics: the only relevant anti-unitary operator seems to be the time reversal
operator49 50.
In any case, following exactly the same procedure used in Classical Kinematics,
diagram (III.6) leads to the consideration of three possible strategies for representing
external groups in the Quantum arena.
Definition III.5. For a given abstract group G,
– a ray representation is a morphism of groups G Aut(PH);L
– a projective ray representation is a morphism of groups G AutU(PH);U
– a unitary representation is a morphism of groups G U(H):U
48U is an anti-unitary operator on H if U is anti-linear—that is, for '; 2 H and a; b 2 C, one has
U(a'+ b ) = aU'+ bU —and preserves the hermitian product (hU';U i = h'; i).
Wigner’s theorem is usually stated as: given a one-to-one transformation of the projective Hilbert
space onto itself which preserves the transition probabilities, there exists a unique (up to a factor of
modulus 1) unitary or anti-unitary operator on H which extends this ray transformation.
49It is quite easy to be convinced of the fact that the time reversal operator  must be anti-unitary.
Indeed, if x and p are the position and linear momentum operators, one should have xy = x and
py =  p. Applying this to the commutation relations [x;p] = i leads to
iy = [x;p]y =  [x;p] =  i:
Hence  must be anti-linear.
50The dissymmetry between unitary and anti-unitary operators in Quantum Mechanics seems to
originate in the following fact: the square of a unitary or anti-unitary operator is a unitary operator.
Because of this, all elements of a Lie group G which are connected to the identity are necessarily
represented by unitary operators. To prove this, one uses the followings two facts (cf. ibid., p. 2):
1. There exists a neighborhood N of the identity such that: i) every group element in N is the
square of some element, and ii) every group element connected to the identity can be written
as a finite product of elements in N .
2. The square of a unitary or anti-unitary ray operator is a unitary ray operator.
Therefore, for connected Lie groups, one can safely ignore anti-unitary operators.
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Comparison of diagrams (III.3) and (III.6) suggests quite a different analogy from
the naive one proposed by focusing on the Hilbert space formalism: the morphisms of
groups G AutU(PH)U and G U(H)U should be thought as the quantum
analogue of the morphisms of Lie algebras g  (TS)HH and g C1(S;R)bJ
respectively. Put differently, this approach hints at the following analogy:
Classical Kinematics Quantum Kinematics
Hamiltonian g-actions projective ray G-representations






Table III.1 – The quantum analogue of (strongly) Hamiltonian actions
Now, since strongly Hamiltonian g-actions may equivalently be seen as represen-
tations of a classical algebra of properties constructed out of g (cf. page 252), one
may wonder if it is also possible to perceive unitary G-representations as being in-
duced by representations of a certain quantum algebra of properties constructed out
of G. The answer is positive, for besides the usual Hilbert space approach to unitary
representations, there exist two other different yet equivalent points of view:
– from the perspective of C-algebras: to any group G, one can associate a C-
algebra, called the group C-algebra and denoted by C(G)51. Then, a unitary
51It is defined as follows. For f; g 2 C1(G;C), respectively define the convolution and involution
products by
f  g(x) :=
Z
G
dyf(xy 1)g(y) ; f(x) := f(x 1):
This turns C1(G;C) into a *-algebra. Then, define C(G) as the norm closure of this convolution
algebra in the norm kfk := sup k(f)k, where  : C1(G;C) ! B(H) is a bounded non-degenerate
Chapter III. Constructing the Mathematical Description of a Physical System 267
representation of G on H is equivalent to a non-degenerate representation of
C(G) on H—that is, to a morphism of C-algebras
C(G) B(H):
In particular, irreducible unitary representations of G correspond to irreducible
representations of the group C-algebra52.
– from the perspective of JLB-algebras: this is a trivial reformulation of the previous
point of view. One defines the Jordan-Lie-Banach algebra JL(G) := C(G)R and
uses the fact that any morphism of C-algebras restricts to a morphism of JLB-
algebras of the self-adjoint parts (and viceversa). Thus, a unitary (irreducible)
representation of G is equivalent to an (irreducible) representation of JL(G) on
H—that is, to a morphism of JLB-algebras53:
JL(G) BR(H):
Hence, we see that, indeed, unitary G-representations arise from taking into ac-
count the double role of quantum properties. The quantum representation problem,
analogue of Figure III.1, may then be depicted by the diagram below (Figure III.3).
In the spirit of the comment made immediately after Figure III.1, an important
point should be remarked here: the proposed analogy foreshadows a surprising merger
between the physical process of quantization—from the Classical to the Quantum—and
the mathematical process of integration—from the Local to the Global. Whereas the
Poisson algebra C1(g;R) associated to a Lie group G depends only on the infinites-
imal information g, the group JLB-algebra JL(G) does encode global information:
morphism of associative *-algebras. The group C-algebra is commutative if and only if the group is
abelian. (Landsman, op. cit., Definition III.1.7.4, p. 204.)
52See ibid., Corollary III.1.7.5, p. 204. In this way, the unitary dual bG of any group may be
described as the set of symplectic leaves of the pure state space of C(G): bG = P(C(G))/ . In
particular, if G is abelian, bG = P(C(G)), or, what amounts to the same, C(G) = C0( bG;C).
53This is a point I continue to stress: all mentions of C-algebras in Quantum Mechanics can
systematically be replaced by an analogous statement in terms of real JLB-algebras. By the same
token, one can develop the whole of Quantum Mechanics without using complex numbers. This
is a point Landsman repeats many times (for example, in “Classical and Quantum Representation
Theory”, pp. 2 and 17).





















Fig. III.3 – The Quantum representation problem for Lie groups.
On the top left and bottom right of the ‘diagram’ are the initial external and internal structures.
Squiggle arrows represent intrinsic constructions of new structures (some of which, but not all, being
functorial), while all other arrows represent morphisms in the appropriate category. The coloured
arrows represent the various a priori different transits between the external and the internal structures.
two non-isomorphic groups with same Lie algebra will have non-isomorphic group al-
gebras. In fact, as we will progressively unveil during the remainder of the chapter,
this seems to capture a deep difference between Classical and Quantum Kinematics:
the former is attached to infinitesimal transformations, while the latter is attached to
global transformations.
III.2.2.b Pursuing the analogy: unitary vs. projective representations
A first strategy for exploring this analogy is to analyze the quantum concepts
through the looking glass of symplectic geometry. Recall that, from the geometric
point of view, the quantum space of states may be perceived as a classical space of
states with extra structure (section II.2). In particular, the quantum space of states
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is a symplectic manifold and it is always enlightening, for the comparison of both
Kinematics, to treat it as if it were a classical space of states.
Consider then a unitary representation G U(H):U It induces a ray repre-
sentation through the following diagram of groups
G U(H) AutU(PH) Aut(PH):U
U
p 
In order to distinguish the map U from the map U, let us call the latter a unitary
ray representation. Since Aut(PH) ,! Symp(PH), U is a Poisson G-action. The
question, of course, is which kind of Poisson action it is, and the answer is the expected
one: it is a strongly Hamiltonian G-action!
The idea of the proof is quite simple: given the unitary representation U , the
associated infinitesimal version is a map dU : g  ! BR(H). But we also have
BR(H) ' C1(PH;R)K (cf. Equation II.17). Therefore, a unitary representation al-
lows to generate the diagram of Lie algebras
g BR(H) ' C1(PH;R)K  C1(PH;R)  (TPH)HdU
H
v 
which corresponds exactly to the definition of a strongly Hamiltonian g-action on PH
(cf. page 251). This shows that, when perceived from the perspective of symplec-
tic geometry, unitary representations are strongly Hamiltonian actions. Moreover, it
clarifies the relation between the co-momentum map in Classical Kinematics and the
unitary representation in Quantum Kinematics. Indeed, the co-momentum map of the
unitary ray representation U is simply the derivative of the unitary map: bJ = dU54.
In this way, this symplectic approach allows to relate, in a very transparent fash-
ion, the central group-theoretical notion of Classical Kinematics (strongly Hamiltonian
actions) to unitary representations in Quantum Kinematics. In fact, we have the fol-
lowing characterization of unitary ray representations among all strongly Hamiltonian
54Because of the technical difficulties alluded to in footnote 15 (page 246), this does not constitute a
rigorous proof. A careful derivation is found in Marsden and Ratiu, op. cit., pp. 376–377 and 394–395.
In the same vein, it is possible to prove that projective ray representations yield Hamiltonian actions.
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actions on PH:
Proposition III.4. A strongly Hamiltonian g-action on PH stems from a unitary ray
G-representation if and only if
i) it acts by infinitesimal isometries (Killing vectors),
ii) it is integrable.
Condition i) appeals to the non-trivial structure distinguishing the Quantum arena
from the Classical one. Condition ii) suggests a new difference between the Classical
and the Quantum, which was not perceived at the level of the homogeneous arenas.
This notwithstanding, a clearer manifestation that Table III.1 is indeed the correct
analogy is to study more closely the difference between unitary G-representations and
projective ray representations, while comparing it with the relation between strongly
Hamiltonian and Hamiltonian g-actions explored in the previous section. As we will
now see, the analysis is strikingly similar to that conducted in subsection III.2.1.b.
Recall: a unitary representation G U(H)U induces a ray representation
through the following diagram of groups
G U(H) AutU(PH) Aut(PH):U
U
p  (III.7)
This should be compared with diagram (III.4, page 256) defining strongly Hamilto-
nian actions: the morphism of groups U inducing the unitary ray representation U is
the quantum analogue of the classical infinitesimally equivariant co-momentum map
inducing the strongly Hamiltonian action H .
On the other hand, given a projective ray representation U of a Lie group, it is
always possible to construct a map U : G  ! U(H) by picking a representative for
each unitary operator ray U(g). However, in general U will fail to be a morphism of
groups (and hence a unitary G-representation). Indeed, the relation U(g)U(h) = U(gh)
implies only U(g)U(h) = m(g; h)U(gh), where m(g; h) 2 U(1). A map U verifying this
condition is called a projective representation of G on H. Projective ray representations
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are thus defined by the existence of the following diagram:
G U(H) AutU(H) Aut(PH):U
U
p  (III.8)
This is the quantum analogue of diagram (III.5, page 256) defining Hamiltonian actions,
and all the comments below it equally apply here.
Indeed, there are two key differences between diagrams (III.7) and (III.8). The
first obvious one—already mentioned—is that U fails to be a morphism of Lie groups
for general projective ray representations (in the same way that the co-momentum
map fails to be a morphism of Lie algebras for general Hamiltonian actions). The
second difference lies in the possible transits between the morphisms U and U. For
unitary ray representations, one can either: start from the data U and deduce the
data U (one defines it as U := p  U), or start from the unitary ray representation
and deduce the morphism U (the unitary representation on H is uniquely defined for
a unitary ray representation). This freedom of circulation breaks down for projective
ray representations: given a map G U ! U(H), the induced map p  U is no longer
guaranteed to be a morphism of Lie groups. Moreover, given a ray representation, one
cannot associate to it one single map G U ! U(H) but rather a class of such maps (the
representative U(g) of U(g) is not uniquely defined). In other words, whereas unitary
ray representations of G on PH and unitary representations of G on H are equivalent
(one can freely circulate between the two), the notion of ray representation is prior to
the “non-equivariant” map U (one must start from the data G U ! Aut(PH))55.
With this at hand, we can now describe the obstruction for projective ray repre-
sentations to be unitary56:
Theorem III.5. The second cohomology group of G with values in U(1) governs the
obstruction to have unitary ray representations. In other terms, any projective ray
representation is unitary if and only if H2(G;U(1)) = 0.57
55Notice how these last ten lines are, literally, a copy-paste of the paragraph following diagram
(III.5) on page 256.
56Again, I will develop part of the formalism in the footnotes in order to stress the general lines of
the investigation. All the mathematical details may be found in Landsman, op. cit., pp. 187–197.
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This is to be compared with Theorem III.2 (page 257). As in the classical case,
there are two possible strategies for bypassing this obstruction, each of them enforcing
the analogy between unitary (respectively projective) ray representations on the Quan-
tum side and strongly Hamiltonian (respectively Hamiltonian) actions on the Classical
side:
1. Absorb the obstruction by modifying the group C-algebra C(G). From the alge-
braic point of view, a projective representation of G on H is seen as arising from
a map
C(G) B(H)
which fails to be a morphism of C-algebras. Instead, one can modify the convo-
lution and involution products and define a new C-algebra in such a way that
57See ibid., Proposition III.1.5.2., p. 197. Given a diagram of the form (III.8), the failure of U to
be a morphism of Lie groups is measured by the function
m : GG  ! U(1)
(g; h) 7 ! m(g; h) := U(g)U(h)U(gh) 1
Because of the associativity of composition and the existence of an identity element in both G and
U(H)/U(1), the function m satisfies the properties
i) m(g; h)m(gh; k) = m(g; hk)m(h; k) for all g; h; k 2 G,
ii) m(e; g) = m(g; e) = 1 for all g 2 G.
A function m : G  G  ! U(1) satisfying these two properties is called a multiplier. The set of all
multipliers is denoted by Z2(G;U(1)).
But the map U is not uniquely determined by the projective ray representation (each U(g) is defined
up to an element of U(1)), and thus Z2(G;U(1)) still does not capture the obstruction to have unitary
ray representations. Indeed, consider a different choice: U 0(g) = b(g)U(g) with b(g) 2 U(1). Then,
we have




Two multipliers satisfying this equation are said to be equivalent. A multiplierm for which there exists
b : G  ! U(1) such that m(g; h) = b(gh)b(g)b(h) is said to be trivial and their set is denoted B2(G;U(1)).
The last equation shows that, whenever m is trivial, one can redefine the map U associated to the ray
representation U in such a way that U is a unitary representation.
Therefore, the object intrinsically associated to a given projective representation is an equivalence
class of multipliers—that is, an element of
H2(G;U(1)) := Z2(G;U(1))/B2(G;U(1)):
This is called the second cohomology group of G with values in U(1).
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the map  appears as a morphism of C-algebras58
C(G;m) B(H):










2. Absorb the obstruction by modifying the initial Lie group G. One reinterprets the
locus of the obstruction—that is, the second cohomology group H2(G;U(1))—as
the classifier of central extensions of G by U(1). Given a projective represen-
tation of G on H, this allows to construct a new Lie group Gm which has a
unitary representation on H60. From this perspective, we have the equivalence
58For the twisted group C-algebra C(G;m), the convolution and involution products are defined
as follows (see ibid., p. 202):





For two equivalent multipliers m and m0, the associated twisted group C-algebras are isomorphic.
59Ibid., Corollary III.1.7.5, p. 204.
60A central extension Gm of G by U(1) is a short exact sequence e ! U(1) ! Gm ! G ! e such
that, in addition, U(1) is contained in the center of Gm. This implies Gm is a U(1)-principal bundle
over G.
Two central extensions Gm and Gn are said to be equivalent if there exists an isomorphism of Lie
groups Gm  ! Gn such that the following diagram commutes
Gm
e U(1) G e
Gn
It can be shown that there is a one-to-one correspondence between equivalence classes of U(1)-central
extensions of G and the set H2(G;U(1)) of equivalence classes of multipliers on G (see Tuynman and
Wiegerinck, op. cit., proposition 3.4, p. 6).
Now, the construction of a unitary representation of a central extension of G from a projective ray
representation G U ! AutU (PH), may be captured in the following commutative diagram:
AutU (PH) U(H) U(1)
G Gm U(1)
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of notions61
projective ray representation
of G with multiplier m
unitary Gm-representation in
which the center acts trivially
Both strategies show that projective ray representations fall under the represen-
tation theory of JLB-algebras. Moreover, through the second move, the study of all
projective ray representations of a certain group G can be transformed into the prob-
lem of studying all unitary ray representations of G and its U(1)-central extensions, in
exact analogy with the translation of the question of studying all Hamiltonian g-actions
into the question of studying all strongly Hamiltonian actions of g and its R-central
extensions.
* * * * *
We have then arrived at the following two proposals:
Classical System 2. A classical system is characterized by a strongly Hamiltonian g-
action—that is, by the data of a triple Sg := (S; g; bJ), where S is an abstract symplectic
manifold, g is an abstract Lie algebra and bJ : g  ! C1(S;R) is a morphism of Lie
algebras called the (infinitesimally equivariant) co-momentum map.
Quantum System 2. A quantum system is characterized by a unitary (ray) G-
representation—that is, by the data of a triple HG := (H; G; U), where H is an ab-
stract Hilbert space, G is an abstract (Lie) group and U : G  ! U(H) is a morphism
of groups.
As it was the case for the first naive definitions proposed (cf. p. 139), we now
need to assess whether these more sophisticated versions may or may not be regarded
as acceptable candidates for the mathematical description of a physical system. In
particular, we need to understand whether or not these new abstract structures meet
the requirement of individuation (page 17).
Given the projective ray representation (in green), one constructs the central extension and its strongly
Hamiltonian action (in red) by pull-back. (Compare this discussion with footnote 38, page 259.)
61Landsman, op. cit., Proposition III.1.5.1.
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III.3 Introducing discernibility through groups (2):
the individuation problem
As we concluded at the end of the first chapter, to investigate the amount of
individuation within an abstract structure S one should study the action of the auto-
morphism group Aut(S)  S (cf. page 135). Therefore, our first task is to determine
the group of automorphisms for the structures HG and Sg. This turns out to be a
delicate matter, as we will presently see.
III.3.1 Identity and the group of automorphisms
III.3.1.a The quantum case
Let us start by discussing the situation in Quantum Kinematics. Perhaps, the
naive expectation would be the following: by passing from a bare abstract Hilbert
space H to a unitary G-representation HG, we reduce the group of automorphisms
from U(H) to U(G). Put differently, one could imagine that endowing an abstract
Hilbert space H with a morphism G U(H)U is a way of selecting, among all
available automorphisms (U(H)), those that are to be considered ‘physically meaning-
ful’ (U(G)). Since the problem with the quantum kinematical arena was, essentially,
that the group of automorphisms was too big—Aut(H)  PH is a transitive action—,
this reduction from U(H) to U(G) should then represent a step forward in dealing with
the problematic homogeneity of the space of states62.
A minute of reflexion shows however that the identity Aut(HG) = U(G) cannot
be true in general. To see this, simply consider the trivial representation, for which
U(G) = Id. This should be tantamount to not introducing the group at all, and
thus should have no impact on the homogeneity of the quantum space of states. Yet,
according to the above identity, by endowing an abstract Hilbert space with such a G-
representation, we would mysteriously pass from a completely homogeneous structure
62This was at leastmy initial expectation, as is manifest in my article “The Mathematical Description
of a Generic Physical System”, p. 346. And it certainly was quite a naive thought...
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where no elements can be individuated to a rigid structure where all elements can be
individuated: indeed, if Aut(HG) = U(G) were true, we would have Aut(HG) = Id for
the trivial representation.
This only shows that we must proceed with due care in the determination of
the group of automorphisms of the structure HG, which, in turn, should follow from
reflecting on the appropriate notion of morphism for this kind of structures. What is
then the good definition of the “category of unitary representations”? The following
definition is often found in the literature:
Definition III.6. The category URep(G) of G-unitary representations has G-
unitary representations (H; G; U) as objects and G-equivariant linear maps as mor-
phisms. In other words, a morphism (H; G; U) (H0; G; U 0) is given by a linear






Such a map is usually called an intertwiner between the unitary representations U and
U 063.
Given this definition, we see that an isomorphism of unitary G-representations
corresponds to the usual notion of equivalence. Therefore, conceived as an object of
the category URep(G), the group of automorphisms of the structure HG—sometimes
called the group of “symmetries of the unitary representation”64—is
AutURep(G)(HG) = fG-equivariant unitary operators of Hg: (III.9)
63For this definition (in the case of linear representations) see for example C. Procesi. Lie Groups:
An Approach through Invariants and Representations. New York: Springer, 2007, p. 12.
That this is a natural category to consider is further supported if one recalls that groups may
themselves be seen as categories (with only one object and all arrows being isomorphisms). Indeed,
from this perspective a unitary G-representation is a functor from G to Hilb and the obvious choice
for the category URep(G) should then be the category of functors HilbG where morphisms are natural
transformations between functors. But the definition of an intertwiner is precisely that of a natural
transformation between the functors U and U 0 and hence both definitions for the category URep(G)
coincide.
64Ibid., p. 3.
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This may be rephrased by remarking that an automorphism of the structure HG is
simply a unitary operator on H which commutes with any U(g). Thus, we can also
write:
AutURep(G)(HG) = centralizer of U(G) in U(H)65:
Let us explore some consequences of this result to evaluate its soundness. First, we
see that if G U(H)U is the trivial representation, then AutURep(G)(HG) = U(H)
and the homogeneity of the quantum space of states has not been broken whatsoever,
as it should be. Second, if U is an irreducible representation, the automorphism group
gets severely reduced: by Schur’s lemma we have AutURep(G)(HG) = U(1), which in turn
projects into the trivial group when passing to the projective space PH66. Therefore,
if Definition III.6 is correct, by considering irreducible unitary G-representations on H
instead of considering bare Hilbert spaces, we manage to pass from a transitive action
Aut(H)  PH to a trivial action Aut(HG)  PH. In this case, all states of the physical
system described by the structure HG are stable under the action of the automorphism
group and reveal themselves to be qualitatively discernible individuals, as we so wish.
There is a certain evident appeal in the fact that irreducible representations appear
as precisely those quantum structures satisfying the requirement of individuation. The
idea that quantum systems should be described by these particular structures cannot
but resonate with “Wigner’s definition” of quantum elementary particles as irreducible
unitary representations of the Poincaré group67. Unfortunately, there is—yet again—a




8s 2 S; gs = sg	. The centralizer is necessarily a group.
66Schur’s Lemma: Let G be a Lie group and consider an intertwiner  between two irreducible
unitary representations U and U 0. Then either  = 0 or  is an equivalence.
From this one concludes that any non-vanishing intertwiner of an irreducible representation with
itself must be proportional to the identity map. The proof of both results may be found in any book
on group representation theory. See for example A. W. Knapp. Lie Groups Beyond an Introduction.
2nd ed. Boston: Birkhäuser, 2002, p. 240.
67Although Wigner did not explicitly define elementary particles in this way, it is attributed to him.
This is discussed in some detail by Yuval Ne’eman and Shlomo Sternberg. They write:
Ever since the fundamental paper of Wigner on the irreducible representations of the
Poincaré group, it has been a (perhaps implicit) definition in physics that an elementary
particle “is” an irreducible representation of the group, G, of “symmetries of nature”.
(Y. Ne’eman and S. Sternberg. “Internal Supersymmetry and Superconnections”. In:
Symplectic Geometry and Mathematical Physics: Actes du colloque en l’honneur de Jean-
Marie Souriau. Ed. by P. Donato et al. Boston: Birkhäuser, 1991, pp. 326–354, p. 327.)
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serious problem with this idea.
Indeed, were it to be true, we would have at our disposal two drastically different
manners in which to conceive an abstract projective Hilbert space PHn. If, on the
one hand, one decides to consider an n-dimensional Hilbert space as an object of the
category Hilb, then PHn would appear as a homogeneous structure: the automorphism
group U(Hn) ' U(n) acts transitively on PHn. On the other hand, one could use the
fact that U(Hn) is represented on Hn (the representation being the tautological triple
(Hn; U(Hn); Id)) in order to perceive Hn as an object of the category URep(U(Hn)).
In this case, since the representation is obviously irreducible, its automorphism group
AutURep(U(Hn))(Hn) is simply U(1) and now Hn would show to be a rigid structure
whose automorphism group acts trivially on PHn. It would therefore appear that the
characteristics of the projective Hilbert space depend crucially on the choice of the
category to which it belongs. And this would be an embarrassing situation: if the
homogeneity of PH is not an intrinsic feature of the structure but depends on the
arbitrary choice of a point of view—should we see U(H)  H as the action of the
automorphism group on the structure defining the group, or rather as the irreducible
representation of the group U(H) on H?—then, the fundamental problem leading our
whole investigation—namely, the chase for individuation in the mathematical struc-
tures of Quantum Kinematics—suddenly disappears into thin air...
It seems that the only way out of this problem is to question the validity of
Equation III.9 and therefore of Definition III.6. To see what has gone wrong and
why URep(G) is not the correct category to consider for our inquiries, let us ask
the following question: when should we consider two abstract unitary representations
U;U 0 : G  ! U(H) to be equal? The usual ‘material’ set theoretical criterion of
identity would be:







But we know from section I.2 that this is not the correct answer when dealing with
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abstract Hilbert spaces. In this case, we need to take into account that the appropriate
notion of identity is isomorphism—this is the definition of an abstract structure68.
Thus, we get the more sophisticated answer:
U 0  U () 9 2 U(H) such that 8g 2 G;U 0(g) = U(g) 1







This of course is the notion of equivalence of unitary G-representations, which was also
the notion of isomorphism in the category URep(G). In this way, we see that this
latter category is intimately related to the choice of (III.11) as the proper criterion of
identity for unitary G-representations.
However, when dealing with an abstract unitary G-representation onH, we should
take into account not only the fact that the Hilbert space is abstract but also that the
group G is itself an abstract structure. And, as comparison of the diagrams (III.10)
and (III.11) clearly shows, neither of the two proposed criteria of identity includes this.
Indeed, in order to incorporate the abstract nature of the Hilbert space H, we passed
from the criterion of identity (III.10) to the criterion (III.11) by replacing the equality
U(H) = U(H) by the isomorphism U(H) ' U(H). Now, the same must be done with
the equality G = G. Therefore, it appears that the correct answer to the question
“When are two unitary representations U;U 0 : G  ! U(H) equal?” is then:
68Recall in particular Makkai’s claim that “isomorphism is the real equality in Abstract Mathemat-
ics” (see page 88).
69 Given a group G, any element g0 of the group gives rise to an automorphism g0 2 Aut(G)
through conjugation
 8g 2 G; g0(g) := g0g(g0) 1. Any such automorphism is called an inner
automorphism of the group. The set of all inner automorphisms forms a subgroup of Aut(G) denoted
by Inn(G). Given  2 U(H), I will denote by  2 Inn(UH)) the associated inner automorphism of
U(H).
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Criterion of identity for unitary representations. Given two unitary represen-
tations U and U 0 of an abstract group G on an abstract Hilbert space H, we have
U 0 ' U () 9(; ) 2 U(H) Aut(G) such that 8g 2 G;U 0((g)) = U(g) 1








Only in this way do we take into account the fact that both the Hilbert space H
and the external group G used to describe a quantum system are abstract structures71.
70Since this is not the usual criterion of identity used by mathematicians when working with group
representations, let me give an explicit example of two unitary representations which are not equivalent
but nonetheless should be, in my view, considered as essentially the same. Consider the following:
– G is the abelian abstract group f1; a; b; b 1g with the multiplication rules:
a2 = 1; b2 = (b 1)2 = a;
– U : G  ! U(1) is the one-dimensional unitary representation defined by
U(1) = Id; U(a) =  Id; U(b) = iId and U(b 1) =  i Id;
–  is the only possible non-trivial automorphism of G, namely that which exchanges b with b 1
while leaving 1 and a fixed.
Then, the new unitary representation U 0 = U   is simply the complex conjugate of U , which
is not equivalent to U . (Indeed, suppose there exists a linear map  : C  ! C such that









= iz, which is impossible.)
Therefore, from the standard point of view of representation theory, U and U 0 will be considered as
different representations. Yet, from an abstract structuralist point of view, the elements b and b 1 are
indiscernible. The group G is isomorphic to the group of complex numbers f1; 1; i; ig with the usual
multiplication, and the representations U and U 0 differ only in our arbitrary choice to equate b with i
or  i. They should then be considered as two different descriptions/presentations/coordinatizations
of the same situation.
I thank Christine Cachot for finding this example.
71It is enlightening to recast this discussion on the identity of unitary representations in the cate-
gorical language described in footnote 63 (page 276). From this perspective, the question is when to
consider the two functors U and U 0 equal. The first criterion of identity corresponds to considering
that two functors F1; F2 : C  ! D are equal whenever they coincide on objects and arrows:









But in category theory there is no sense of talking about equality of objects: the strongest claim one
can make about the identity on objects should be isomorphism. Therefore, in the above criterion
F1(C) = F2(C) should be replaced by F1(C) ' F2(C), and one should then demand the existence








. In other words,
one considers two functors to be equal whenever there exists a natural isomorphism between them.
Contrary to the naive criterion of identity, which considers the collection of functors DC to form a set,
this second criterion recognizes the fact that DC is a category.
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This motivates to look for a new category of unitary representations in which the
notion of isomorphism coincides with the criterion of identity (III.12). This is achieved
by rather considering a category where the group G is not fixed:
Definition III.7. The category URep of unitary representations has unitary repre-
sentations (H; G; U) as objects. A morphism (H; G; U) (H0; G0; U 0)(,) is given
by a linear map H H0 together with a morphism of groups G G0 such



















Let us again explore this result and compare it with the previous proposal (Equa-
tion III.9, page 276). First, if the unitary G-representation is the trivial one, then
AutURep(HG) ' U(H)  Aut(G). This is the expected result: considering the trivial
representation (H; G; U) should be equivalent to considering the pair of independent
However, this second criterion of identity corresponds to the criterion of Equation III.11, which we
have also rejected. Now, the problem is most clearly perceived. In a given category, contrary to what
happens with identity on objects, identity on morphisms (between two given objects) is primitive: it
is a matter of fact whether two arrows f; g : C  ! C 0 are or not equal. Put differently, in category
theory, the collection HomC (C;C 0) is described as a set. Therefore, by describing G as a category—
and thus describing the elements as arrows of the category—we lose the automorphisms of the group
and forget the idea that elements of the group might be indiscernible...
72In fact, this definition is a particular case of the so-called Grothendieck construction (I thank Zhen
Lin for pointing this to me). Given a functor F : C  ! Cat , the Grothendieck construction defines
the category  (F ), where objects are pairs (A; x) 2 Ob(C )Ob(F (A)) and morphisms f : (A; x)  !
(A0; x0) are pairs (f0; f1) where f0 2 HomC (A;A0) and f1 2 HomF (A0)(F (f0)x; x0).
The category URep is the Grothendieck construction for the functor F : Grpop  ! Cat which
associates to a group G the category URep(G).
In the case where the functor F lands in sets (considered as discrete categories), the category  (F )
is called the category of points of the functor F and is denoted by R F . This special case is discussed
in S. Mac Lane and I. Moerdijk. Sheaves in Geometry and Logic: A First Introduction to Topos
Theory. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992, pp. 41–44. For the general definition, see the Wikipedia
entry “Grothendieck construction”.
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structures (H; G). Therefore, the group AutURep(HG) should be the product of the
two automorphism groups. In particular, we see again that, by considering the trivial
representation, one does not break the homogeneity of the space of states.
Second—and this is the crucial difference between (III.9) and (III.13)—there is
now, for any unitary G-representation HG, a canonical morphism of groups
Q : G AutURep(HG): (III.14)
Indeed, the canonical map is simply the product Q := UInn, where G U(H)U
is the unitary map and G Aut(G)Inn is the map of inner automorphisms (cf.
footnote 69, page 279)73. In other words, in this new category, elements of the group
G invariably give rise to (non-trivial) automorphisms of the structure HG. Hence, the
existence of this canonical map may be perceived as a sophisticated version of the initial
naive expectation that the elements of the group G should be the automorphisms of
the structure HG (cf. page 275).
In this way, we see that even for an irreducible representation the group of au-
tomorphisms of HG will in general act non trivially on PH. In particular, we recover
the fact that for an abstract Hilbert space, even when seen as equipped with the ir-
reducible representation of U(H), its group of automorphisms acts transitively on PH
(since U(H)  AutURep(HU(H))).
III.3.1.b The classical case
Having dealt with the group of automorphisms of HG in quite some detail, it is
now a simpler task to transpose the discussion over to the Classical arena. As we have
learned, the problem is better dealt with if one addresses first the related issues of
determining: i) a criterion of identity for abstract strongly Hamiltonian g-actions, and
ii) the correct category sHam of strongly Hamiltonian actions associated to the chosen
criterion of identity.
73More explicitly, given an element g0 2 G, we have Q(g0) :=
 
U(g0); g0
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Following the case with unitary G-representations, there are again three possible
levels of identity one may consider. Two strongly Hamiltonian actions Sg := (S; g; bJ)
and S 0g0 := (S 0; g0; bJ 0) are said to be:
i) identical (denoted Sg = S 0g0) if8>>>><>>>>:
S = S 0
g = g0
8X 2 g; bJ(X) = bJ 0(X);
(III.15)
ii) equivalent (denoted Sg  S 0g0) if8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
S ' S 0
g = g0









iii) isomorphic (denoted Sg ' S 0g0) if8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
S ' S 0
g ' g0








74Instead of using the momentum maps, this third condition may also be written in terms of the
co-momentum maps bJ and bJ 0 as







75Similarly, in terms of the co-momentum map, this third condition becomes:
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These criteria are the three analogues of (III.10), (III.11) and (III.12) of the pre-
vious section. As noted, the first corresponds to the material set-theoretical identity
based on extensionality. Only the third one is a sensible criterion of identity for ab-
stract strongly Hamiltonian actions, where both the symplectic manifold S and the Lie
algebra g are conceived abstractly. The associated category of strongly Hamiltonian
actions is defined as follows:
Definition III.8. The category sHam of strongly Hamiltonian Lie algebra actions has
strongly Hamiltonian actions (S; g; bJ) as objects. A morphism (S; g; bJ) (S 0; g0; bJ 0)(,)
is given by a morphism of symplectic manifolds S S 0 (i.e., such that the pull-
back C1(S 0;R) C1(S;R) is a morphism of Poisson algebras) together with a







Finally, given this definition or the criterion of identity (III.17), the group of
automorphisms of the structure Sg shows to be
AutsHam(Sg) =
n










Again, one can readily see that, if the strongly Hamiltonian g-action g  (TS)!
integrates into a group action G Aut(S);L then the group elements give rise to
automorphisms of the abstract structure Sg. In other words, as it was the case for
abstract unitary representations, there exists, for any strongly Hamiltonian G-action,
a canonical morphism of groups
C : G Aut(Sg): (III.19)
It is given by C := LAd where G Aut(S)Ad is the adjoint action (cf. footnote
18, page 248): with this choice, the commutativity of the diagram in (III.18) for each
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C(g) amounts precisely to the definition of a strongly Hamiltonian G-action76.
III.3.2 The group-theoretical labelling scheme
The complete solution to the individuation problem (see page 243) for the abstract
structures Sg and HG may be seen as involving the two following aspects:
i) From the perspective of states, to understand which are the smallest subsets of
the space of states one can possibly expect to individuate. As we have already
discussed, this means to determine the orbits of the actions AutURep(HG)  PH
and AutsHam(Sg)  S.
ii) From the perspective of properties, to understand how does one construct specific
structural properties which allow to effectively define a labelling scheme that
distinguishes states.
Because of the existence of the two canonical morphisms G AutURep(HG)Q
(III.14, page 282) and G AutsHam(Sg)C (III.19, page 284), these two aspects
are related to the study of invariants of the group G.
III.3.2.a Quantum properties as labels of irreducible representations
In this respect, the most standard problem in linear representation theory is the
breaking of a unitary representation into its irreducible components. Recall: a unitary





i2I such that the total Hilbert space may be written as a direct sum of
these : H =L
i2I
Vi. Moreover, it is called completely reducible if the invariant subspaces
Vi are the smallest possible (i.e., they contain no non-trivial invariant subspaces). Said
differently, a unitary G-representation U is completely reducible whenever it is possible







which is the Co-equivariance condition of the momentum map (Definition III.3, page 247).
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to write it as a direct sum of irreducible representations: U = L
i2 bGUi. For compact Lie
groups, any unitary representation is completely reducible77, but in general this is not
the case.
The problem of breaking a unitary group representation into its irreducible compo-
nents undisputedly plays a crucial role in the description of quantum systems. Because
of the clear similarity of this problem with that of breaking the space of states into
the orbits of AutURep(HG)—the first seeks to write H as a direct sum of the smallest
possible invariant linear subspaces, while the second seeks to write PH as a union of the
smallest possible invariant subspaces—, one could be led to think that by finding the
decomposition of a unitary representation one solves problem i) above. However, the
similarity is misleading and the two problems are better kept apart: given a unitary rep-
resentation G U(H)U and the associated induced action G Aut(PH);U
the irreducibility of the former does not entail the transitivity of the latter78.
In fact, the role of irreducible representations is better understood when ap-
proached in relation to properties rather than states. Since the decomposition U =L
i2 bGUi is invariant under the equivalence relation, belonging to a particular irreducible
component of the abstract structure HG = (H; G; U) is a structural property which can
be used to distinguish some states of the system. Thus, in the group-theoretical ap-
proach to the kinematical description of quantum systems, the mathematical problem
of finding a parametrization of the unitary dual bG becomes the main road for building
a labelling scheme. In this way, it appears as quite natural a phenomenon for quantum
numbers to be “indices characterizing representations of groups” as was pointed out
by Hermann Weyl79.
77See for instance Knapp, loc. cit.
78This is easily seen by dimensional considerations: given a Hilbert space of dimension d, the
projective space PH, as a real manifold, has dimension 2(d   1). Now, while most Lie groups admit
irreducible unitary representations of any finite dimension, transitive actions must be at most of the
dimension of the Lie group. In other words, if 2d > dimG + 1, then it is impossible for the action
G  PH to be transitive. The converse statement is however true: if the action G Aut(PH)U
is transitive, then the irreducible representation from which it stems is irreducible.
79Weyl, op. cit., p. xxi.
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For our investigation, the important point is to understand the amount of discerni-
bility introduced into the quantum space of states through this group-representational
labelling scheme. In general, it is clear that, by simply indexing the various irreducible
representations of the abstract group G, one does not succeed in individuating most
states. There are two main reasons for this to be so. First, there is the dimensionality
of a given unitary irreducible representation: by singling out an irreducible compo-
nent Vi of the structure HG, one designates a submanifold of the quantum space of
states which is (2dimVi   2)–dimensional. Hence, unless Vi is one-dimensional, one
does not individuate in this way a point of the quantum space of states. An impor-
tant exception to this drawback is the case of abelian groups, for which any irreducible
unitary representation is necessarily one-dimensional. Abelian groups play hence an
important role in the labelling of states. But even in this latter case there is a second
source of indistinguishability: the eventual multiplicity of an irreducible component.
In the decomposition U = L
i2 bGUi, nothing prevents the same irreducible representa-
tion from appearing twice (or more), and, in order to clearly show this possibility, the




miUi; where mi 2 N: (III.20)
In such cases where mi /2 f0; 1g, there is no sense in which one can talk about the
linear subspace Vi  H that supports the irreducible representation Ui.
These issues are well perceived when looking at the paradigmatic example of the
group-representational labelling scheme in Quantum Mechanics—namely, the treat-
ment of spin states in relation to the abstract group SU(2). As it turns out, there
is exactly one unique irreducible representation of this group for any given dimension
d 2 N80. Hence, the unitary dual \SU(2) is parametrized by a single variable with
discrete integer values, which in physics is taken to be s := d 1
2
. Only for the case
s = 0 is this number enough to designate a state, since the representation is then
one-dimensional. For the remaining cases, more work needs to be done to individuate
a state. In the spirit of the representational labelling scheme, one considers a maximal
80Cf. M. R. Sepanski. Compact Lie Groups. New York: Springer, 2007, Theorem 3.32 p. 68.
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torus of SU(2)—that is, a connected abelian subgroup TX  SU(2) that has the prop-
erty of not being a subgroup of any other abelian subgroup of SU(2)—and decomposes
each irreducible representation of the whole group into irreducible representations of
the subgroup (which are also called ‘weights’). More specifically, one here takes
TX ' U(1), so that cTX ' Z. In this way, a second quantum number is constructed







Us;m is no other than the usual spin state js;mi: it denotes the unique one-dimensional
irreducible representation of U(1) labelled by m which is found inside the unique (2s+
1)-dimensional irreducible representation of SU(2).
Because the above involves the arbitrary choice of a subgroup of G, it could be felt
that this last construction does not comply with the abstract structuralist methodology
followed so far. And the objection would be valid if the definition of the quantum
number m relied on the ability to distinguish the specific maximal torus TX from all
others. Indeed, whenever the group G is conceived abstractly, any two maximal tori
TX and TY are structurally indiscernible: it is always possible to find an automorphism
g 2 Inn(G) such that g(TX) = TY 81. But the decomposition (III.21) is in fact
independent of the choice of the subgroup TX : all maximal tori of a compact Lie group
are isomorphic and the same weights will appear for any maximal torus82. Hence, the
definition of this second quantum property does not involve any specificity of some
particular maximal torus and can be considered a structural property of the abstract
structure HG.
In the best possible scenario, where all multiplicities appearing in (III.21) are
either 0 or 1, we therefore see how the labelling scheme succeeds in individuating
a ‘basis’ of states—that is, in constructing a complete set of commuting observables.
This is certainly the best situation which can be hoped for in the group-representational
81Ibid., Corollary 5.10.b), p. 101.
82T. Bröcker and T. tom Dieck. Representations of Compact Lie Groups. 1st ed. New York:
Springer, 1985, p. 184.
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approach to the kinematical description of a quantum system. However, it does not
automatically mean that the requirement of individuation is satisfied. Even in this
case, even when it is possible to individuate a family of states from which one can
generate the whole quantum space of states, there remain qualitatively indiscernible
states. That this is so may be counter-intuitive from the point of view of Hilbert
spaces: given a basis B of H, any element  2 H can be written in a unique way
as a linear combination of elements of B. This implies that, if a basis of vectors can
be individuated, then all elements of the Hilbert space can be as well. But—let us
not forget—a state is described by a ray, not by an element of the Hilbert space, and
the group-representational labelling scheme only achieves at best the individuation of
a ray. In this case, the amount of discernibility that is introduced into the quantum
space of states is therefore more difficult to grasp.
The simplest example of this phenomenon is the spin-1
2
quantum system, described












The choice of a maximal torus TX—or, equivalently, of a component of the spin SX—








i (‘spin down’), and any
other state results from a superposition of these two. Geometrically, the quantum
space of states P may be depicted as a sphere with two antipodal points pinned (Fig-
ure III.4)83. In this picture, it becomes clear that not all states have been individuated:
given the two poles, the intrinsic metric structure of the space of states only allows
to distinguish the different ‘parallels’ of the sphere but any two states lying in the
same ‘parallel’ are qualitatively indiscernible84. To further increase the amount of dis-
cernibility and finally individuate all states, it would be necessary to consider several
83Recall that, as real manifolds, one has PC2 ' S2. Moreover, states that are orthogonal in the
Hilbert space formulation are antipodal in the geometric formulation.
84For  2 [0; 2 ], the parallel P is defined as the subset of states lying at distance  from the statej 12 , 12 i (or, equivalently, at distance 2    from the state j 12 ,  12 i):
P :=












P can also be defined in more familiar form in terms of the probabilities of the measurement outcome
for the property SX as the subset of states such that Pr(SX = ~2 ) = 1  Pr(SX =  ~2 ) = cos2().
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different components of the spin. But this involves the consideration of various differ-
ent maximal tori and the ability to qualitatively distinguish them, which, as have we











Fig. III.4 – The space of states of the spin- 12 system.
The individuation of two antipodal states through the group-representational labelling
scheme only allows to distinguish the different ‘parallels’ (such as the green, blue and
red ones), but not the states within them.
III.3.2.b Classical properties as labels of transitive actions
When Weyl introduced the idea that quantum numbers could be seen as labels
characterizing irreducible representations, he seemed to be highlighting a characteristic
novelty of the Quantum. Yet, inspired by this group-representational labelling scheme,
one can attempt to build well-defined classical properties in a similar way. Given the
abstract structure HG = (H; G; U), the key in the above construction was to use the
morphism G U(H)U in order to produce a decomposition of the quantum space
of states which was also an invariant of the equivalence class [U ]. In the classical case,
where the abstract structure is now Sg = (S; g; bJ), one can use the momentum map to
write an analogous decomposition into qualitatively discernible subsets of states.
Given the map S g;J the most natural partition of S to consider is the
one defined by the equivalence relation
p  q () J(p) =g J(q); (III.22)
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where p and q are points in S. One can then write S = F
2g
J 1(). However, this
decomposition does not immediately yield the desired result, for two subsets J 1()
and J 1() are not necessarily qualitatively discernible. Indeed, this is the case only
if the elements  and  are themselves qualitatively discernible elements of g: if
there exists  2 Aut(g) such that () =  (in which case  and  are qualitatively
indiscernible), then there also exists  2 Symp(S) such that  J 1() = J 1() and
(; ) 2 AutsHam(Sg)85. Thus, to achieve a decomposition in the spirit of (III.20), in-
stead of considering the pre-images under the momentum map of the elements of the
abstract structure g, one should rather consider the pre-images of the smallest subsets
of g which can be individuated. If Ol  g is any such subset, then its pre-image
Sl := J
 1(Ol)  S will be also be a qualitatively discernible subset of the space of
states.
The study of the amount of discernibility introduced into the classical space of
states by endowing it with a strongly Hamiltonian g-action involves therefore a study
of the amount of discernibility intrinsic to the abstract Poisson manifold g. Luckily,
the latter is easily determined, for it is simply given by the symplectic decomposition
of g. Any finite-dimensional Poisson manifold P can be written as a disjoint union
of symplectic manifolds, called the symplectic leaves of P , which can be viewed as
maximal sets of points that are connected by a piecewise smooth Hamiltonian curve86.
In particular, this means that for any two points of a symplectic leave there exists
an automorphism of P relating them. Hence, a symplectic leave of g is precisely a
maximal set of points that are qualitatively indiscernible.
In this way, we arrive at the following scheme: given the structure Sg = (S; g; bJ),





85Take  = Ad(g) for some g 2 G. We know that  L(g); Ad(g) 2 AutsHam(Sg) (see footnote 76
page 285). Moreover, because of the equivariance of the momentum map , for any p 2 J 1() and
any q 2 J 1() we have J L(g)p) =  and J L(g 1)q) = . Hence, L(g) J 1() = J 1().
86See Landsman, op. cit., Definition I.2.4.3 and Theorem I.2.4.7, pp. 70-71 (and also herein Chapter
II, page 227).
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where Sl is the pre-image under the momentummap of the symplectic leaveOl. In other
words, this new partition of the space states arises from considering the equivalence
relation
p  q () [J(p)] =g/Aut(g) [J(q)] (III.24)
instead of the equivalence (III.22) taken initially. The subsets Sl thus obtained have
no reason to be symplectic submanifolds of the space of states87. Now, the label l,
which runs over the set of symplectic leaves of g, can effectively be used to distinguish
states of the classical system described by Sg. In this way, one achieves the structural
construction of a classical number that is an ‘index characterizing a symplectic leaf of
g’.
This is indeed similar to Weyl’s insight on quantum numbers, but perhaps not
quite as much as expected. By following the analogy of Table III.1 (page 266), one
would have surely conjectured the classical analogue of Weyl’s ‘quantum numbers as
indices characterizing representations of groups’—if any—to be: ‘classical numbers as
indices characterizing actions of Lie algebras’. Nonetheless, with a little more work, it
is possible to reformulate the above construction in exactly those terms.
The first step in this direction is to find the classical analogue of irreducible uni-
tary representations. Recall: in the Quantum  ! Classical comparison, unitary
G-representations correspond to strongly Hamiltonian g-actions, in particular because
the former are equivalent to representations of the JLB-algebra JL(G) while the lat-
ter are equivalent to representations of the Poisson algebra C1(g;R) (see pages 267
87 However, it is not difficult to construct new symplectic manifolds from the subsets Sl (although
these will not be submanifolds of the space of states). Because S gJ is a Poisson map, the
entire g-orbit through an arbitrary point p 2 Sl will be contained in Sl. For any subspace Sl, one can
therefore consider its space of g-orbits, denoted Sl/g. If the g-action is ‘sufficiently well-behaved’, the
space Sl/g is a manifold, in which case it can be proven to be a symplectic manifold. This construction
is called the Marsden-Weinstein symplectic reduction and was introduced in their joint article J. E.
Marsden and A. Weinstein. “Reduction of Symplectic Manifolds With Symmetry”. In: Reports on
Mathematical Physics 5.1 (1974), pp. 121–130.
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and 252). Moreover, irreducible unitary group representations are equivalent to ir-
reducible representations of JL(G). Therefore, the classical analogue of irreducible
G-representations are those g-actions induced by irreducible Poisson representations
of C1(g;R). With no surprise, these correspond to transitive strongly Hamiltonian
g-actions88.
88A Poisson representation C1(g;R) C1(S;R)J is said to be irreducible if, for any p 2 S,
the composite map C1(g;R) C1(S;R)  (TS)H TpSJ
 v  evp is surjective. This means
that all the infinitesimal transformations at any given point of S can be generated by elements of
C1(g;R) (see Landsman, op. cit., Definition I.2.6.6 p. 78).
On the other hand, a g-action g  (TS) is said to be transitive if, for any p 2 S, the
composite map g  (TS) TpS
evp is surjective (see Alekseevsky and Michor, op. cit., p. 6).
I have not been able to find in the mathematical literature a proof of the equivalence “irreducible
representations of C1(g;R)” () “transitive strongly Hamiltonian g-actions” to which I could refer
the reader. So, for completeness, here it is:










The goal is to prove: jp surjective () Jjp surjective.
=) : It is a particular case of the fact that, if f  g is surjective, then so is f .
(= : We wish to show that for all vp 2 TpS there exists X 2 g such that jp(X) = vp. In other
words, we want !(vp; ) = !(jp(X); ).
By definition, we have !((X); ) = dJ( ~X), where ~X  i(X). Moreover, J( ~X)(p) = J(p)(X)
where J : S  ! g is the momentum map. Hence, dJ( ~X) = d(hJ;Xi) = hdJ;Xi.
Let fX1; : : : ; Xng be a basis of g, and f1; : : : ; ng the associated dual basis. With this choice, one
can write J = Jkk where Jk : S  ! R, and therefore dJ = dJkk where dJk 2 
1(S;R). Then, for
X = xkXk 2 g, we have
!((X); ) = dJkxk:
On the other hand, since by hypothesis Jjp is surjective, there must exist f 2 C1(g;R) such that
!(vp; ) = !(Jjp(f); ) = dJ(f)

p





































and X := xkXk (so that xk 2 R and X 2 g), the last
equation may be rewritten as
!(vp; ) = dJk

p
xk = !(jp(X); ): 
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Second, one uses the following key result due to Kostant:
Theorem III.6 (Kostant’s Coadjoint Orbit Covering Theorem). Consider a transitive
strongly Hamiltonian action g  S. Then, S must be symplectomorphic to a symplectic
leaf of g or to a covering space of one.89
Put differently, Kostant’s theorem shows that the symplectic leaves of g classify
all the possible transitive strongly Hamiltonian g-actions. Under this light, the classical
decomposition (III.23) appears to be somewhat analogous to the quantum decompo-
sition (III.20), in the sense that it describes which transitive g-actions show up in the
structure Sg90. In addition, the classical label l receives a new interpretation and we
can now claim:
In the same way that the values of quantum properties can be seen
as labels characterizing irreducible unitary representations of groups,
the values of classical properties can be seen as labels characterizing
transitive strongly Hamiltonian actions of Lie algebras.
Let us close this discussion by exhibiting the example of the group SU(2), as
we did in the previous section. In the present approach for introducing individuality
89The theorem is more commonly stated in terms of left transitive strongly Hamiltonian G-actions
and Co-adjoint orbits (hence the name). See for example Marsden and Ratiu, op. cit., p. 463.
The reason why I have chosen this ‘unconventional’ formulation is because it involves no group
action whatsoever—it only involves g. By the same token, it emphasizes that only the infinitesimal
information is relevant. It is taken from Landsman, op. cit., Corollary III.1.4.7, p. 195 (combined
with Theorem III.1.4.4).
90Notwithstanding this, (III.23) is not the complete analogue of (III.20). What is missing here is
the equivalent of the multiplicities mi appearing in (III.20), which would describe the number of times
a given transitive action appears in the initial action g  S. Victor Guillemin and Shlomo Sternberg
have done some remarkable work in trying to determine the classical analogue of these multiplicities.
The kernel of their idea is that the multiplicities mi are intimately related to the symplectic manifolds
Sl/g of the Marsden-Weinstein symplectic reduction (cf. footnote 87). This is captured in their famous
conjecture that ‘quantization commutes with reduction’, which has subsequently played an important
role in the mathematical foundations of quantization. The conceptual implications of their ideas have
been explored in much detail by Gabriel Catren. See V. Guillemin and S. Sternberg. “Geometric
Quantization and Multiplicities of Group Representations”. In: Inventiones Mathematicae 67 (1982),
pp. 515–538, G. Catren. “On the Relation Between Gauge and Phase Symmetries”. In: Foundations of
Physics 44 (2014), pp. 1317–1335 and also N. P. Landsman. “Quantum Mechanics and Representation
Theory: the New Synthesis”. In: Acta Applicandae Mathematica 81.1 (2004), pp. 167–189.
The main reason why I do not discuss more closely these ideas is mainly because I unfortunately
still do not master the mathematical technique of these works well enough to see the forest and not
the trees.
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into Classical Kinematics, only the infinitesimal information of the group is relevant.
Hence, it does not matter whether one considers SU(2) or SO(3) since they have the
same Lie algebra: su(2) ' so(3). As a vector space, one has so(3) ' R3, but as a






Therefore, transitive strongly Hamiltonian actions of so(3) are classified by one con-
tinuous parameter which can take any positive real value. The space of states of the
classical system described by (S; so(3); bJ) can be written as the disjoint union of the
pre-images of these spheres and the resulting subsets of states, which we denote by
Sr
92, will be qualitatively individuated by the value of the radius r. The classical
property that, to any state p 2 S, associates the value r of the subset Sr to which
it belongs, is the magnitude of angular momentum. This explains the fact that in
Classical Mechanics the possible values of angular momentum form a continuous set,
contrary to the case of Quantum Mechanics where they form a discrete set. In general,
the subsets Sr will contain more than one state, so this construction will again not
suffice to individuate single states and further techniques need to be considered.
III.4 Conclusion
As pointed out by several authors, the description of a physical system cannot
involve only the fundamental kinematical structures discussed in Chapter II. Because
these are homogeneous abstract structures, the description must involve “further geo-
metrical structure on the space of states” (Brody and Hughston) that allow to define
a “labelling scheme” (Segal) and answer the question of how to specify the particular
element of the algebra of properties which is to “represent a given physical quantity”
(Dickson). This problem applies likewise to the Classical and Quantum formalisms
91By ‘3-dimensional sphere’ I mean of course spheres which can be embedded in R3. Hence, a 3-
dimensional sphere is, in fact, a 2-dimensional manifold. In local angle coordinates  and ' (polar angle
and azimuthal angle), the symplectic 2-form of the sphere S2r of radius r writes ! = r sin()d ^ d'.
92Here the notation becomes tricky: S2r  so(3) and Sr = J 1(S2r )  S are not the same object!
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and the mechanisms used to address it are also extremely similar in both cases. In
this chapter, the goal was to discuss some of the underlying mathematical techniques
used to specify physical properties and label states, introducing in this way a certain
amount of discernibility into the Classical and Quantum arenas. The form of exposi-
tion has been chosen such that it highlights the resemblances of both Kinematics (see
Table III.2, page 298).
As we have explained in Section III.1, the general strategy for endowing the
kinematical description with further structure is what could be called a ‘represen-
tational approach’: one considers external structures E which have no a priori relation
to the fundamental kinematical structures K, and then looks for possible morphisms
 between them. In the case of groups, the central objects in Quantum and Clas-
sical Kinematics are respectively unitary representations—that is, group morphisms
G U(H)—andU strongly Hamiltonian actions—that is, Lie algebra morphisms
g C1(S;R):bJ But these are not the only possible choices. In fact, they are not
even the most natural ones to consider from the point of view of states: indeed, the
first guess would have been to consider morphisms from the external abstract group
to the automorphisms of the space of states—in other words, to consider Poisson ac-
tions in Classical Kinematics and ray representations in Quantum Kinematics. One
is hence confronted with the question of why strongly Hamiltonian actions and uni-
tary representations play such a prominent role in the construction of the kinematical
descriptions (representation problem).
I propose that this is intimately related to the fundamental two-fold role of phys-
ical properties highlighted in Chapter II. While both Poisson actions and strongly
Hamiltonian actions allow to distinguish a specific subset of state transformations,
only the latter allow to perceive these transformations as being generated by physical
properties. With hindsight, this can even be considered to be the definition of strongly
Hamiltonian actions: it is a morphism that takes abstract infinitesimal transforma-
tions and represents them unambiguously as classical properties-as-transformations.
Exactly the same remark applies to unitary representations, which can be seen as
morphisms taking abstract transformations and representing them unambiguously as
quantum properties-as-transformations. This last point is best seen with the remark
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that a unitary representation is the same as a strongly Hamiltonian action on PH which,
moreover, is isometric (i.e. respects the additional geometric structure of the Quantum,
see Section II.2.2). In sum, morphisms G U(H)U and g C1(S;R)bJ are
the cornerstones in this approach to the kinematical descriptions because they respect
the roles of properties-as-transformations and properties-as-quantities.
With the objects Sg = (S; g; bJ) and HG = (H; G; U) taken now as initial data, the
question becomes to understand in what manner this move allows to effectively break
the homogeneity of the Classical and Quantum arenas (individuation problem). Since
these structures ought to be considered abstractly, it is necessary to first establish their
correct criterion of identity. I claim that neither the usual set-theoretic identity, based
on extensionality, nor the widely used notion of equivalence of group representations are
acceptable candidates, for they both fail to take into account that both the fundamental
kinematical structure and the external group are abstract. I then propose a novel
criterion of identity, which applies in general to any type of morphisms between abstract
objects: given any two such morphisms E K and E 0 K0 in the category
C , one should ask
 =C 







Only with this choice, do the elements of the abstract group G give rise to auto-
morphisms of the structures HG and Sg. In this way, the individuation problem relates
to the study of invariant subspaces. The decomposition of a unitary representation
into irreducible components appears then as an intrinsic feature of the structure HG,
insofar as it is an invariant of the criterion of identity, and the labels of these compo-
nents allow to define a well-specified physical property. In Classical Kinematics, the
symplectic decomposition of the Poisson manifold g allows an analogous construction,
but the labels refer now to transitive strongly Hamiltonian actions.
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Absorption central extensions of g by R central extensions of G by U(1)
Table III.2 – Classical and Quantum Kinematics compared from a group-
theoretical perspective.
Conclusion
The idea of a Chase for Individuation was launched by the remark of a conceptual
tension between a certain ‘abstract way’ of conceiving mathematical structures, which
shows up mainly in mathematical physics, and some general features of the theoretical
discourse used in the handling of Mechanics. For indeed, when the basic mathematical
structures involved in Classical and Quantum Kinematics are conceived abstractly an
unambiguous designation of their elements becomes problematic. Given an abstract
Hilbert space or an abstract symplectic manifold, it is impossible to find a “conceptual
fixation of points [...] that would enable one to reconstruct any point when it has been
lost”93. This failure to single out elements of the structures which ought to describe
the space of states or the algebra of observables of a physical system evidently clashes
with the practice. The theoretical discourse is plagued with expressions referring to
specific properties or states: the energy function H, the norm p2 of the classical linear





fact, little could be said in Mechanics without this capacity to designate particular
elements of the structures involved. But in the abstract approach, how is one to
understand which, among all elements, is the mathematical representative f of the
physical property f being considered? Since there is no question of appealing to a
demonstrative act—as if the elements were standing in front of our eyes and one could
declare: ‘take this element right here’—, the only reasonable stance is to consider
a central task of mathematical physics to propose mechanisms of designation which
allow to convey a precise meaning to those referential expressions while at the same
time remaining faithful to the abstract method.
93H. Weyl. Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science. Trans. by O. Helmer. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 75.
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This is the central problem of this thesis but the conceptual setting in which it
becomes meaningful requires a great deal of clarifications. In particular, because it
relies so heavily on the abstract way of conceiving Hilbert spaces, symplectic manifolds
and the like, the first chapter was entirely devoted to elucidating this conception and
justifying its importance for Kinematics. In this spirit, the example of the equivalence
between Schrödinger’s Wave Mechanics and Göttingen’s Matrix Mechanics was used
to indicate that below a certain level of specification the details of the mathematical
construction have no relevance for the Physics and can therefore be omitted. Von
Neumann showed that the development of both theories relied only on the Hilbert
space structure of L2(R) and l2(N) and proposed to consider abstract Hilbert spaces as
the starting point of the mathematical formulation of Quantum Mechanics. Although
he did not explain in which precise way an abstract Hilbert space H was to differ
from a particular Hilbert space, the crucial point in his methodology was to consider
H as an independent and autonomous entity: von Neumann’s precept was indeed to
avoid any coordinatization and ‘work directly with the abstract entity itself ’. To arrive
at the conclusion that the physical content of a theory is better grasped when one
avoids superfluous technical specifications and works abstractly, I could have very well
used other examples in the practice of theoretical physics. I think in particular of
the description of spacetime by abstract Riemannian manifolds in General Relativity.
This is certainly a situation worth discussing but it involves the quicksands of general
covariance and diffeomorphism invariance, whose clarification would have taken us too
far apart from Mechanics, and I decided to leave that exploration for future work94.
The next step was to clarify von Neumann’s core distinction between particular
and abstract entities. Abstraction is a widely discussed topic in the philosophy of
mathematics, but it is often viewed as a process starting from the consideration of
entities of a certain kind and leading to the consideration of entities of a new kind.
94The classic reference for this subject is J. D. Norton. “General Covariance and the Foundations
of General Relaitivity: Eight Decades of Dispute”. In: Reports on Progress in Physics 56 (1993),
pp. 791–858. For a discussion of this in the context of Abstract Mathematics (in the sense of Makkai),
see M. Shulman. “Homotopy Type Theory: A Synthetic Approach to Higher Equalities”. In: arXiv
preprint (2016). url: http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.05035.
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With the notable exception of Marquis’ work, the problem of understanding the par-
ticular/abstract distinction for entities of the same kind seems to be better treated in
the context of mathematical structuralism. Therein, the position which insists in con-
sidering abstract structures as autonomous entities rather than as convenient linguistic
tools for expressing generalizations over particulars is called ante rem or sui generis
structuralism. Nonetheless, instead of analyzing this form of structuralism from the
outset, I decided in my exposition to focus first on abstraction and only afterwards on
structuralism. In this way, one clearly perceives which challenges to the abstract con-
ception of structures are inherited from the general problem of abstraction and which
are specific to structuralism. The upshot of the first discussion was that the handling
of different well-defined levels of abstraction is achieved through a complex hierarchy
of identities, where isomorphisms play a crucial role. With the consideration of a new
criterion of identity, properties which appeared to be invariant at one level become
intrinsic properties at the new level, and it is this feature that gives autonomy to the
newly defined abstract entity. On the other hand, it is characteristic of the mathemat-
ical method of structuralism to always consider entities which are sets endowed with
relations. An important challenge in this setting is then to understand the nature of the
elements of an abstract structure, and in particular the means allowing to differentiate
them. Through the analysis of the so-called ‘problem of identity of structural indis-
cernibles’, we arrived at the conclusion that abstract structures are better conceived as
structured types endowed with an ungrounded primitive typed identity. This in turn
allowed us to finally give a precise meaning to the Chase for Individuation: to ask for
an ‘unambiguous designation of the elements of the abstract structure S’ means to be
able to reconstruct the primitive typed identity of S by means of structural properties.
The second chapter started initially as a small branch in the unfolding of the Chase
for Individuation, but it eventually grew to the point of becoming a second trunk of this
work. In my view, it contains the most important idea of the thesis—which is borrowed
from the work of Gabriel Catren—namely: that the general relation between functions
and transformations enabled by the presence of a symplectic structure on the space of
states is to be viewed as a constitutive ingredient in the definition of both classical and
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quantum properties. Any physical property certainly has a quantitative dimension.
But it also possesses a transformational one, and the physical interpretation of a given
quantity should not be separated from the study of the transformations it generates.
The second chapter thematized this twofold role and investigated the precise articu-
lation between the two dimensions. Under the focus of this question, many features
of the mathematical formalisms of Classical and Quantum Kinematics shone with a
different light, and we reached a new understanding of some of the crucial differences
between the two theories. Indeed, the claim was that the Quantum exhibits a com-
patibility between properties-as-quantities and properties-as-transformations which is
lacking in the Classical.
In the standard formulation of both Kinematics, one could already remark that
Jordan-Lie algebras—i.e., algebras endowed with two products, one commutative (Jor-
dan) and one anti-commutative (Lie)—offer a common language in which to describe
the algebras of both classical and quantum properties. Here, the sole difference be-
tween the two lies in the associativity (Classical) or non-associativity (Quantum) of
the Jordan product. Yet, a conceptual reading of what this means was not obvious.
In this respect, the geometrical reformulation of Quantum Mechanics in terms of Her-
mitian symmetric spaces—which have, in particular, a symplectic and a Riemannian
structure—offered some remarkable insights. Above all, there was the rigorous result
that, indeed, physical properties are defined by their twofold role: in both theories,
physical properties are described precisely by those functions over the space of states
whose associated Hamiltonian vector field is an infinitesimal state transformation. This
is trivial in Classical Kinematics but it also manages to characterize self-adjoint opera-
tors in Quantum Kinematics. Moreover, there was the surprising observation that the
numerical values of quantum properties-as-quantities describe the behavior of quantum
properties-as-transformations. More precisely, the indeterminacy f of a property f
equals the norm of the Hamiltonian vector field associated to it.
This appeared as the first indication of a distinctive trait of the Quantum realm
in the way the two roles of properties are articulated, but in order to reach a better
understanding of this phenomenon it was necessary to examine as well the algebraic
formulation of Quantum Mechanics in terms of C-algebras or real JLB-algebras. By
Conclusion 303
studying the transitions from the algebra of properties to the space of states and vice
versa, we finally hit upon the common geometric language describing both the classical
and quantum spaces of states. This was the language of uniform Poisson spaces with a
transition probability. The two geometric structures of the space of states mirror the
two algebraic structures of the algebra of properties and the whole is a manifestation
of the two roles of properties. In my view, the key result in this formulation was
Landsman’s characterization of quantum space states as those uniform Poisson spaces
with a transition probability for which the symplectic leaves coincide with the sectors
of the transition probability function. I interpreted as showing that the Quantum
distinguishes itself from the Classical by the following consistency condition between
the twofold role of properties: the discernibility introduced into the space of states
by properties-as-transformations must not differ from the discernibility induced by
properties-as-quantities.
After this long analysis of the mathematical structures constituting the arenas for
Classical and Quantum Kinematics, the third and final chapter returned to the Chase
for Individuation proper. In it we showed how many of the mathematical develop-
ments in the dealing of groups in Classical and Quantum Mechanics could indeed be
understood as constituting a program for introducing discernibility into the homoge-
neous kinematical structures. By considering abstract morphisms of Lie groups and
Lie algebras which respect the twofold role of physical properties, this program suc-
ceeds in unambiguously designating certain properties. In Classical Kinematics, the
intrinsic symplectic decomposition of the abstract Poisson manifold g allows to view
classical properties as labels characterizing transitive strongly Hamiltonian actions. In
Quantum Kinematics, on the other hand, the decomposition of an abstract unitary
representation into irreducible components allows to view quantum properties as la-
bels characterizing irreducible unitary representations. In this abstract constructive
approach to the kinematical description of physical system, groups therefore appeared
as a fundamental tool to introduce a notion of difference into the space of states and
the algebra of properties. This does not contradict in any way the traditional view
on groups as describing symmetries, since the states related by the group action are
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among those that this method of differentiation does not succeed in distinguishing.
However, the ‘sameness’ of that which is related by a symmetry is not to be viewed as
a consequence of the introduction of the group but rather as remnant of the underlying
homogeneity of the fundamental kinematical structures.
Now, the consideration of groups is not the only strategy for introducing discerni-
bility into the Classical and Quantum kinematical arenas. The Chase for Individuation
offers a perspective from which one could attempt to understand many other develop-
ments in the mathematical foundations of Mechanics. An important example is the
theory of systems of imprimitivity developed by the american mathematician George
Mackey in the 1950’s, which can be viewed as an elucidation of the mathematical
structures lurking behind the labelling scheme that differentiates linear momentum
and position. Instead of taking groups as the additional external structure to con-
sider, this theory explores representations of groupoids. Therein, a quantum system is
described by a unitary representation of an action Lie groupoid GnE, whereas a clas-
sical system is described by a Poisson representation of an action Lie algebroid gnE95.
Again, one perceives the idea, already hinted at in the group-theoretical approach, that
the transition from Classical to Quantum Kinematics involves a phenomenon of inte-
gration from infinitesimal to global transformations. This is an interesting path worth
further investigation.
95This groupoid-theoretical view on systems of imprimitivity is presented in N. P. Landsman. “Lie
Groupoids and Lie Algebroids in Physics and Noncommutative Geometry”. In: Journal of Geometry
and Physics 56.1 (2006), pp. 24–54. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/math-ph/0506024.
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-transformations, 5, 145, 155, 162,
174, 176, 184, 198, 230, 255, 296,
302
pure states, 207, 212, 213, 223
qualitatively discernible individuals, 134,
236, 289, 291
quantization, 1, 11, 12, 135, 153, 186, 196,
204, 230, 267, 304
quantum
g-representation, 263
compatibility of Poisson and
transition probability structures,
228
interplay of quantities and
transformations, 184, 205, 229
logic, 193
Poisson bracket, 24
state reduction, 3, 6






realization of a Poisson manifold, 252
Relational Principle of Identity, 111, 113,
115
relative discernibility (Quine’s), 110
representation of
a C-algebra, 208, 210, 273
a group, see group representation
a JLB-algebra, 208, 273, 297
a Lie algebra, 245
a Poisson algebra, 252, 297
representation problem, 243, 296, 297
requirement of individuation, 17, 88, 105,
135, 136, 243, 274, 277
Riemannian
bracket, 180
metric, 170, 179, 180, 185, 220, 232
sphere, 190
rigid structure, 67, 108, 276, 278
schematic nature, 56, 70, 88
Schrödinger
cat, 6
equation, 4, 6, 30, 36
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equation (time-independent), 29, 31,
47, 50
Schur’s lemma, 217, 277
sector, 227
short exact sequence, 251
sketches, 83
spectrum
of a commutative C-algebra, 217
of a non-commutative C-algebra, 218
spin, 239, 287, 290
states (algebraic approach), 207, 210
stationary states, 21, 29, 31
Steinitz’s theorem, 117
Stone’s theorem, 157, 263
strict deformation quantization, 13
strongly Hamiltonian





sets, see abstract sets
structuralism (mathematical method of),
97, 137, 301
Structuralist Foundation of Abstract
Mathematics, 123
superposition principle, 166, 167, 187,
190, 229, 289
symplectic
2-form, 147, 151, 153, 172, 174, 232
decomposition of a Poisson space,
174, 220, 291, 295, 297, 303
gradient, 151, 180
leaves, 227, 228, 229, 267, 291, 294,
303
manifold, 147
symplectomorphism, 147, 170, 246
systems of imprimitivity, 55, 304
time-reversal operator, 265
transformation theory, 42, 49
transition probability, 183, 220, 221, 226,
232, 265
space, 220
transitive strongly Hamiltonian actions,
293, 297, 304
trivial representation, 276, 282
two-fold role of physical properties, 5, 144,
152, 177, 214, 229, 230, 255, 296,
297, 302
two-sphere property, 191, 229
type theory, 84, 120, 121, 123
type-to-token relation, 122, 123
uniqueness of kind, 56, 68, 88
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Univalent Foundations Program, 120
valuation, 154
vector states, 209, 210
von Neumann algebra, 46
von Neumann’s
ordinals, 62, 85, 123
wave-function ontology, 37
weak discernibility (Quine’s), 110
weights, 288
Weinstein’s symplectic category, 246
Weyl algebra, 213
Wigner’s theorem, 264




E F Injection of E in F (monomorphism)
E F Projection of E onto F (epimorphism)
HomC (E;F ) Set of arrows from E to F in the category C
Groups
G;H; : : : Abstract (Lie) groups
g; h; : : : Abstract Lie algebras
g; h; : : : Dual space of g; h (space of linear functionals)
G  E (or g  E) left action of G (or g) on E
E 	 G (or E 	 g) right action of G (or g) on E
Ad Adjoint action of G on g
Co Co-adjoint action of G on gbG Set of equivalence classes of irreducible unitary G-representations
Hilbert spaces
H Abstract Hilbert space
HG Abstract Hilbert space equipped with a unitary G-representation
h; i Hermitian product on H
PH Abstract projective Hilbert space
SH Unit sphere (vectors of norm 1 in H)
U(H) Unitary operators on H
B(H) C-algebra of bounded operators on H
BR(H) Real Jordan-Lie algebra of bounded self-adjoint operators
BiR(H) Real Jordan-Lie algebra of bounded anti-self-adjoint operators
 Composition of operators
[; ]+ (or 2•) Anti-commutator (Jordan product)
[; ] (or 2i ?) Commutator (Lie product)
C-algebras
U Abstract C-algebra
UR Abstract Jordan-Lie algebra (real part of a U)
S(U) Space of states
P(U) Space of pure statesbU Set of equivalence classes of irreducible representations of U
Cycl (U) Set of equivalence classes of cyclic representations of U
Functions
C(M;C) Continuous complex-valued functions on M
C0(M;C) Continuous complex-valued functions vanishing at infinity
C1(M;R) Smooth real-valued functions on M
Symplectic
(S; !) Abstract manifold S with symplectic two-form !
333
334 Symbols
Sg Abstract symplectic manifold with a strongly Hamiltonian g-action
f  g Pointwise multiplication of the functions f and g
f; gS or f; g Poisson bracket on S
 (TS)! Vector fields preserving the symplectic structure
 (TS)H Hamiltonian vector fields
C1(S;R) v   !  (TS)H Symplectic gradient
C1(S;R)K Smooth functions whose associated Hamiltonian vector field
preserves the Kinematical structures

n(S) Differential n-forms on S
J : S ! g momentum mapbJ : g! C1(S;R) co-momentum map
Varia
Sn Sphere in n+ 1-dimensions
@S boundary of the manifold S
V  Topological dual of the vector space V
